Files
RaresKeYandStressTestor 7026cf40b5 docs: bootstrap specs ground truth (#5794)
* docs(specs): restore bootstrap after dev rewrite

* docs(specs): remove runtime inventory snapshot

* docs(specs): reconcile current dev truth

* docs(specs): document scheduled task actions as an owner-attribution source

Owner Attribution covered cookie, bearer-token and internal-loopback
requests. Scheduled task actions are a fourth source and behave
differently: _execute_action passes owner=task.owner off the stored
ScheduledTask row, so no request and no resolved principal are in
flight, and route-level require_user() never runs.

Webhook triggers are the sharp case. They are unauthenticated by
design with the token as the only credential and execute under the
stored task.owner.

Paths cite routes/task/task_routes.py, the canonical location after
the task subpackage move (#6081); routes/task_routes.py on current dev
is the backward-compat shim.

* docs(specs): add chained tasks to the trigger list, refresh dev stamp

Review feedback from RaresKeY on the previous commit.

"Every trigger path" was too broad: success-chained tasks are another
path into _execute_action. Added them with their own citation, and
noted that chaining additionally requires the target task to share
task.owner and rejects cycles, which is stricter than the trigger-side
checks. Softened the lead-in to "these trigger paths".

Line 56 still pointed at routes/task_routes.py for webhook credential
validation. That path is the backward-compat shim on current dev after
the task subpackage move (#6081); repointed to the canonical
routes/task/task_routes.py.

Stamp moved to dev@2a6b09b. Inspection backing that bump was scoped:
every file path cited in this spec was mechanically checked to resolve
on 2a6b09b, and every file:line in the Owner Attribution additions was
read against it. Behavioral claims elsewhere in the file were not
re-audited.

* docs(specs): correct SECURE_COOKIES description to match current behavior

Third of the stale details RaresKeY enumerated. The cookie section
described SECURE_COOKIES as purely opt-in, which stopped being true.

_secure_cookie() (routes/auth_routes.py:89) treats an explicit true or
false as authoritative and derives the Secure attribute from the
request otherwise, including when the variable is unset and when
docker-compose injects it present-but-empty. Either the connection
scheme or the first X-Forwarded-Proto hop being https is enough.

* docs(specs): refresh current dev truth

---------

Co-authored-by: StressTestor <212606152+StressTestor@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-25 14:18:44 +02:00

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1.9 KiB
Markdown

# vLLM Provider Shape
Last updated: dev@e57f60b | 2026-07-20
## Scope
Canonical placeholder provider ID `vllm`; OpenAI Chat and Responses serving;
generic identity-only inventory normalization. There is no dedicated vLLM
reader or model-card detector on current `dev`.
## Catalog Shape
Current `GET /v1/models` returns `object: list`, `data[]` model cards with
`id`, `object`, `owned_by: vllm`, `root`, `parent`, `max_model_len`, and
`permission[]`. The generic reader retains only identity/raw data and does not
inspect `owned_by`, `root`, `parent`, `max_model_len`, or `permission`. The card
does not prove chat template, tools,
reasoning parser, vision assets, embeddings, transcription, or rerank.
LoRA cards can use a different `id`, root path, and parent. Keep each served ID
endpoint scoped and do not merge it globally with the base checkpoint.
## Runtime Capability
vLLM's supported API surface is broad, but actual behavior depends on the
loaded model task, chat template, multimodal assets, tool-call parser,
reasoning parser, structured-output configuration, and launch flags. Current
Odysseus reasoning regressions cover structured `reasoning`, legacy
`reasoning_content`, and compatible fields (#602). These response channels are
transport evidence, not a claim that every vLLM model reasons.
## Fallback And Safety
Current reader detection identifies port 8000 as vLLM, or accepts an explicit
endpoint kind, then dispatches to the generic identity-only reader. It does not
infer vLLM from the model-card payload. Do not consume `/server_info`
environment/config dumps for normal discovery because they can be large and
operationally sensitive.
## Current Gaps
- A small safe native capability endpoint is not part of the canonical probe.
- Deployment parser/template flags are not persisted with endpoint capability.
- No dedicated reader maps vLLM model-card fields today.