release v1.8.0

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>

.pql/changelog/ticket_history/2026-08.sql

@@ -45,3 +45,106 @@ So every timeout since 2025-12-07 has been recorded as a generic failure carryin
 FIX: catch asyncio.TimeoutError explicitly in _run_executor, ahead of the broad handler, and let it propagate (or return a marker execute_task can distinguish). Note the ordering is the whole bug — a narrower except after a broader one is dead code, and there is no linter configured here to say so.
 
 Related: a thread started by asyncio.to_thread cannot be cancelled, so after T-74 a timeout frees the loop while the work continues to completion. Whatever ''timeout'' comes to mean should say so rather than implying the work stopped.', NULL, '2026-08-11 09:59:05', '2026-08-11 09:59:05.545', '2026-08-11 09:59:05.545', NULL, 'af08842306d6326036b1865b8cbf7c58', 2) ON CONFLICT(hash) DO NOTHING;
+INSERT INTO ticket_history (ticket_record_id, field, old_value, new_value, changed_by, changed_at, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06FZ0GQAR5KXM3PTG0QT3R1PV8', 'description', 'get_tasks_for_minute (src/tasks/executor.py:70) excludes any task holding a task_executions row with status=''running'':
+
+  AND id NOT IN (SELECT task_id FROM task_executions WHERE status = ''running'')
+
+Nothing ever reconciles that row. It is written before the executor runs and updated after, so a process that dies in between leaves it ''running'' permanently — and the task is then excluded from every future minute, forever, with no error, no alarm and no log line. The task simply stops existing as far as the scheduler is concerned.
+
+This is not hypothetical. test_example_task has held a ''running'' row since 2025-12-07 — 5916 hours. It happens to be disabled, so nothing is broken today; the mechanism is what matters, not this instance.
+
+The exposure is real and daily: Watchtower restarts this container every morning at 4 AM. Any task still running at that moment is permanently unscheduled by it. The config backup runs 03:05 and takes ~21 minutes, which is not far off.
+
+The failure mode is the one this system keeps producing: it looks like nothing. A backup that stops running forever produces no failure — it produces silence, and silence reads as health.
+
+FIX: reconcile at startup. Any row left ''running'' when the process starts cannot be running, because the process that owned it is gone. Mark those ''orphaned'' (or ''failed'' with a message naming the restart) during app startup, before the scheduler begins its first minute. Consider also a stale-row guard for rows older than the task''s timeout_seconds, which covers a killed worker without a restart.
+
+The audit trail is preserved either way — this is a status correction, not a deletion.', 'get_tasks_for_minute (src/tasks/executor.py:70) excludes any task holding a task_executions row with status=''running'':
+
+  AND id NOT IN (SELECT task_id FROM task_executions WHERE status = ''running'')
+
+Nothing ever reconciles that row. It is written before the executor runs and updated after, so a process that dies in between leaves it ''running'' permanently — and the task is then excluded from every future minute, forever, with no error, no alarm and no log line. The task simply stops existing as far as the scheduler is concerned.
+
+This is not hypothetical. test_example_task has held a ''running'' row since 2025-12-07 — 5916 hours. It happens to be disabled, so nothing is broken today; the mechanism is what matters, not this instance.
+
+The exposure is real and daily: Watchtower restarts this container every morning at 4 AM. Any task still running at that moment is permanently unscheduled by it. The config backup runs 03:05 and takes ~21 minutes, which is not far off.
+
+The failure mode is the one this system keeps producing: it looks like nothing. A backup that stops running forever produces no failure — it produces silence, and silence reads as health.
+
+FIX: reconcile at startup. Any row left ''running'' when the process starts cannot be running, because the process that owned it is gone. Mark those ''orphaned'' (or ''failed'' with a message naming the restart) during app startup, before the scheduler begins its first minute. Consider also a stale-row guard for rows older than the task''s timeout_seconds, which covers a killed worker without a restart.
+
+The audit trail is preserved either way — this is a status correction, not a deletion.
+
+FIXED in v1.6.0 (e45de4f). TaskExecutor.reconcile_orphaned_executions() runs in the lifespan before the scheduler starts.
+
+Proven on the real system rather than in a test. The row that had been ''running'' since 2025-12-07 22:44 was released at startup:
+
+  WARNING - Orphaned execution recovered: test_example_task was left ''running''
+            since 2025-12-07 22:44:00.046695. That task had been excluded from
+            scheduling until now.
+
+Rows still ''running'' afterwards: 0. Status is ''orphaned'', error names the restart.
+
+''orphaned'' rather than ''failed'' because the outcome is genuinely unknown — a task that completed and never got to update its row looks exactly like one that died halfway, and ''failed'' would assert something nobody observed.
+
+Ordering is part of the fix and is mutation-checked: reconciliation must complete before the first minute is processed, or the first tick still sees the stale rows. Removing the startup call fails the test.
+
+Not extended to a duration-based sweep, deliberately. While the process lives, execute_task''s finally always closes the row out, so a stale row implies a dead owner; a time-based rule would have to distinguish a slow task from a dead one and would eventually close the record of a task that is still working.', NULL, '2026-08-11 10:11:39', '2026-08-11 10:11:39.058', '2026-08-11 10:11:39.058', NULL, '0cec030639664cf075a113be75218e8d', 2) ON CONFLICT(hash) DO NOTHING;
+INSERT INTO ticket_history (ticket_record_id, field, old_value, new_value, changed_by, changed_at, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06FZ0GQAR5KXM3PTG0QT3R1PV8', 'status', 'backlog', 'done', NULL, '2026-08-11 10:11:39', '2026-08-11 10:11:39.178', '2026-08-11 10:11:39.178', NULL, 'cd26a078365d91d44e6d284e80da39f5', 2) ON CONFLICT(hash) DO NOTHING;
+INSERT INTO ticket_history (ticket_record_id, field, old_value, new_value, changed_by, changed_at, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06FZ0GQBTCRCTXK6EJF0T8CS2C', 'description', 'execute_task has an `except asyncio.TimeoutError` handler (src/tasks/executor.py:179) that records status=''timeout''. It can never run.
+
+_run_executor wraps the awaited call in `except Exception` (line 219) and returns the error as a value. Since Python 3.11 asyncio.TimeoutError IS the builtin TimeoutError, which inherits OSError -> Exception, so the broad handler catches it first and converts it into an ordinary (None, error) tuple. execute_task then sees a non-None error and files status=''failed''.
+
+Verified in the deployed runtime:
+  asyncio.TimeoutError is TimeoutError: True
+  MRO: TimeoutError -> OSError -> Exception -> BaseException
+
+And confirmed against 8 months of history — 18,785 executions, and the count of status=''timeout'' rows is zero:
+  success 16690 | failed 2093 | running 2 | timeout 0
+
+So every timeout since 2025-12-07 has been recorded as a generic failure carrying a traceback. Operationally that erases the distinction that matters most when a job misbehaves: "this job is too slow for its window" and "this job is broken" need different responses, and right now they look identical in the history.
+
+FIX: catch asyncio.TimeoutError explicitly in _run_executor, ahead of the broad handler, and let it propagate (or return a marker execute_task can distinguish). Note the ordering is the whole bug — a narrower except after a broader one is dead code, and there is no linter configured here to say so.
+
+Related: a thread started by asyncio.to_thread cannot be cancelled, so after T-74 a timeout frees the loop while the work continues to completion. Whatever ''timeout'' comes to mean should say so rather than implying the work stopped.', 'execute_task has an `except asyncio.TimeoutError` handler (src/tasks/executor.py:179) that records status=''timeout''. It can never run.
+
+_run_executor wraps the awaited call in `except Exception` (line 219) and returns the error as a value. Since Python 3.11 asyncio.TimeoutError IS the builtin TimeoutError, which inherits OSError -> Exception, so the broad handler catches it first and converts it into an ordinary (None, error) tuple. execute_task then sees a non-None error and files status=''failed''.
+
+Verified in the deployed runtime:
+  asyncio.TimeoutError is TimeoutError: True
+  MRO: TimeoutError -> OSError -> Exception -> BaseException
+
+And confirmed against 8 months of history — 18,785 executions, and the count of status=''timeout'' rows is zero:
+  success 16690 | failed 2093 | running 2 | timeout 0
+
+So every timeout since 2025-12-07 has been recorded as a generic failure carrying a traceback. Operationally that erases the distinction that matters most when a job misbehaves: "this job is too slow for its window" and "this job is broken" need different responses, and right now they look identical in the history.
+
+FIX: catch asyncio.TimeoutError explicitly in _run_executor, ahead of the broad handler, and let it propagate (or return a marker execute_task can distinguish). Note the ordering is the whole bug — a narrower except after a broader one is dead code, and there is no linter configured here to say so.
+
+Related: a thread started by asyncio.to_thread cannot be cancelled, so after T-74 a timeout frees the loop while the work continues to completion. Whatever ''timeout'' comes to mean should say so rather than implying the work stopped.
+
+FIXED in v1.6.0 (e45de4f). _run_executor now catches asyncio.TimeoutError ahead of the broad handler and re-raises, so execute_task''s timeout branch is reachable for the first time.
+
+A trap surfaced while fixing it, and it is the interesting part. While the branch was unreachable, a timeout travelled the NORMAL path — which does update scheduled_tasks. Making the branch reachable without adding that write would have swapped a wrong status (''failed'') for a stale one (last_status showing the previous run''s outcome indefinitely). _update_task_outcome now mirrors terminal outcomes onto the parent row. A fix that repairs the reported symptom while breaking something adjacent is worse than the bug.
+
+The timeout message also records that the work may still be running: after T-74 executors are handed to asyncio.to_thread, and a thread cannot be cancelled, so wait_for frees the loop while the work continues to completion. Saying "timed out" without that would imply the work stopped.
+
+Mutation-checked: removing the narrow except clause fails the propagation test. A third test pins that ordinary exceptions are still returned rather than raised, so the narrow clause cannot start swallowing anything else.', NULL, '2026-08-11 10:11:39', '2026-08-11 10:11:39.291', '2026-08-11 10:11:39.291', NULL, '8bdb93fdcfbc234e18f3d034ddf25277', 2) ON CONFLICT(hash) DO NOTHING;
+INSERT INTO ticket_history (ticket_record_id, field, old_value, new_value, changed_by, changed_at, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06FZ0GQBTCRCTXK6EJF0T8CS2C', 'status', 'backlog', 'done', NULL, '2026-08-11 10:11:39', '2026-08-11 10:11:39.421', '2026-08-11 10:11:39.421', NULL, '7bc24ec03ed40ccacd71d7c7269d05af', 2) ON CONFLICT(hash) DO NOTHING;
+INSERT INTO ticket_history (ticket_record_id, field, old_value, new_value, changed_by, changed_at, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06FZ0PNFBDB743QJQ9MF38MPJ8', 'description', NULL, 'DONE in v1.7.0 (538bfe5). Verified on a real row:
+
+  12:24:27  ok  task=backup_portainer_daily  source=scheduler/portainer_backup_executor
+
+WHY, and why not the other fix. A row written by a failing probe on 2026-08-11 was byte-for-byte what a nightly backup failure would have written — same source, same domain, nothing naming the task. The reflex was to delete the inconvenient row; that was refused as audit tampering and the refusal was right twice over, because the row is TRUE (a run did fail) and the defect is that it cannot say which run. Attribution keeps the record intact and makes it answer the question.
+
+MECHANISM. A ContextVar (src/task_context.py) set by the engine around executor invocation, read by health_report. Not an argument: executors are invoked as execute(config, settings), there are ten, and several are dormant — they exist only as a string in a database row and become live the moment someone inserts a task naming them. A signature change would leave those broken in a way no import, grep or test would reveal. Not injected into `config` either: config is what a human wrote in the task definition and an executor may legitimately reject unknown keys.
+
+TWO PROPERTIES VERIFIED IN THE DEPLOYED RUNTIME rather than assumed:
+  - asyncio.to_thread propagates context, so attribution survives the worker thread T-74 introduced. Had it not, every row from a real executor would have lost its task while unit tests kept passing — hence a test that goes through report_async specifically.
+  - Each asyncio Task gets its own copy, so five concurrent executions cannot read each other''s. The isolation test yields mid-execution to force interleaving; without that it would pass against a shared global.
+  - A plain await does NOT get its own copy and leaks to the caller. Both entry points use create_task, but task_scope resets by token rather than relying on it.
+
+Omitted rather than nulled when absent — report() is callable from a script, and a null would claim a task existed with no name.
+
+The one pre-existing critical row still carries no task, which now identifies it: it is the only backup row without the field, so it is legible as pre-attribution rather than ambiguous.', NULL, '2026-08-11 10:25:02', '2026-08-11 10:25:02.952', '2026-08-11 10:25:02.952', NULL, 'ede9b41ea9849e08202b7aae16e9a54c', 2) ON CONFLICT(hash) DO NOTHING;
+INSERT INTO ticket_history (ticket_record_id, field, old_value, new_value, changed_by, changed_at, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06FZ0PNFBDB743QJQ9MF38MPJ8', 'status', 'backlog', 'done', NULL, '2026-08-11 10:25:03', '2026-08-11 10:25:03.085', '2026-08-11 10:25:03.085', NULL, 'b45fb340bf78c6c7e4287df001d01456', 2) ON CONFLICT(hash) DO NOTHING;

