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#6683 made an exact approval seal a launch boundary (and a filesystem root) in the request's workspace, but only when a workspace is bound. Agent mode with no folder picked is the default, and there the approval still sealed nothing, so "Allow" always ended in "Approved action has no sealed process/job identity" (bash/python) or "Approved filesystem action has no sealed resource identity" (write_file). In Docker every agent turn carries the backend runtime context, so bash and write_file always ask for approval and never ran. With no workspace, seal the root in the agent workspace, which is where agent_cwd() already runs bash/python in that case. Inherited (child) authorities still cannot widen. Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
148 lines
6.1 KiB
Python
148 lines
6.1 KiB
Python
"""An exact approval must be able to run a bash/python call the request did not grant (#6635).
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`ToolApprovalStore.create()` sealed the process identity only from the request
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authority's launch scopes, and those exist only for granted bash/python
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backends. For an ungranted call the sealing failed silently, so the approval
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card was created with no process identity and the executor refused it:
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"Approved action has no sealed process/job identity".
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"""
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import pytest
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from src.agent_runtime.authority import OperationGrant, RequestAuthority
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from src.tool_approvals import ToolApprovalStore
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from src.tool_capabilities import ToolRunSecurityContext, capabilities_for_action
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from src.tool_types import ToolBlock
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@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
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def admin_owner(monkeypatch):
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from src import tool_execution as execution
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monkeypatch.setattr(execution, "_owner_is_admin", lambda owner: True)
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def _authority(workspace, *tools):
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return RequestAuthority("approval-request", "alice", "s", str(workspace),
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tuple(OperationGrant(t) for t in tools))
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def _approve(authority, tool, content, store=None):
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store = store or ToolApprovalStore()
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pending = store.create(owner=authority.owner, session_id=authority.session_id, origin_run_id="run",
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tool_name=tool, content=content, workspace=authority.workspace, request_authority=authority,
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external_untrusted_context_seen=True, capabilities=capabilities_for_action(tool, content))
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return pending, store.consume(pending.approval_id, decision="approve",
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owner=authority.owner, session_id=authority.session_id)
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async def _dispatch(authority, tool, content, exact):
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from src import tool_execution as execution
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return await execution.execute_tool_block(ToolBlock(tool, content), owner=authority.owner,
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session_id=authority.session_id, workspace=authority.workspace,
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request_authority=authority, exact_approval=exact,
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security_context=ToolRunSecurityContext(external_untrusted_context_seen=True))
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def test_approval_for_ungranted_bash_seals_a_launch_in_the_workspace(tmp_path):
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authority = _authority(tmp_path, "get_workspace")
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assert authority.launch_scopes == ()
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pending, _ = _approve(authority, "bash", "printf approved-run")
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bound = pending.process_operation
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assert bound is not None
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assert bound.launch is not None
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assert bound.launch.scope.root.path == str(tmp_path.resolve())
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assert bound.request_id == authority.request_id
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async def test_approved_ungranted_bash_runs_once(tmp_path):
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authority = _authority(tmp_path, "get_workspace")
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_, exact = _approve(authority, "bash", "printf approved-run")
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description, result = await _dispatch(authority, "bash", "printf approved-run", exact)
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assert result.get("failure_kind") != "resource_identity_denied", result
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assert result.get("exit_code") == 0, result
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assert "approved-run" in str(result.get("output", "")) + description
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_, replay = await _dispatch(authority, "bash", "printf approved-run", exact)
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assert replay.get("blocked") is True, replay
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async def test_inherited_authority_still_cannot_widen_to_ungranted_bash(tmp_path):
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# A child (inherited) authority may only narrow its parent, so an approval
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# it proposes for an ungranted launch must stay unsealed and unrunnable.
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from dataclasses import replace
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child = replace(_authority(tmp_path, "get_workspace"), inherited=True)
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pending, exact = _approve(child, "bash", "printf approved-run")
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assert pending.process_operation is None
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_, result = await _dispatch(child, "bash", "printf approved-run", exact)
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assert result.get("blocked") is True
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@pytest.fixture
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def agent_workspace():
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import os
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from src.constants import AGENT_WORKSPACE_DIR
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os.makedirs(AGENT_WORKSPACE_DIR, exist_ok=True)
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return os.path.realpath(AGENT_WORKSPACE_DIR)
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def test_approval_without_a_workspace_seals_a_launch_in_the_agent_workspace(agent_workspace):
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# Agent mode with no folder picked is the default. bash already runs in the
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# agent workspace there (agent_cwd), so that is where its approval seals.
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authority = _authority("", "get_workspace")
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assert authority.resource_roots == ()
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pending, _ = _approve(authority, "bash", "pwd")
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bound = pending.process_operation
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assert bound is not None
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assert bound.launch is not None
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assert bound.launch.scope.root.path == agent_workspace
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async def test_approved_bash_without_a_workspace_runs_in_the_agent_workspace(agent_workspace):
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authority = _authority("", "get_workspace")
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_, exact = _approve(authority, "bash", "pwd")
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description, result = await _dispatch(authority, "bash", "pwd", exact)
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assert result.get("failure_kind") != "resource_identity_denied", result
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assert result.get("exit_code") == 0, result
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containment = result.get("containment") or {}
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assert containment.get("workspace", agent_workspace) == agent_workspace, containment
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async def test_inherited_authority_without_a_workspace_still_cannot_widen(agent_workspace):
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from dataclasses import replace
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child = replace(_authority("", "get_workspace"), inherited=True)
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pending, exact = _approve(child, "bash", "pwd")
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assert pending.process_operation is None
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_, result = await _dispatch(child, "bash", "pwd", exact)
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assert result.get("blocked") is True
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async def test_approved_write_without_a_workspace_lands_in_the_agent_workspace(agent_workspace):
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# write_file had the same gap: with no workspace the approval sealed no
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# root, so "approve" ended in "no sealed resource identity".
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import os
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target = "approved-write-6635.txt"
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content = f"{target}\nhello"
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authority = _authority("", "get_workspace")
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pending, exact = _approve(authority, "write_file", content)
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assert pending.resource_operation is not None
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_, result = await _dispatch(authority, "write_file", content, exact)
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assert result.get("failure_kind") != "resource_identity_denied", result
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written = os.path.join(agent_workspace, target)
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try:
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with open(written) as fh:
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assert fh.read().strip() == "hello"
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finally:
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if os.path.exists(written):
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os.remove(written)
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