- Fix sova headquarters GJ 280B → GJ 280A (core.toml + tier1.toml) - Relocate Ross 154 Water Cooperative to Kapteyn's Star (GJ 191) - Fix Rødvik archetype gas_giant_skimming → frontier_ice_mining - Fix Altmark shadow economy hop band (outer_reach → mid_reach, hop 6) - Fix Holgersen naming (was Holmgren) in north_reach.toml - Fix Hansestadt gate count 5 → 6 in currency_zones.toml - Fix unclosed parenthesis in shadow_economy.toml CAPACITY GAP comment Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
670 lines
34 KiB
TOML
670 lines
34 KiB
TOML
# ==========================================================================
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# Settled Reach — Shadow Economy Seeding Parameters
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# Source of truth for shadow_economy_intensity initialization.
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# Compiled to systems.db via `make economy-db`.
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#
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# shadow_economy_intensity: float [0.0, 1.0]
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# Measures the gap between formal (Commission-audited) and real economic
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# activity at each node. This is NOT a crime index. A system with
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# intensity 0.8 has roughly 20% of its economy visible to the Assembly
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# lattice audit trail — not because 80% is criminal, but because 80%
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# is conducted through channels the Commission does not count.
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#
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# The official_coverage_ratio signal (D-181 signal 7) derives directly
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# from this initialization parameter:
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# official_coverage_ratio ≈ 1.0 - shadow_economy_intensity
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# A system with intensity 0.7 → official_coverage_ratio ≈ 0.3, meaning
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# the Commission's economic picture understates reality by roughly 3×.
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#
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# Seeding algorithm:
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# 1. Look up geographic band by hop_distance_from_gateway
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# 2. Sample uniformly within [band.intensity_min, band.intensity_max]
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# 3. Apply active modifiers (additive, order-independent)
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# 4. Clamp result to [0.0, 1.0]
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# 5. Apply system_override if present (replaces formula result entirely)
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#
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# Sol (the currency) is the shadow medium of exchange — untraceable,
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# no issuer to cooperate with enforcement, no lattice audit trail.
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# Sol is NOT a currency zone; it is modeled as a shadow commodity (D-171).
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# Shadow_economy_intensity controls how active the Sol shadow layer is:
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# higher intensity → higher Sol black-market premium above Tractus par.
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#
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# Contraband types (canonical, from D-174):
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# - Unlicensed lattice components (D-037)
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# - Sol-denominated luxury goods (Earth imports)
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# - Unregistered commercial intelligence
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# - Unlicensed re-embodiment
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#
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# Decisions: D-174 (shadow economy layer), D-171 (Sol as shadow commodity),
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# D-172 (Compact currency friction → structural driver),
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# D-181 (official_coverage_ratio signal)
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# Authors: Paula (narrative framing), Miri (geographic distribution),
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# Mellanie (file structure and prose)
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# ==========================================================================
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# --------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# THE COMPACT FRAMING — READ THIS BEFORE MODIFYING (D-174)
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#
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# The Compact of Westphalia's shadow economy is PRINCIPLED ECONOMIC
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# RESISTANCE to Assembly currency friction on enforcement costs.
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# It is NOT frontier lawlessness. This distinction is architecturally
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# critical for NPC dialogue, faction reactions, and the inspect verb.
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#
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# WHY THE COMPACT HAS HIGH INTENSITY:
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#
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# Commission certification fees and enforcement assessments are
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# Tractus-denominated. Compact systems operating in the Mark zone pay
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# these costs at the ~3% cross-zone conversion rate (D-172). Over time,
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# rational actors in Compact systems structure their transactions to avoid
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# Commission audit requirements: Mark-denominated domestic trade, supply
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# chains routed through Compact customs arrangements, Sol for cross-zone
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# transactions that benefit from anonymity. None of this is criminal.
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# It is economically rational behavior in a zone where Commission authority
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# is both politically contested and economically punitive.
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#
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# Intensity in Compact systems reflects the GAP IN THE ASSEMBLY'S
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# ACCOUNTING, not the behavior of the people. A Compact system at
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# intensity 0.75 is not more criminal than an inner system at 0.1 —
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# its economy is simply less legible to the Commission because its
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# residents have decided, as a matter of political principle, not to
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# organize their commerce around Assembly certification requirements.