.pql/changelog/ticket_idmap/2026-08.sql

@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
 INSERT INTO ticket_idmap (record_id, ticket_id, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06FZ0FHPBBXXKBRWGR3FJZRK58', 'T-1', '2026-08-11 09:53:56.835', '2026-08-11 09:53:56.835', NULL, '3d980945e785a6bc7ca8fcaa8250e22b', 2) ON CONFLICT(record_id) DO UPDATE SET ticket_id=excluded.ticket_id, updated_at=excluded.updated_at, deleted_at=excluded.deleted_at, hash=excluded.hash, canonical_version=excluded.canonical_version WHERE excluded.updated_at >= ticket_idmap.updated_at;
 INSERT INTO ticket_idmap (record_id, ticket_id, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06FZ0GQAR5KXM3PTG0QT3R1PV8', 'T-2', '2026-08-11 09:59:05.153', '2026-08-11 09:59:05.153', NULL, 'c8655ec9601ba93fe822395329e62262', 2) ON CONFLICT(record_id) DO UPDATE SET ticket_id=excluded.ticket_id, updated_at=excluded.updated_at, deleted_at=excluded.deleted_at, hash=excluded.hash, canonical_version=excluded.canonical_version WHERE excluded.updated_at >= ticket_idmap.updated_at;
 INSERT INTO ticket_idmap (record_id, ticket_id, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06FZ0GQBTCRCTXK6EJF0T8CS2C', 'T-3', '2026-08-11 09:59:05.427', '2026-08-11 09:59:05.427', NULL, '3bce28c3d803d3f5036cfbb1ac11969c', 2) ON CONFLICT(record_id) DO UPDATE SET ticket_id=excluded.ticket_id, updated_at=excluded.updated_at, deleted_at=excluded.deleted_at, hash=excluded.hash, canonical_version=excluded.canonical_version WHERE excluded.updated_at >= ticket_idmap.updated_at;
+INSERT INTO ticket_idmap (record_id, ticket_id, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06FZ0PNFBDB743QJQ9MF38MPJ8', 'T-4', '2026-08-11 10:25:02.811', '2026-08-11 10:25:02.811', NULL, 'eb8c6e4088b39b797541c1be0ee313fd', 2) ON CONFLICT(record_id) DO UPDATE SET ticket_id=excluded.ticket_id, updated_at=excluded.updated_at, deleted_at=excluded.deleted_at, hash=excluded.hash, canonical_version=excluded.canonical_version WHERE excluded.updated_at >= ticket_idmap.updated_at;

.pql/changelog/tickets/2026-08.sql

@@ -48,3 +48,146 @@ So every timeout since 2025-12-07 has been recorded as a generic failure carryin
 FIX: catch asyncio.TimeoutError explicitly in _run_executor, ahead of the broad handler, and let it propagate (or return a marker execute_task can distinguish). Note the ordering is the whole bug — a narrower except after a broader one is dead code, and there is no linter configured here to say so.
 
