mirror of
https://github.com/pewdiepie-archdaemon/odysseus.git
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RaresKeYandStressTestor
7026cf40b5
* docs(specs): restore bootstrap after dev rewrite
* docs(specs): remove runtime inventory snapshot
* docs(specs): reconcile current dev truth
* docs(specs): document scheduled task actions as an owner-attribution source
Owner Attribution covered cookie, bearer-token and internal-loopback
requests. Scheduled task actions are a fourth source and behave
differently: _execute_action passes owner=task.owner off the stored
ScheduledTask row, so no request and no resolved principal are in
flight, and route-level require_user() never runs.
Webhook triggers are the sharp case. They are unauthenticated by
design with the token as the only credential and execute under the
stored task.owner.
Paths cite routes/task/task_routes.py, the canonical location after
the task subpackage move (#6081); routes/task_routes.py on current dev
is the backward-compat shim.
* docs(specs): add chained tasks to the trigger list, refresh dev stamp
Review feedback from RaresKeY on the previous commit.
"Every trigger path" was too broad: success-chained tasks are another
path into _execute_action. Added them with their own citation, and
noted that chaining additionally requires the target task to share
task.owner and rejects cycles, which is stricter than the trigger-side
checks. Softened the lead-in to "these trigger paths".
Line 56 still pointed at routes/task_routes.py for webhook credential
validation. That path is the backward-compat shim on current dev after
the task subpackage move (#6081); repointed to the canonical
routes/task/task_routes.py.
Stamp moved to dev@2a6b09b. Inspection backing that bump was scoped:
every file path cited in this spec was mechanically checked to resolve
on 2a6b09b, and every file:line in the Owner Attribution additions was
read against it. Behavioral claims elsewhere in the file were not
re-audited.
* docs(specs): correct SECURE_COOKIES description to match current behavior
Third of the stale details RaresKeY enumerated. The cookie section
described SECURE_COOKIES as purely opt-in, which stopped being true.
_secure_cookie() (routes/auth_routes.py:89) treats an explicit true or
false as authoritative and derives the Secure attribute from the
request otherwise, including when the variable is unset and when
docker-compose injects it present-but-empty. Either the connection
scheme or the first X-Forwarded-Proto hop being https is enough.
* docs(specs): refresh current dev truth
---------
Co-authored-by: StressTestor <212606152+StressTestor@users.noreply.github.com>
47 lines
1.7 KiB
Markdown
47 lines
1.7 KiB
Markdown
# GitHub Copilot Provider Shape
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Last updated: dev@e57f60b | 2026-07-20
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## Scope
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Canonical provider ID `copilot`; OpenAI-compatible chat with Copilot headers
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and OAuth; runtime adapter `src/copilot.py` and routes in
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`routes/copilot_routes.py`. There is no dedicated Copilot canonical reader on
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current `dev`.
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## Catalog Shape
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The observed Copilot `/models` response uses `data[]` entries with:
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- `id`;
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- `model_picker_enabled`;
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- `capabilities.supports.tool_calls` and `.vision`;
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- optional limit/family metadata.
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Runtime model discovery uses picker state for availability. The canonical
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reader package does not map the nested support fields; an explicitly supplied
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`copilot` vendor currently uses generic identity-only normalization, and
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`model_picker_enabled` does not become canonical capability.
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## Request And Response Shape
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Chat is OpenAI-compatible but requires Copilot/GitHub API version, editor/plugin
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identity, intent, integration, and initiator headers; image requests add the
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vision request flag. Header derivation must tolerate malformed message entries.
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OAuth token exchange and access policies are provider authentication, not model
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capability.
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## Fallback And Safety
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Use exact GitHub Copilot host or explicit kind, including the constrained
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enterprise `copilot-api.*.ghe.com` form. Do not treat arbitrary `ghe.com` hosts
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as Copilot. Official model availability tables are useful registry context but
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do not replace the account-scoped catalog response.
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## Current Gaps
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- The catalog shape is implementation-observed and needs ongoing fixture
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comparison with current Copilot clients.
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- Copilot catalog capability fields are not normalized by current `dev`.
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- Account/plan/policy availability must remain endpoint-user scoped.
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