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#
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# CONTRAST — WHY FRONTIER SYSTEMS HAVE HIGH INTENSITY:
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#
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# Frontier systems (hop 10+) have high intensity for structurally
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# different reasons: genuine Commission absence, sparse enforcement,
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# actual contraband networks, unlicensed re-embodiment operations, Sol
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# black markets filling gaps in formal medical and technical supply.
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# The frontier shadow economy is a CAPACITY GAP (the Commission cannot
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# physically reach here), not a deliberate choice to operate outside it.
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#
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# WHAT THIS MEANS FOR THE INVESTIGATE VERB (Phase 3):
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#
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# An investigator who treats Compact opacity as criminality will lose
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# trust rapidly and find closed doors. The Compact's "shadow" economy
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# is visible to anyone who operates within Compact commercial frameworks —
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# it is only opaque to the Commission's audit tools. Gaining access to
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# a Compact system's real economic picture requires building relationships
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# within the Compact network, not finding criminal informants.
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#
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# An investigator who treats frontier opacity as principled politics will
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# miss actual criminal networks operating in the enforcement vacuum. The
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# frontier's shadow economy includes actors who are genuinely dangerous
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# and genuinely hidden. Finding them requires different tools than finding
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# Compact commerce.
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#
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# The inspect verb should reflect this distinction. Framing it as a
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# binary "formal/informal" misses the politics. The right question is:
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# "Informal by whose accounting? Principled non-compliance or operational
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# concealment?"
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# --------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# --------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# GEOGRAPHIC BASE RANGES
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#
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# Applied by hop_distance_from_gateway (system_gates.hop_distance_from_gateway).
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# The import pipeline samples uniformly within [intensity_min, intensity_max]
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# to produce the base value before modifiers.
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#
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# Miri: geographic distribution of specific systems within these bands,
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# and whether any band boundaries need adjusting based on actual system map.
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# --------------------------------------------------------------------------
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[bands.core]
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hop_range = [0, 2]
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intensity_min = 0.00
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intensity_max = 0.20
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note = """
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Gateway and immediate core systems. Commission enforcement capacity is at maximum density;
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lattice audit coverage is comprehensive. Formal-channel compliance is the economically
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rational choice here — certification costs are low, enforcement risk is high, and formal
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alternatives exist for nearly every transaction category.
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Sol black market exists (Earth luxury goods have always moved through informal channels)
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but is thin relative to the formal economy. Prosecution risk and the ready availability
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of certified alternatives keep the shadow layer suppressed. The gap between official and
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real economic activity is narrow enough that Commission economic statistics are largely
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reliable at this range.
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"""
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[bands.inner_reach]
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hop_range = [3, 4]
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intensity_min = 0.10
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intensity_max = 0.35
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note = """
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Established inner corridor. Commission presence is significant but geographically uneven —
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major trade nodes are well-covered; secondary systems increasingly rely on periodic
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enforcement visits rather than resident Commission staff. Shadow market exists and is
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commercially viable for contraband and Commission-contested goods, but formal-channel
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alternatives are still competitive for most transaction categories.
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Tractus is hegemonic in this band; Mark is accepted at a premium in systems with
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west_reach trade relationships. Sol circulates for high-end Earth imports and as a
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prestige payment mechanism for services that benefit from untraceability.
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"""
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[bands.mid_reach]
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hop_range = [5, 6]
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intensity_min = 0.30
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intensity_max = 0.55
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note = """
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Commission enforcement becomes increasingly expensive and selective at this range.
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Resident Commission staff is rare; enforcement relies on periodic inspection of
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high-volume transit nodes with secondary systems going largely unchecked.
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MIXED currency zone begins here (sympathetic Compact systems at hops 5–6, per D-172).
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Shadow market for luxury goods, unlicensed services, and Sol-denominated transactions
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is commercially viable and commonly used. In Compact-sympathetic systems, informal
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commerce is beginning to reflect principled non-compliance rather than purely
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opportunistic avoidance.
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Miri: identify specific systems in this band for Compact-sympathetic classification
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and apply the compact_membership modifier accordingly.