 Related: a thread started by asyncio.to_thread cannot be cancelled, so after T-74 a timeout frees the loop while the work continues to completion. Whatever ''timeout'' comes to mean should say so rather than implying the work stopped.', 'backlog', 'medium', NULL, NULL, NULL, '2026-08-11 09:59:05.427', '2026-08-11 09:59:05.545', NULL, 'ae0db866086e38b681b0ea32837df277', 2) ON CONFLICT(record_id) DO UPDATE SET type=excluded.type, parent_record_id=excluded.parent_record_id, title=excluded.title, description=excluded.description, status=excluded.status, priority=excluded.priority, assigned_to=excluded.assigned_to, team=excluded.team, decision_ref=excluded.decision_ref, updated_at=excluded.updated_at, deleted_at=excluded.deleted_at, hash=excluded.hash, canonical_version=excluded.canonical_version WHERE excluded.updated_at >= tickets.updated_at;
+INSERT INTO tickets (record_id, type, parent_record_id, title, description, status, priority, assigned_to, team, decision_ref, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06FZ0GQAR5KXM3PTG0QT3R1PV8', 'bug', NULL, 'A restart mid-task unschedules that task forever, silently', 'get_tasks_for_minute (src/tasks/executor.py:70) excludes any task holding a task_executions row with status=''running'':
+
+  AND id NOT IN (SELECT task_id FROM task_executions WHERE status = ''running'')
+
+Nothing ever reconciles that row. It is written before the executor runs and updated after, so a process that dies in between leaves it ''running'' permanently — and the task is then excluded from every future minute, forever, with no error, no alarm and no log line. The task simply stops existing as far as the scheduler is concerned.
+
+This is not hypothetical. test_example_task has held a ''running'' row since 2025-12-07 — 5916 hours. It happens to be disabled, so nothing is broken today; the mechanism is what matters, not this instance.
+
+The exposure is real and daily: Watchtower restarts this container every morning at 4 AM. Any task still running at that moment is permanently unscheduled by it. The config backup runs 03:05 and takes ~21 minutes, which is not far off.
+
+The failure mode is the one this system keeps producing: it looks like nothing. A backup that stops running forever produces no failure — it produces silence, and silence reads as health.
+
+FIX: reconcile at startup. Any row left ''running'' when the process starts cannot be running, because the process that owned it is gone. Mark those ''orphaned'' (or ''failed'' with a message naming the restart) during app startup, before the scheduler begins its first minute. Consider also a stale-row guard for rows older than the task''s timeout_seconds, which covers a killed worker without a restart.
+
+The audit trail is preserved either way — this is a status correction, not a deletion.
+
+FIXED in v1.6.0 (e45de4f). TaskExecutor.reconcile_orphaned_executions() runs in the lifespan before the scheduler starts.
+
+Proven on the real system rather than in a test. The row that had been ''running'' since 2025-12-07 22:44 was released at startup:
+
+  WARNING - Orphaned execution recovered: test_example_task was left ''running''
+            since 2025-12-07 22:44:00.046695. That task had been excluded from
+            scheduling until now.
+
+Rows still ''running'' afterwards: 0. Status is ''orphaned'', error names the restart.
+
+''orphaned'' rather than ''failed'' because the outcome is genuinely unknown — a task that completed and never got to update its row looks exactly like one that died halfway, and ''failed'' would assert something nobody observed.
+
+Ordering is part of the fix and is mutation-checked: reconciliation must complete before the first minute is processed, or the first tick still sees the stale rows. Removing the startup call fails the test.
+
+Not extended to a duration-based sweep, deliberately. While the process lives, execute_task''s finally always closes the row out, so a stale row implies a dead owner; a time-based rule would have to distinguish a slow task from a dead one and would eventually close the record of a task that is still working.', 'backlog', 'high', NULL, NULL, NULL, '2026-08-11 09:59:05.153', '2026-08-11 10:11:39.058', NULL, '8d88d4684f803319131765d97772e64d', 2) ON CONFLICT(record_id) DO UPDATE SET type=excluded.type, parent_record_id=excluded.parent_record_id, title=excluded.title, description=excluded.description, status=excluded.status, priority=excluded.priority, assigned_to=excluded.assigned_to, team=excluded.team, decision_ref=excluded.decision_ref, updated_at=excluded.updated_at, deleted_at=excluded.deleted_at, hash=excluded.hash, canonical_version=excluded.canonical_version WHERE excluded.updated_at >= tickets.updated_at;
+INSERT INTO tickets (record_id, type, parent_record_id, title, description, status, priority, assigned_to, team, decision_ref, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06FZ0GQAR5KXM3PTG0QT3R1PV8', 'bug', NULL, 'A restart mid-task unschedules that task forever, silently', 'get_tasks_for_minute (src/tasks/executor.py:70) excludes any task holding a task_executions row with status=''running'':
+
+  AND id NOT IN (SELECT task_id FROM task_executions WHERE status = ''running'')
+
+Nothing ever reconciles that row. It is written before the executor runs and updated after, so a process that dies in between leaves it ''running'' permanently — and the task is then excluded from every future minute, forever, with no error, no alarm and no log line. The task simply stops existing as far as the scheduler is concerned.
+
+This is not hypothetical. test_example_task has held a ''running'' row since 2025-12-07 — 5916 hours. It happens to be disabled, so nothing is broken today; the mechanism is what matters, not this instance.
+
+The exposure is real and daily: Watchtower restarts this container every morning at 4 AM. Any task still running at that moment is permanently unscheduled by it. The config backup runs 03:05 and takes ~21 minutes, which is not far off.
+
+The failure mode is the one this system keeps producing: it looks like nothing. A backup that stops running forever produces no failure — it produces silence, and silence reads as health.
+
+FIX: reconcile at startup. Any row left ''running'' when the process starts cannot be running, because the process that owned it is gone. Mark those ''orphaned'' (or ''failed'' with a message naming the restart) during app startup, before the scheduler begins its first minute. Consider also a stale-row guard for rows older than the task''s timeout_seconds, which covers a killed worker without a restart.
+
+The audit trail is preserved either way — this is a status correction, not a deletion.
+
+FIXED in v1.6.0 (e45de4f). TaskExecutor.reconcile_orphaned_executions() runs in the lifespan before the scheduler starts.
+
+Proven on the real system rather than in a test. The row that had been ''running'' since 2025-12-07 22:44 was released at startup:
+
+  WARNING - Orphaned execution recovered: test_example_task was left ''running''
+            since 2025-12-07 22:44:00.046695. That task had been excluded from
+            scheduling until now.
+
+Rows still ''running'' afterwards: 0. Status is ''orphaned'', error names the restart.
+
+''orphaned'' rather than ''failed'' because the outcome is genuinely unknown — a task that completed and never got to update its row looks exactly like one that died halfway, and ''failed'' would assert something nobody observed.
+
+Ordering is part of the fix and is mutation-checked: reconciliation must complete before the first minute is processed, or the first tick still sees the stale rows. Removing the startup call fails the test.
+
