release v2.7.2

Production logs INFO to stdout: docker logs tatlock becomes a real
diagnostic surface for the first time.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

.pql/changelog/ticket_history/2026-09.sql

@@ -1,2 +1,9 @@
 INSERT INTO ticket_history (ticket_record_id, field, old_value, new_value, changed_by, changed_at, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G99D07EM5DZWTS0WD9V8PSKM', 'status', 'backlog', 'in_progress', NULL, '2026-09-12 13:50:48', '2026-09-12 13:50:48.289', '2026-09-12 13:50:48.289', NULL, '2e88d155325b3e704787f48b2aa97591', 2) ON CONFLICT(hash) DO NOTHING;
 INSERT INTO ticket_history (ticket_record_id, field, old_value, new_value, changed_by, changed_at, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G99D07EM5DZWTS0WD9V8PSKM', 'status', 'in_progress', 'done', NULL, '2026-09-12 14:13:29', '2026-09-12 14:13:29.027', '2026-09-12 14:13:29.027', NULL, '5b9dd9a62002db0fb4dc58f7f9ffcbb6', 2) ON CONFLICT(hash) DO NOTHING;
+INSERT INTO ticket_history (ticket_record_id, field, old_value, new_value, changed_by, changed_at, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G9KH87TRDGW45GMDWVDRPABR', 'description', 'src/ollama/provider.py sets self._openai_client after super().__init__, but OllamaProvider.client serves self._client (pydantic_ai 1.27''s official openai_client= constructor param is the right wiring — webber hit the identical bug and fixed it 2026-09-13, exposed by the wrapper 503ing a session-less request). Silently dead in production as a result: the content-null sanitizer (moot on llama-server, live hazard if Ollama ever returns), the T-4 x-boilerroom-* signal hook (never logs), and the OLLAMA_TIMEOUT=120 cap (SDK default ~600s applies). Sessions were unaffected — they ride ModelSettings extra_body. Fix like webber: pass _SanitizedAsyncOpenAI through openai_client=, add a wiring test asserting provider.client is the sanitized type, then verify balancing/compaction logs actually appear.', 'src/ollama/provider.py sets self._openai_client after super().__init__, but OllamaProvider.client serves self._client (pydantic_ai 1.27''s official openai_client= constructor param is the right wiring — webber hit the identical bug and fixed it 2026-09-13, exposed by the wrapper 503ing a session-less request). Silently dead in production as a result: the content-null sanitizer (moot on llama-server, live hazard if Ollama ever returns), the T-4 x-boilerroom-* signal hook (never logs), and the OLLAMA_TIMEOUT=120 cap (SDK default ~600s applies). Sessions were unaffected — they ride ModelSettings extra_body. Fix like webber: pass _SanitizedAsyncOpenAI through openai_client=, add a wiring test asserting provider.client is the sanitized type, then verify balancing/compaction logs actually appear.
+
+Second finding 2026-09-13, from webber''s twin fix: an httpx event-hook on the client (the T-4 signal-reading approach) never fires under the openai SDK even when correctly wired — webber verified headers arriving while the hook stayed silent. When rewiring the client, read the signals from the parsed body''s model_extra in the sanitized create() instead (the wrapper injects balancing/compaction_due into non-streamed JSON bodies; openai pydantic models retain unknown fields). The steward''s raw-call body read is unaffected and already correct.', NULL, '2026-09-13 08:00:17', '2026-09-13 08:00:17.002', '2026-09-13 08:00:17.002', NULL, '6fb4cc1d7d7222e3d570cd8c7fed4fd9', 2) ON CONFLICT(hash) DO NOTHING;
+INSERT INTO ticket_history (ticket_record_id, field, old_value, new_value, changed_by, changed_at, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G9KH87TRDGW45GMDWVDRPABR', 'status', 'backlog', 'in_progress', NULL, '2026-09-13 08:19:35', '2026-09-13 08:19:35.028', '2026-09-13 08:19:35.028', NULL, '5bcf19379361a2f766cd4787ff734611', 2) ON CONFLICT(hash) DO NOTHING;
+INSERT INTO ticket_history (ticket_record_id, field, old_value, new_value, changed_by, changed_at, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G9KH87TRDGW45GMDWVDRPABR', 'status', 'in_progress', 'done', NULL, '2026-09-13 08:27:21', '2026-09-13 08:27:21.779', '2026-09-13 08:27:21.779', NULL, '1c59422336b88a76c6f1c3720916d7d5', 2) ON CONFLICT(hash) DO NOTHING;
+INSERT INTO ticket_history (ticket_record_id, field, old_value, new_value, changed_by, changed_at, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G99D07Z3FZY8EBT9PJ1RCGHW', 'status', 'backlog', 'in_progress', NULL, '2026-09-13 08:48:55', '2026-09-13 08:48:55.587', '2026-09-13 08:48:55.587', NULL, 'ca4f8fb42c961b0002aa87bb7b1d5af5', 2) ON CONFLICT(hash) DO NOTHING;
+INSERT INTO ticket_history (ticket_record_id, field, old_value, new_value, changed_by, changed_at, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G99D07Z3FZY8EBT9PJ1RCGHW', 'status', 'in_progress', 'done', NULL, '2026-09-13 09:00:50', '2026-09-13 09:00:50.006', '2026-09-13 09:00:50.006', NULL, '5ea799ee4815e42ede80c3df4c81b28c', 2) ON CONFLICT(hash) DO NOTHING;

