fix(provider): T-6 — the sanitized client is wired for real
The provider assigned self._openai_client, an attribute nobody reads — OllamaProvider.client serves self._client — so the null-content sanitizer, the wrapper signal reading and the OLLAMA_TIMEOUT cap were all silently dead in production (sessions unaffected; they ride ModelSettings). Found via webber's identical bug on 2026-09-13. Three fixes travel together, because wiring alone would have traded a silent bypass for a loud crash: the client goes through the official openai_client constructor parameter; the parent-chat lookup survives openai's property/cached_property descriptor change (this venv's 2.11.0 is the latter — the old hardcoded .fget would have raised AttributeError on the first wired completion; ported from webber's 2026-08-11 fix); and the balancing/compaction signals are read from the response body's model_extra inside create() — the httpx event-hook approach demonstrably never fires under the openai SDK. The tests now assert through provider.client, the property pydantic_ai actually reads. The old ones asserted on the dead attribute and stayed green for the entire bypass — a check whose subject is not the real thing cannot fail for the real reason (workspace D-24's shape). Three mutations shown to fail their tests: the dead-attribute wiring, the .fget-only lookup, and removing the signal read from the request path. 683 tests green; a live dev turn through the wired client answers normally. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Claude Fable 5
@@ -1,2 +1,7 @@
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|
||||
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|
||||
INSERT INTO ticket_history (ticket_record_id, field, old_value, new_value, changed_by, changed_at, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G9KH87TRDGW45GMDWVDRPABR', 'description', 'src/ollama/provider.py sets self._openai_client after super().__init__, but OllamaProvider.client serves self._client (pydantic_ai 1.27''s official openai_client= constructor param is the right wiring — webber hit the identical bug and fixed it 2026-09-13, exposed by the wrapper 503ing a session-less request). Silently dead in production as a result: the content-null sanitizer (moot on llama-server, live hazard if Ollama ever returns), the T-4 x-boilerroom-* signal hook (never logs), and the OLLAMA_TIMEOUT=120 cap (SDK default ~600s applies). Sessions were unaffected — they ride ModelSettings extra_body. Fix like webber: pass _SanitizedAsyncOpenAI through openai_client=, add a wiring test asserting provider.client is the sanitized type, then verify balancing/compaction logs actually appear.', 'src/ollama/provider.py sets self._openai_client after super().__init__, but OllamaProvider.client serves self._client (pydantic_ai 1.27''s official openai_client= constructor param is the right wiring — webber hit the identical bug and fixed it 2026-09-13, exposed by the wrapper 503ing a session-less request). Silently dead in production as a result: the content-null sanitizer (moot on llama-server, live hazard if Ollama ever returns), the T-4 x-boilerroom-* signal hook (never logs), and the OLLAMA_TIMEOUT=120 cap (SDK default ~600s applies). Sessions were unaffected — they ride ModelSettings extra_body. Fix like webber: pass _SanitizedAsyncOpenAI through openai_client=, add a wiring test asserting provider.client is the sanitized type, then verify balancing/compaction logs actually appear.