+Not extended to a duration-based sweep, deliberately. While the process lives, execute_task''s finally always closes the row out, so a stale row implies a dead owner; a time-based rule would have to distinguish a slow task from a dead one and would eventually close the record of a task that is still working.', 'done', 'high', NULL, NULL, NULL, '2026-08-11 09:59:05.153', '2026-08-11 10:11:39.177', NULL, '99284d5f4a53a35637ee10c7b6b66c6e', 2) ON CONFLICT(record_id) DO UPDATE SET type=excluded.type, parent_record_id=excluded.parent_record_id, title=excluded.title, description=excluded.description, status=excluded.status, priority=excluded.priority, assigned_to=excluded.assigned_to, team=excluded.team, decision_ref=excluded.decision_ref, updated_at=excluded.updated_at, deleted_at=excluded.deleted_at, hash=excluded.hash, canonical_version=excluded.canonical_version WHERE excluded.updated_at >= tickets.updated_at;
+INSERT INTO tickets (record_id, type, parent_record_id, title, description, status, priority, assigned_to, team, decision_ref, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06FZ0GQBTCRCTXK6EJF0T8CS2C', 'bug', NULL, 'The ''timeout'' execution status is unreachable; timeouts are filed as generic failures', 'execute_task has an `except asyncio.TimeoutError` handler (src/tasks/executor.py:179) that records status=''timeout''. It can never run.
+
+_run_executor wraps the awaited call in `except Exception` (line 219) and returns the error as a value. Since Python 3.11 asyncio.TimeoutError IS the builtin TimeoutError, which inherits OSError -> Exception, so the broad handler catches it first and converts it into an ordinary (None, error) tuple. execute_task then sees a non-None error and files status=''failed''.
+
+Verified in the deployed runtime:
+  asyncio.TimeoutError is TimeoutError: True
+  MRO: TimeoutError -> OSError -> Exception -> BaseException
+
+And confirmed against 8 months of history — 18,785 executions, and the count of status=''timeout'' rows is zero:
+  success 16690 | failed 2093 | running 2 | timeout 0
+
+So every timeout since 2025-12-07 has been recorded as a generic failure carrying a traceback. Operationally that erases the distinction that matters most when a job misbehaves: "this job is too slow for its window" and "this job is broken" need different responses, and right now they look identical in the history.
+
+FIX: catch asyncio.TimeoutError explicitly in _run_executor, ahead of the broad handler, and let it propagate (or return a marker execute_task can distinguish). Note the ordering is the whole bug — a narrower except after a broader one is dead code, and there is no linter configured here to say so.
+
+Related: a thread started by asyncio.to_thread cannot be cancelled, so after T-74 a timeout frees the loop while the work continues to completion. Whatever ''timeout'' comes to mean should say so rather than implying the work stopped.
+
+FIXED in v1.6.0 (e45de4f). _run_executor now catches asyncio.TimeoutError ahead of the broad handler and re-raises, so execute_task''s timeout branch is reachable for the first time.
+
+A trap surfaced while fixing it, and it is the interesting part. While the branch was unreachable, a timeout travelled the NORMAL path — which does update scheduled_tasks. Making the branch reachable without adding that write would have swapped a wrong status (''failed'') for a stale one (last_status showing the previous run''s outcome indefinitely). _update_task_outcome now mirrors terminal outcomes onto the parent row. A fix that repairs the reported symptom while breaking something adjacent is worse than the bug.
+
+The timeout message also records that the work may still be running: after T-74 executors are handed to asyncio.to_thread, and a thread cannot be cancelled, so wait_for frees the loop while the work continues to completion. Saying "timed out" without that would imply the work stopped.
+
+Mutation-checked: removing the narrow except clause fails the propagation test. A third test pins that ordinary exceptions are still returned rather than raised, so the narrow clause cannot start swallowing anything else.', 'backlog', 'medium', NULL, NULL, NULL, '2026-08-11 09:59:05.427', '2026-08-11 10:11:39.291', NULL, 'b7379fa662b40c6996f17c36b64010c0', 2) ON CONFLICT(record_id) DO UPDATE SET type=excluded.type, parent_record_id=excluded.parent_record_id, title=excluded.title, description=excluded.description, status=excluded.status, priority=excluded.priority, assigned_to=excluded.assigned_to, team=excluded.team, decision_ref=excluded.decision_ref, updated_at=excluded.updated_at, deleted_at=excluded.deleted_at, hash=excluded.hash, canonical_version=excluded.canonical_version WHERE excluded.updated_at >= tickets.updated_at;
+INSERT INTO tickets (record_id, type, parent_record_id, title, description, status, priority, assigned_to, team, decision_ref, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06FZ0GQBTCRCTXK6EJF0T8CS2C', 'bug', NULL, 'The ''timeout'' execution status is unreachable; timeouts are filed as generic failures', 'execute_task has an `except asyncio.TimeoutError` handler (src/tasks/executor.py:179) that records status=''timeout''. It can never run.
+
+_run_executor wraps the awaited call in `except Exception` (line 219) and returns the error as a value. Since Python 3.11 asyncio.TimeoutError IS the builtin TimeoutError, which inherits OSError -> Exception, so the broad handler catches it first and converts it into an ordinary (None, error) tuple. execute_task then sees a non-None error and files status=''failed''.
+
+Verified in the deployed runtime:
+  asyncio.TimeoutError is TimeoutError: True
+  MRO: TimeoutError -> OSError -> Exception -> BaseException
+
+And confirmed against 8 months of history — 18,785 executions, and the count of status=''timeout'' rows is zero:
+  success 16690 | failed 2093 | running 2 | timeout 0
+
+So every timeout since 2025-12-07 has been recorded as a generic failure carrying a traceback. Operationally that erases the distinction that matters most when a job misbehaves: "this job is too slow for its window" and "this job is broken" need different responses, and right now they look identical in the history.
+
+FIX: catch asyncio.TimeoutError explicitly in _run_executor, ahead of the broad handler, and let it propagate (or return a marker execute_task can distinguish). Note the ordering is the whole bug — a narrower except after a broader one is dead code, and there is no linter configured here to say so.
+
+Related: a thread started by asyncio.to_thread cannot be cancelled, so after T-74 a timeout frees the loop while the work continues to completion. Whatever ''timeout'' comes to mean should say so rather than implying the work stopped.
+
+FIXED in v1.6.0 (e45de4f). _run_executor now catches asyncio.TimeoutError ahead of the broad handler and re-raises, so execute_task''s timeout branch is reachable for the first time.
+
+A trap surfaced while fixing it, and it is the interesting part. While the branch was unreachable, a timeout travelled the NORMAL path — which does update scheduled_tasks. Making the branch reachable without adding that write would have swapped a wrong status (''failed'') for a stale one (last_status showing the previous run''s outcome indefinitely). _update_task_outcome now mirrors terminal outcomes onto the parent row. A fix that repairs the reported symptom while breaking something adjacent is worse than the bug.
+
+The timeout message also records that the work may still be running: after T-74 executors are handed to asyncio.to_thread, and a thread cannot be cancelled, so wait_for frees the loop while the work continues to completion. Saying "timed out" without that would imply the work stopped.
+