.pql/changelog/ticket_idmap/2026-09.sql

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
 INSERT INTO ticket_idmap (record_id, ticket_id, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G94KC9XM3PW91C6B7VJA6VRM', 'T-3', '2026-09-11 21:09:10.267', '2026-09-11 21:09:10.267', NULL, 'a1ccf4d118877c230dffb961a7531cb4', 2) ON CONFLICT(record_id) DO UPDATE SET ticket_id=excluded.ticket_id, updated_at=excluded.updated_at, deleted_at=excluded.deleted_at, hash=excluded.hash, canonical_version=excluded.canonical_version WHERE excluded.updated_at >= ticket_idmap.updated_at;
 INSERT INTO ticket_idmap (record_id, ticket_id, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G99D07EM5DZWTS0WD9V8PSKM', 'T-4', '2026-09-12 08:20:21.494', '2026-09-12 08:20:21.494', NULL, '5b28e07bdc3be1f9ed0ed71d2da60c72', 2) ON CONFLICT(record_id) DO UPDATE SET ticket_id=excluded.ticket_id, updated_at=excluded.updated_at, deleted_at=excluded.deleted_at, hash=excluded.hash, canonical_version=excluded.canonical_version WHERE excluded.updated_at >= ticket_idmap.updated_at;
 INSERT INTO ticket_idmap (record_id, ticket_id, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G99D07Z3FZY8EBT9PJ1RCGHW', 'T-5', '2026-09-12 08:20:21.625', '2026-09-12 08:20:21.625', NULL, '0a417012779f612a4dad1a7dbd0787e3', 2) ON CONFLICT(record_id) DO UPDATE SET ticket_id=excluded.ticket_id, updated_at=excluded.updated_at, deleted_at=excluded.deleted_at, hash=excluded.hash, canonical_version=excluded.canonical_version WHERE excluded.updated_at >= ticket_idmap.updated_at;
+INSERT INTO ticket_idmap (record_id, ticket_id, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G9KH87TRDGW45GMDWVDRPABR', 'T-6', '2026-09-13 07:57:01.782', '2026-09-13 07:57:01.782', NULL, 'd6c184ba6d24e03c0dc77064bf71fead', 2) ON CONFLICT(record_id) DO UPDATE SET ticket_id=excluded.ticket_id, updated_at=excluded.updated_at, deleted_at=excluded.deleted_at, hash=excluded.hash, canonical_version=excluded.canonical_version WHERE excluded.updated_at >= ticket_idmap.updated_at;
+INSERT INTO ticket_idmap (record_id, ticket_id, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G9KZSCFR79G4DFCT4E5W5CAM', 'T-7', '2026-09-13 09:00:32.255', '2026-09-13 09:00:32.255', NULL, 'b0b0a4c3ccaabeb58ad1958e7c2c2602', 2) ON CONFLICT(record_id) DO UPDATE SET ticket_id=excluded.ticket_id, updated_at=excluded.updated_at, deleted_at=excluded.deleted_at, hash=excluded.hash, canonical_version=excluded.canonical_version WHERE excluded.updated_at >= ticket_idmap.updated_at;