|
||||
|
||||
Second finding 2026-09-13, from webber''s twin fix: an httpx event-hook on the client (the T-4 signal-reading approach) never fires under the openai SDK even when correctly wired — webber verified headers arriving while the hook stayed silent. When rewiring the client, read the signals from the parsed body''s model_extra in the sanitized create() instead (the wrapper injects balancing/compaction_due into non-streamed JSON bodies; openai pydantic models retain unknown fields). The steward''s raw-call body read is unaffected and already correct.', NULL, '2026-09-13 08:00:17', '2026-09-13 08:00:17.002', '2026-09-13 08:00:17.002', NULL, '6fb4cc1d7d7222e3d570cd8c7fed4fd9', 2) ON CONFLICT(hash) DO NOTHING;
|
||||
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|
||||
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@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
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INSERT INTO ticket_idmap (record_id, ticket_id, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G94KC9XM3PW91C6B7VJA6VRM', 'T-3', '2026-09-11 21:09:10.267', '2026-09-11 21:09:10.267', NULL, 'a1ccf4d118877c230dffb961a7531cb4', 2) ON CONFLICT(record_id) DO UPDATE SET ticket_id=excluded.ticket_id, updated_at=excluded.updated_at, deleted_at=excluded.deleted_at, hash=excluded.hash, canonical_version=excluded.canonical_version WHERE excluded.updated_at >= ticket_idmap.updated_at;
|
||||
INSERT INTO ticket_idmap (record_id, ticket_id, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G99D07EM5DZWTS0WD9V8PSKM', 'T-4', '2026-09-12 08:20:21.494', '2026-09-12 08:20:21.494', NULL, '5b28e07bdc3be1f9ed0ed71d2da60c72', 2) ON CONFLICT(record_id) DO UPDATE SET ticket_id=excluded.ticket_id, updated_at=excluded.updated_at, deleted_at=excluded.deleted_at, hash=excluded.hash, canonical_version=excluded.canonical_version WHERE excluded.updated_at >= ticket_idmap.updated_at;
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||||
INSERT INTO ticket_idmap (record_id, ticket_id, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G99D07Z3FZY8EBT9PJ1RCGHW', 'T-5', '2026-09-12 08:20:21.625', '2026-09-12 08:20:21.625', NULL, '0a417012779f612a4dad1a7dbd0787e3', 2) ON CONFLICT(record_id) DO UPDATE SET ticket_id=excluded.ticket_id, updated_at=excluded.updated_at, deleted_at=excluded.deleted_at, hash=excluded.hash, canonical_version=excluded.canonical_version WHERE excluded.updated_at >= ticket_idmap.updated_at;
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INSERT INTO ticket_idmap (record_id, ticket_id, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G9KH87TRDGW45GMDWVDRPABR', 'T-6', '2026-09-13 07:57:01.782', '2026-09-13 07:57:01.782', NULL, 'd6c184ba6d24e03c0dc77064bf71fead', 2) ON CONFLICT(record_id) DO UPDATE SET ticket_id=excluded.ticket_id, updated_at=excluded.updated_at, deleted_at=excluded.deleted_at, hash=excluded.hash, canonical_version=excluded.canonical_version WHERE excluded.updated_at >= ticket_idmap.updated_at;
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@@ -3,3 +3,13 @@ INSERT INTO tickets (record_id, type, parent_record_id, title, description, stat
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||||
INSERT INTO tickets (record_id, type, parent_record_id, title, description, status, priority, assigned_to, team, decision_ref, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G99D07Z3FZY8EBT9PJ1RCGHW', 'bug', NULL, 'The container logs nowhere: stdout empty, /app/logs mount untouched', 'docker logs tatlock is 0 lines and the mounted ~/docker-data/tatlock/logs has been empty since 2025-12 — the running app writes logs to neither, which made the 2026-09-12 wrapper-cutover verification blind (flavor detection had to be proven behaviorally). Dev mode logs to build/logs/server.log via make run; production should log to stdout for docker logs at minimum.', 'backlog', 'medium', NULL, NULL, NULL, '2026-09-12 08:20:21.624', '2026-09-12 08:20:21.624', NULL, '3fd294efc9afa857aef15810d9003298', 2) ON CONFLICT(record_id) DO UPDATE SET type=excluded.type, parent_record_id=excluded.parent_record_id, title=excluded.title, description=excluded.description, status=excluded.status, priority=excluded.priority, assigned_to=excluded.assigned_to, team=excluded.team, decision_ref=excluded.decision_ref, updated_at=excluded.updated_at, deleted_at=excluded.deleted_at, hash=excluded.hash, canonical_version=excluded.canonical_version WHERE excluded.updated_at >= tickets.updated_at;
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||||
INSERT INTO tickets (record_id, type, parent_record_id, title, description, status, priority, assigned_to, team, decision_ref, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G99D07EM5DZWTS0WD9V8PSKM', 'story', NULL, 'Adopt boilerroom named sessions with the usage ranking', 'Replace raw id_slot pinning (BACKEND_SLOT_PINNING) with the wrapper''s session extension fields, now that tatlock routes through boilerroom:8602 (since 2026-09-12). Ranking by likelihood of use, decided 2026-09-12 — lower eviction_order parks sooner: tatlock pipeline phases highest (eviction_order 40; e.g. sessions tatlock-steward/tatlock-orchestrate/tatlock-synthesize), librarian-routed calls as session librarian (30), webber will sit at 20 (workspace T-137), Open WebUI stays session-less by design (idle slots only, can never evict — and it is being deprecated for an own-webui