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210 changed files with 7155 additions and 30609 deletions
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@@ -189,7 +189,6 @@ SEARXNG_INSTANCE=http://localhost:8080
# ODYSSEUS_EMAIL_COMPOSE_UPLOAD_MAX_BYTES=26214400 # email compose attachment (25 MB)
# ODYSSEUS_STT_MAX_AUDIO_BYTES=26214400 # speech-to-text audio (25 MB)
# ODYSSEUS_ICS_MAX_BYTES=10485760 # calendar .ics import (10 MB)
# ODYSSEUS_TTS_CACHE_MAX_BYTES=524288000 # TTS cache (500 MB)
# ============================================================
# Host Docker access (explicit opt-in)
+2 -2
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@@ -8,8 +8,8 @@ body:
value: |
**Before submitting:** search [open issues](https://github.com/odysseus-dev/odysseus/issues)
and [discussions](https://github.com/odysseus-dev/odysseus/discussions) first.
Feature requests that duplicate [ROADMAP.md](https://github.com/odysseus-dev/odysseus/blob/main/ROADMAP.md)
or an existing open issue will be closed as duplicates.
The [roadmap](https://github.com/odysseus-dev/odysseus/blob/main/ROADMAP.md) is directional rather than a complete backlog.
Feature requests that duplicate an existing issue or accepted proposal may be closed as duplicates.
If your idea needs community input before it becomes a concrete proposal,
start a [discussion](https://github.com/odysseus-dev/odysseus/discussions/categories/ideas) instead.
+3 -10
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@@ -153,16 +153,6 @@ module.exports = async ({ github, context, core }) => {
}
}
const LABEL_BAD = 'needs more info';
const LABEL_GOOD = 'ready for review';
// Closed issues are no longer awaiting review.
// This also prevents later edits to closed issues from restoring the label.
if (issue.state === 'closed') {
await dropLabel(LABEL_GOOD);
return;
}
// ── Find existing bot comment to update in-place ──────────────────────────
const MARKER = '<!-- issue-description-check -->';
const { data: comments } = await github.rest.issues.listComments({
@@ -170,6 +160,9 @@ module.exports = async ({ github, context, core }) => {
});
const existing = comments.find(c => c.user.type === 'Bot' && c.body.includes(MARKER));
const LABEL_BAD = 'needs more info';
const LABEL_GOOD = 'ready for review';
if (failures.length === 0) {
if (existing) {
await github.rest.issues.deleteComment({ owner, repo, comment_id: existing.id });
+5 -2
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@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ name: CI
on:
push:
branches: [main, dev]
branches: [main]
pull_request:
# Least privilege: none of the jobs write to the repo.
@@ -103,7 +103,10 @@ jobs:
python-tests:
name: Python tests (pytest)
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
# Make Python test validation authoritative for the configured scope.
# Informational for now: the suite has known flaky / environment-dependent
# failures (test isolation + embedding-model assertions). Tracked under the
# ROADMAP "fresh install smoke tests" item; make this required once green.
continue-on-error: true
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0
with:
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ name: ci / issue description check
on:
issues:
types: [opened, edited, reopened, closed]
types: [opened, edited, reopened]
permissions:
issues: write
+8 -4
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@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
# Odysseus
<p align="center">
<img src="docs/odysseus-wordmark.png" alt="Odysseus" width="238">
</p>
@@ -9,6 +11,8 @@
<p align="center">
<a href="#quick-start">Quick Start</a> ·
<a href="docs/setup.md">Setup Guide</a> ·
<a href="docs/ARCHITECTURE.md">Architecture</a> ·
<a href="SECURITY.md">Security</a> ·
<a href="CONTRIBUTING.md">Contributing</a> ·
<a href="ROADMAP.md">Roadmap</a>
</p>
@@ -51,15 +55,15 @@ Native installs, GPU notes, Windows/macOS instructions, HTTPS, and configuration
## Demo
A full hover-to-play tour lives on the landing page: [`docs/index.html`](docs/index.html).