.pql/changelog/tickets/2026-09.sql

@@ -3,3 +3,16 @@ INSERT INTO tickets (record_id, type, parent_record_id, title, description, stat
 INSERT INTO tickets (record_id, type, parent_record_id, title, description, status, priority, assigned_to, team, decision_ref, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G99D07Z3FZY8EBT9PJ1RCGHW', 'bug', NULL, 'The container logs nowhere: stdout empty, /app/logs mount untouched', 'docker logs tatlock is 0 lines and the mounted ~/docker-data/tatlock/logs has been empty since 2025-12 — the running app writes logs to neither, which made the 2026-09-12 wrapper-cutover verification blind (flavor detection had to be proven behaviorally). Dev mode logs to build/logs/server.log via make run; production should log to stdout for docker logs at minimum.', 'backlog', 'medium', NULL, NULL, NULL, '2026-09-12 08:20:21.624', '2026-09-12 08:20:21.624', NULL, '3fd294efc9afa857aef15810d9003298', 2) ON CONFLICT(record_id) DO UPDATE SET type=excluded.type, parent_record_id=excluded.parent_record_id, title=excluded.title, description=excluded.description, status=excluded.status, priority=excluded.priority, assigned_to=excluded.assigned_to, team=excluded.team, decision_ref=excluded.decision_ref, updated_at=excluded.updated_at, deleted_at=excluded.deleted_at, hash=excluded.hash, canonical_version=excluded.canonical_version WHERE excluded.updated_at >= tickets.updated_at;
 INSERT INTO tickets (record_id, type, parent_record_id, title, description, status, priority, assigned_to, team, decision_ref, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G99D07EM5DZWTS0WD9V8PSKM', 'story', NULL, 'Adopt boilerroom named sessions with the usage ranking', 'Replace raw id_slot pinning (BACKEND_SLOT_PINNING) with the wrapper''s session extension fields, now that tatlock routes through boilerroom:8602 (since 2026-09-12). Ranking by likelihood of use, decided 2026-09-12 — lower eviction_order parks sooner: tatlock pipeline phases highest (eviction_order 40; e.g. sessions tatlock-steward/tatlock-orchestrate/tatlock-synthesize), librarian-routed calls as session librarian (30), webber will sit at 20 (workspace T-137), Open WebUI stays session-less by design (idle slots only, can never evict — and it is being deprecated for an own-webui build). Read the x-boilerroom-balancing and compaction_due signals; the compaction endpoint expects the client transcript (tatlock''s Redis/Qdrant context is the natural producer — boilerroom D-5 names tatlock the first producer).', 'in_progress', 'high', NULL, NULL, NULL, '2026-09-12 08:20:21.493', '2026-09-12 13:50:48.289', NULL, '62abeb4da2f1f7aedb8d92884e7e148c', 2) ON CONFLICT(record_id) DO UPDATE SET type=excluded.type, parent_record_id=excluded.parent_record_id, title=excluded.title, description=excluded.description, status=excluded.status, priority=excluded.priority, assigned_to=excluded.assigned_to, team=excluded.team, decision_ref=excluded.decision_ref, updated_at=excluded.updated_at, deleted_at=excluded.deleted_at, hash=excluded.hash, canonical_version=excluded.canonical_version WHERE excluded.updated_at >= tickets.updated_at;
 INSERT INTO tickets (record_id, type, parent_record_id, title, description, status, priority, assigned_to, team, decision_ref, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G99D07EM5DZWTS0WD9V8PSKM', 'story', NULL, 'Adopt boilerroom named sessions with the usage ranking', 'Replace raw id_slot pinning (BACKEND_SLOT_PINNING) with the wrapper''s session extension fields, now that tatlock routes through boilerroom:8602 (since 2026-09-12). Ranking by likelihood of use, decided 2026-09-12 — lower eviction_order parks sooner: tatlock pipeline phases highest (eviction_order 40; e.g. sessions tatlock-steward/tatlock-orchestrate/tatlock-synthesize), librarian-routed calls as session librarian (30), webber will sit at 20 (workspace T-137), Open WebUI stays session-less by design (idle slots only, can never evict — and it is being deprecated for an own-webui build). Read the x-boilerroom-balancing and compaction_due signals; the compaction endpoint expects the client transcript (tatlock''s Redis/Qdrant context is the natural producer — boilerroom D-5 names tatlock the first producer).', 'done', 'high', NULL, NULL, NULL, '2026-09-12 08:20:21.493', '2026-09-12 14:13:29.027', NULL, '89ce1be323ebb26f00c63569f197cab1', 2) ON CONFLICT(record_id) DO UPDATE SET type=excluded.type, parent_record_id=excluded.parent_record_id, title=excluded.title, description=excluded.description, status=excluded.status, priority=excluded.priority, assigned_to=excluded.assigned_to, team=excluded.team, decision_ref=excluded.decision_ref, updated_at=excluded.updated_at, deleted_at=excluded.deleted_at, hash=excluded.hash, canonical_version=excluded.canonical_version WHERE excluded.updated_at >= tickets.updated_at;
+INSERT INTO tickets (record_id, type, parent_record_id, title, description, status, priority, assigned_to, team, decision_ref, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G9KH87TRDGW45GMDWVDRPABR', 'bug', NULL, 'The sanitized OpenAI client is never used: the override pokes an attribute nobody reads', 'src/ollama/provider.py sets self._openai_client after super().__init__, but OllamaProvider.client serves self._client (pydantic_ai 1.27''s official openai_client= constructor param is the right wiring — webber hit the identical bug and fixed it 2026-09-13, exposed by the wrapper 503ing a session-less request). Silently dead in production as a result: the content-null sanitizer (moot on llama-server, live hazard if Ollama ever returns), the T-4 x-boilerroom-* signal hook (never logs), and the OLLAMA_TIMEOUT=120 cap (SDK default ~600s applies). Sessions were unaffected — they ride ModelSettings extra_body. Fix like webber: pass _SanitizedAsyncOpenAI through openai_client=, add a wiring test asserting provider.client is the sanitized type, then verify balancing/compaction logs actually appear.', 'backlog', 'high', NULL, NULL, NULL, '2026-09-13 07:57:01.782', '2026-09-13 07:57:01.782', NULL, '5e8ea3bf2d18ade9d17f0044ae1ff96b', 2) ON CONFLICT(record_id) DO UPDATE SET type=excluded.type, parent_record_id=excluded.parent_record_id, title=excluded.title, description=excluded.description, status=excluded.status, priority=excluded.priority, assigned_to=excluded.assigned_to, team=excluded.team, decision_ref=excluded.decision_ref, updated_at=excluded.updated_at, deleted_at=excluded.deleted_at, hash=excluded.hash, canonical_version=excluded.canonical_version WHERE excluded.updated_at >= tickets.updated_at;
