fix(tests): T-7 — the unit suite is hermetic, the flake class is gone

Three flakes in one day, never a captured name — the name finally
came from a discriminating run instead of patience: pointing
OLLAMA_HOST at a dead port failed exactly eight tests, all in
tests/agents/test_tatlock_agent.py, all already marked integration,
all running in the unit gate anyway because make test excluded by
directory and they live outside the ignored directories. Eight tests
doing ~110 seconds of real LLM inference against the production
wrapper on every unit run, failing whenever the backend was
mid-deploy — which this week it constantly was.

The second coupling sat in the session init: conftest ran the real
health probes, an HTTP round trip to whatever answers behind
OLLAMA_HOST plus a real Anthropic API call whenever the dev .env
carries a key, so the cached backend globals followed the network of
the moment. The probes are stubbed to the deterministic local-first
state; tests needing other states patch the globals themselves, as
the selector tests always did.

make test now enforces -m "not integration" alongside the directory
ignores, and the acceptance is blunt: 679 passed in ~12 s, identical
against a dead backend and no API key — down from ~129 s of
infrastructure-coupled runtime. Both prongs mutation-checked: the
gate removed fails eight against a dead backend; the stub removed
fails the new session-globals test. T-8 files the orphaned
tests/integration directory that no make target runs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

.pql/changelog/ticket_history/2026-09.sql

@@ -1,2 +1,14 @@
 INSERT INTO ticket_history (ticket_record_id, field, old_value, new_value, changed_by, changed_at, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G99D07EM5DZWTS0WD9V8PSKM', 'status', 'backlog', 'in_progress', NULL, '2026-09-12 13:50:48', '2026-09-12 13:50:48.289', '2026-09-12 13:50:48.289', NULL, '2e88d155325b3e704787f48b2aa97591', 2) ON CONFLICT(hash) DO NOTHING;
 INSERT INTO ticket_history (ticket_record_id, field, old_value, new_value, changed_by, changed_at, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G99D07EM5DZWTS0WD9V8PSKM', 'status', 'in_progress', 'done', NULL, '2026-09-12 14:13:29', '2026-09-12 14:13:29.027', '2026-09-12 14:13:29.027', NULL, '5b9dd9a62002db0fb4dc58f7f9ffcbb6', 2) ON CONFLICT(hash) DO NOTHING;
+INSERT INTO ticket_history (ticket_record_id, field, old_value, new_value, changed_by, changed_at, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G9KH87TRDGW45GMDWVDRPABR', 'description', 'src/ollama/provider.py sets self._openai_client after super().__init__, but OllamaProvider.client serves self._client (pydantic_ai 1.27''s official openai_client= constructor param is the right wiring — webber hit the identical bug and fixed it 2026-09-13, exposed by the wrapper 503ing a session-less request). Silently dead in production as a result: the content-null sanitizer (moot on llama-server, live hazard if Ollama ever returns), the T-4 x-boilerroom-* signal hook (never logs), and the OLLAMA_TIMEOUT=120 cap (SDK default ~600s applies). Sessions were unaffected — they ride ModelSettings extra_body. Fix like webber: pass _SanitizedAsyncOpenAI through openai_client=, add a wiring test asserting provider.client is the sanitized type, then verify balancing/compaction logs actually appear.', 'src/ollama/provider.py sets self._openai_client after super().__init__, but OllamaProvider.client serves self._client (pydantic_ai 1.27''s official openai_client= constructor param is the right wiring — webber hit the identical bug and fixed it 2026-09-13, exposed by the wrapper 503ing a session-less request). Silently dead in production as a result: the content-null sanitizer (moot on llama-server, live hazard if Ollama ever returns), the T-4 x-boilerroom-* signal hook (never logs), and the OLLAMA_TIMEOUT=120 cap (SDK default ~600s applies). Sessions were unaffected — they ride ModelSettings extra_body. Fix like webber: pass _SanitizedAsyncOpenAI through openai_client=, add a wiring test asserting provider.client is the sanitized type, then verify balancing/compaction logs actually appear.
+
+Second finding 2026-09-13, from webber''s twin fix: an httpx event-hook on the client (the T-4 signal-reading approach) never fires under the openai SDK even when correctly wired — webber verified headers arriving while the hook stayed silent. When rewiring the client, read the signals from the parsed body''s model_extra in the sanitized create() instead (the wrapper injects balancing/compaction_due into non-streamed JSON bodies; openai pydantic models retain unknown fields). The steward''s raw-call body read is unaffected and already correct.', NULL, '2026-09-13 08:00:17', '2026-09-13 08:00:17.002', '2026-09-13 08:00:17.002', NULL, '6fb4cc1d7d7222e3d570cd8c7fed4fd9', 2) ON CONFLICT(hash) DO NOTHING;
+INSERT INTO ticket_history (ticket_record_id, field, old_value, new_value, changed_by, changed_at, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G9KH87TRDGW45GMDWVDRPABR', 'status', 'backlog', 'in_progress', NULL, '2026-09-13 08:19:35', '2026-09-13 08:19:35.028', '2026-09-13 08:19:35.028', NULL, '5bcf19379361a2f766cd4787ff734611', 2) ON CONFLICT(hash) DO NOTHING;
+INSERT INTO ticket_history (ticket_record_id, field, old_value, new_value, changed_by, changed_at, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G9KH87TRDGW45GMDWVDRPABR', 'status', 'in_progress', 'done', NULL, '2026-09-13 08:27:21', '2026-09-13 08:27:21.779', '2026-09-13 08:27:21.779', NULL, '1c59422336b88a76c6f1c3720916d7d5', 2) ON CONFLICT(hash) DO NOTHING;
+INSERT INTO ticket_history (ticket_record_id, field, old_value, new_value, changed_by, changed_at, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G99D07Z3FZY8EBT9PJ1RCGHW', 'status', 'backlog', 'in_progress', NULL, '2026-09-13 08:48:55', '2026-09-13 08:48:55.587', '2026-09-13 08:48:55.587', NULL, 'ca4f8fb42c961b0002aa87bb7b1d5af5', 2) ON CONFLICT(hash) DO NOTHING;
+INSERT INTO ticket_history (ticket_record_id, field, old_value, new_value, changed_by, changed_at, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G99D07Z3FZY8EBT9PJ1RCGHW', 'status', 'in_progress', 'done', NULL, '2026-09-13 09:00:50', '2026-09-13 09:00:50.006', '2026-09-13 09:00:50.006', NULL, '5ea799ee4815e42ede80c3df4c81b28c', 2) ON CONFLICT(hash) DO NOTHING;
+INSERT INTO ticket_history (ticket_record_id, field, old_value, new_value, changed_by, changed_at, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G9KZSCFR79G4DFCT4E5W5CAM', 'description', 'Observed 2026-09-13 twice: before the v2.7.0 release audit and again during T-5 — make test exits 1 with a failure that does not reproduce on the immediate rerun, and both times the failing test''s name went uncaptured because the diagnostic rerun passed. Next occurrence: keep the FULL output of the failing run (make test 2>&1 | tee /tmp/flake.log) before rerunning, then pin the named test. Suspects worth checking when a name exists: order-dependent state in the session-scoped app init (conftest asyncio.run + cached health globals), port/redis contention with the live containers, and the coverage plugin''s tmp handling.', 'Observed 2026-09-13 twice: before the v2.7.0 release audit and again during T-5 — make test exits 1 with a failure that does not reproduce on the immediate rerun, and both times the failing test''s name went uncaptured because the diagnostic rerun passed. Next occurrence: keep the FULL output of the failing run (make test 2>&1 | tee /tmp/flake.log) before rerunning, then pin the named test. Suspects worth checking when a name exists: order-dependent state in the session-scoped app init (conftest asyncio.run + cached health globals), port/redis contention with the live containers, and the coverage plugin''s tmp handling.
+
+Third occurrence 2026-09-13, during the v2.7.2 release gate — and two process lessons captured the hard way: (1) the gate run was piped through grep, which swallowed make''s exit code, so the tag went out on a red run (release content was safe — version+changelog only on green-tested aace128 — but the gate did not gate); release runs must let make test''s exit code stand alone. (2) The failing name went uncaptured AGAIN because the tee capture only started on the rerun, which passed. The capture must wrap the FIRST gate run, every time, not begin after a failure.', NULL, '2026-09-13 09:14:10', '2026-09-13 09:14:10.345', '2026-09-13 09:14:10.345', NULL, '22909a81b656320b4a39405165f48612', 2) ON CONFLICT(hash) DO NOTHING;
+INSERT INTO ticket_history (ticket_record_id, field, old_value, new_value, changed_by, changed_at, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G9KZSCFR79G4DFCT4E5W5CAM', 'status', 'backlog', 'in_progress', NULL, '2026-09-13 09:16:08', '2026-09-13 09:16:08.928', '2026-09-13 09:16:08.928', NULL, '34276614ec535d50d5fa6ddf9f5e0da6', 2) ON CONFLICT(hash) DO NOTHING;
+INSERT INTO ticket_history (ticket_record_id, field, old_value, new_value, changed_by, changed_at, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G9KZSCFR79G4DFCT4E5W5CAM', 'status', 'in_progress', 'done', NULL, '2026-09-13 09:29:10', '2026-09-13 09:29:10.192', '2026-09-13 09:29:10.192', NULL, 'e040af9004e4510c4f8a9e9cacee9a8c', 2) ON CONFLICT(hash) DO NOTHING;