build). Read the x-boilerroom-balancing and compaction_due signals; the compaction endpoint expects the client transcript (tatlock''s Redis/Qdrant context is the natural producer — boilerroom D-5 names tatlock the first producer).', 'in_progress', 'high', NULL, NULL, NULL, '2026-09-12 08:20:21.493', '2026-09-12 13:50:48.289', NULL, '62abeb4da2f1f7aedb8d92884e7e148c', 2) ON CONFLICT(record_id) DO UPDATE SET type=excluded.type, parent_record_id=excluded.parent_record_id, title=excluded.title, description=excluded.description, status=excluded.status, priority=excluded.priority, assigned_to=excluded.assigned_to, team=excluded.team, decision_ref=excluded.decision_ref, updated_at=excluded.updated_at, deleted_at=excluded.deleted_at, hash=excluded.hash, canonical_version=excluded.canonical_version WHERE excluded.updated_at >= tickets.updated_at;
|
||||
INSERT INTO tickets (record_id, type, parent_record_id, title, description, status, priority, assigned_to, team, decision_ref, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G99D07EM5DZWTS0WD9V8PSKM', 'story', NULL, 'Adopt boilerroom named sessions with the usage ranking', 'Replace raw id_slot pinning (BACKEND_SLOT_PINNING) with the wrapper''s session extension fields, now that tatlock routes through boilerroom:8602 (since 2026-09-12). Ranking by likelihood of use, decided 2026-09-12 — lower eviction_order parks sooner: tatlock pipeline phases highest (eviction_order 40; e.g. sessions tatlock-steward/tatlock-orchestrate/tatlock-synthesize), librarian-routed calls as session librarian (30), webber will sit at 20 (workspace T-137), Open WebUI stays session-less by design (idle slots only, can never evict — and it is being deprecated for an own-webui build). Read the x-boilerroom-balancing and compaction_due signals; the compaction endpoint expects the client transcript (tatlock''s Redis/Qdrant context is the natural producer — boilerroom D-5 names tatlock the first producer).', 'done', 'high', NULL, NULL, NULL, '2026-09-12 08:20:21.493', '2026-09-12 14:13:29.027', NULL, '89ce1be323ebb26f00c63569f197cab1', 2) ON CONFLICT(record_id) DO UPDATE SET type=excluded.type, parent_record_id=excluded.parent_record_id, title=excluded.title, description=excluded.description, status=excluded.status, priority=excluded.priority, assigned_to=excluded.assigned_to, team=excluded.team, decision_ref=excluded.decision_ref, updated_at=excluded.updated_at, deleted_at=excluded.deleted_at, hash=excluded.hash, canonical_version=excluded.canonical_version WHERE excluded.updated_at >= tickets.updated_at;
|
||||
INSERT INTO tickets (record_id, type, parent_record_id, title, description, status, priority, assigned_to, team, decision_ref, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G9KH87TRDGW45GMDWVDRPABR', 'bug', NULL, 'The sanitized OpenAI client is never used: the override pokes an attribute nobody reads', 'src/ollama/provider.py sets self._openai_client after super().__init__, but OllamaProvider.client serves self._client (pydantic_ai 1.27''s official openai_client= constructor param is the right wiring — webber hit the identical bug and fixed it 2026-09-13, exposed by the wrapper 503ing a session-less request). Silently dead in production as a result: the content-null sanitizer (moot on llama-server, live hazard if Ollama ever returns), the T-4 x-boilerroom-* signal hook (never logs), and the OLLAMA_TIMEOUT=120 cap (SDK default ~600s applies). Sessions were unaffected — they ride ModelSettings extra_body. Fix like webber: pass _SanitizedAsyncOpenAI through openai_client=, add a wiring test asserting provider.client is the sanitized type, then verify balancing/compaction logs actually appear.', 'backlog', 'high', NULL, NULL, NULL, '2026-09-13 07:57:01.782', '2026-09-13 07:57:01.782', NULL, '5e8ea3bf2d18ade9d17f0044ae1ff96b', 2) ON CONFLICT(record_id) DO UPDATE SET type=excluded.type, parent_record_id=excluded.parent_record_id, title=excluded.title, description=excluded.description, status=excluded.status, priority=excluded.priority, assigned_to=excluded.assigned_to, team=excluded.team, decision_ref=excluded.decision_ref, updated_at=excluded.updated_at, deleted_at=excluded.deleted_at, hash=excluded.hash, canonical_version=excluded.canonical_version WHERE excluded.updated_at >= tickets.updated_at;
|
||||
INSERT INTO tickets (record_id, type, parent_record_id, title, description, status, priority, assigned_to, team, decision_ref, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G9KH87TRDGW45GMDWVDRPABR', 'bug', NULL, 'The sanitized OpenAI client is never used: the override pokes an attribute nobody reads', 'src/ollama/provider.py sets self._openai_client after super().__init__, but OllamaProvider.client serves self._client (pydantic_ai 1.27''s official openai_client= constructor param is the right wiring — webber hit the identical bug and fixed it 2026-09-13, exposed by the wrapper 503ing a session-less request). Silently dead in production as a result: the content-null sanitizer (moot on llama-server, live hazard if Ollama ever returns), the T-4 x-boilerroom-* signal hook (never logs), and the OLLAMA_TIMEOUT=120 cap (SDK default ~600s applies). Sessions were unaffected — they ride ModelSettings extra_body. Fix like webber: pass _SanitizedAsyncOpenAI through openai_client=, add a wiring test asserting provider.client is the sanitized type, then verify balancing/compaction logs actually appear.