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"""
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[bands.outer_reach]
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hop_range = [7, 9]
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intensity_min = 0.45
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intensity_max = 0.70
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note = """
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Commission presence is minimal. Assembly observation thins sharply at this range —
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the furthest sustained Commission post (Altmark, GJ 357) sits at mid_reach (hop 6),
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one band inward. In outer_reach systems, enforcement is intermittent and practically symbolic.
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Compact member systems dominate this band. Mark-denominated commerce is the norm;
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Tractus is accepted but priced at a premium that reflects currency friction and
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political signaling. The base band intensity (0.45–0.70) reflects the structural
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enforcement gap; Compact membership raises this further via modifier (see below).
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IMPORTANT: High intensity in this band does not indicate elevated criminality relative
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to inner systems. It reflects that Compact-internal trade is not Commission-audited
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and that the Commission's tools for measuring economic activity do not reach this deep.
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The economy is real, organized, and commercially sophisticated — it is simply operating
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under different governance than the Assembly recognizes.
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Miri: flag systems in this band that are NOT Compact members (Assembly-compliant
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outer systems) — they should not receive the compact_membership modifier.
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"""
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[bands.deep_frontier]
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hop_range = [10, 99]
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intensity_min = 0.60
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intensity_max = 0.90
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note = """
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Commission authority is theoretical at this range. Enforcement capacity does not
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exist in any meaningful sense — the cost of projecting enforcement to hop 10+
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exceeds any plausible revenue from compliance enforcement.
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High intensity at this range reflects two overlapping realities that must be
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distinguished in NPC generation and dialogue:
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1. PRINCIPLED NON-COMPLIANCE: Systems founded by settlers from Compact member
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communities carry the Compact's political culture from founding. Their informal
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commerce is structurally similar to outer_reach Compact systems — organized,
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Mark-denominated, non-violent, operating through well-established commercial
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relationships. The Compact framing applies here.
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2. ENFORCEMENT VACUUM: Where Compact culture has not taken root, the enforcement
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vacuum is filled by actors who are genuinely operating outside any recognized
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governance framework. Unlicensed re-embodiment operations, unregistered
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commercial intelligence networks, Sol black markets in contraband, unlicensed
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lattice component trade — these are the canonical contraband categories and
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they are real at this depth.
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The investigator must determine which reality is present in a given system.
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Both can coexist. A deep frontier system may have principled Compact commerce
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in one economic sector and genuine contraband networks in another.
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"""
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# --------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# SEEDING MODIFIERS
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#
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# Additive adjustments applied to the sampled band base. Multiple modifiers
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# can apply simultaneously. Final value is clamped to [0.0, 1.0].
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#
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# Modifier sources (system_factions table fields):
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# compact_membership: currency_zone = 'MARK_PRIMARY' (per D-172)
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# commission_strong: commission_presence = 'strong'
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# commission_moderate: commission_presence = 'moderate'
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# commission_absent: commission_presence IS NULL or 'none'
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# gate_dead_end: system_gates.gate_topology = 'dead_end'
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# gate_transit_hub: system_gates.gate_connections >= 3
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#
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# Server team (#808): implement modifier lookup from these fields.
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# --------------------------------------------------------------------------
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[modifiers.compact_membership]
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delta = 0.15
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cap = 0.90
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field = "currency_zone"
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field_value = "MARK_PRIMARY"
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note = """
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Compact membership elevates intensity independently of hop distance. A hop-6
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Compact system is elevated above a hop-6 non-Compact system. A hop-4
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Compact-sympathetic system (MIXED zone) shows moderate elevation even though
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the Commission is physically present.
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This captures the structural currency friction: Commission certification costs
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trigger Tractus-to-Mark conversion at ~3% overhead per transaction, making
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informal-channel transactions economically rational even for actors who have
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no objection to formal compliance in principle. Over time, informal channels
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become entrenched not through choice but through accumulated economic logic.
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The cap of 0.90 prevents Compact membership alone from pushing intensity to
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maximum — even the most committed Compact systems maintain some formal-channel
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commerce, particularly for intra-Compact transactions that benefit from the
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Compact's own customs infrastructure.
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Narrative: Compact intensity is PRINCIPLED. Do not conflate with criminality.