.pql/changelog/ticket_idmap/2026-09.sql

@@ -1,3 +1,6 @@
 INSERT INTO ticket_idmap (record_id, ticket_id, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G94KC9XM3PW91C6B7VJA6VRM', 'T-3', '2026-09-11 21:09:10.267', '2026-09-11 21:09:10.267', NULL, 'a1ccf4d118877c230dffb961a7531cb4', 2) ON CONFLICT(record_id) DO UPDATE SET ticket_id=excluded.ticket_id, updated_at=excluded.updated_at, deleted_at=excluded.deleted_at, hash=excluded.hash, canonical_version=excluded.canonical_version WHERE excluded.updated_at >= ticket_idmap.updated_at;
 INSERT INTO ticket_idmap (record_id, ticket_id, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G99D07EM5DZWTS0WD9V8PSKM', 'T-4', '2026-09-12 08:20:21.494', '2026-09-12 08:20:21.494', NULL, '5b28e07bdc3be1f9ed0ed71d2da60c72', 2) ON CONFLICT(record_id) DO UPDATE SET ticket_id=excluded.ticket_id, updated_at=excluded.updated_at, deleted_at=excluded.deleted_at, hash=excluded.hash, canonical_version=excluded.canonical_version WHERE excluded.updated_at >= ticket_idmap.updated_at;
 INSERT INTO ticket_idmap (record_id, ticket_id, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G99D07Z3FZY8EBT9PJ1RCGHW', 'T-5', '2026-09-12 08:20:21.625', '2026-09-12 08:20:21.625', NULL, '0a417012779f612a4dad1a7dbd0787e3', 2) ON CONFLICT(record_id) DO UPDATE SET ticket_id=excluded.ticket_id, updated_at=excluded.updated_at, deleted_at=excluded.deleted_at, hash=excluded.hash, canonical_version=excluded.canonical_version WHERE excluded.updated_at >= ticket_idmap.updated_at;
+INSERT INTO ticket_idmap (record_id, ticket_id, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G9KH87TRDGW45GMDWVDRPABR', 'T-6', '2026-09-13 07:57:01.782', '2026-09-13 07:57:01.782', NULL, 'd6c184ba6d24e03c0dc77064bf71fead', 2) ON CONFLICT(record_id) DO UPDATE SET ticket_id=excluded.ticket_id, updated_at=excluded.updated_at, deleted_at=excluded.deleted_at, hash=excluded.hash, canonical_version=excluded.canonical_version WHERE excluded.updated_at >= ticket_idmap.updated_at;
+INSERT INTO ticket_idmap (record_id, ticket_id, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G9KZSCFR79G4DFCT4E5W5CAM', 'T-7', '2026-09-13 09:00:32.255', '2026-09-13 09:00:32.255', NULL, 'b0b0a4c3ccaabeb58ad1958e7c2c2602', 2) ON CONFLICT(record_id) DO UPDATE SET ticket_id=excluded.ticket_id, updated_at=excluded.updated_at, deleted_at=excluded.deleted_at, hash=excluded.hash, canonical_version=excluded.canonical_version WHERE excluded.updated_at >= ticket_idmap.updated_at;
+INSERT INTO ticket_idmap (record_id, ticket_id, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G9M68FC27YHQSP1R9SQQ87P0', 'T-8', '2026-09-13 09:28:48.737', '2026-09-13 09:28:48.737', NULL, 'd3a29143f5496ea4b4ee8a9a834c5290', 2) ON CONFLICT(record_id) DO UPDATE SET ticket_id=excluded.ticket_id, updated_at=excluded.updated_at, deleted_at=excluded.deleted_at, hash=excluded.hash, canonical_version=excluded.canonical_version WHERE excluded.updated_at >= ticket_idmap.updated_at;