+INSERT INTO tickets (record_id, type, parent_record_id, title, description, status, priority, assigned_to, team, decision_ref, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G9KH87TRDGW45GMDWVDRPABR', 'bug', NULL, 'The sanitized OpenAI client is never used: the override pokes an attribute nobody reads', 'src/ollama/provider.py sets self._openai_client after super().__init__, but OllamaProvider.client serves self._client (pydantic_ai 1.27''s official openai_client= constructor param is the right wiring — webber hit the identical bug and fixed it 2026-09-13, exposed by the wrapper 503ing a session-less request). Silently dead in production as a result: the content-null sanitizer (moot on llama-server, live hazard if Ollama ever returns), the T-4 x-boilerroom-* signal hook (never logs), and the OLLAMA_TIMEOUT=120 cap (SDK default ~600s applies). Sessions were unaffected — they ride ModelSettings extra_body. Fix like webber: pass _SanitizedAsyncOpenAI through openai_client=, add a wiring test asserting provider.client is the sanitized type, then verify balancing/compaction logs actually appear.
+
+Second finding 2026-09-13, from webber''s twin fix: an httpx event-hook on the client (the T-4 signal-reading approach) never fires under the openai SDK even when correctly wired — webber verified headers arriving while the hook stayed silent. When rewiring the client, read the signals from the parsed body''s model_extra in the sanitized create() instead (the wrapper injects balancing/compaction_due into non-streamed JSON bodies; openai pydantic models retain unknown fields). The steward''s raw-call body read is unaffected and already correct.', 'backlog', 'high', NULL, NULL, NULL, '2026-09-13 07:57:01.782', '2026-09-13 08:00:17.002', NULL, '755abc3689e8ff4fc511deb164137fe5', 2) ON CONFLICT(record_id) DO UPDATE SET type=excluded.type, parent_record_id=excluded.parent_record_id, title=excluded.title, description=excluded.description, status=excluded.status, priority=excluded.priority, assigned_to=excluded.assigned_to, team=excluded.team, decision_ref=excluded.decision_ref, updated_at=excluded.updated_at, deleted_at=excluded.deleted_at, hash=excluded.hash, canonical_version=excluded.canonical_version WHERE excluded.updated_at >= tickets.updated_at;
+INSERT INTO tickets (record_id, type, parent_record_id, title, description, status, priority, assigned_to, team, decision_ref, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G9KH87TRDGW45GMDWVDRPABR', 'bug', NULL, 'The sanitized OpenAI client is never used: the override pokes an attribute nobody reads', 'src/ollama/provider.py sets self._openai_client after super().__init__, but OllamaProvider.client serves self._client (pydantic_ai 1.27''s official openai_client= constructor param is the right wiring — webber hit the identical bug and fixed it 2026-09-13, exposed by the wrapper 503ing a session-less request). Silently dead in production as a result: the content-null sanitizer (moot on llama-server, live hazard if Ollama ever returns), the T-4 x-boilerroom-* signal hook (never logs), and the OLLAMA_TIMEOUT=120 cap (SDK default ~600s applies). Sessions were unaffected — they ride ModelSettings extra_body. Fix like webber: pass _SanitizedAsyncOpenAI through openai_client=, add a wiring test asserting provider.client is the sanitized type, then verify balancing/compaction logs actually appear.
+
+Second finding 2026-09-13, from webber''s twin fix: an httpx event-hook on the client (the T-4 signal-reading approach) never fires under the openai SDK even when correctly wired — webber verified headers arriving while the hook stayed silent. When rewiring the client, read the signals from the parsed body''s model_extra in the sanitized create() instead (the wrapper injects balancing/compaction_due into non-streamed JSON bodies; openai pydantic models retain unknown fields). The steward''s raw-call body read is unaffected and already correct.', 'in_progress', 'high', NULL, NULL, NULL, '2026-09-13 07:57:01.782', '2026-09-13 08:19:35.028', NULL, '5af3c96930a30bbe4bb64d13ddbc509e', 2) ON CONFLICT(record_id) DO UPDATE SET type=excluded.type, parent_record_id=excluded.parent_record_id, title=excluded.title, description=excluded.description, status=excluded.status, priority=excluded.priority, assigned_to=excluded.assigned_to, team=excluded.team, decision_ref=excluded.decision_ref, updated_at=excluded.updated_at, deleted_at=excluded.deleted_at, hash=excluded.hash, canonical_version=excluded.canonical_version WHERE excluded.updated_at >= tickets.updated_at;