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"""
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[modifiers.commission_strong]
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delta = -0.20
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floor = 0.05
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field = "commission_presence"
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field_value = "strong"
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note = """
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Strong Commission presence suppresses the shadow economy. Enforcement risk rises;
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formal-channel compliance becomes competitive because informal operators face active
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prosecution. Certification costs are worth paying when the alternative is Commission
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scrutiny.
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The floor of 0.05 acknowledges that no system is fully opaque to informal commerce.
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Sol-denominated transactions for premium Earth goods persist even under heavy
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enforcement — the demand for untraceability at the high end of the market does not
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disappear when enforcement intensifies, it just becomes more expensive and discrete.
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"""
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[modifiers.commission_moderate]
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delta = -0.10
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floor = 0.05
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field = "commission_presence"
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field_value = "moderate"
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note = """
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Moderate Commission presence. Selective enforcement: high-value contraband is
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prosecuted; low-level informal commerce is tolerated or ignored. Typical for
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mid-corridor systems where the Commission maintains a registered office and
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resident staff but lacks the capacity to audit routine commercial activity.
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The shadow economy is commercially viable but carries some risk premium —
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informal operators price enforcement exposure into their margins.
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"""
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[modifiers.commission_absent]
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delta = 0.10
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floor = 0.0
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field = "commission_presence"
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field_value = "none"
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note = """
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No Commission presence. Formal certification is not locally available, which means
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it is not economically accessible even for actors who would prefer it. Elevates
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intensity because some actors shift to informal channels by necessity, not choice.
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Note: commission_absent does NOT imply that the system is lawless. In Compact
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systems, the absence of Commission presence reflects the Compact's own governance
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filling the regulatory function. In frontier systems, the absence may be genuine
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governance vacuum. The modifier value is identical; the narrative interpretation
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differs depending on political context.
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"""
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[modifiers.gate_dead_end]
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delta = 0.10
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floor = 0.0
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field = "gate_topology"
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field_value = "dead_end"
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note = """
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Dead-end gate topology (single outbound connection). Low transit volume means fewer
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Commission inspection opportunities and reduced economic incentive for formal-channel
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compliance. Smuggling routes are well-established in dead-end systems — a gate with
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one connection is easier to predict, easier to avoid, and once controlled, provides
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a reliable informal transit corridor.
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Dead-end systems also tend toward economic captivity: their single gate makes them
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dependent on the transit node that gate connects to, and that dependency creates
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commercial relationships that may be structured informally regardless of political
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disposition.
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"""
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[modifiers.gate_transit_hub]
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delta = -0.05
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floor = 0.0
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field = "gate_connections"
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field_comparison = ">="
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field_value = 3
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note = """
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Multi-connection transit hub. High freight volume attracts Commission inspection
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infrastructure; formal-channel compliance has commercial value (faster clearance,
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bonded carrier status, access to Commission-certified logistics networks).
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Partial suppression only — major transit hubs also attract contraband passing
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through en route to secondary systems. The hub's formal economy is more competitive,
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but the volume of traffic means that informal operators have more cover. Net effect
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is modest suppression compared to the stronger commission_presence modifiers.
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"""
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# --------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# EFFECTS REFERENCE
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#
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# How shadow_economy_intensity affects simulation parameters at runtime.
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# These are read by the economics simulation; not authored here, just
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# documented for cross-reference.
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#
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# intensity_band sol_premium contraband_discount formal_service_quality
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# 0.0 – 0.2 none none high
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# 0.2 – 0.4 +5–15% 5–10% below cert. moderate
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# 0.4 – 0.6 +15–30% 10–20% below cert. moderate-low
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# 0.6 – 0.8 +30–60% 20–35% below cert. low
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# 0.8 – 1.0 +60–120%+ 35–50% below cert. degraded
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#
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# sol_premium: Sol black-market price above Tractus par (Sol scarcity)
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# contraband_discount: informal-channel price vs. Commission-certified price
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# formal_service_quality: Commission-certified service availability and
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# reliability (lower = queues, delays, unofficial fees demanded)
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#
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# Server team (#808): these are guidelines for the behavioral layer, not
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# simulation parameters. Actual calibration belongs in the sim binary.