.pql/changelog/tickets/2026-09.sql

@@ -3,3 +3,26 @@ INSERT INTO tickets (record_id, type, parent_record_id, title, description, stat
 INSERT INTO tickets (record_id, type, parent_record_id, title, description, status, priority, assigned_to, team, decision_ref, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G99D07Z3FZY8EBT9PJ1RCGHW', 'bug', NULL, 'The container logs nowhere: stdout empty, /app/logs mount untouched', 'docker logs tatlock is 0 lines and the mounted ~/docker-data/tatlock/logs has been empty since 2025-12 — the running app writes logs to neither, which made the 2026-09-12 wrapper-cutover verification blind (flavor detection had to be proven behaviorally). Dev mode logs to build/logs/server.log via make run; production should log to stdout for docker logs at minimum.', 'backlog', 'medium', NULL, NULL, NULL, '2026-09-12 08:20:21.624', '2026-09-12 08:20:21.624', NULL, '3fd294efc9afa857aef15810d9003298', 2) ON CONFLICT(record_id) DO UPDATE SET type=excluded.type, parent_record_id=excluded.parent_record_id, title=excluded.title, description=excluded.description, status=excluded.status, priority=excluded.priority, assigned_to=excluded.assigned_to, team=excluded.team, decision_ref=excluded.decision_ref, updated_at=excluded.updated_at, deleted_at=excluded.deleted_at, hash=excluded.hash, canonical_version=excluded.canonical_version WHERE excluded.updated_at >= tickets.updated_at;
 INSERT INTO tickets (record_id, type, parent_record_id, title, description, status, priority, assigned_to, team, decision_ref, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G99D07EM5DZWTS0WD9V8PSKM', 'story', NULL, 'Adopt boilerroom named sessions with the usage ranking', 'Replace raw id_slot pinning (BACKEND_SLOT_PINNING) with the wrapper''s session extension fields, now that tatlock routes through boilerroom:8602 (since 2026-09-12). Ranking by likelihood of use, decided 2026-09-12 — lower eviction_order parks sooner: tatlock pipeline phases highest (eviction_order 40; e.g. sessions tatlock-steward/tatlock-orchestrate/tatlock-synthesize), librarian-routed calls as session librarian (30), webber will sit at 20 (workspace T-137), Open WebUI stays session-less by design (idle slots only, can never evict — and it is being deprecated for an own-webui build). Read the x-boilerroom-balancing and compaction_due signals; the compaction endpoint expects the client transcript (tatlock''s Redis/Qdrant context is the natural producer — boilerroom D-5 names tatlock the first producer).', 'in_progress', 'high', NULL, NULL, NULL, '2026-09-12 08:20:21.493', '2026-09-12 13:50:48.289', NULL, '62abeb4da2f1f7aedb8d92884e7e148c', 2) ON CONFLICT(record_id) DO UPDATE SET type=excluded.type, parent_record_id=excluded.parent_record_id, title=excluded.title, description=excluded.description, status=excluded.status, priority=excluded.priority, assigned_to=excluded.assigned_to, team=excluded.team, decision_ref=excluded.decision_ref, updated_at=excluded.updated_at, deleted_at=excluded.deleted_at, hash=excluded.hash, canonical_version=excluded.canonical_version WHERE excluded.updated_at >= tickets.updated_at;
 INSERT INTO tickets (record_id, type, parent_record_id, title, description, status, priority, assigned_to, team, decision_ref, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G99D07EM5DZWTS0WD9V8PSKM', 'story', NULL, 'Adopt boilerroom named sessions with the usage ranking', 'Replace raw id_slot pinning (BACKEND_SLOT_PINNING) with the wrapper''s session extension fields, now that tatlock routes through boilerroom:8602 (since 2026-09-12). Ranking by likelihood of use, decided 2026-09-12 — lower eviction_order parks sooner: tatlock pipeline phases highest (eviction_order 40; e.g. sessions tatlock-steward/tatlock-orchestrate/tatlock-synthesize), librarian-routed calls as session librarian (30), webber will sit at 20 (workspace T-137), Open WebUI stays session-less by design (idle slots only, can never evict — and it is being deprecated for an own-webui build). Read the x-boilerroom-balancing and compaction_due signals; the compaction endpoint expects the client transcript (tatlock''s Redis/Qdrant context is the natural producer — boilerroom D-5 names tatlock the first producer).', 'done', 'high', NULL, NULL, NULL, '2026-09-12 08:20:21.493', '2026-09-12 14:13:29.027', NULL, '89ce1be323ebb26f00c63569f197cab1', 2) ON CONFLICT(record_id) DO UPDATE SET type=excluded.type, parent_record_id=excluded.parent_record_id, title=excluded.title, description=excluded.description, status=excluded.status, priority=excluded.priority, assigned_to=excluded.assigned_to, team=excluded.team, decision_ref=excluded.decision_ref, updated_at=excluded.updated_at, deleted_at=excluded.deleted_at, hash=excluded.hash, canonical_version=excluded.canonical_version WHERE excluded.updated_at >= tickets.updated_at;
+INSERT INTO tickets (record_id, type, parent_record_id, title, description, status, priority, assigned_to, team, decision_ref, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G9KH87TRDGW45GMDWVDRPABR', 'bug', NULL, 'The sanitized OpenAI client is never used: the override pokes an attribute nobody reads', 'src/ollama/provider.py sets self._openai_client after super().__init__, but OllamaProvider.client serves self._client (pydantic_ai 1.27''s official openai_client= constructor param is the right wiring — webber hit the identical bug and fixed it 2026-09-13, exposed by the wrapper 503ing a session-less request). Silently dead in production as a result: the content-null sanitizer (moot on llama-server, live hazard if Ollama ever returns), the T-4 x-boilerroom-* signal hook (never logs), and the OLLAMA_TIMEOUT=120 cap (SDK default ~600s applies). Sessions were unaffected — they ride ModelSettings extra_body. Fix like webber: pass _SanitizedAsyncOpenAI through openai_client=, add a wiring test asserting provider.client is the sanitized type, then verify balancing/compaction logs actually appear.', 'backlog', 'high', NULL, NULL, NULL, '2026-09-13 07:57:01.782', '2026-09-13 07:57:01.782', NULL, '5e8ea3bf2d18ade9d17f0044ae1ff96b', 2) ON CONFLICT(record_id) DO UPDATE SET type=excluded.type, parent_record_id=excluded.parent_record_id, title=excluded.title, description=excluded.description, status=excluded.status, priority=excluded.priority, assigned_to=excluded.assigned_to, team=excluded.team, decision_ref=excluded.decision_ref, updated_at=excluded.updated_at, deleted_at=excluded.deleted_at, hash=excluded.hash, canonical_version=excluded.canonical_version WHERE excluded.updated_at >= tickets.updated_at;
+INSERT INTO tickets (record_id, type, parent_record_id, title, description, status, priority, assigned_to, team, decision_ref, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G9KH87TRDGW45GMDWVDRPABR', 'bug', NULL, 'The sanitized OpenAI client is never used: the override pokes an attribute nobody reads', 'src/ollama/provider.py sets self._openai_client after super().__init__, but OllamaProvider.client serves self._client (pydantic_ai 1.27''s official openai_client= constructor param is the right wiring — webber hit the identical bug and fixed it 2026-09-13, exposed by the wrapper 503ing a session-less request). Silently dead in production as a result: the content-null sanitizer (moot on llama-server, live hazard if Ollama ever returns), the T-4 x-boilerroom-* signal hook (never logs), and the OLLAMA_TIMEOUT=120 cap (SDK default ~600s applies). Sessions were unaffected — they ride ModelSettings extra_body. Fix like webber: pass _SanitizedAsyncOpenAI through openai_client=, add a wiring test asserting provider.client is the sanitized type, then verify balancing/compaction logs actually appear.
+
+Second finding 2026-09-13, from webber''s twin fix: an httpx event-hook on the client (the T-4 signal-reading approach) never fires under the openai SDK even when correctly wired — webber verified headers arriving while the hook stayed silent. When rewiring the client, read the signals from the parsed body''s model_extra in the sanitized create() instead (the wrapper injects balancing/compaction_due into non-streamed JSON bodies; openai pydantic models retain unknown fields). The steward''s raw-call body read is unaffected and already correct.', 'backlog', 'high', NULL, NULL, NULL, '2026-09-13 07:57:01.782', '2026-09-13 08:00:17.002', NULL, '755abc3689e8ff4fc511deb164137fe5', 2) ON CONFLICT(record_id) DO UPDATE SET type=excluded.type, parent_record_id=excluded.parent_record_id, title=excluded.title, description=excluded.description, status=excluded.status, priority=excluded.priority, assigned_to=excluded.assigned_to, team=excluded.team, decision_ref=excluded.decision_ref, updated_at=excluded.updated_at, deleted_at=excluded.deleted_at, hash=excluded.hash, canonical_version=excluded.canonical_version WHERE excluded.updated_at >= tickets.updated_at;