+Mutation-checked: removing the narrow except clause fails the propagation test. A third test pins that ordinary exceptions are still returned rather than raised, so the narrow clause cannot start swallowing anything else.', 'done', 'medium', NULL, NULL, NULL, '2026-08-11 09:59:05.427', '2026-08-11 10:11:39.420', NULL, '333edb040cfa995cf26f45b6fa2cd2f9', 2) ON CONFLICT(record_id) DO UPDATE SET type=excluded.type, parent_record_id=excluded.parent_record_id, title=excluded.title, description=excluded.description, status=excluded.status, priority=excluded.priority, assigned_to=excluded.assigned_to, team=excluded.team, decision_ref=excluded.decision_ref, updated_at=excluded.updated_at, deleted_at=excluded.deleted_at, hash=excluded.hash, canonical_version=excluded.canonical_version WHERE excluded.updated_at >= tickets.updated_at;
+INSERT INTO tickets (record_id, type, parent_record_id, title, description, status, priority, assigned_to, team, decision_ref, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06FZ0PNFBDB743QJQ9MF38MPJ8', 'task', NULL, 'check_history rows name the task that produced them', NULL, 'backlog', 'medium', NULL, NULL, NULL, '2026-08-11 10:25:02.811', '2026-08-11 10:25:02.811', NULL, 'b099197d1cbdea7e682a054dc17788ab', 2) ON CONFLICT(record_id) DO UPDATE SET type=excluded.type, parent_record_id=excluded.parent_record_id, title=excluded.title, description=excluded.description, status=excluded.status, priority=excluded.priority, assigned_to=excluded.assigned_to, team=excluded.team, decision_ref=excluded.decision_ref, updated_at=excluded.updated_at, deleted_at=excluded.deleted_at, hash=excluded.hash, canonical_version=excluded.canonical_version WHERE excluded.updated_at >= tickets.updated_at;
+INSERT INTO tickets (record_id, type, parent_record_id, title, description, status, priority, assigned_to, team, decision_ref, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06FZ0PNFBDB743QJQ9MF38MPJ8', 'task', NULL, 'check_history rows name the task that produced them', 'DONE in v1.7.0 (538bfe5). Verified on a real row:
+
+  12:24:27  ok  task=backup_portainer_daily  source=scheduler/portainer_backup_executor
+
+WHY, and why not the other fix. A row written by a failing probe on 2026-08-11 was byte-for-byte what a nightly backup failure would have written — same source, same domain, nothing naming the task. The reflex was to delete the inconvenient row; that was refused as audit tampering and the refusal was right twice over, because the row is TRUE (a run did fail) and the defect is that it cannot say which run. Attribution keeps the record intact and makes it answer the question.
+
+MECHANISM. A ContextVar (src/task_context.py) set by the engine around executor invocation, read by health_report. Not an argument: executors are invoked as execute(config, settings), there are ten, and several are dormant — they exist only as a string in a database row and become live the moment someone inserts a task naming them. A signature change would leave those broken in a way no import, grep or test would reveal. Not injected into `config` either: config is what a human wrote in the task definition and an executor may legitimately reject unknown keys.
+
+TWO PROPERTIES VERIFIED IN THE DEPLOYED RUNTIME rather than assumed:
+  - asyncio.to_thread propagates context, so attribution survives the worker thread T-74 introduced. Had it not, every row from a real executor would have lost its task while unit tests kept passing — hence a test that goes through report_async specifically.
+  - Each asyncio Task gets its own copy, so five concurrent executions cannot read each other''s. The isolation test yields mid-execution to force interleaving; without that it would pass against a shared global.
+  - A plain await does NOT get its own copy and leaks to the caller. Both entry points use create_task, but task_scope resets by token rather than relying on it.
+
+Omitted rather than nulled when absent — report() is callable from a script, and a null would claim a task existed with no name.
+
+The one pre-existing critical row still carries no task, which now identifies it: it is the only backup row without the field, so it is legible as pre-attribution rather than ambiguous.', 'backlog', 'medium', NULL, NULL, NULL, '2026-08-11 10:25:02.811', '2026-08-11 10:25:02.951', NULL, '5b7bbb05cf6aedfbd0a6a49a356f6e6f', 2) ON CONFLICT(record_id) DO UPDATE SET type=excluded.type, parent_record_id=excluded.parent_record_id, title=excluded.title, description=excluded.description, status=excluded.status, priority=excluded.priority, assigned_to=excluded.assigned_to, team=excluded.team, decision_ref=excluded.decision_ref, updated_at=excluded.updated_at, deleted_at=excluded.deleted_at, hash=excluded.hash, canonical_version=excluded.canonical_version WHERE excluded.updated_at >= tickets.updated_at;
+INSERT INTO tickets (record_id, type, parent_record_id, title, description, status, priority, assigned_to, team, decision_ref, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06FZ0PNFBDB743QJQ9MF38MPJ8', 'task', NULL, 'check_history rows name the task that produced them', 'DONE in v1.7.0 (538bfe5). Verified on a real row:
+
+  12:24:27  ok  task=backup_portainer_daily  source=scheduler/portainer_backup_executor
+
+WHY, and why not the other fix. A row written by a failing probe on 2026-08-11 was byte-for-byte what a nightly backup failure would have written — same source, same domain, nothing naming the task. The reflex was to delete the inconvenient row; that was refused as audit tampering and the refusal was right twice over, because the row is TRUE (a run did fail) and the defect is that it cannot say which run. Attribution keeps the record intact and makes it answer the question.
+
+MECHANISM. A ContextVar (src/task_context.py) set by the engine around executor invocation, read by health_report. Not an argument: executors are invoked as execute(config, settings), there are ten, and several are dormant — they exist only as a string in a database row and become live the moment someone inserts a task naming them. A signature change would leave those broken in a way no import, grep or test would reveal. Not injected into `config` either: config is what a human wrote in the task definition and an executor may legitimately reject unknown keys.
+
+TWO PROPERTIES VERIFIED IN THE DEPLOYED RUNTIME rather than assumed:
+  - asyncio.to_thread propagates context, so attribution survives the worker thread T-74 introduced. Had it not, every row from a real executor would have lost its task while unit tests kept passing — hence a test that goes through report_async specifically.
+  - Each asyncio Task gets its own copy, so five concurrent executions cannot read each other''s. The isolation test yields mid-execution to force interleaving; without that it would pass against a shared global.
+  - A plain await does NOT get its own copy and leaks to the caller. Both entry points use create_task, but task_scope resets by token rather than relying on it.
+
+Omitted rather than nulled when absent — report() is callable from a script, and a null would claim a task existed with no name.
+
+The one pre-existing critical row still carries no task, which now identifies it: it is the only backup row without the field, so it is legible as pre-attribution rather than ambiguous.', 'done', 'medium', NULL, NULL, NULL, '2026-08-11 10:25:02.811', '2026-08-11 10:25:03.084', NULL, '63f6b48e753891a75d47dd0b3d7b5a4c', 2) ON CONFLICT(record_id) DO UPDATE SET type=excluded.type, parent_record_id=excluded.parent_record_id, title=excluded.title, description=excluded.description, status=excluded.status, priority=excluded.priority, assigned_to=excluded.assigned_to, team=excluded.team, decision_ref=excluded.decision_ref, updated_at=excluded.updated_at, deleted_at=excluded.deleted_at, hash=excluded.hash, canonical_version=excluded.canonical_version WHERE excluded.updated_at >= tickets.updated_at;