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# --------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# --------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# SYSTEM-SPECIFIC OVERRIDES
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#
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# These take precedence over the band + modifier formula. Used for named
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# systems with historically exceptional shadow economy conditions that
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# the general formula would not capture correctly.
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#
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# Required fields per override:
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# intensity float [0.0, 1.0] — replaces formula output
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# rationale string — required; import pipeline rejects undocumented overrides
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#
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# Miri: add additional Compact member systems with exceptional conditions.
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# Miri: cross-reference against compact-of-westphalia.md and individual
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# system pages for systems that may warrant override treatment.
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# --------------------------------------------------------------------------
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[system_overrides."GJ 0"]
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# Sol — Earth system, hop 0
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intensity = 0.40
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rationale = """
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Sol is the origin point of the currency that underpins the shadow economy — Sol-the-
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currency was Earth's before the Reach existed. But it is also the most heavily
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regulated system in the Reach. Assembly authority is at maximum density; the
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Commission's enforcement apparatus is headquartered here; arrival screening and
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commercial monitoring are comprehensive.
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The elevated intensity (above core band maximum of 0.20) reflects Sol's structural
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role as the entrepôt for two shadow economy flows: (1) premium Earth goods
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entering the Reach as Sol-denominated imports — wines, foods, artisan goods that
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the producer community never routes through Commission certification because Sol
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buyers specifically value the chain-of-custody opacity; (2) Reach luxury exports
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moving to Sol buyers through informal channels that preserve seller anonymity and
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avoid Tractus conversion.
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This is a sophisticated shadow economy, not a disorganized one. The actors are
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experienced, the routes are well-established, and the transactions are deliberately
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structured to avoid Commission visibility. Sol's informal commercial sector is more
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legally complex and commercially advanced than any frontier shadow economy —
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it simply has the resources to operate discretely rather than visibly.
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"""
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[system_overrides."GJ 357"]
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# Altmark — Assembly trade delegate post, hop 6, mid_reach/Compact border
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intensity = 0.48
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rationale = """
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Altmark hosts the Assembly's permanent trade delegate — the furthest sustained
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Commission presence in the west_reach corridor. Its intensity is above the
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mid_reach band midpoint (0.30–0.55 = midpoint ~0.42) because Altmark sits at
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the edge of the Compact zone: outbound freight heading deeper into Compact space
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passes through here, and a meaningful fraction of that commerce enters Compact
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customs arrangements that Commission audit cannot follow.
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The delegate's presence introduces informal scrutiny that suppresses the most
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visible informal commerce. Operators in Altmark understand that the Commission
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watches here; high-profile informal commerce that would be unremarkable in a
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deeper system draws attention in Altmark.
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However, Altmark is not truly an Assembly-compliant system. It is the border.
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Both currencies circulate in daily commerce. Both sets of customs rules are
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applied negotiably. The shadow economy is real but structured: informal-channel
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operators have adapted to the delegate's presence, which means Altmark's shadow
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economy is more disciplined and harder to observe than a typical hop-6 system —
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but it is not suppressed. What you will find at Altmark is not absence of informal
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commerce but absence of visible informal commerce.
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The Assembly delegate files commercial intelligence reports after every visit to
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Compact systems. Operators in Altmark know this and factor it into their behavior.
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"""
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[system_overrides."GJ 601A"]
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# Ostmark — Compact of Westphalia founding member, institutional anchor, hop 9
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intensity = 0.75
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rationale = """
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Ostmark is the institutional anchor of the Compact of Westphalia — a wave_1
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settlement with five centuries of self-governance history, the founding signatory
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whose representatives helped draft the mutual recognition framework sixty years ago.