+INSERT INTO tickets (record_id, type, parent_record_id, title, description, status, priority, assigned_to, team, decision_ref, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G9KH87TRDGW45GMDWVDRPABR', 'bug', NULL, 'The sanitized OpenAI client is never used: the override pokes an attribute nobody reads', 'src/ollama/provider.py sets self._openai_client after super().__init__, but OllamaProvider.client serves self._client (pydantic_ai 1.27''s official openai_client= constructor param is the right wiring — webber hit the identical bug and fixed it 2026-09-13, exposed by the wrapper 503ing a session-less request). Silently dead in production as a result: the content-null sanitizer (moot on llama-server, live hazard if Ollama ever returns), the T-4 x-boilerroom-* signal hook (never logs), and the OLLAMA_TIMEOUT=120 cap (SDK default ~600s applies). Sessions were unaffected — they ride ModelSettings extra_body. Fix like webber: pass _SanitizedAsyncOpenAI through openai_client=, add a wiring test asserting provider.client is the sanitized type, then verify balancing/compaction logs actually appear.
+
+Second finding 2026-09-13, from webber''s twin fix: an httpx event-hook on the client (the T-4 signal-reading approach) never fires under the openai SDK even when correctly wired — webber verified headers arriving while the hook stayed silent. When rewiring the client, read the signals from the parsed body''s model_extra in the sanitized create() instead (the wrapper injects balancing/compaction_due into non-streamed JSON bodies; openai pydantic models retain unknown fields). The steward''s raw-call body read is unaffected and already correct.', 'in_progress', 'high', NULL, NULL, NULL, '2026-09-13 07:57:01.782', '2026-09-13 08:19:35.028', NULL, '5af3c96930a30bbe4bb64d13ddbc509e', 2) ON CONFLICT(record_id) DO UPDATE SET type=excluded.type, parent_record_id=excluded.parent_record_id, title=excluded.title, description=excluded.description, status=excluded.status, priority=excluded.priority, assigned_to=excluded.assigned_to, team=excluded.team, decision_ref=excluded.decision_ref, updated_at=excluded.updated_at, deleted_at=excluded.deleted_at, hash=excluded.hash, canonical_version=excluded.canonical_version WHERE excluded.updated_at >= tickets.updated_at;
+INSERT INTO tickets (record_id, type, parent_record_id, title, description, status, priority, assigned_to, team, decision_ref, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G9KH87TRDGW45GMDWVDRPABR', 'bug', NULL, 'The sanitized OpenAI client is never used: the override pokes an attribute nobody reads', 'src/ollama/provider.py sets self._openai_client after super().__init__, but OllamaProvider.client serves self._client (pydantic_ai 1.27''s official openai_client= constructor param is the right wiring — webber hit the identical bug and fixed it 2026-09-13, exposed by the wrapper 503ing a session-less request). Silently dead in production as a result: the content-null sanitizer (moot on llama-server, live hazard if Ollama ever returns), the T-4 x-boilerroom-* signal hook (never logs), and the OLLAMA_TIMEOUT=120 cap (SDK default ~600s applies). Sessions were unaffected — they ride ModelSettings extra_body. Fix like webber: pass _SanitizedAsyncOpenAI through openai_client=, add a wiring test asserting provider.client is the sanitized type, then verify balancing/compaction logs actually appear.
+
+Second finding 2026-09-13, from webber''s twin fix: an httpx event-hook on the client (the T-4 signal-reading approach) never fires under the openai SDK even when correctly wired — webber verified headers arriving while the hook stayed silent. When rewiring the client, read the signals from the parsed body''s model_extra in the sanitized create() instead (the wrapper injects balancing/compaction_due into non-streamed JSON bodies; openai pydantic models retain unknown fields). The steward''s raw-call body read is unaffected and already correct.', 'done', 'high', NULL, NULL, NULL, '2026-09-13 07:57:01.782', '2026-09-13 08:27:21.778', NULL, 'ce3151ff27c70a1028ba7c03b07119a2', 2) ON CONFLICT(record_id) DO UPDATE SET type=excluded.type, parent_record_id=excluded.parent_record_id, title=excluded.title, description=excluded.description, status=excluded.status, priority=excluded.priority, assigned_to=excluded.assigned_to, team=excluded.team, decision_ref=excluded.decision_ref, updated_at=excluded.updated_at, deleted_at=excluded.deleted_at, hash=excluded.hash, canonical_version=excluded.canonical_version WHERE excluded.updated_at >= tickets.updated_at;
+INSERT INTO tickets (record_id, type, parent_record_id, title, description, status, priority, assigned_to, team, decision_ref, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G99D07Z3FZY8EBT9PJ1RCGHW', 'bug', NULL, 'The container logs nowhere: stdout empty, /app/logs mount untouched', 'docker logs tatlock is 0 lines and the mounted ~/docker-data/tatlock/logs has been empty since 2025-12 — the running app writes logs to neither, which made the 2026-09-12 wrapper-cutover verification blind (flavor detection had to be proven behaviorally). Dev mode logs to build/logs/server.log via make run; production should log to stdout for docker logs at minimum.', 'in_progress', 'medium', NULL, NULL, NULL, '2026-09-12 08:20:21.624', '2026-09-13 08:48:55.586', NULL, '4770f6c6759cb82d825eb550dd4e42e2', 2) ON CONFLICT(record_id) DO UPDATE SET type=excluded.type, parent_record_id=excluded.parent_record_id, title=excluded.title, description=excluded.description, status=excluded.status, priority=excluded.priority, assigned_to=excluded.assigned_to, team=excluded.team, decision_ref=excluded.decision_ref, updated_at=excluded.updated_at, deleted_at=excluded.deleted_at, hash=excluded.hash, canonical_version=excluded.canonical_version WHERE excluded.updated_at >= tickets.updated_at;
+INSERT INTO tickets (record_id, type, parent_record_id, title, description, status, priority, assigned_to, team, decision_ref, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G9KZSCFR79G4DFCT4E5W5CAM', 'bug', NULL, 'The full suite flakes: one run fails, the rerun passes, twice now', 'Observed 2026-09-13 twice: before the v2.7.0 release audit and again during T-5 — make test exits 1 with a failure that does not reproduce on the immediate rerun, and both times the failing test''s name went uncaptured because the diagnostic rerun passed. Next occurrence: keep the FULL output of the failing run (make test 2>&1 | tee /tmp/flake.log) before rerunning, then pin the named test. Suspects worth checking when a name exists: order-dependent state in the session-scoped app init (conftest asyncio.run + cached health globals), port/redis contention with the live containers, and the coverage plugin''s tmp handling.', 'backlog', 'medium', NULL, NULL, NULL, '2026-09-13 09:00:32.255', '2026-09-13 09:00:32.255', NULL, '36c6f97b5a309e169b7acb35f7ca46d4', 2) ON CONFLICT(record_id) DO UPDATE SET type=excluded.type, parent_record_id=excluded.parent_record_id, title=excluded.title, description=excluded.description, status=excluded.status, priority=excluded.priority, assigned_to=excluded.assigned_to, team=excluded.team, decision_ref=excluded.decision_ref, updated_at=excluded.updated_at, deleted_at=excluded.deleted_at, hash=excluded.hash, canonical_version=excluded.canonical_version WHERE excluded.updated_at >= tickets.updated_at;