+INSERT INTO tickets (record_id, type, parent_record_id, title, description, status, priority, assigned_to, team, decision_ref, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G9KH87TRDGW45GMDWVDRPABR', 'bug', NULL, 'The sanitized OpenAI client is never used: the override pokes an attribute nobody reads', 'src/ollama/provider.py sets self._openai_client after super().__init__, but OllamaProvider.client serves self._client (pydantic_ai 1.27''s official openai_client= constructor param is the right wiring — webber hit the identical bug and fixed it 2026-09-13, exposed by the wrapper 503ing a session-less request). Silently dead in production as a result: the content-null sanitizer (moot on llama-server, live hazard if Ollama ever returns), the T-4 x-boilerroom-* signal hook (never logs), and the OLLAMA_TIMEOUT=120 cap (SDK default ~600s applies). Sessions were unaffected — they ride ModelSettings extra_body. Fix like webber: pass _SanitizedAsyncOpenAI through openai_client=, add a wiring test asserting provider.client is the sanitized type, then verify balancing/compaction logs actually appear.
+
+Second finding 2026-09-13, from webber''s twin fix: an httpx event-hook on the client (the T-4 signal-reading approach) never fires under the openai SDK even when correctly wired — webber verified headers arriving while the hook stayed silent. When rewiring the client, read the signals from the parsed body''s model_extra in the sanitized create() instead (the wrapper injects balancing/compaction_due into non-streamed JSON bodies; openai pydantic models retain unknown fields). The steward''s raw-call body read is unaffected and already correct.', 'done', 'high', NULL, NULL, NULL, '2026-09-13 07:57:01.782', '2026-09-13 08:27:21.778', NULL, 'ce3151ff27c70a1028ba7c03b07119a2', 2) ON CONFLICT(record_id) DO UPDATE SET type=excluded.type, parent_record_id=excluded.parent_record_id, title=excluded.title, description=excluded.description, status=excluded.status, priority=excluded.priority, assigned_to=excluded.assigned_to, team=excluded.team, decision_ref=excluded.decision_ref, updated_at=excluded.updated_at, deleted_at=excluded.deleted_at, hash=excluded.hash, canonical_version=excluded.canonical_version WHERE excluded.updated_at >= tickets.updated_at;
+INSERT INTO tickets (record_id, type, parent_record_id, title, description, status, priority, assigned_to, team, decision_ref, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G99D07Z3FZY8EBT9PJ1RCGHW', 'bug', NULL, 'The container logs nowhere: stdout empty, /app/logs mount untouched', 'docker logs tatlock is 0 lines and the mounted ~/docker-data/tatlock/logs has been empty since 2025-12 — the running app writes logs to neither, which made the 2026-09-12 wrapper-cutover verification blind (flavor detection had to be proven behaviorally). Dev mode logs to build/logs/server.log via make run; production should log to stdout for docker logs at minimum.', 'in_progress', 'medium', NULL, NULL, NULL, '2026-09-12 08:20:21.624', '2026-09-13 08:48:55.586', NULL, '4770f6c6759cb82d825eb550dd4e42e2', 2) ON CONFLICT(record_id) DO UPDATE SET type=excluded.type, parent_record_id=excluded.parent_record_id, title=excluded.title, description=excluded.description, status=excluded.status, priority=excluded.priority, assigned_to=excluded.assigned_to, team=excluded.team, decision_ref=excluded.decision_ref, updated_at=excluded.updated_at, deleted_at=excluded.deleted_at, hash=excluded.hash, canonical_version=excluded.canonical_version WHERE excluded.updated_at >= tickets.updated_at;
+INSERT INTO tickets (record_id, type, parent_record_id, title, description, status, priority, assigned_to, team, decision_ref, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G9KZSCFR79G4DFCT4E5W5CAM', 'bug', NULL, 'The full suite flakes: one run fails, the rerun passes, twice now', 'Observed 2026-09-13 twice: before the v2.7.0 release audit and again during T-5 — make test exits 1 with a failure that does not reproduce on the immediate rerun, and both times the failing test''s name went uncaptured because the diagnostic rerun passed. Next occurrence: keep the FULL output of the failing run (make test 2>&1 | tee /tmp/flake.log) before rerunning, then pin the named test. Suspects worth checking when a name exists: order-dependent state in the session-scoped app init (conftest asyncio.run + cached health globals), port/redis contention with the live containers, and the coverage plugin''s tmp handling.', 'backlog', 'medium', NULL, NULL, NULL, '2026-09-13 09:00:32.255', '2026-09-13 09:00:32.255', NULL, '36c6f97b5a309e169b7acb35f7ca46d4', 2) ON CONFLICT(record_id) DO UPDATE SET type=excluded.type, parent_record_id=excluded.parent_record_id, title=excluded.title, description=excluded.description, status=excluded.status, priority=excluded.priority, assigned_to=excluded.assigned_to, team=excluded.team, decision_ref=excluded.decision_ref, updated_at=excluded.updated_at, deleted_at=excluded.deleted_at, hash=excluded.hash, canonical_version=excluded.canonical_version WHERE excluded.updated_at >= tickets.updated_at;
+INSERT INTO tickets (record_id, type, parent_record_id, title, description, status, priority, assigned_to, team, decision_ref, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G99D07Z3FZY8EBT9PJ1RCGHW', 'bug', NULL, 'The container logs nowhere: stdout empty, /app/logs mount untouched', 'docker logs tatlock is 0 lines and the mounted ~/docker-data/tatlock/logs has been empty since 2025-12 — the running app writes logs to neither, which made the 2026-09-12 wrapper-cutover verification blind (flavor detection had to be proven behaviorally). Dev mode logs to build/logs/server.log via make run; production should log to stdout for docker logs at minimum.', 'done', 'medium', NULL, NULL, NULL, '2026-09-12 08:20:21.624', '2026-09-13 09:00:50.006', NULL, 'd04562943a55527d6036ec38c2657308', 2) ON CONFLICT(record_id) DO UPDATE SET type=excluded.type, parent_record_id=excluded.parent_record_id, title=excluded.title, description=excluded.description, status=excluded.status, priority=excluded.priority, assigned_to=excluded.assigned_to, team=excluded.team, decision_ref=excluded.decision_ref, updated_at=excluded.updated_at, deleted_at=excluded.deleted_at, hash=excluded.hash, canonical_version=excluded.canonical_version WHERE excluded.updated_at >= tickets.updated_at;