Explore the interface through the [interactive product tour](docs/index.html).
## Contributing
Help is welcome. The best entry points are fresh-install testing, provider setup bugs, mobile/editor polish, docs, and small focused refactors. See [CONTRIBUTING.md](CONTRIBUTING.md) and [ROADMAP.md](ROADMAP.md).
Help is welcome. The best entry points are fresh-install testing, provider setup bugs, mobile/editor polish, documentation, and small focused refactors. Read the [contributing guide](CONTRIBUTING.md), review the [public roadmap](ROADMAP.md), and browse the open [GitHub issues](https://github.com/odysseus-dev/odysseus/issues).
## Security
Odysseus is a self-hosted workspace with powerful local tools. Keep auth enabled, keep private data out of Git, and do not expose raw model/service ports publicly. Deployment details are in the [setup guide](docs/setup.md#security-notes).
Odysseus is a self-hosted workspace with powerful local tools. Keep auth enabled, keep private data out of Git, and do not expose raw model or service ports publicly. Read the [security policy](SECURITY.md) and the [deployment security guidance](docs/setup.md#security-notes).
## Star History
@@ -73,4 +77,4 @@ Odysseus is a self-hosted workspace with powerful local tools. Keep auth enabled
## License
AGPL-3.0-or-later -- see [LICENSE](LICENSE) and [ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.md](ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.md).
Licensed under AGPL-3.0-or-later. See the [license](LICENSE) and [acknowledgments](ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.md).
+43 -75
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@@ -1,87 +1,55 @@
# Roadmap / Help Wanted
# Roadmap
Odysseus is on a voyage, but not home yet. It works great for me (lol), but this ship is moving fast and feedback/help would be appreciated! (I don't know what I'm doing, help).
This document provides a high-level view of the areas Odysseus is currently improving.
If you see weird CSS, strange layout behavior, or a suspiciously murky corner of
the codebase, you are probably right to stay away.
It is directional rather than exhaustive. Priorities may change as the project evolves, defects are discovered, and maintainers learn more from implementation work and user feedback.
## High Priority
For current implementation work, see the open [GitHub issues](https://github.com/odysseus-dev/odysseus/issues). Accepted behaviour should be documented in the repository alongside the code.
- SQUASH BUGS
- Fresh install smoke tests on Linux, macOS, and Windows. Docker, native Python,
and WSL all need coverage.
## Current priorities
- Integration audit: do integrations even work? Confirm what works, what needs setup docs, and what should be removed or hidden.
- Cookbook reliability on other computers. This is probably the area most likely to need work across different machines, GPUs, drivers, shells, and Python environments.
- Cookbook SGLang support across platforms. Make sure SGLang setup/serve works
predictably on Linux, Windows/WSL, macOS where possible, Docker, and common
NVIDIA/AMD hardware paths.
- Deep Research model presets by hardware. Recommend approved model/parameter
profiles for small, medium, and large local setups so people with different
hardware can use Deep Research without guessing. Surface this either in Deep
Research settings or as a Cookbook scan/dropdown suggestion.
- Cookbook model scan/download ranking. Prioritize newer architectures and
better hardware-fit models instead of scoring everything almost the same.
Ranking should account for architecture age, quant format, VRAM/RAM fit,
backend support, vision/mmproj requirements, and likely serve reliability.
- Cookbook error feedback and logging. Failed downloads, dependency installs,
preflights, and serve jobs should show the actual command/output/error in the
UI, with copyable logs and clear next steps instead of just "crashed".
- Agent prompt/context bloat. Agent mode is too heavy for smaller local models:
tool schemas, skills, memory, documents, and instructions can eat the context
before the user request really starts. We need slimmer prompts, better tool
selection, smaller default tool sets, and clearer guidance for models with
4k/8k/16k context windows.