+INSERT INTO tickets (record_id, type, parent_record_id, title, description, status, priority, assigned_to, team, decision_ref, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G99D07Z3FZY8EBT9PJ1RCGHW', 'bug', NULL, 'The container logs nowhere: stdout empty, /app/logs mount untouched', 'docker logs tatlock is 0 lines and the mounted ~/docker-data/tatlock/logs has been empty since 2025-12 — the running app writes logs to neither, which made the 2026-09-12 wrapper-cutover verification blind (flavor detection had to be proven behaviorally). Dev mode logs to build/logs/server.log via make run; production should log to stdout for docker logs at minimum.', 'done', 'medium', NULL, NULL, NULL, '2026-09-12 08:20:21.624', '2026-09-13 09:00:50.006', NULL, 'd04562943a55527d6036ec38c2657308', 2) ON CONFLICT(record_id) DO UPDATE SET type=excluded.type, parent_record_id=excluded.parent_record_id, title=excluded.title, description=excluded.description, status=excluded.status, priority=excluded.priority, assigned_to=excluded.assigned_to, team=excluded.team, decision_ref=excluded.decision_ref, updated_at=excluded.updated_at, deleted_at=excluded.deleted_at, hash=excluded.hash, canonical_version=excluded.canonical_version WHERE excluded.updated_at >= tickets.updated_at;
+INSERT INTO tickets (record_id, type, parent_record_id, title, description, status, priority, assigned_to, team, decision_ref, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G9KZSCFR79G4DFCT4E5W5CAM', 'bug', NULL, 'The full suite flakes: one run fails, the rerun passes, twice now', 'Observed 2026-09-13 twice: before the v2.7.0 release audit and again during T-5 — make test exits 1 with a failure that does not reproduce on the immediate rerun, and both times the failing test''s name went uncaptured because the diagnostic rerun passed. Next occurrence: keep the FULL output of the failing run (make test 2>&1 | tee /tmp/flake.log) before rerunning, then pin the named test. Suspects worth checking when a name exists: order-dependent state in the session-scoped app init (conftest asyncio.run + cached health globals), port/redis contention with the live containers, and the coverage plugin''s tmp handling.
+
+Third occurrence 2026-09-13, during the v2.7.2 release gate — and two process lessons captured the hard way: (1) the gate run was piped through grep, which swallowed make''s exit code, so the tag went out on a red run (release content was safe — version+changelog only on green-tested aace128 — but the gate did not gate); release runs must let make test''s exit code stand alone. (2) The failing name went uncaptured AGAIN because the tee capture only started on the rerun, which passed. The capture must wrap the FIRST gate run, every time, not begin after a failure.', 'backlog', 'medium', NULL, NULL, NULL, '2026-09-13 09:00:32.255', '2026-09-13 09:14:10.345', NULL, 'ba4c6ab575af14f50acd3a29ff5e7ef8', 2) ON CONFLICT(record_id) DO UPDATE SET type=excluded.type, parent_record_id=excluded.parent_record_id, title=excluded.title, description=excluded.description, status=excluded.status, priority=excluded.priority, assigned_to=excluded.assigned_to, team=excluded.team, decision_ref=excluded.decision_ref, updated_at=excluded.updated_at, deleted_at=excluded.deleted_at, hash=excluded.hash, canonical_version=excluded.canonical_version WHERE excluded.updated_at >= tickets.updated_at;
+INSERT INTO tickets (record_id, type, parent_record_id, title, description, status, priority, assigned_to, team, decision_ref, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G9KZSCFR79G4DFCT4E5W5CAM', 'bug', NULL, 'The full suite flakes: one run fails, the rerun passes, twice now', 'Observed 2026-09-13 twice: before the v2.7.0 release audit and again during T-5 — make test exits 1 with a failure that does not reproduce on the immediate rerun, and both times the failing test''s name went uncaptured because the diagnostic rerun passed. Next occurrence: keep the FULL output of the failing run (make test 2>&1 | tee /tmp/flake.log) before rerunning, then pin the named test. Suspects worth checking when a name exists: order-dependent state in the session-scoped app init (conftest asyncio.run + cached health globals), port/redis contention with the live containers, and the coverage plugin''s tmp handling.
+
+Third occurrence 2026-09-13, during the v2.7.2 release gate — and two process lessons captured the hard way: (1) the gate run was piped through grep, which swallowed make''s exit code, so the tag went out on a red run (release content was safe — version+changelog only on green-tested aace128 — but the gate did not gate); release runs must let make test''s exit code stand alone. (2) The failing name went uncaptured AGAIN because the tee capture only started on the rerun, which passed. The capture must wrap the FIRST gate run, every time, not begin after a failure.', 'in_progress', 'medium', NULL, NULL, NULL, '2026-09-13 09:00:32.255', '2026-09-13 09:16:08.928', NULL, '660f20aa80dccf32427c3c3e26c46c8c', 2) ON CONFLICT(record_id) DO UPDATE SET type=excluded.type, parent_record_id=excluded.parent_record_id, title=excluded.title, description=excluded.description, status=excluded.status, priority=excluded.priority, assigned_to=excluded.assigned_to, team=excluded.team, decision_ref=excluded.decision_ref, updated_at=excluded.updated_at, deleted_at=excluded.deleted_at, hash=excluded.hash, canonical_version=excluded.canonical_version WHERE excluded.updated_at >= tickets.updated_at;
+INSERT INTO tickets (record_id, type, parent_record_id, title, description, status, priority, assigned_to, team, decision_ref, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G9M68FC27YHQSP1R9SQQ87P0', 'task', NULL, 'tests/integration/ runs under no make target', 'Surfaced during T-7: make test ignores tests/integration by directory, and make test-integration runs only tests/agents/test_tatlock_agent.py — so the marked streaming tests in tests/integration/test_tatlock_streaming.py execute under no target at all. Fold them into test-integration (and check they still pass against the current wrapper topology) or retire them deliberately.', 'backlog', 'medium', NULL, NULL, NULL, '2026-09-13 09:28:48.737', '2026-09-13 09:28:48.737', NULL, '50b6e6d25ab009bd17a23544b08e722a', 2) ON CONFLICT(record_id) DO UPDATE SET type=excluded.type, parent_record_id=excluded.parent_record_id, title=excluded.title, description=excluded.description, status=excluded.status, priority=excluded.priority, assigned_to=excluded.assigned_to, team=excluded.team, decision_ref=excluded.decision_ref, updated_at=excluded.updated_at, deleted_at=excluded.deleted_at, hash=excluded.hash, canonical_version=excluded.canonical_version WHERE excluded.updated_at >= tickets.updated_at;
+INSERT INTO tickets (record_id, type, parent_record_id, title, description, status, priority, assigned_to, team, decision_ref, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G9KZSCFR79G4DFCT4E5W5CAM', 'bug', NULL, 'The full suite flakes: one run fails, the rerun passes, twice now', 'Observed 2026-09-13 twice: before the v2.7.0 release audit and again during T-5 — make test exits 1 with a failure that does not reproduce on the immediate rerun, and both times the failing test''s name went uncaptured because the diagnostic rerun passed. Next occurrence: keep the FULL output of the failing run (make test 2>&1 | tee /tmp/flake.log) before rerunning, then pin the named test. Suspects worth checking when a name exists: order-dependent state in the session-scoped app init (conftest asyncio.run + cached health globals), port/redis contention with the live containers, and the coverage plugin''s tmp handling.
+
+Third occurrence 2026-09-13, during the v2.7.2 release gate — and two process lessons captured the hard way: (1) the gate run was piped through grep, which swallowed make''s exit code, so the tag went out on a red run (release content was safe — version+changelog only on green-tested aace128 — but the gate did not gate); release runs must let make test''s exit code stand alone. (2) The failing name went uncaptured AGAIN because the tee capture only started on the rerun, which passed. The capture must wrap the FIRST gate run, every time, not begin after a failure.', 'done', 'medium', NULL, NULL, NULL, '2026-09-13 09:00:32.255', '2026-09-13 09:29:10.191', NULL, 'b15a45c0eaa13b417afe5257236ed0ec', 2) ON CONFLICT(record_id) DO UPDATE SET type=excluded.type, parent_record_id=excluded.parent_record_id, title=excluded.title, description=excluded.description, status=excluded.status, priority=excluded.priority, assigned_to=excluded.assigned_to, team=excluded.team, decision_ref=excluded.decision_ref, updated_at=excluded.updated_at, deleted_at=excluded.deleted_at, hash=excluded.hash, canonical_version=excluded.canonical_version WHERE excluded.updated_at >= tickets.updated_at;

