mirror of
https://github.com/pewdiepie-archdaemon/odysseus.git
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RaresKeYandStressTestor
7026cf40b5
* docs(specs): restore bootstrap after dev rewrite
* docs(specs): remove runtime inventory snapshot
* docs(specs): reconcile current dev truth
* docs(specs): document scheduled task actions as an owner-attribution source
Owner Attribution covered cookie, bearer-token and internal-loopback
requests. Scheduled task actions are a fourth source and behave
differently: _execute_action passes owner=task.owner off the stored
ScheduledTask row, so no request and no resolved principal are in
flight, and route-level require_user() never runs.
Webhook triggers are the sharp case. They are unauthenticated by
design with the token as the only credential and execute under the
stored task.owner.
Paths cite routes/task/task_routes.py, the canonical location after
the task subpackage move (#6081); routes/task_routes.py on current dev
is the backward-compat shim.
* docs(specs): add chained tasks to the trigger list, refresh dev stamp
Review feedback from RaresKeY on the previous commit.
"Every trigger path" was too broad: success-chained tasks are another
path into _execute_action. Added them with their own citation, and
noted that chaining additionally requires the target task to share
task.owner and rejects cycles, which is stricter than the trigger-side
checks. Softened the lead-in to "these trigger paths".
Line 56 still pointed at routes/task_routes.py for webhook credential
validation. That path is the backward-compat shim on current dev after
the task subpackage move (#6081); repointed to the canonical
routes/task/task_routes.py.
Stamp moved to dev@2a6b09b. Inspection backing that bump was scoped:
every file path cited in this spec was mechanically checked to resolve
on 2a6b09b, and every file:line in the Owner Attribution additions was
read against it. Behavioral claims elsewhere in the file were not
re-audited.
* docs(specs): correct SECURE_COOKIES description to match current behavior
Third of the stale details RaresKeY enumerated. The cookie section
described SECURE_COOKIES as purely opt-in, which stopped being true.
_secure_cookie() (routes/auth_routes.py:89) treats an explicit true or
false as authoritative and derives the Secure attribute from the
request otherwise, including when the variable is unset and when
docker-compose injects it present-but-empty. Either the connection
scheme or the first X-Forwarded-Proto hop being https is enough.
* docs(specs): refresh current dev truth
---------
Co-authored-by: StressTestor <212606152+StressTestor@users.noreply.github.com>
28 lines
1.1 KiB
Markdown
28 lines
1.1 KiB
Markdown
# Together AI Provider Shape
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Last updated: dev@e57f60b | 2026-07-20
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## Scope
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Canonical provider ID `together`; OpenAI-compatible cloud transport; curated
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models and discovery compatibility in `routes/model_routes.py`.
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## Shape And Observations
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Together has returned both standard `data[]` and bare model-card lists. The
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current generic reader accepts the standard envelope when the caller supplies
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the Together vendor, but it does not accept a bare root list. It keeps
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identity/provider scope and promotes no capability fields. Task, modality,
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parameter, and limit data needs a dedicated Together reader before it becomes
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canonical; model names and the curated picker list are not capability evidence.
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Together can serve many upstream families. Direct-provider quirks do not
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automatically apply because Together may normalize requests and responses.
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## Fallback And Current Gaps
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Both `*.together.xyz` and `*.together.ai` identify the provider. Malformed/null
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lists fail soft. A provider-specific rich capability schema has not been
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confirmed, so general fallback remains intentional. Bare-list catalogs require
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route-specific preprocessing or a future reader update.
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