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -6,6 +6,23 @@ The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.0.0/).
 
 ## [Unreleased]
 
+## [1.8.0] - 2026-08-11
+
+### Fixed
+- Deleting a task that has run returns 409 instead of a bare 500. It failed on a foreign key
+  against its own execution history, which the error never mentioned.
+
+### Added
+- `DELETE /tasks/{name}?purge=true` removes a task together with its execution history, in one
+  transaction. The response reports `executions_purged`.
+
+## [1.7.0] - 2026-08-11
+
+### Added
+- `check_history` rows name the scheduled task that produced them. `source` names the code,
+  which cannot distinguish two tasks sharing one executor — so a failure could not be
+  attributed to the job that caused it. Omitted when there is no task.
+
 ## [1.6.0] - 2026-08-11
 
 ### Fixed

CLAUDE.md

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ It is the homelab's cron. Recurring work belongs here rather than in a systemd t
 
 ## Live contract
 
-`http://localhost:8090/openapi.json` — 10 paths, `version: 1.6.0` (verified 2026-08-11). Human
+`http://localhost:8090/openapi.json` — 10 paths, `version: 1.8.0` (verified 2026-08-11). Human
 docs at `/docs`. Generated from running code, so read it instead of inferring routes.
 
 **Every route except `/health` requires `Authorization: Bearer $SCHEDULER_API_KEY`.** An

pyproject.toml

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 [project]
 name = "the-scheduler"
-version = "1.6.0"
+version = "1.8.0"
 description = "System-wide maintenance orchestration - backups, doc mirroring, cleanup, task automation"
 readme = "README.md"
 requires-python = ">=3.12"

src/executors/health_report.py

@@ -20,6 +20,11 @@ Three consequences that are load-bearing here:
 
 - `source` names the producer, because the table now has several writers and a
   row must say which one wrote it.
+- `task` names the schedule that invoked it, which `source` cannot: two tasks
+  may share one executor. On 2026-08-11 two did, and their rows were identical
+  apart from their contents — a failure could not be attributed to either. It
+  comes from a ContextVar the engine sets (`src/task_context.py`), so executors
+  need no signature change and dormant ones stay valid.
 - `domain` is a shared namespace. Two producers claiming one name would
   interleave silently.
 - **A reporting failure must never fail the task.** Backing up successfully and
@@ -36,6 +41,8 @@ from typing import Any, Dict, Optional
 
 import psycopg2
 
+from src.task_context import current_task_name
+
 logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
 
 # The database holding check_history. Not the scheduler's own database — this is
@@ -61,6 +68,7 @@ def report(
     """
     metrics = metrics or {}
     now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+    task = current_task_name()
     result = {
         # The envelope the table has carried since the shell era. A reader of a
         # year of history should not have to know which producer wrote a row in
@@ -71,6 +79,14 @@ def report(
         "status": status,
         "metrics": metrics,
     }
+    # Which scheduled task produced this. `source` names the code; two tasks can
+    # share one executor, and on 2026-08-11 two did — a 425 MB probe and the 5 GB
+    # nightly backup wrote rows that were identical apart from their contents, so
+    # a failure could not be attributed to either. Omitted rather than nulled
+    # when absent, per the convention that a missing field means "not
+    # applicable": report() is also callable from a script with no task around it.
+    if task:
+        result["task"] = task
 
     try:
         conn = psycopg2.connect(

src/main.py

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ Architecture: Hybrid APScheduler + DB-based priority system
 - Job queries DB for tasks scheduled in that minute
 - Executes up to 5 tasks concurrently based on priority
 """
-from fastapi import FastAPI, HTTPException, Depends, Header
+from fastapi import FastAPI, HTTPException, Depends, Header, Query
 from apscheduler.schedulers.asyncio import AsyncIOScheduler
 from apscheduler.jobstores.sqlalchemy import SQLAlchemyJobStore
 from apscheduler.triggers.cron import CronTrigger
@@ -353,26 +353,67 @@ async def update_task(
 @app.delete("/tasks/{task_name}")
 async def delete_task(
     task_name: str,
+    purge: bool = Query(
+        False,
+        description="Also delete this task's execution history. Required when the "
+                    "task has ever run, and destroys its audit trail."
+    ),
     api_key: str = Depends(verify_api_key),
     executor: TaskExecutor = Depends(get_task_executor)
 ):
-    """Delete a scheduled task."""
+    """Delete a scheduled task.
+
+    A task that has ever run owns rows in task_executions, and those rows are
+    the audit trail — when it ran, how long it took, what it returned. Deleting
+    the task alone violates task_executions_task_id_fkey, which surfaced as a
+    bare 500 with no indication that history was the obstacle, so it read as the
+    service being broken rather than the request being refusable. Since every
+    task that has ever fired has history, the endpoint effectively worked only
+    for tasks that had never run.
+
+    Refusing with 409 rather than cascading by default, because the two outcomes
+    are not equally recoverable: a task definition can be recreated from the API
+    in one call, its execution history cannot be recreated at all. The caller
+    who wants both gone says so.
+
+    Disabling is usually what was actually wanted — it stops the task running and
+    keeps the record — so the refusal names that too.
+    """
     with executor.get_db_connection() as conn:
         with conn.cursor() as cur:
-            cur.execute("""
-                DELETE FROM scheduled_tasks
-                WHERE task_name = %s
-                RETURNING task_name
-            """, (task_name,))
-
-            deleted = cur.fetchone()
-            if not deleted:
+            cur.execute("SELECT id FROM scheduled_tasks WHERE task_name = %s", (task_name,))
+            row = cur.fetchone()
+            if not row:
                 raise HTTPException(404, f"Task '{task_name}' not found")
+            task_id = row[0]
 