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -7,6 +7,58 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0
 
 ## [Unreleased]
 
+### Fixed
+
+- The unit suite is hermetic and the flake class is gone (T-7). Two
+  live couplings hid inside `make test`: the session init ran the real
+  backend health probes (an HTTP round trip to OLLAMA_HOST and a real
+  Anthropic API call whenever the dev .env carries a key), and the
+  eight integration-marked tests in `tests/agents/test_tatlock_agent.py`
+  ran in the unit gate because it excluded by directory while they
+  live outside the ignored directories — ~110 seconds of real LLM
+  inference per "unit" run, failing whenever the backend was
+  mid-deploy. The probes are now stubbed to the deterministic
+  local-first state (a session test pins it), the gate enforces
+  `-m "not integration"`, and the suite runs in ~12 s with identical
+  results against a dead backend. T-8 files the orphaned
+  `tests/integration/` directory that no make target runs.
+
+## [2.7.2] - 2026-09-13
+
+### Fixed
+
+- Production logs exist now (T-5): the production default log level
+  was WARNING ("minimal noise"), and a healthy service warns roughly
+  never — so `docker logs tatlock` was empty for months, startup,
+  backend flavor detection and the wrapper's balancing/compaction
+  signals all suppressed, and the serving cutover could not be
+  verified from logs. The production default is INFO on stdout;
+  `LOG_LEVEL` remains the override for when noise is ever the real
+  problem. (The `/app/logs` mount was always decorative — no file
+  handler exists; `docker logs` is the log.)
+
+## [2.7.1] - 2026-09-13
+
+### Fixed
+
+- The sanitized OpenAI client was never used (T-6): the provider
+  assigned `self._openai_client`, an attribute nobody reads —
+  `OllamaProvider.client` serves `self._client` — so the null-content
+  sanitizer, the wrapper signal reading and the `OLLAMA_TIMEOUT` cap
+  were all silently dead (sessions were unaffected; they ride
+  ModelSettings). Found via webber's identical bug. The client now
+  goes through the constructor's official `openai_client` parameter,
+  the parent-chat lookup survives openai's property/cached_property
+  descriptor change (ported from webber's 2026-08-11 fix — the old
+  `.fget` access would have crashed the first wired completion on
+  openai 2.11), and the wrapper's `balancing`/`compaction_due`
+  signals are read from the response body's `model_extra` in the
+  request path — the httpx event-hook approach demonstrably never
+  fires under the openai SDK. The provider tests now assert through
+  `provider.client`, the property pydantic_ai actually reads; the
+  old ones asserted on the dead attribute and stayed green
+  throughout.
+
 ## [2.7.0] - 2026-09-13
 
 ### Added

Makefile

@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ run: ## Start the development server on port 8777
 	$(UVICORN) src.main:app --reload --host $(HOST) --port $(PORT) 2>&1 | tee build/logs/server.log
 
 test: ## Run unit tests (no external services needed)
-	$(PYTEST) --ignore=tests/e2e --ignore=tests/integration --ignore=tests/contracts
+	$(PYTEST) --ignore=tests/e2e --ignore=tests/integration --ignore=tests/contracts -m "not integration"
 
 test-unit: test ## Alias for test
 

pyproject.toml

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ build-backend = "setuptools.build_meta"
 
 [project]
 name = "tatlock"
-version = "2.7.0"
+version = "2.7.2"
 description = "OpenAI-compatible API with Ollama backend"
 requires-python = ">=3.12"
 dependencies = [

src/core/config.py

@@ -230,15 +230,21 @@ class Config(BaseSettings):
         Get effective log level, auto-determining from environment if not set.
 
         - development: DEBUG (maximum verbosity)
-        - production: WARNING (minimal noise)
+        - production: INFO
         - testing: INFO
+
+        Production ran at WARNING ("minimal noise") until T-5: a healthy
+        service warns roughly never, so `docker logs` was empty for
+        months — startup, backend flavor detection and the wrapper's
+        balancing/compaction signals all suppressed, which made the
+        2026-09-12 serving cutover unverifiable from logs. INFO on
+        stdout is the operational floor; LOG_LEVEL quiets it when noise
+        ever becomes the real problem.
         """
         if self.LOG_LEVEL is not None:
             return self.LOG_LEVEL
         if self.ENVIRONMENT == Environment.DEVELOPMENT:
             return "DEBUG"
-        if self.ENVIRONMENT == Environment.PRODUCTION:
-            return "WARNING"
         return "INFO"
 
     @property

src/ollama/provider.py

@@ -4,11 +4,21 @@ PydanticAI provider for Ollama with message sanitization.
 Ollama's OpenAI-compatible API rejects messages with `content: null`,
 which PydanticAI sends for assistant messages that only contain tool calls.
 This provider sanitizes messages to use empty strings instead of null.
+
+History worth keeping (repo T-6): until 2026-09-13 the sanitized client
+was never in the request path — the provider assigned
+`self._openai_client`, an attribute nobody reads, while
+`OllamaProvider.client` serves `self._client`. The sanitizer, the
+wrapper-signal reading and the OLLAMA_TIMEOUT cap were all silently
+dead (sessions were unaffected — they ride ModelSettings). webber hit
+the identical bug the same day; both now wire the client through the
+constructor's official `openai_client` parameter, and the signals are
+read from the response body — an httpx event-hook variant demonstrably
+never fires under the openai SDK.
 """
 
 from typing import Any
 
-import httpx
 from openai import AsyncOpenAI
 from pydantic_ai.providers.ollama import OllamaProvider
 
@@ -18,21 +28,25 @@ from src.core.logging_config import get_logger
 logger = get_logger(__name__)
 
 
-async def _log_wrapper_signals(response: httpx.Response) -> None:
+def _log_wrapper_signals(response: Any) -> None:
     """
     Surface the boilerroom wrapper's per-response signals (repo T-4).
 