- Local model speculative decoding support. For Odysseus-tuned local models,
plan to ship or recommend a small same-tokenizer draft model when the serving
backend supports it. Early vLLM testing showed a generic `Qwen3-0.6B` draft
beside `Qwen3-8B` can materially reduce wall time, while an unsupported
DSpark conversion performed poorly. Treat this as a supported draft-model lane
first; keep MTP-specific packaging as future work only when the architecture
and runtime support are real. Judge this by time-to-success, tool correctness,
grammar, and unchanged target output, not tokens/sec alone.
- Skill/tool prompt-injection audit. User-editable skills, notes, documents,
fetched pages, and memories should be treated as untrusted data. Keep testing
whether models follow malicious instructions from those surfaces.
- Better degraded-state reporting for ChromaDB, SearXNG, email, ntfy, and provider probes.
- Email performance audit. Fetching, searching, opening, deleting, and sending
email can feel slow, especially over IMAP/SMTP providers with high latency.
Need someone who knows mail performance to profile the current flow, identify
whether the bottleneck is IMAP folder select/fetch, cache invalidation,
attachment/body loading, SMTP handshakes, or frontend refresh behavior, then
propose safer caching/prefetch/batching without breaking multi-account state.
- Provider setup/probing audit for Anthropic, Gemini, Groq, xAI, OpenRouter, OpenAI, and DeepSeek.
### Reliability and setup
## Refactor Targets
- CSS cleanup. `static/style.css` basically Calypso's island atm.
- Tour core helper. The onboarding tours have too much copy-pasted scaffolding; promote a shared `tour-core.js` helper before adding more tours.
- Modal/window positioning cleanup. Some window controls have improved, but the
underlying popup/dropdown/fixed-position behavior is still too fragile.
- Mobile media override discoverability. A lot of "CSS did not move" bugs are mobile `@media` overrides of the same selector; comments or linting around desktop/mobile paired rules would help.
- Dead code pass for old routes, stale feature flags, and unused UI states.
- Improve fresh-install and smoke-test coverage across supported environments.
- Make provider setup, probing, and failure states more predictable.
- Improve Cookbook reliability across hardware, operating systems, drivers, shells, and serving backends.
- Improve degraded-state reporting and recovery guidance when optional services are unavailable.
## Frontend
### Local model workflows
- Expand the Editor for quicker, more robust everyday use. Better file/document
handling, smoother window behavior, clearer save/export flows, stronger image
editing affordances, and fewer brittle edge cases.
- Better AI integration for Notes and Todos. Notes should be easier for the
agent to read, update, summarize, and turn into actions. Todos should be
assignable to an agent from the UI, possibly through a button, task action,
or dedicated skill/tool flow.
- Mobile gallery/editor polish. Easier to launch/download inpaint model or any missing pieces.
- Accessibility pass: keyboard navigation, focus states, contrast, reduced motion.
- Improve empty states and error messages on fresh installs.
- Tighten first-run setup, hints, and tours so they do not repeat or fight each other.
- Vendor CDN assets eventually for a more fully self-hosted/offline mode.
- Improve hardware-aware model recommendations and compatibility guidance.
- Evaluate serving optimizations, including speculative decoding, through reproducible benchmarks.
- Improve installation, preflight checks, logging, and error reporting for local model serving.
- Reduce prompt and context overhead for smaller local models.
## Backend
### Safety and resilience
- More tests around endpoint probing and provider setup.
- Better task scheduler defaults and visibility.
- Backup/restore guide and helper flow for `data/`.
- Security hardening around admin-only tools and clear docs for their risk.
- Continue hardening tool execution, filesystem access, credentials, networking, and destructive operations.
- Treat content from documents, notes, memories, skills, and fetched pages as potentially untrusted.
- Improve security-focused regression coverage and operational guidance.
- Review integrations that expand access to sensitive data or privileged operations.
## Not The Focus Right Now
### Product usability
I prob shouldnt add more themes.
- Improve first-run setup, onboarding, hints, and tours.
- Improve accessibility, keyboard navigation, focus behaviour, contrast, and reduced-motion support.
- Improve empty states, error messages, and recovery paths.
- Strengthen Notes, Todos, Editor, mobile, and everyday workspace flows.