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -7,6 +7,42 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0
 
 ## [Unreleased]
 
+## [2.7.2] - 2026-09-13
+
+### Fixed
+
+- Production logs exist now (T-5): the production default log level
+  was WARNING ("minimal noise"), and a healthy service warns roughly
+  never — so `docker logs tatlock` was empty for months, startup,
+  backend flavor detection and the wrapper's balancing/compaction
+  signals all suppressed, and the serving cutover could not be
+  verified from logs. The production default is INFO on stdout;
+  `LOG_LEVEL` remains the override for when noise is ever the real
+  problem. (The `/app/logs` mount was always decorative — no file
+  handler exists; `docker logs` is the log.)
+
+## [2.7.1] - 2026-09-13
+
+### Fixed
+
+- The sanitized OpenAI client was never used (T-6): the provider
+  assigned `self._openai_client`, an attribute nobody reads —
+  `OllamaProvider.client` serves `self._client` — so the null-content
+  sanitizer, the wrapper signal reading and the `OLLAMA_TIMEOUT` cap
+  were all silently dead (sessions were unaffected; they ride
+  ModelSettings). Found via webber's identical bug. The client now
+  goes through the constructor's official `openai_client` parameter,
+  the parent-chat lookup survives openai's property/cached_property
+  descriptor change (ported from webber's 2026-08-11 fix — the old
+  `.fget` access would have crashed the first wired completion on
+  openai 2.11), and the wrapper's `balancing`/`compaction_due`
+  signals are read from the response body's `model_extra` in the
+  request path — the httpx event-hook approach demonstrably never
+  fires under the openai SDK. The provider tests now assert through
+  `provider.client`, the property pydantic_ai actually reads; the
+  old ones asserted on the dead attribute and stayed green
+  throughout.
+
 ## [2.7.0] - 2026-09-13
 
 ### Added

pyproject.toml

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ build-backend = "setuptools.build_meta"
 
 [project]
 name = "tatlock"
-version = "2.7.0"
+version = "2.7.2"
 description = "OpenAI-compatible API with Ollama backend"
 requires-python = ">=3.12"
 dependencies = [

src/core/config.py

@@ -230,15 +230,21 @@ class Config(BaseSettings):
         Get effective log level, auto-determining from environment if not set.
 
         - development: DEBUG (maximum verbosity)
-        - production: WARNING (minimal noise)
+        - production: INFO
         - testing: INFO
+
+        Production ran at WARNING ("minimal noise") until T-5: a healthy
+        service warns roughly never, so `docker logs` was empty for
+        months — startup, backend flavor detection and the wrapper's
+        balancing/compaction signals all suppressed, which made the
+        2026-09-12 serving cutover unverifiable from logs. INFO on
+        stdout is the operational floor; LOG_LEVEL quiets it when noise
+        ever becomes the real problem.
         """
         if self.LOG_LEVEL is not None:
             return self.LOG_LEVEL
         if self.ENVIRONMENT == Environment.DEVELOPMENT:
             return "DEBUG"
-        if self.ENVIRONMENT == Environment.PRODUCTION:
-            return "WARNING"
         return "INFO"
 
     @property

src/ollama/provider.py

@@ -4,11 +4,21 @@ PydanticAI provider for Ollama with message sanitization.
 Ollama's OpenAI-compatible API rejects messages with `content: null`,
 which PydanticAI sends for assistant messages that only contain tool calls.
 This provider sanitizes messages to use empty strings instead of null.
+
+History worth keeping (repo T-6): until 2026-09-13 the sanitized client
+was never in the request path — the provider assigned
+`self._openai_client`, an attribute nobody reads, while
+`OllamaProvider.client` serves `self._client`. The sanitizer, the
+wrapper-signal reading and the OLLAMA_TIMEOUT cap were all silently
+dead (sessions were unaffected — they ride ModelSettings). webber hit
+the identical bug the same day; both now wire the client through the
+constructor's official `openai_client` parameter, and the signals are
+read from the response body — an httpx event-hook variant demonstrably
+never fires under the openai SDK.
 """
 
 from typing import Any
 
-import httpx
 from openai import AsyncOpenAI
 from pydantic_ai.providers.ollama import OllamaProvider
 
@@ -18,21 +28,25 @@ from src.core.logging_config import get_logger
 logger = get_logger(__name__)
 
 
-async def _log_wrapper_signals(response: httpx.Response) -> None:
+def _log_wrapper_signals(response: Any) -> None:
     """
     Surface the boilerroom wrapper's per-response signals (repo T-4).
 
     balancing names the sessions parked or restored to serve this
     request (wrapper D-4 — never silent); compaction-due says a session
     crossed its authored context budget (wrapper D-5 — a signal, not an
-    interrupt). Reading them is this ticket; producing the compacted
-    transcript is a later one. The headers are absent on any other
-    backend, so the hook costs nothing there.
+    interrupt). Read from the parsed body's extra fields: the wrapper
+    injects them into non-streamed JSON answers and openai's pydantic
+    models retain unknown fields in `model_extra`. Absent on any other
+    backend, so this costs nothing there. Streams carry the signals in
+    headers only and go unlogged here; the steward's raw call reads its
+    own body.
     """
-    balancing = response.headers.get("x-boilerroom-balancing")
-    if balancing and balancing != "[]":
+    extra = getattr(response, "model_extra", None) or {}
+    balancing = extra.get("balancing")
+    if balancing:
         logger.info("backend_balancing", moves=balancing)
-    if response.headers.get("x-boilerroom-compaction-due") == "true":
+    if extra.get("compaction_due"):
         logger.warning(
             "backend_compaction_due",
             hint="GET /sessions on the wrapper names the session over budget",
@@ -58,10 +72,12 @@ class TatlockOllamaProvider(OllamaProvider):
             clean_host = str(config.OLLAMA_HOST).rstrip("/")
             base_url = f"{clean_host}/v1"
 