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Its intensity of 0.75 is the canonical expression of the PRINCIPLED framing.
|
||
|
||
Ostmark's commercial relationships are conducted almost entirely through Compact
|
||
customs arrangements. Its transactions are Mark-denominated as a matter of cultural
|
||
identity, not merely economic calculation. Its supply chains run through the
|
||
Compact's internal trade network. The Commission audit trail does not reach
|
||
Ostmark by deliberate political design — not because Ostmark lacks the
|
||
organizational capacity to interface with Commission frameworks, but because
|
||
Ostmark's governance has formally refused to recognize Commission authority over
|
||
its internal economic affairs.
|
||
|
||
The official_coverage_ratio at Ostmark (≈ 0.25 — roughly 25% of economic activity
|
||
Commission-visible) reflects the institutional depth of Compact non-compliance here:
|
||
even transactions that could be Commission-certified (export commodities that inner
|
||
corridor buyers might want certified) are routed through Compact channels that avoid
|
||
that certification because the certification requirement itself is considered an
|
||
illegitimate imposition.
|
||
|
||
An investigator arriving at Ostmark to investigate "informal commerce" will find that
|
||
the informal sector IS the economy. There is no smaller shadow sector sitting outside
|
||
the main economy — the relationship is inverted. The Commission-visible portion is
|
||
the thin exception; the Compact-organized economy is the full picture.
|
||
"""
|
||
|
||
[system_overrides."GJ 453"]
|
||
# Freiholt — Compact founding member (GJ 453, hop 7, west_reach)
|
||
# Note: GJ 624 = Halvøy (aquaculture world) — do not conflate.
|
||
intensity = 0.72
|
||
rationale = """
|
||
Founding Compact member with strong self-governance heritage. The principled
|
||
framing applies fully — Freiholt's high intensity reflects organized Compact
|
||
commerce, not criminal activity.
|
||
|
||
Marginally lower than Ostmark (0.72 vs 0.75) because Freiholt maintains more
|
||
active commercial traffic with MIXED-zone systems at hops 5–6, introducing a
|
||
degree of formal-channel compliance for those cross-zone transactions. Where
|
||
Ostmark has structurally withdrawn from Commission-adjacent commerce, Freiholt
|
||
maintains selective formal compliance at the border of its commercial relationships
|
||
as a pragmatic accommodation to inner corridor buyers who require certification.
|
||
This creates a visible dual structure: a fully informal internal economy and a
|
||
thin formal-channel interface for outbound trade.
|
||
"""
|
||
|
||
[system_overrides."GJ 3333"]
|
||
# Groenland — pragmatic Compact member, joined for trade economics
|
||
intensity = 0.62
|
||
rationale = """
|
||
Groenland signed the Compact for economic access, not ideological commitment. Its
|
||
agricultural surplus became commercially viable when Compact customs arrangements
|
||
reduced import costs enough to make long-haul transport economical. The membership
|
||
was arithmetic, and the economic behavior reflects that.
|
||
|
||
Groenland actors operate a mixed strategy: formal Commission channels when selling
|
||
to inner corridor buyers who require certification (the agricultural surplus exports
|
||
better with quality certification in Tractus-zone markets), and Compact informal
|
||
channels for domestic and intra-Compact commerce. This mixed strategy produces lower
|
||
intensity than founding Compact members — the formal-channel interface is genuinely
|
||
used, not performatively maintained.
|
||
|
||
The intensity gap between Groenland (0.62) and Ostmark (0.75) is the mechanical
|
||
representation of the Compact's internal tension: founding members who signed for
|
||
principle versus new members who signed for commercial access. That tension has
|
||
governance implications (newer members push for institutional development; founding
|
||
members resist accretion) and economic implications (members with active formal-
|
||
channel commercial relationships have incentives to maintain Commission-compatible
|
||
practices that founding members do not share).
|
||
"""
|
||
|
||
[system_overrides."GJ 127B"]
|
||
# Echternach — deep-corridor member with medical supply dependency
|
||
intensity = 0.82
|
||
rationale = """
|
||
Echternach presents a more complex picture than other Compact systems. Its high
|
||
intensity (above the founding-member range) reflects a combination of principled
|
||
Compact commerce AND genuine contraband in the medical sector.
|
||
|
||
The community depends on medical hardware imports that carry Commission certification
|
||
requirements. At Echternach's depth, certified medical hardware is expensive, often
|
||
delayed by months, and subject to Commission allocation priorities that may not
|
||
match community needs. Unlicensed re-embodiment facilities and unregistered medical
|
||
devices fill this gap. The community does not consider this criminal — the Commission-
|
||
certified alternatives are economically and logistically inaccessible. But from the
|
||
Commission's perspective, this is canonical contraband (unlicensed re-embodiment is
|
||
explicitly listed in D-174's contraband catalog).