|
||||
|
||||
Second finding 2026-09-13, from webber''s twin fix: an httpx event-hook on the client (the T-4 signal-reading approach) never fires under the openai SDK even when correctly wired — webber verified headers arriving while the hook stayed silent. When rewiring the client, read the signals from the parsed body''s model_extra in the sanitized create() instead (the wrapper injects balancing/compaction_due into non-streamed JSON bodies; openai pydantic models retain unknown fields). The steward''s raw-call body read is unaffected and already correct.', 'backlog', 'high', NULL, NULL, NULL, '2026-09-13 07:57:01.782', '2026-09-13 08:00:17.002', NULL, '755abc3689e8ff4fc511deb164137fe5', 2) ON CONFLICT(record_id) DO UPDATE SET type=excluded.type, parent_record_id=excluded.parent_record_id, title=excluded.title, description=excluded.description, status=excluded.status, priority=excluded.priority, assigned_to=excluded.assigned_to, team=excluded.team, decision_ref=excluded.decision_ref, updated_at=excluded.updated_at, deleted_at=excluded.deleted_at, hash=excluded.hash, canonical_version=excluded.canonical_version WHERE excluded.updated_at >= tickets.updated_at;
|
||||
INSERT INTO tickets (record_id, type, parent_record_id, title, description, status, priority, assigned_to, team, decision_ref, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G9KH87TRDGW45GMDWVDRPABR', 'bug', NULL, 'The sanitized OpenAI client is never used: the override pokes an attribute nobody reads', 'src/ollama/provider.py sets self._openai_client after super().__init__, but OllamaProvider.client serves self._client (pydantic_ai 1.27''s official openai_client= constructor param is the right wiring — webber hit the identical bug and fixed it 2026-09-13, exposed by the wrapper 503ing a session-less request). Silently dead in production as a result: the content-null sanitizer (moot on llama-server, live hazard if Ollama ever returns), the T-4 x-boilerroom-* signal hook (never logs), and the OLLAMA_TIMEOUT=120 cap (SDK default ~600s applies). Sessions were unaffected — they ride ModelSettings extra_body. Fix like webber: pass _SanitizedAsyncOpenAI through openai_client=, add a wiring test asserting provider.client is the sanitized type, then verify balancing/compaction logs actually appear.