-        super().__init__(base_url=base_url)
-
-        # Override the client with our sanitized version
-        self._openai_client = _SanitizedAsyncOpenAI(base_url=base_url)
+        # The sanitized client goes through the official constructor
+        # parameter: the provider's `.client` property serves `_client`,
+        # and poking a lookalike attribute after super().__init__ had
+        # built its own client is how the sanitizer sat bypassed in
+        # production (T-6).
+        super().__init__(openai_client=_SanitizedAsyncOpenAI(base_url=base_url))
 
         logger.debug(
             "tatlock_ollama_provider_created",
@@ -78,29 +94,49 @@ class _SanitizedAsyncOpenAI(AsyncOpenAI):
         # configured Ollama timeout instead of the SDK default (~600s),
         # so one stuck request cannot eat the whole delegation budget.
         kwargs.setdefault("timeout", float(config.OLLAMA_TIMEOUT))
-        # The response hook reads the wrapper's balancing/compaction
-        # headers on every call this client makes, streams included.
-        kwargs.setdefault(
-            "http_client",
-            httpx.AsyncClient(
-                event_hooks={"response": [_log_wrapper_signals]},
-                timeout=float(config.OLLAMA_TIMEOUT),
-            ),
-        )
         super().__init__(api_key="ollama", **kwargs)
 
     @property
-    def chat(self) -> "_SanitizedChat":
-        """Return sanitized chat interface."""
+    def chat(self) -> "_SanitizedChat":  # type: ignore[override]
+        """Return sanitized chat interface.
+
+        Deliberately incompatible with AsyncOpenAI.chat, which is a Chat
+        resource. Replacing it is the entire mechanism of this class;
+        typing it as the parent's Chat would describe an object this
+        class does not return. The suppression is on this member alone.
+        """
         return _SanitizedChat(self)
 
 
+def _parent_chat(client: AsyncOpenAI) -> Any:
+    """Get AsyncOpenAI's own `chat`, bypassing the subclass override.
+
+    openai has shipped `chat` as both a property (getter `.fget`) and a
+    functools.cached_property (getter `.func`) — this venv's 2.11.0 is
+    the latter, so the old hardcoded `.fget` access raised
+    AttributeError the moment anything touched `.chat`. It went
+    unnoticed here for the same reason the whole class did: the client
+    was never wired (T-6). Reading whichever getter the descriptor
+    exposes keeps this working across both shapes, and raises something
+    legible if openai adopts a third. Ported from webber's 2026-08-11
+    fix.
+    """
+    descriptor = AsyncOpenAI.__dict__["chat"]
+    getter = getattr(descriptor, "func", None) or getattr(descriptor, "fget", None)
+    if getter is None:  # pragma: no cover - defensive
+        raise TypeError(
+            f"AsyncOpenAI.chat is a {type(descriptor).__name__} with neither "
+            "'func' nor 'fget'; the sanitising wrapper needs updating"
+        )
+    return getter(client)
+
+
 class _SanitizedChat:
     """Chat interface wrapper with sanitized completions."""
 
     def __init__(self, client: _SanitizedAsyncOpenAI):
         self._client = client
-        self._original_chat = AsyncOpenAI.chat.fget(client)  # type: ignore
+        self._original_chat = _parent_chat(client)
 
     @property
     def completions(self) -> "_SanitizedCompletions":
@@ -124,7 +160,9 @@ class _SanitizedCompletions:
         if "messages" in kwargs:
             kwargs["messages"] = _sanitize_messages(kwargs["messages"])
 
-        return await self._original.create(**kwargs)
+        response = await self._original.create(**kwargs)
+        _log_wrapper_signals(response)
+        return response
 
 
 def _sanitize_messages(messages: list[dict[str, Any]]) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:

tests/core/test_logging_config.py

@@ -241,6 +241,41 @@ class TestLoggingConfiguration:
         with patch.object(config, "ENVIRONMENT", Environment.PRODUCTION):
             assert config.log_format == "json"
 
+    def test_production_default_level_is_info(self):
+        """Production logs INFO to stdout (T-5).
+
+        The old WARNING default made `docker logs` empty for months — a
+        healthy service warns roughly never, so startup, flavor
+        detection and the wrapper signals were all suppressed and the
+        serving cutover could not be verified from logs.
+        """
+        from src.core.config import Environment, config
+
+        with (
+            patch.object(config, "ENVIRONMENT", Environment.PRODUCTION),
+            patch.object(config, "LOG_LEVEL", None),
+        ):
+            assert config.effective_log_level == "INFO"
+
+    def test_log_level_env_still_quiets_production(self):
+        """LOG_LEVEL stays the override for when noise is the problem."""
+        from src.core.config import Environment, config
+
+        with (
+            patch.object(config, "ENVIRONMENT", Environment.PRODUCTION),
+            patch.object(config, "LOG_LEVEL", "WARNING"),
+        ):
+            assert config.effective_log_level == "WARNING"
+
+    def test_development_default_stays_debug(self):
+        from src.core.config import Environment, config
+
+        with (
+            patch.object(config, "ENVIRONMENT", Environment.DEVELOPMENT),
+            patch.object(config, "LOG_LEVEL", None),
+        ):
+            assert config.effective_log_level == "DEBUG"
+
     def test_multiple_loggers_independent(self):
         """Test multiple loggers are independent."""
         logger1 = get_logger("test.logger1")

tests/ollama/test_provider.py

@@ -1,31 +1,73 @@
 """
-Tests for TatlockOllamaProvider configuration.
+Tests for TatlockOllamaProvider configuration and wiring.
 