     balancing names the sessions parked or restored to serve this
     request (wrapper D-4 — never silent); compaction-due says a session
     crossed its authored context budget (wrapper D-5 — a signal, not an
-    interrupt). Reading them is this ticket; producing the compacted
-    transcript is a later one. The headers are absent on any other
-    backend, so the hook costs nothing there.
+    interrupt). Read from the parsed body's extra fields: the wrapper
+    injects them into non-streamed JSON answers and openai's pydantic
+    models retain unknown fields in `model_extra`. Absent on any other
+    backend, so this costs nothing there. Streams carry the signals in
+    headers only and go unlogged here; the steward's raw call reads its
+    own body.
     """
-    balancing = response.headers.get("x-boilerroom-balancing")
-    if balancing and balancing != "[]":
+    extra = getattr(response, "model_extra", None) or {}
+    balancing = extra.get("balancing")
+    if balancing:
         logger.info("backend_balancing", moves=balancing)
-    if response.headers.get("x-boilerroom-compaction-due") == "true":
+    if extra.get("compaction_due"):
         logger.warning(
             "backend_compaction_due",
             hint="GET /sessions on the wrapper names the session over budget",
@@ -58,10 +72,12 @@ class TatlockOllamaProvider(OllamaProvider):
             clean_host = str(config.OLLAMA_HOST).rstrip("/")
             base_url = f"{clean_host}/v1"
 
-        super().__init__(base_url=base_url)
-
-        # Override the client with our sanitized version
-        self._openai_client = _SanitizedAsyncOpenAI(base_url=base_url)
+        # The sanitized client goes through the official constructor
+        # parameter: the provider's `.client` property serves `_client`,
+        # and poking a lookalike attribute after super().__init__ had
+        # built its own client is how the sanitizer sat bypassed in
+        # production (T-6).
+        super().__init__(openai_client=_SanitizedAsyncOpenAI(base_url=base_url))
 
         logger.debug(
             "tatlock_ollama_provider_created",
@@ -78,29 +94,49 @@ class _SanitizedAsyncOpenAI(AsyncOpenAI):
         # configured Ollama timeout instead of the SDK default (~600s),
         # so one stuck request cannot eat the whole delegation budget.
         kwargs.setdefault("timeout", float(config.OLLAMA_TIMEOUT))
-        # The response hook reads the wrapper's balancing/compaction
-        # headers on every call this client makes, streams included.
-        kwargs.setdefault(
-            "http_client",
-            httpx.AsyncClient(
-                event_hooks={"response": [_log_wrapper_signals]},
-                timeout=float(config.OLLAMA_TIMEOUT),
-            ),
-        )
         super().__init__(api_key="ollama", **kwargs)
 
     @property
-    def chat(self) -> "_SanitizedChat":
-        """Return sanitized chat interface."""
+    def chat(self) -> "_SanitizedChat":  # type: ignore[override]
+        """Return sanitized chat interface.
+
+        Deliberately incompatible with AsyncOpenAI.chat, which is a Chat
+        resource. Replacing it is the entire mechanism of this class;
+        typing it as the parent's Chat would describe an object this
+        class does not return. The suppression is on this member alone.
+        """
         return _SanitizedChat(self)
 
 
+def _parent_chat(client: AsyncOpenAI) -> Any:
+    """Get AsyncOpenAI's own `chat`, bypassing the subclass override.
+
+    openai has shipped `chat` as both a property (getter `.fget`) and a
+    functools.cached_property (getter `.func`) — this venv's 2.11.0 is
+    the latter, so the old hardcoded `.fget` access raised
+    AttributeError the moment anything touched `.chat`. It went
+    unnoticed here for the same reason the whole class did: the client
+    was never wired (T-6). Reading whichever getter the descriptor
+    exposes keeps this working across both shapes, and raises something
+    legible if openai adopts a third. Ported from webber's 2026-08-11
+    fix.
+    """
+    descriptor = AsyncOpenAI.__dict__["chat"]
+    getter = getattr(descriptor, "func", None) or getattr(descriptor, "fget", None)
+    if getter is None:  # pragma: no cover - defensive
+        raise TypeError(
+            f"AsyncOpenAI.chat is a {type(descriptor).__name__} with neither "
+            "'func' nor 'fget'; the sanitising wrapper needs updating"
+        )
+    return getter(client)
+
+
 class _SanitizedChat:
     """Chat interface wrapper with sanitized completions."""
 
     def __init__(self, client: _SanitizedAsyncOpenAI):
         self._client = client
-        self._original_chat = AsyncOpenAI.chat.fget(client)  # type: ignore
+        self._original_chat = _parent_chat(client)
 
     @property
     def completions(self) -> "_SanitizedCompletions":
@@ -124,7 +160,9 @@ class _SanitizedCompletions:
         if "messages" in kwargs:
             kwargs["messages"] = _sanitize_messages(kwargs["messages"])
 
-        return await self._original.create(**kwargs)
+        response = await self._original.create(**kwargs)
+        _log_wrapper_signals(response)
+        return response
 
 
 def _sanitize_messages(messages: list[dict[str, Any]]) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:

tests/conftest.py

@@ -49,16 +49,44 @@ def _tenant_guard():
 @pytest.fixture(scope="session", autouse=True)
 def _initialize_app(_tenant_guard):
     """
-    Run application lifespan (Claude health check, household registration, etc.)
+    Run application lifespan (household registration, backend globals)
     once per test session. ASGITransport doesn't trigger lifespan events,
     so we call it explicitly.
 
+    The backend health probes are stubbed (T-7): `make test` promises
+    "no external services", but the real probes coupled every unit run
+    to live infrastructure — an HTTP round trip to whatever answers
+    behind OLLAMA_HOST, and a real Anthropic API call whenever the dev
+    .env carries a key. The suite flaked whenever the local backend was
+    mid-deploy: the ollama probe failed, the cached globals flipped,
+    and any test that consults them unpatched changed behavior. The
+    stubs land the globals in the deterministic local-first state a
+    healthy startup produces; tests needing other states patch the
+    globals themselves, and `make test-integration` runs real probes.
+
     Depends on _tenant_guard so the suite refuses to start under the
     production tenant before any initialization happens.
     """
-    from src.core.startup import initialize_application
+    from unittest.mock import patch
 
-    asyncio.run(initialize_application())
+    from src.anthropic import model_selector
+    from src.core import startup
+
+    async def _healthy_local_backend() -> bool:
+        model_selector._ollama_available = True
+        model_selector._local_flavor = "boilerroom"
+        return True
+
+    async def _no_cloud_fallback() -> bool:
+        model_selector._claude_available = False
+        return False
+
+    # Patch the names startup actually calls (imported into its module).
+    with (
+        patch.object(startup, "check_ollama_health", _healthy_local_backend),
+        patch.object(startup, "check_claude_health", _no_cloud_fallback),
+    ):
+        asyncio.run(startup.initialize_application())
 
 
 @pytest.fixture

tests/core/test_logging_config.py

@@ -241,6 +241,41 @@ class TestLoggingConfiguration:
         with patch.object(config, "ENVIRONMENT", Environment.PRODUCTION):
             assert config.log_format == "json"
 