+            cur.execute("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM task_executions WHERE task_id = %s", (task_id,))
+            executions = cur.fetchone()[0]
+
+            if executions and not purge:
+                raise HTTPException(
+                    409,
+                    f"Task '{task_name}' has {executions} execution record(s). "
+                    f"Deleting it would discard that history. Re-send with "
+                    f"?purge=true to delete the task and its history together, or "
+                    f"PUT enabled=false to stop it running while keeping the record."
+                )
+
+            # One transaction: a purge that removed the history and then failed to
+            # remove the task would leave the audit trail gone and the task alive.
+            if executions:
+                cur.execute("DELETE FROM task_executions WHERE task_id = %s", (task_id,))
+            cur.execute("DELETE FROM scheduled_tasks WHERE id = %s", (task_id,))
             conn.commit()
 
-    logger.info(f"Deleted task: {task_name}")
-    return {"message": f"Task '{task_name}' deleted successfully"}
+    if executions:
+        logger.warning(f"Deleted task {task_name} and purged {executions} execution record(s)")
+    else:
+        logger.info(f"Deleted task: {task_name}")
+    return {
+        "message": f"Task '{task_name}' deleted successfully",
+        "executions_purged": executions,
+    }
 
 @app.post("/tasks/{task_name}/trigger")
 async def trigger_task(

src/task_context.py

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+"""Which scheduled task is currently executing.
+
+Executors are invoked as `execute(config, settings)` and are never told which
+task they are. That is fine until one of them writes to a shared record: on
+2026-08-11 a probe task and the nightly backup both used
+config_backup_executor, and the rows they wrote into `check_history` were
+indistinguishable — same `source`, same `domain`. A failure from a 425 MB test
+archive was impossible to tell from a failure of the 5 GB nightly job, so the
+health record could not answer "which one broke?".
+
+A ContextVar rather than a parameter, because the alternatives are worse here:
+
+  - Threading a `task` argument through `execute(config, settings, task)` is a
+    signature change across every executor, including the dormant ones that
+    exist only as a string in a database row and would break the moment
+    somebody enabled them.
+  - Injecting the name into `config` corrupts the thing executors validate.
+    `config` is what a human wrote in the task definition, and an executor is
+    entitled to reject keys it does not recognise.
+
+Two properties make this safe, both verified in the deployed runtime rather
+than assumed:
+
+  - `asyncio.to_thread` propagates the context, so a reporter still sees the
+    task after T-74 moved executor bodies into worker threads.
+  - Each asyncio Task gets its own copy, so the five concurrent executions
+    allowed by MAX_CONCURRENT_TASKS cannot read each other's value.
+
+A plain `await` of a coroutine does NOT get its own copy and would leak the
+value back to the caller, so `task_scope` resets it rather than relying on the
+call always arriving via create_task.
+"""
+from contextlib import contextmanager
+from contextvars import ContextVar
+from typing import Optional
+
+_current_task_name: ContextVar[Optional[str]] = ContextVar(
+    "current_task_name", default=None
+)
+
+
+@contextmanager
+def task_scope(task_name: str):
+    """Name the executing task for the duration of the block."""
+    token = _current_task_name.set(task_name)
+    try:
+        yield
+    finally:
+        _current_task_name.reset(token)
+
+
+def current_task_name() -> Optional[str]:
+    """The executing task's name, or None outside an execution.
+
+    None is a real answer, not an error: a reporter may be called from a script
+    or a test with no task around it. Callers omit the field rather than
+    inventing one.
+    """
+    return _current_task_name.get()

src/tasks/executor.py

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ from psycopg2.extras import RealDictCursor
 import traceback
 
 from src.config import Settings
+from src.task_context import task_scope
 
 logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
 
@@ -209,8 +210,11 @@ class TaskExecutor:
                     execution_id = cur.fetchone()[0]
                     conn.commit()
 
-            # Load and execute the task
-            output, error = await self._run_executor(executor_name, task, timeout)
+            # Load and execute the task. The scope names it for anything the
+            # executor writes to a shared record — without it, two tasks sharing
+            # one executor produce rows nobody can tell apart.
+            with task_scope(task_name):
+                output, error = await self._run_executor(executor_name, task, timeout)
 
             completed_at = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
             duration = int((completed_at - started_at).total_seconds())

tests/test_task_attribution.py

@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
+"""A check_history row must say which task produced it.
+
+On 2026-08-11 a 425 MB probe task and the 5 GB nightly backup both ran through
+config_backup_executor. The probe failed, and the row it wrote was
+indistinguishable from a nightly-backup failure — same `source`, same `domain`,
+nothing naming the task. The health record could not answer which job broke,
+which is most of what a health record is for.
+
+Executors are called as `execute(config, settings)` and are never told which
+task they are, so the name travels in a ContextVar. These tests pin the three
+properties that makes safe: it reaches the reporter, it survives the worker
+thread T-74 introduced, and concurrent executions cannot read each other's.
+"""
+import asyncio
+import json
+
+import pytest
+from unittest.mock import AsyncMock, MagicMock, patch
+
+from src.config import Settings
+from src.executors import health_report
+from src.task_context import current_task_name, task_scope
+from src.tasks.executor import TaskExecutor
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def captured_row(monkeypatch):
+    """Capture the JSON payload report() would insert, without a database."""
+    box = {}
+    conn, cur = MagicMock(), MagicMock()
+
+    def execute(sql, params):
+        box['result'] = json.loads(params[4])
+
+    cur.execute.side_effect = execute
+    conn.cursor.return_value.__enter__ = MagicMock(return_value=cur)
+    conn.cursor.return_value.__exit__ = MagicMock(return_value=None)
+    conn.__enter__ = MagicMock(return_value=conn)
+    conn.__exit__ = MagicMock(return_value=None)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(health_report.psycopg2, 'connect', lambda **kw: conn)
+    return box
+
+
+def _report(settings, **kw):
+    health_report.report(
+        settings, domain="backup", status=health_report.OK,
+        source="scheduler/config_backup_executor", metrics={}, **kw
+    )
+
+
+@pytest.mark.unit
+class TestAttribution:
+
+    def test_the_row_names_the_task(self, test_settings: Settings, captured_row):
+        with task_scope("backup_docker_configs_daily"):
+            _report(test_settings)
+        assert captured_row['result']['task'] == "backup_docker_configs_daily"
+
+    def test_source_still_names_the_code(self, test_settings: Settings, captured_row):
+        """Task and source answer different questions; both are needed.
+
+        `source` says which code wrote the row, `task` says which schedule
+        invoked it. Replacing one with the other loses a distinction.
+        """
+        with task_scope("t74_loop_probe"):
+            _report(test_settings)
+        r = captured_row['result']
+        assert r['source'] == "scheduler/config_backup_executor"
+        assert r['task'] == "t74_loop_probe"
+
+    def test_the_field_is_omitted_rather_than_nulled(self, test_settings: Settings, captured_row):
+        """report() is callable from a script with no task around it.
+
+        A null would claim there was a task and it had no name. Absence says the
+        question does not apply.
+        """
+        _report(test_settings)
+        assert 'task' not in captured_row['result']
+
+    @pytest.mark.asyncio
+    async def test_attribution_survives_the_worker_thread(
+        self, test_settings: Settings, captured_row
+    ):
+        """T-74 moved reporting into asyncio.to_thread. Attribution has to follow.
+
+        If the context did not propagate, every row written by a real executor
+        would silently lose its task while the tests above still passed.
+        """
+        with task_scope("backup_portainer_daily"):
+            await health_report.report_async(
+                test_settings, domain="backup", status=health_report.OK,
+                source="scheduler/portainer_backup_executor", metrics={},
+            )
+        assert captured_row['result']['task'] == "backup_portainer_daily"
+
+
+@pytest.mark.unit
+class TestAttributionIsolation:
+    """MAX_CONCURRENT_TASKS is 5, so mixing values between them is a live risk."""
+
+    def _executor_with_db(self, test_settings):
+        executor = TaskExecutor(test_settings)
+        conn, cur = MagicMock(), MagicMock()
+        cur.fetchone.return_value = [1]
+        conn.cursor.return_value.__enter__ = MagicMock(return_value=cur)
+        conn.cursor.return_value.__exit__ = MagicMock(return_value=None)
+        conn.__enter__ = MagicMock(return_value=conn)
+        conn.__exit__ = MagicMock(return_value=None)
+        return executor, patch.object(executor, 'get_db_connection', return_value=conn)
+
+    def _task(self, name):
+        return {'id': hash(name) % 1000, 'task_name': name, 'executor': 'x',
+                'service': 'scheduler', 'priority': 5, 'timeout_seconds': 60}
+
+    @pytest.mark.asyncio
+    async def test_the_engine_names_the_task_and_clears_it_after(
+        self, test_settings: Settings
+    ):
+        executor, db = self._executor_with_db(test_settings)
+        seen = {}
+
+        async def fake_run(name, task, timeout):
+            seen['during'] = current_task_name()
+            return "done", None
+
+        with db, patch.object(executor, '_run_executor', new=fake_run):
+            await executor.execute_task(self._task("nightly_backup"))
+
+        assert seen['during'] == "nightly_backup", "executor ran unattributed"
+        assert current_task_name() is None, "attribution leaked past the execution"
+
+    @pytest.mark.asyncio
+    async def test_concurrent_executions_do_not_see_each_other(
+        self, test_settings: Settings
+    ):
+        executor, db = self._executor_with_db(test_settings)
+        seen = {}
+
+        async def fake_run(name, task, timeout):
+            who = task['task_name']
+            # Yield mid-flight so the executions genuinely interleave; without
+            # this they would run to completion one at a time and the test would
+            # pass even with a shared global.
+            await asyncio.sleep(0.01 if who == "slow_one" else 0)
+            seen[who] = current_task_name()
+            return "done", None
+
+        with db, patch.object(executor, '_run_executor', new=fake_run):
+            await asyncio.gather(
+                executor.execute_task(self._task("slow_one")),
+                executor.execute_task(self._task("fast_one")),
+            )
+
+        assert seen == {"slow_one": "slow_one", "fast_one": "fast_one"}