-The AsyncOpenAI client must carry an explicit timeout from
-config.OLLAMA_TIMEOUT instead of the SDK default (~600s), so a stuck
-LLM call cannot consume the whole delegation budget.
+Every assertion here goes through `provider.client` — the property
+pydantic_ai actually reads. The previous version asserted on
+`_openai_client`, a lookalike attribute nobody read, and stayed green
+for the whole period the sanitizer was bypassed in production (T-6):
+a test whose subject is not the real thing cannot fail for the real
+reason.
 """
 
 import pytest
 
 from src.core.config import config
-from src.ollama.provider import TatlockOllamaProvider, _sanitize_messages
+from src.ollama import provider as provider_module
+from src.ollama.provider import (
+    TatlockOllamaProvider,
+    _parent_chat,
+    _sanitize_messages,
+    _SanitizedAsyncOpenAI,
+    _SanitizedCompletions,
+)
+
+
+@pytest.mark.unit
+class TestClientWiring:
+    """The sanitized client must be the one the provider serves (T-6)."""
+
+    def test_provider_serves_the_sanitized_client(self):
+        provider = TatlockOllamaProvider(base_url="http://localhost:11434/v1")
+
+        assert isinstance(provider.client, _SanitizedAsyncOpenAI)
+
+    def test_the_full_chain_reaches_completions(self):
+        # Walks provider.client -> sanitized chat -> parent lookup ->
+        # completions. Under openai's cached_property `chat`, the old
+        # hardcoded `.fget` access raised AttributeError right here.
+        provider = TatlockOllamaProvider(base_url="http://localhost:11434/v1")
+
+        assert provider.client.chat.completions is not None
+
+    def test_parent_lookup_survives_either_descriptor_shape(self):
+        from openai import AsyncOpenAI
+
+        descriptor = AsyncOpenAI.__dict__["chat"]
+        assert hasattr(descriptor, "func") or hasattr(
+            descriptor, "fget"
+        ), "AsyncOpenAI.chat exposes neither getter; _parent_chat needs updating"
+        client = _SanitizedAsyncOpenAI(base_url="http://localhost:11434/v1")
+        parent = _parent_chat(client)
+        assert parent is not None
+        assert (
+            type(parent).__name__ != "_SanitizedChat"
+        ), "parent lookup must not recurse into the override"
 
 
 @pytest.mark.unit
 class TestProviderTimeout:
-    """Timeout configuration on the underlying AsyncOpenAI client."""
+    """Timeout configuration on the client the provider actually serves."""
 
     def test_openai_client_timeout_from_config(self):
         provider = TatlockOllamaProvider(base_url="http://localhost:11434/v1")
 
-        assert provider._openai_client.timeout == float(config.OLLAMA_TIMEOUT)
+        assert provider.client.timeout == float(config.OLLAMA_TIMEOUT)
 
     def test_timeout_is_not_sdk_default(self):
         provider = TatlockOllamaProvider(base_url="http://localhost:11434/v1")
 
         # The OpenAI SDK defaults to 600s; the configured cap must win
-        assert provider._openai_client.timeout < 600
+        assert provider.client.timeout < 600
 
 
 @pytest.mark.unit
@@ -52,3 +94,68 @@ class TestMessageSanitization:
         ]
 
         assert _sanitize_messages(messages) == messages
+
+
+class _StubLogger:
+    def __init__(self):
+        self.calls = []
+
+    def info(self, event, **kwargs):
+        self.calls.append(("info", event, kwargs))
+
+    def warning(self, event, **kwargs):
+        self.calls.append(("warning", event, kwargs))
+
+
+class _BusyResponse:
+    def __init__(self):
+        self.model_extra = {
+            "balancing": [{"parked": "librarian"}],
+            "compaction_due": True,
+        }
+
+
+class _QuietResponse:
+    def __init__(self):
+        self.model_extra = {"balancing": [], "compaction_due": False}
+
+
+@pytest.mark.unit
+class TestWrapperSignals:
+    """The wrapper's body signals must not pass silently (T-4/T-6).
+
+    Read from the parsed body's model_extra: an httpx event-hook
+    variant demonstrably never fires under the openai SDK.
+    """
+
+    def test_busy_response_logs_balancing_and_compaction(self, monkeypatch):
+        stub = _StubLogger()
+        monkeypatch.setattr(provider_module, "logger", stub)
+
+        provider_module._log_wrapper_signals(_BusyResponse())
+
+        assert any(kind == "info" and event == "backend_balancing" for kind, event, _ in stub.calls)
+        assert any(kind == "warning" for kind, _, _ in stub.calls)
+
+    def test_quiet_response_logs_nothing(self, monkeypatch):
+        stub = _StubLogger()
+        monkeypatch.setattr(provider_module, "logger", stub)
+
+        provider_module._log_wrapper_signals(_QuietResponse())
+
+        assert stub.calls == []
+
+    async def test_create_surfaces_the_signals(self, monkeypatch):
+        # The read must sit in the request path, not merely exist:
+        # removing the call from create() has to fail this test.
+        stub = _StubLogger()
+        monkeypatch.setattr(provider_module, "logger", stub)
+
+        class FakeOriginal:
+            async def create(self, **kwargs):
+                return _BusyResponse()
+
+        completions = _SanitizedCompletions(FakeOriginal())
+        await completions.create(messages=[{"role": "user", "content": "hi"}])
+
+        assert any(event == "backend_balancing" for _, event, _ in stub.calls)