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RaresKeYandLéo
ed78beee1b
Select the official immutable SearXNG release with corrected system and certifi stores in all Compose deployments. Retain native offline, actual-entrypoint and Compose/live regression checks while removing the custom trust-repair image and registry publication path. Reuse the canonical CA inventory checker. Include released Python, certifi, grpcio, uv and Docker CLI trust updates and strict fourteen-chain validation. Keep unreleased CPython verifier and native-helper fixes separate from claims about shipped artifacts. Part of #6784 and #6790. Co-authored-by: Léo <leograndcontact@gmail.com>
18 lines
2.9 KiB
Markdown
18 lines
2.9 KiB
Markdown
# CA trust regression fixtures
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The public certificates embedded in `tests/test_ca_trust.py` exercise the October 2026 eMudhra trust-store check. They contain no private keys. `emsign-g3.pem` and `aaa.pem` are the incident's affected trust anchors; `emsign-g1.pem` is an unaffected emSign anchor that must remain usable. `localhost-leaf.pem` is a synthetic self-signed Ed25519 server certificate with `CA:FALSE`, generated solely to reproduce hashed non-CA certificates found in Ubuntu's OpenSSL directory; its private key was discarded. The test creates temporary PEM files from these public constants. The certificate fingerprints are the factual identity of each fixture.
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Sources: the [incident root list](https://emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com/roots.json) and the public Mozilla root certificates distributed in Debian's `ca-certificates` package.
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`incident.json` contains the four published roots, sixteen [compromised intermediate certificates and cross-signs](https://emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com/impacted-intermediates.json), and the [fourteen published server chains](https://emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com/chains.zip), retrieved on 2026-10-21 with chains refreshed on 2026-10-23. The refresh adds the two DV G3B hosts without Certificate Transparency entries and preserves the original twelve chains. Certificates are deduplicated by SHA-256 of DER; each chain lists its leaf first. The additional cross-signed `emSign Root TLS CA - G3` issuer comes from those chains and has fingerprint `3094025792039a68af6e553686410bdab7c0d4a36b9084cba64202e35d6ebbdd`. Like the intermediates, it must not be accepted as a custom trust anchor. All data is public certificate material, with no private keys.
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Downloaded source SHA-256 values:
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- `roots.json`: `119f32cd81a6b5a4e3c4c2df5fe07daa90dc43cafa123a62f0394f1895d92380`
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- `impacted-intermediates.json`: `f67b3abe9b4879f4e91874ed041beccd71257f1db41c588c724ccf12aa90c59e`
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- `chains.zip`: `7b949956955fc501a30f4d98d2f513d34c0bbbe92e29a968194c96e097ce2345`
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The offline OpenSSL regression verifies server purpose, hostname and strict certificate rules with partial-chain trust, at `2026-10-23T12:00:00Z` (`1792756800`). Fixing the verification date keeps later certificate expiry from masking a broken mitigation. All fourteen chains must verify against the affected positive-control roots and fail against the unaffected G1-only store. Adding the compromised DV G3B intermediate restores four paths, including the two new hosts, which the checker must reject. The regression makes no network requests and skips chain verification if the OpenSSL executable is unavailable; certificate-inventory tests still run using Python's standard library.
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The upstream SearXNG image validation uses the same `incident.json` inventory and fixed verification timestamp, checking each stored DER fingerprint before use. See [the image documentation](../../../docs/searxng-trust-image.md) for its validation targets and source provenance.
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