|
||
|
||
The investigator will encounter both realities in the same economic space: the bulk
|
||
of Echternach's commerce follows the principled Compact framing (Mark-denominated,
|
||
Compact-channel, non-violent, politically organized); the medical sector operates
|
||
in a genuine enforcement vacuum with actors who are doing things the Commission
|
||
classifies as criminal and the community classifies as necessary.
|
||
|
||
This makes Echternach a useful case study for the inspect verb: the same high
|
||
official_coverage_ratio (≈ 0.18) describes two structurally different informal
|
||
sectors. Understanding which is which requires qualitative investigation, not just
|
||
intensity metrics.
|
||
"""
|
||
|
||
# --- MIRI GEOGRAPHIC ADDENDUM ---
|
||
# Addresses outstanding questions from band notes above.
|
||
# Cross-reference: wiki/economics/currency_zones.toml (Miri, Sprint 33)
|
||
|
||
# OUTER_REACH BAND QUERY (hop 7-9, "flag non-Compact outer systems"):
|
||
# Answer: there are NONE. All 22 west_reach systems at hops 7-9 are Compact
|
||
# formal signatories per currency_zones.toml. The outer_reach band formula
|
||
# reliably represents Compact territory for this corridor. Systems in other
|
||
# sectors (east_reach, south_reach) at comparable hops are TRACTUS_PRIMARY
|
||
# and receive a lower base before modifiers.
|
||
#
|
||
# MID_REACH BAND QUERY (hop 5-6, "identify Compact-sympathetic systems"):
|
||
# All 14 west_reach systems at hops 5-6 are MIXED zone (Compact-sympathetic).
|
||
# See currency_zones.toml [[mixed]] table for full list.
|
||
# The compact_membership modifier applies to MARK_PRIMARY zone only (not MIXED).
|
||
# MIXED-zone systems at hop 5-6 do NOT get the +0.15 modifier; their elevated
|
||
# intensity relative to inner-reach systems is captured by the band range itself
|
||
# (0.30-0.55 vs. 0.10-0.35 for inner_reach).
|
||
|
||
[system_overrides."GJ 832"]
|
||
# Hansestadt — Merchant Assembly hub, west_reach, hop 5, MIXED zone
|
||
intensity = 0.38
|
||
rationale = """
|
||
Hansestadt is the commercial center of the west_reach corridor and the seat of
|
||
the Merchant Assembly — a west_reach commercial governance body that is distinct
|
||
from and coordinates with (but is not subordinate to) the Concord Assembly.
|
||
Its five gates make it the busiest transit node between inner corridor and
|
||
Compact territory.
|
||
|
||
The intensity of 0.38 is above the inner_reach band and at the lower edge of
|
||
the mid_reach band. Both currencies are in routine use; the formal economy is
|
||
sophisticated and commercially dominant. However, the volume of Compact-direction
|
||
freight (moving outward through Altmark toward Freiholt and beyond) means that
|
||
a substantial fraction of goods passing through Hansestadt are in the process of
|
||
entering the Compact zone, where they will disappear from Commission audit
|
||
visibility. The gap between goods entering Hansestadt from inward and goods
|
||
reported as delivered to Compact-zone recipients is structurally permanent.
|
||
|
||
This is not criminal in Hansestadt — goods are properly manifested to the point
|
||
they cross into Compact customs territory, at which point manifesting ceases. The
|
||
informal layer at Hansestadt is commercial transit, not commercial origin. The
|
||
Sol premium here is modest (Earth goods available through established import
|
||
merchants); contraband shadow pricing exists but is not the dominant commercial
|
||
story. Hansestadt's shadow economy is volume-driven, not intensity-driven.
|
||
|
||
The Merchant Assembly's governance role creates formal commercial frameworks that
|
||
can accommodate both currency zones without requiring informal channels for most
|
||
transaction categories. This keeps intensity below what raw hop distance and
|
||
transit volume would otherwise suggest.