|
||||
|
||||
Second finding 2026-09-13, from webber''s twin fix: an httpx event-hook on the client (the T-4 signal-reading approach) never fires under the openai SDK even when correctly wired — webber verified headers arriving while the hook stayed silent. When rewiring the client, read the signals from the parsed body''s model_extra in the sanitized create() instead (the wrapper injects balancing/compaction_due into non-streamed JSON bodies; openai pydantic models retain unknown fields). The steward''s raw-call body read is unaffected and already correct.', 'in_progress', 'high', NULL, NULL, NULL, '2026-09-13 07:57:01.782', '2026-09-13 08:19:35.028', NULL, '5af3c96930a30bbe4bb64d13ddbc509e', 2) ON CONFLICT(record_id) DO UPDATE SET type=excluded.type, parent_record_id=excluded.parent_record_id, title=excluded.title, description=excluded.description, status=excluded.status, priority=excluded.priority, assigned_to=excluded.assigned_to, team=excluded.team, decision_ref=excluded.decision_ref, updated_at=excluded.updated_at, deleted_at=excluded.deleted_at, hash=excluded.hash, canonical_version=excluded.canonical_version WHERE excluded.updated_at >= tickets.updated_at;
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||||
INSERT INTO tickets (record_id, type, parent_record_id, title, description, status, priority, assigned_to, team, decision_ref, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G9KH87TRDGW45GMDWVDRPABR', 'bug', NULL, 'The sanitized OpenAI client is never used: the override pokes an attribute nobody reads', 'src/ollama/provider.py sets self._openai_client after super().__init__, but OllamaProvider.client serves self._client (pydantic_ai 1.27''s official openai_client= constructor param is the right wiring — webber hit the identical bug and fixed it 2026-09-13, exposed by the wrapper 503ing a session-less request). Silently dead in production as a result: the content-null sanitizer (moot on llama-server, live hazard if Ollama ever returns), the T-4 x-boilerroom-* signal hook (never logs), and the OLLAMA_TIMEOUT=120 cap (SDK default ~600s applies). Sessions were unaffected — they ride ModelSettings extra_body. Fix like webber: pass _SanitizedAsyncOpenAI through openai_client=, add a wiring test asserting provider.client is the sanitized type, then verify balancing/compaction logs actually appear.
|
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|
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Second finding 2026-09-13, from webber''s twin fix: an httpx event-hook on the client (the T-4 signal-reading approach) never fires under the openai SDK even when correctly wired — webber verified headers arriving while the hook stayed silent. When rewiring the client, read the signals from the parsed body''s model_extra in the sanitized create() instead (the wrapper injects balancing/compaction_due into non-streamed JSON bodies; openai pydantic models retain unknown fields). The steward''s raw-call body read is unaffected and already correct.', 'done', 'high', NULL, NULL, NULL, '2026-09-13 07:57:01.782', '2026-09-13 08:27:21.778', NULL, 'ce3151ff27c70a1028ba7c03b07119a2', 2) ON CONFLICT(record_id) DO UPDATE SET type=excluded.type, parent_record_id=excluded.parent_record_id, title=excluded.title, description=excluded.description, status=excluded.status, priority=excluded.priority, assigned_to=excluded.assigned_to, team=excluded.team, decision_ref=excluded.decision_ref, updated_at=excluded.updated_at, deleted_at=excluded.deleted_at, hash=excluded.hash, canonical_version=excluded.canonical_version WHERE excluded.updated_at >= tickets.updated_at;
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@@ -7,6 +7,26 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0
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## [Unreleased]
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### Fixed
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- The sanitized OpenAI client was never used (T-6): the provider
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assigned `self._openai_client`, an attribute nobody reads —
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`OllamaProvider.client` serves `self._client` — so the null-content
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sanitizer, the wrapper signal reading and the `OLLAMA_TIMEOUT` cap
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were all silently dead (sessions were unaffected; they ride
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ModelSettings). Found via webber's identical bug. The client now
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goes through the constructor's official `openai_client` parameter,
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the parent-chat lookup survives openai's property/cached_property
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descriptor change (ported from webber's 2026-08-11 fix — the old
|
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`.fget` access would have crashed the first wired completion on
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openai 2.11), and the wrapper's `balancing`/`compaction_due`
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signals are read from the response body's `model_extra` in the
|
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request path — the httpx event-hook approach demonstrably never
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fires under the openai SDK. The provider tests now assert through
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`provider.client`, the property pydantic_ai actually reads; the
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old ones asserted on the dead attribute and stayed green
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throughout.
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## [2.7.0] - 2026-09-13
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### Added
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+63
-25
@@ -4,11 +4,21 @@ PydanticAI provider for Ollama with message sanitization.
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Ollama's OpenAI-compatible API rejects messages with `content: null`,
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which PydanticAI sends for assistant messages that only contain tool calls.
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This provider sanitizes messages to use empty strings instead of null.