tests/test_task_delete.py

@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+"""Deleting a task must not destroy its history by accident, or 500 by surprise.
+
+DELETE /tasks/{name} used to issue a bare DELETE against scheduled_tasks. Any
+task that had ever run owned rows in task_executions, so the foreign key
+rejected it and the caller got "Internal Server Error" with nothing pointing at
+history as the obstacle — it read as the service being broken rather than the
+request being refusable. Since every task that has ever fired has history, the
+endpoint effectively worked only for tasks that never ran.
+
+It now refuses with 409 and takes ?purge=true to mean it. The asymmetry is the
+argument: a task definition can be recreated from the API in one call, its
+execution history cannot be recreated at all.
+"""
+import pytest
+from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
+from unittest.mock import MagicMock
+
+from src.main import app, get_task_executor
+
+
+def _fake_executor(task_row, execution_count=0):
+    """A stand-in whose cursor answers the endpoint's two lookups in order."""
+    ex = MagicMock()
+    conn, cur = MagicMock(), MagicMock()
+    cur.fetchone.side_effect = (
+        [task_row, (execution_count,)] if task_row is not None else [None]
+    )
+    conn.cursor.return_value.__enter__ = MagicMock(return_value=cur)
+    conn.cursor.return_value.__exit__ = MagicMock(return_value=None)
+    conn.__enter__ = MagicMock(return_value=conn)
+    conn.__exit__ = MagicMock(return_value=None)
+    ex.get_db_connection.return_value = conn
+    return ex, cur
+
+
+def _statements(cur):
+    return [c[0][0] for c in cur.execute.call_args_list]
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def override():
+    made = {}
+
+    def _install(task_row, execution_count=0):
+        ex, cur = _fake_executor(task_row, execution_count)
+        app.dependency_overrides[get_task_executor] = lambda: ex
+        made['cur'] = cur
+        return cur
+
+    yield _install
+    app.dependency_overrides.pop(get_task_executor, None)
+
+
+@pytest.mark.unit
+class TestDeleteTask:
+
+    def test_history_blocks_deletion_with_409(self, client: TestClient, auth_headers, override):
+        cur = override((46,), execution_count=12)
+        r = client.delete("/tasks/some_task", headers=auth_headers)
+
+        assert r.status_code == 409
+        detail = r.json()["detail"]
+        # The message has to carry the facts the caller needs to act: how much
+        # history is at stake, the flag that proceeds, and the option they
+        # probably actually wanted. A bare "conflict" would be no better than
+        # the 500 it replaces.
+        assert "12 execution record" in detail
+        assert "purge=true" in detail
+        assert "enabled=false" in detail
+
+    def test_a_refused_delete_deletes_nothing(self, client: TestClient, auth_headers, override):
+        cur = override((46,), execution_count=12)
+        client.delete("/tasks/some_task", headers=auth_headers)
+        assert not any("DELETE" in s.upper() for s in _statements(cur))
+
+    def test_purge_removes_history_then_the_task(self, client: TestClient, auth_headers, override):
+        cur = override((46,), execution_count=12)
+        r = client.delete("/tasks/some_task?purge=true", headers=auth_headers)
+
+        assert r.status_code == 200
+        assert r.json()["executions_purged"] == 12
+        deletes = [s for s in _statements(cur) if "DELETE" in s.upper()]
+        assert len(deletes) == 2
+        # History first: the foreign key points that way, and the reverse order
+        # is the failure this endpoint started with.
+        assert "task_executions" in deletes[0]
+        assert "scheduled_tasks" in deletes[1]
+
+    def test_a_task_that_never_ran_deletes_without_the_flag(
+        self, client: TestClient, auth_headers, override
+    ):
+        cur = override((46,), execution_count=0)
+        r = client.delete("/tasks/fresh_task", headers=auth_headers)
+
+        assert r.status_code == 200
+        assert r.json()["executions_purged"] == 0
+        deletes = [s for s in _statements(cur) if "DELETE" in s.upper()]
+        assert len(deletes) == 1, "nothing to purge, so history must not be touched"
+        assert "scheduled_tasks" in deletes[0]
+
+    def test_unknown_task_is_404_not_409(self, client: TestClient, auth_headers, override):
+        override(None)
+        r = client.delete("/tasks/nope", headers=auth_headers)
+        assert r.status_code == 404
+
+    def test_purge_on_an_unknown_task_is_still_404(
+        self, client: TestClient, auth_headers, override
+    ):
+        """The flag must not turn a missing task into a success."""
+        override(None)
+        r = client.delete("/tasks/nope?purge=true", headers=auth_headers)
+        assert r.status_code == 404