mirror of
https://github.com/pewdiepie-archdaemon/odysseus.git
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RaresKeYandStressTestor
7026cf40b5
* docs(specs): restore bootstrap after dev rewrite
* docs(specs): remove runtime inventory snapshot
* docs(specs): reconcile current dev truth
* docs(specs): document scheduled task actions as an owner-attribution source
Owner Attribution covered cookie, bearer-token and internal-loopback
requests. Scheduled task actions are a fourth source and behave
differently: _execute_action passes owner=task.owner off the stored
ScheduledTask row, so no request and no resolved principal are in
flight, and route-level require_user() never runs.
Webhook triggers are the sharp case. They are unauthenticated by
design with the token as the only credential and execute under the
stored task.owner.
Paths cite routes/task/task_routes.py, the canonical location after
the task subpackage move (#6081); routes/task_routes.py on current dev
is the backward-compat shim.
* docs(specs): add chained tasks to the trigger list, refresh dev stamp
Review feedback from RaresKeY on the previous commit.
"Every trigger path" was too broad: success-chained tasks are another
path into _execute_action. Added them with their own citation, and
noted that chaining additionally requires the target task to share
task.owner and rejects cycles, which is stricter than the trigger-side
checks. Softened the lead-in to "these trigger paths".
Line 56 still pointed at routes/task_routes.py for webhook credential
validation. That path is the backward-compat shim on current dev after
the task subpackage move (#6081); repointed to the canonical
routes/task/task_routes.py.
Stamp moved to dev@2a6b09b. Inspection backing that bump was scoped:
every file path cited in this spec was mechanically checked to resolve
on 2a6b09b, and every file:line in the Owner Attribution additions was
read against it. Behavioral claims elsewhere in the file were not
re-audited.
* docs(specs): correct SECURE_COOKIES description to match current behavior
Third of the stale details RaresKeY enumerated. The cookie section
described SECURE_COOKIES as purely opt-in, which stopped being true.
_secure_cookie() (routes/auth_routes.py:89) treats an explicit true or
false as authoritative and derives the Secure attribute from the
request otherwise, including when the variable is unset and when
docker-compose injects it present-but-empty. Either the connection
scheme or the first X-Forwarded-Proto hop being https is enough.
* docs(specs): refresh current dev truth
---------
Co-authored-by: StressTestor <212606152+StressTestor@users.noreply.github.com>
42 lines
1.7 KiB
Markdown
42 lines
1.7 KiB
Markdown
# Hugging Face Provider And Registry Shape
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Last updated: dev@e57f60b | 2026-07-20
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## Scope
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Canonical placeholder vendor ID `huggingface`; download/fit metadata in
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`services/hwfit/`; OpenAI-compatible inference providers/TGI handled as their
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serving dialect. There is no dedicated Hugging Face canonical reader on
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current `dev`.
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## Hub Model Shape
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Hub model info can provide `modelId`/`id`, `pipeline_tag`, `tags`, `config`, and
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card metadata. Current canonical normalization does not map `pipeline_tag`,
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`config.model_type`, or Hub task/modality fields. An explicitly selected
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Hugging Face vendor uses generic identity-only normalization.
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This source is `cookbook_hf`/registry confidence, not live endpoint truth.
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Free-form tags, README/card prose, repository names, and architecture names do
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not automatically claim capability. A serving engine can load a model with
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missing projection, different template, or disabled parser.
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## Serving Shape
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Hugging Face routed inference and TGI can expose OpenAI-compatible endpoints;
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their model list may be identity-only. Keep Hub identity separate from the
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serving endpoint and merge only when exact revision/model identity is known.
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## Fallback And Safety
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Hub metadata can fill a scoped registry record after provider payload fields
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and probes, but must not overwrite fresh endpoint-negative evidence. Treat
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remote code, model cards, and repository files as untrusted content.
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## Current Gaps
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- Revision/digest linkage between downloads, Hub records, and serving
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endpoints is incomplete.
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- Hub task/family metadata is not consumed by the canonical reader package.
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- Pipeline tags can be missing or overly broad; unknown stays unknown.
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