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History worth keeping (repo T-6): until 2026-09-13 the sanitized client
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was never in the request path — the provider assigned
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`self._openai_client`, an attribute nobody reads, while
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`OllamaProvider.client` serves `self._client`. The sanitizer, the
|
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wrapper-signal reading and the OLLAMA_TIMEOUT cap were all silently
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dead (sessions were unaffected — they ride ModelSettings). webber hit
|
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the identical bug the same day; both now wire the client through the
|
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constructor's official `openai_client` parameter, and the signals are
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read from the response body — an httpx event-hook variant demonstrably
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never fires under the openai SDK.
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"""
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from typing import Any
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import httpx
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from openai import AsyncOpenAI
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from pydantic_ai.providers.ollama import OllamaProvider
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@@ -18,21 +28,25 @@ from src.core.logging_config import get_logger
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logger = get_logger(__name__)
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async def _log_wrapper_signals(response: httpx.Response) -> None:
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def _log_wrapper_signals(response: Any) -> None:
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"""
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Surface the boilerroom wrapper's per-response signals (repo T-4).
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balancing names the sessions parked or restored to serve this
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request (wrapper D-4 — never silent); compaction-due says a session
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crossed its authored context budget (wrapper D-5 — a signal, not an
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interrupt). Reading them is this ticket; producing the compacted
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transcript is a later one. The headers are absent on any other
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backend, so the hook costs nothing there.
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interrupt). Read from the parsed body's extra fields: the wrapper
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injects them into non-streamed JSON answers and openai's pydantic
|
||||
models retain unknown fields in `model_extra`. Absent on any other
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backend, so this costs nothing there. Streams carry the signals in
|
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headers only and go unlogged here; the steward's raw call reads its
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own body.
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"""
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balancing = response.headers.get("x-boilerroom-balancing")
|
||||
if balancing and balancing != "[]":
|
||||
extra = getattr(response, "model_extra", None) or {}
|
||||
balancing = extra.get("balancing")
|
||||
if balancing:
|
||||
logger.info("backend_balancing", moves=balancing)
|
||||
if response.headers.get("x-boilerroom-compaction-due") == "true":
|
||||
if extra.get("compaction_due"):
|
||||
logger.warning(
|
||||
"backend_compaction_due",
|
||||
hint="GET /sessions on the wrapper names the session over budget",
|
||||
@@ -58,10 +72,12 @@ class TatlockOllamaProvider(OllamaProvider):
|
||||
clean_host = str(config.OLLAMA_HOST).rstrip("/")
|
||||
base_url = f"{clean_host}/v1"
|
||||
|
||||
super().__init__(base_url=base_url)
|
||||
|
||||
# Override the client with our sanitized version
|
||||
self._openai_client = _SanitizedAsyncOpenAI(base_url=base_url)
|
||||
# The sanitized client goes through the official constructor
|
||||
# parameter: the provider's `.client` property serves `_client`,
|
||||
# and poking a lookalike attribute after super().__init__ had
|
||||
# built its own client is how the sanitizer sat bypassed in
|
||||
# production (T-6).
|
||||
super().__init__(openai_client=_SanitizedAsyncOpenAI(base_url=base_url))
|
||||
|
||||
logger.debug(
|
||||
"tatlock_ollama_provider_created",
|
||||
@@ -78,29 +94,49 @@ class _SanitizedAsyncOpenAI(AsyncOpenAI):
|
||||
# configured Ollama timeout instead of the SDK default (~600s),
|
||||
# so one stuck request cannot eat the whole delegation budget.
|
||||
kwargs.setdefault("timeout", float(config.OLLAMA_TIMEOUT))
|
||||
# The response hook reads the wrapper's balancing/compaction
|
||||
# headers on every call this client makes, streams included.
|
||||
kwargs.setdefault(
|
||||
"http_client",
|
||||
httpx.AsyncClient(
|
||||
event_hooks={"response": [_log_wrapper_signals]},
|
||||
timeout=float(config.OLLAMA_TIMEOUT),
|
||||
),
|
||||
)
|
||||
super().__init__(api_key="ollama", **kwargs)
|
||||
|
||||
@property
|
||||
def chat(self) -> "_SanitizedChat":
|
||||
"""Return sanitized chat interface."""
|
||||
def chat(self) -> "_SanitizedChat": # type: ignore[override]
|
||||
"""Return sanitized chat interface.