+    def test_production_default_level_is_info(self):
+        """Production logs INFO to stdout (T-5).
+
+        The old WARNING default made `docker logs` empty for months — a
+        healthy service warns roughly never, so startup, flavor
+        detection and the wrapper signals were all suppressed and the
+        serving cutover could not be verified from logs.
+        """
+        from src.core.config import Environment, config
+
+        with (
+            patch.object(config, "ENVIRONMENT", Environment.PRODUCTION),
+            patch.object(config, "LOG_LEVEL", None),
+        ):
+            assert config.effective_log_level == "INFO"
+
+    def test_log_level_env_still_quiets_production(self):
+        """LOG_LEVEL stays the override for when noise is the problem."""
+        from src.core.config import Environment, config
+
+        with (
+            patch.object(config, "ENVIRONMENT", Environment.PRODUCTION),
+            patch.object(config, "LOG_LEVEL", "WARNING"),
+        ):
+            assert config.effective_log_level == "WARNING"
+
+    def test_development_default_stays_debug(self):
+        from src.core.config import Environment, config
+
+        with (
+            patch.object(config, "ENVIRONMENT", Environment.DEVELOPMENT),
+            patch.object(config, "LOG_LEVEL", None),
+        ):
+            assert config.effective_log_level == "DEBUG"
+
     def test_multiple_loggers_independent(self):
         """Test multiple loggers are independent."""
         logger1 = get_logger("test.logger1")

tests/core/test_session_init.py

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+"""
+The suite's backend globals are stubbed, not probed (T-7).
+
+`make test` promises "no external services". The session init used to
+run the real health probes — an HTTP round trip to whatever answers
+behind OLLAMA_HOST and a real Anthropic API call whenever the dev .env
+carries a key — so the cached globals depended on live infrastructure,
+and the suite flaked whenever the backend was mid-deploy. This test
+discriminates: under the stub the globals are always the local-first
+healthy state; under real probes they follow the network of the moment.
+"""
+
+from src.anthropic import model_selector
+
+
+def test_session_globals_are_deterministic():
+    assert model_selector._ollama_available is True
+    assert model_selector._local_flavor == "boilerroom"
+    assert model_selector._claude_available is False

tests/ollama/test_provider.py

@@ -1,31 +1,73 @@
 """
-Tests for TatlockOllamaProvider configuration.
+Tests for TatlockOllamaProvider configuration and wiring.
 
-The AsyncOpenAI client must carry an explicit timeout from
-config.OLLAMA_TIMEOUT instead of the SDK default (~600s), so a stuck
-LLM call cannot consume the whole delegation budget.
+Every assertion here goes through `provider.client` — the property
+pydantic_ai actually reads. The previous version asserted on
+`_openai_client`, a lookalike attribute nobody read, and stayed green
+for the whole period the sanitizer was bypassed in production (T-6):
+a test whose subject is not the real thing cannot fail for the real
+reason.
 """
 
 import pytest
 
 from src.core.config import config
-from src.ollama.provider import TatlockOllamaProvider, _sanitize_messages
+from src.ollama import provider as provider_module
+from src.ollama.provider import (
+    TatlockOllamaProvider,
+    _parent_chat,
+    _sanitize_messages,
+    _SanitizedAsyncOpenAI,
+    _SanitizedCompletions,
+)
+
+
+@pytest.mark.unit
+class TestClientWiring:
+    """The sanitized client must be the one the provider serves (T-6)."""
+
+    def test_provider_serves_the_sanitized_client(self):
+        provider = TatlockOllamaProvider(base_url="http://localhost:11434/v1")
+
+        assert isinstance(provider.client, _SanitizedAsyncOpenAI)
+
+    def test_the_full_chain_reaches_completions(self):
+        # Walks provider.client -> sanitized chat -> parent lookup ->
+        # completions. Under openai's cached_property `chat`, the old
+        # hardcoded `.fget` access raised AttributeError right here.
+        provider = TatlockOllamaProvider(base_url="http://localhost:11434/v1")
+
+        assert provider.client.chat.completions is not None
+
+    def test_parent_lookup_survives_either_descriptor_shape(self):
+        from openai import AsyncOpenAI
+
+        descriptor = AsyncOpenAI.__dict__["chat"]
+        assert hasattr(descriptor, "func") or hasattr(
+            descriptor, "fget"
+        ), "AsyncOpenAI.chat exposes neither getter; _parent_chat needs updating"
+        client = _SanitizedAsyncOpenAI(base_url="http://localhost:11434/v1")
+        parent = _parent_chat(client)
+        assert parent is not None
+        assert (
+            type(parent).__name__ != "_SanitizedChat"
+        ), "parent lookup must not recurse into the override"
 
 
 @pytest.mark.unit
 class TestProviderTimeout:
-    """Timeout configuration on the underlying AsyncOpenAI client."""
+    """Timeout configuration on the client the provider actually serves."""
 
     def test_openai_client_timeout_from_config(self):
         provider = TatlockOllamaProvider(base_url="http://localhost:11434/v1")
 
-        assert provider._openai_client.timeout == float(config.OLLAMA_TIMEOUT)
+        assert provider.client.timeout == float(config.OLLAMA_TIMEOUT)
 
     def test_timeout_is_not_sdk_default(self):
         provider = TatlockOllamaProvider(base_url="http://localhost:11434/v1")
 
         # The OpenAI SDK defaults to 600s; the configured cap must win
-        assert provider._openai_client.timeout < 600
+        assert provider.client.timeout < 600
 
 
 @pytest.mark.unit
@@ -52,3 +94,68 @@ class TestMessageSanitization:
         ]
 
         assert _sanitize_messages(messages) == messages
+
+
+class _StubLogger:
+    def __init__(self):
+        self.calls = []
+
+    def info(self, event, **kwargs):
+        self.calls.append(("info", event, kwargs))
+
+    def warning(self, event, **kwargs):
+        self.calls.append(("warning", event, kwargs))
+
+
+class _BusyResponse:
+    def __init__(self):
+        self.model_extra = {
+            "balancing": [{"parked": "librarian"}],
+            "compaction_due": True,
+        }
+
+
+class _QuietResponse:
+    def __init__(self):
+        self.model_extra = {"balancing": [], "compaction_due": False}
+
+
+@pytest.mark.unit
+class TestWrapperSignals:
+    """The wrapper's body signals must not pass silently (T-4/T-6).
+
+    Read from the parsed body's model_extra: an httpx event-hook
+    variant demonstrably never fires under the openai SDK.
+    """
+
+    def test_busy_response_logs_balancing_and_compaction(self, monkeypatch):
+        stub = _StubLogger()
+        monkeypatch.setattr(provider_module, "logger", stub)
+
+        provider_module._log_wrapper_signals(_BusyResponse())
+
+        assert any(kind == "info" and event == "backend_balancing" for kind, event, _ in stub.calls)
+        assert any(kind == "warning" for kind, _, _ in stub.calls)
+
+    def test_quiet_response_logs_nothing(self, monkeypatch):
+        stub = _StubLogger()
+        monkeypatch.setattr(provider_module, "logger", stub)
+
+        provider_module._log_wrapper_signals(_QuietResponse())
+
+        assert stub.calls == []
+
+    async def test_create_surfaces_the_signals(self, monkeypatch):
+        # The read must sit in the request path, not merely exist:
+        # removing the call from create() has to fail this test.
+        stub = _StubLogger()
+        monkeypatch.setattr(provider_module, "logger", stub)
+
+        class FakeOriginal:
+            async def create(self, **kwargs):
+                return _BusyResponse()
+
+        completions = _SanitizedCompletions(FakeOriginal())
+        await completions.create(messages=[{"role": "user", "content": "hi"}])
+
+        assert any(event == "backend_balancing" for _, event, _ in stub.calls)