|
||
"""
|
||
|
||
[system_overrides."GJ 529"]
|
||
# Yttermark — outermost dead-end in west_reach, hop 17, MARK_PRIMARY
|
||
intensity = 0.91
|
||
rationale = """
|
||
Yttermark is the outermost settled system in the west_reach corridor — a dead-end
|
||
at hop 17, where the name (Swedish: 'outermost boundary') describes the lived
|
||
reality. Commission authority is not theoretical here; it does not exist as a
|
||
meaningful concept. There is no periodic enforcement. There is no Commission
|
||
inspector. There is no certified supply chain for most transaction categories.
|
||
|
||
The intensity of 0.91 reflects the operational reality: formal-channel commerce
|
||
requires infrastructure that Yttermark does not have and cannot obtain at
|
||
commercially viable costs. This is the extreme of the frontier enforcement vacuum.
|
||
|
||
The PRINCIPLED framing still applies — Yttermark was founded from Compact-culture
|
||
communities and its self-governance is organized and stable, not anarchic. The
|
||
high intensity does not indicate disorder; it indicates comprehensive Commission
|
||
invisibility. The official_coverage_ratio at Yttermark (≈ 0.09) means the
|
||
Commission's economic picture of the system is built almost entirely on what the
|
||
two gates transmit in transit manifests. Everything else — all local commerce,
|
||
all service provision, all production and consumption at the single inhabited body
|
||
— is invisible to the Assembly.
|
||
|
||
The intensity cap of 0.90 from the compact_membership modifier is exceeded here
|
||
by the accumulation of enforcement vacuum and dead-end topology effects, plus
|
||
the base deep_frontier range. Pipeline: clamp to 1.0 if formula exceeds it.
|
||
"""
|
||
|
||
[system_overrides."GJ 807"]
|
||
# Grenzstein — 'Boundary stone', west_reach, hop 16, MARK_PRIMARY
|
||
intensity = 0.88
|
||
rationale = """
|
||
Near-identical conditions to Yttermark. Grenzstein sits one hop inward from the
|
||
outermost settled node and shares the structural characteristics of the far
|
||
frontier: no Commission presence, no certified supply alternatives, Compact-culture
|
||
self-governance, and through-route topology connecting to Yttermark.
|
||
|
||
The through_route topology provides one degree of differentiation — Grenzstein is
|
||
not a dead-end, which means slightly higher transit volume and slightly more
|
||
commercial interaction with systems inward. Through-routes create informal customs
|
||
functions (goods pass through, some transit commerce develops) that partially
|
||
substitute for formal Commission infrastructure. This keeps intensity marginally
|
||
below the dead-end Yttermark, but the conditions are structurally equivalent.
|
||
|
||
The name is deliberate and ironic — the community at the boundary stone is not
|
||
at a boundary of civilizational capacity but at a boundary of Commission legibility.
|
||
They govern themselves, they trade through the Compact, they maintain the gate.
|
||
They simply do not report to anyone who would file Commission paperwork.
|
||
"""
|
||
|
||
[system_overrides."GJ 282A"]
|
||
# Bout du Chemin — 'End of the road', west_reach, hop 15, MARK_PRIMARY
|
||
intensity = 0.85
|
||
rationale = """
|
||
'End of the road' is the literal translation and the accurate description. At hop
|
||
15, Bout du Chemin was the furthest point of the settled corridor before Grenzstein
|
||
and Yttermark extended the reach. Its founding name reflects that original status.
|
||
|
||
Through-route topology connecting to Grenzstein means Bout du Chemin serves as an
|
||
informal transit node for goods moving between the inner corridor and the truly
|
||
outer frontier. The shadow economy here includes a transit function that the two
|
||
outermost systems do not have: goods are moving through, not just being produced
|
||
and consumed locally.
|
||
|
||
This transit function introduces a layer of Sol-denominated brokerage that makes
|
||
Bout du Chemin slightly more commercially sophisticated than the two deeper systems.
|
||
The actors here who are managing the informal transit economy are experienced. They
|
||
know how far Commission authority reaches (not here), what the exchange premium on
|
||
Sol is at this depth, and what can be moved through a system where no one is
|
||
counting. The intensity of 0.85 reflects this: high but not maximum, because the
|
||
transit sophistication creates pricing discipline that pure enforcement-vacuum
|
||
systems lack.
|
||
"""
|