|
||||
|
||||
Deliberately incompatible with AsyncOpenAI.chat, which is a Chat
|
||||
resource. Replacing it is the entire mechanism of this class;
|
||||
typing it as the parent's Chat would describe an object this
|
||||
class does not return. The suppression is on this member alone.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
return _SanitizedChat(self)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _parent_chat(client: AsyncOpenAI) -> Any:
|
||||
"""Get AsyncOpenAI's own `chat`, bypassing the subclass override.
|
||||
|
||||
openai has shipped `chat` as both a property (getter `.fget`) and a
|
||||
functools.cached_property (getter `.func`) — this venv's 2.11.0 is
|
||||
the latter, so the old hardcoded `.fget` access raised
|
||||
AttributeError the moment anything touched `.chat`. It went
|
||||
unnoticed here for the same reason the whole class did: the client
|
||||
was never wired (T-6). Reading whichever getter the descriptor
|
||||
exposes keeps this working across both shapes, and raises something
|
||||
legible if openai adopts a third. Ported from webber's 2026-08-11
|
||||
fix.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
descriptor = AsyncOpenAI.__dict__["chat"]
|
||||
getter = getattr(descriptor, "func", None) or getattr(descriptor, "fget", None)
|
||||
if getter is None: # pragma: no cover - defensive
|
||||
raise TypeError(
|
||||
f"AsyncOpenAI.chat is a {type(descriptor).__name__} with neither "
|
||||
"'func' nor 'fget'; the sanitising wrapper needs updating"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return getter(client)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class _SanitizedChat:
|
||||
"""Chat interface wrapper with sanitized completions."""
|
||||
|
||||
def __init__(self, client: _SanitizedAsyncOpenAI):
|
||||
self._client = client
|
||||
self._original_chat = AsyncOpenAI.chat.fget(client) # type: ignore
|
||||
self._original_chat = _parent_chat(client)
|
||||
|
||||
@property
|
||||
def completions(self) -> "_SanitizedCompletions":
|
||||
@@ -124,7 +160,9 @@ class _SanitizedCompletions:
|
||||
if "messages" in kwargs:
|
||||
kwargs["messages"] = _sanitize_messages(kwargs["messages"])
|
||||
|
||||
return await self._original.create(**kwargs)
|
||||
response = await self._original.create(**kwargs)
|
||||
_log_wrapper_signals(response)
|
||||
return response
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _sanitize_messages(messages: list[dict[str, Any]]) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,31 +1,73 @@
|
||||
"""
|
||||
Tests for TatlockOllamaProvider configuration.
|
||||
Tests for TatlockOllamaProvider configuration and wiring.
|
||||
|
||||
The AsyncOpenAI client must carry an explicit timeout from
|
||||
config.OLLAMA_TIMEOUT instead of the SDK default (~600s), so a stuck
|
||||
LLM call cannot consume the whole delegation budget.
|
||||
Every assertion here goes through `provider.client` — the property
|
||||
pydantic_ai actually reads. The previous version asserted on
|
||||
`_openai_client`, a lookalike attribute nobody read, and stayed green
|
||||
for the whole period the sanitizer was bypassed in production (T-6):
|
||||
a test whose subject is not the real thing cannot fail for the real
|
||||
reason.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
import pytest
|
||||
|
||||
from src.core.config import config
|
||||
from src.ollama.provider import TatlockOllamaProvider, _sanitize_messages
|
||||
from src.ollama import provider as provider_module
|
||||
from src.ollama.provider import (
|
||||
TatlockOllamaProvider,
|
||||
_parent_chat,
|
||||
_sanitize_messages,
|
||||
_SanitizedAsyncOpenAI,
|
||||
_SanitizedCompletions,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@pytest.mark.unit
|
||||
class TestClientWiring:
|
||||
"""The sanitized client must be the one the provider serves (T-6)."""
|
||||
|
||||
def test_provider_serves_the_sanitized_client(self):
|
||||
provider = TatlockOllamaProvider(base_url="http://localhost:11434/v1")
|
||||
|
||||
assert isinstance(provider.client, _SanitizedAsyncOpenAI)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_the_full_chain_reaches_completions(self):
|
||||
# Walks provider.client -> sanitized chat -> parent lookup ->
|
||||
# completions. Under openai's cached_property `chat`, the old
|
||||
# hardcoded `.fget` access raised AttributeError right here.
|
||||
provider = TatlockOllamaProvider(base_url="http://localhost:11434/v1")
|
||||
|
||||
assert provider.client.chat.completions is not None
|
||||
|
||||
def test_parent_lookup_survives_either_descriptor_shape(self):
|
||||
from openai import AsyncOpenAI
|
||||
|
||||
descriptor = AsyncOpenAI.__dict__["chat"]
|
||||
assert hasattr(descriptor, "func") or hasattr(
|
||||
descriptor, "fget"
|
||||
), "AsyncOpenAI.chat exposes neither getter; _parent_chat needs updating"
|
||||
client = _SanitizedAsyncOpenAI(base_url="http://localhost:11434/v1")
|
||||
parent = _parent_chat(client)
|
||||
assert parent is not None
|
||||
assert (
|
||||
type(parent).__name__ != "_SanitizedChat"
|
||||
), "parent lookup must not recurse into the override"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@pytest.mark.unit
|
||||
class TestProviderTimeout:
|
||||
"""Timeout configuration on the underlying AsyncOpenAI client."""
|
||||
"""Timeout configuration on the client the provider actually serves."""
|
||||
|
||||
def test_openai_client_timeout_from_config(self):
|
||||
provider = TatlockOllamaProvider(base_url="http://localhost:11434/v1")
|
||||
|
||||
assert provider._openai_client.timeout == float(config.OLLAMA_TIMEOUT)
|
||||
assert provider.client.timeout == float(config.OLLAMA_TIMEOUT)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_timeout_is_not_sdk_default(self):
|
||||
provider = TatlockOllamaProvider(base_url="http://localhost:11434/v1")
|
||||
|
||||
# The OpenAI SDK defaults to 600s; the configured cap must win
|
||||
assert provider._openai_client.timeout < 600
|
||||
assert provider.client.timeout < 600
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@pytest.mark.unit
|
||||
@@ -52,3 +94,68 @@ class TestMessageSanitization:
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
assert _sanitize_messages(messages) == messages
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class _StubLogger:
|
||||
def __init__(self):
|
||||
self.calls = []
|
||||
|
||||
def info(self, event, **kwargs):
|
||||
self.calls.append(("info", event, kwargs))
|
||||
|
||||
def warning(self, event, **kwargs):
|
||||
self.calls.append(("warning", event, kwargs))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class _BusyResponse:
|
||||
def __init__(self):
|
||||
self.model_extra = {
|
||||
"balancing": [{"parked": "librarian"}],
|
||||
"compaction_due": True,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class _QuietResponse:
|
||||
def __init__(self):
|
||||
self.model_extra = {"balancing": [], "compaction_due": False}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@pytest.mark.unit
|
||||
class TestWrapperSignals:
|
||||
"""The wrapper's body signals must not pass silently (T-4/T-6).
|
||||
|
||||
Read from the parsed body's model_extra: an httpx event-hook
|
||||
variant demonstrably never fires under the openai SDK.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
def test_busy_response_logs_balancing_and_compaction(self, monkeypatch):
|
||||
stub = _StubLogger()
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(provider_module, "logger", stub)
|
||||
|
||||
provider_module._log_wrapper_signals(_BusyResponse())
|
||||
|
||||
assert any(kind == "info" and event == "backend_balancing" for kind, event, _ in stub.calls)
|
||||
assert any(kind == "warning" for kind, _, _ in stub.calls)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_quiet_response_logs_nothing(self, monkeypatch):
|
||||
stub = _StubLogger()
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(provider_module, "logger", stub)
|
||||
|
||||
provider_module._log_wrapper_signals(_QuietResponse())
|
||||
|
||||
assert stub.calls == []
|
||||
|
||||
async def test_create_surfaces_the_signals(self, monkeypatch):
|
||||
# The read must sit in the request path, not merely exist:
|
||||
# removing the call from create() has to fail this test.
|
||||
stub = _StubLogger()
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(provider_module, "logger", stub)
|
||||
|
||||
class FakeOriginal:
|
||||
async def create(self, **kwargs):
|
||||
return _BusyResponse()
|
||||
|
||||
completions = _SanitizedCompletions(FakeOriginal())
|
||||
await completions.create(messages=[{"role": "user", "content": "hi"}])
|
||||
|
||||
assert any(event == "backend_balancing" for _, event, _ in stub.calls)
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user