### Architecture and maintainability
- Reduce duplication and technical debt through focused, reviewable refactors.
- Improve subsystem documentation as behaviour and architecture become stable.
- Remove stale code, obsolete feature flags, and unsupported integrations.
- Keep implementation decisions grounded in current code and verified behaviour.
## Tracking work
Concrete implementation tasks, defects, proposals, and technical investigations are tracked in:
- [GitHub Issues](https://github.com/odysseus-dev/odysseus/issues)
- [Contributing Guide](CONTRIBUTING.md)
Maintainers may use additional private coordination tools for ownership, planning, and unresolved decisions.
This roadmap is not a complete backlog or a guarantee that a particular item will be delivered.
+3 -1
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@@ -37,4 +37,6 @@ Only `.env.example`, docs, source, tests, and static assets should be committed.
## Reporting
Please report vulnerabilities privately via GitHub security advisories if available, or by opening a minimal issue that does not disclose exploit details.
Report security vulnerabilities privately through [GitHub Security Advisories](https://github.com/odysseus-dev/odysseus/security/advisories/new).
Do not open a public issue or discussion, and do not disclose exploit details publicly.
+5 -5
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@@ -68,14 +68,14 @@ External content that reaches the LLM is treated as untrusted via `src/prompt_se
- `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` and `Referrer-Policy: no-referrer` everywhere.
- **CSP:** nonce-based `script-src 'self' 'nonce-{nonce}' https://cdn.jsdelivr.net`. `style-src 'unsafe-inline'` is intentionally kept — `static/index.html` ships inline `<style>` blocks and JS modules set `style=""` attributes at runtime. Inline styles do not execute script so the risk is visual-only. Removing this requires templating the HTML files and auditing all JS-set style attributes.
## Token-Supplied Model Endpoints
Direct `/api/v1/chat` requests with a token-supplied `base_url` must use a public HTTP(S) endpoint. This restriction applies only to untrusted direct values; administrator-configured endpoints may intentionally use local or LAN URLs for private model providers.
## Known Gaps
These are open, acknowledged, and contributor help is welcome:
1. **No shell/filesystem sandbox.** The agent `bash` and `read_file`/`write_file` tools run as the app process user with no network egress filtering or filesystem confinement. A successful prompt-injection reaching a shell-enabled admin session can make outbound requests to internal services. See #1058 for the sandbox proposal.
2. **SSRF via `/api/v1/chat` `base_url` parameter.** A chat-scoped API token can supply an arbitrary `base_url`; the server forwards the LLM request to that host without validating the scheme or address. PR #1039 fixes this.
3. **`src/search/` partial consolidation.** `src.search.core` and `src.search.providers` correctly alias `services.search` via `sys.modules` replacement. `analytics`, `cache`, `content`, `query`, and `ranking` are still independent copies that can drift. The SSRF regression tests in `tests/test_webhook_ssrf_resilience.py` test `src.webhook_manager` directly (separate from search), so the safety net there is intact. See #1058.
4. **Token scopes are coarse.** There is no way to grant a session a subset of the owning user's privileges. Companion/mobile tokens carry either `chat` or `admin` scope with no per-capability granularity.
2. **Token scopes are coarse.** There is no way to grant a session a subset of the owning user's privileges. Companion/mobile tokens carry either `chat` or `admin` scope with no per-capability granularity.
+8 -19
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@@ -630,24 +630,13 @@ app.include_router(auth_router)
@app.post("/api/activity/heartbeat")
async def activity_heartbeat():
from src.interactive_gate import (
mark_browser_activity,
maybe_stop_background_tasks_for_heartbeat,
)
from src.interactive_gate import mark_browser_activity
await mark_browser_activity()
async def _stop_background():
try:
await maybe_stop_background_tasks_for_heartbeat(
task_scheduler.stop_background_tasks_for_foreground
)
await task_scheduler.stop_background_tasks_for_foreground(reason="browser heartbeat")
except Exception:
logging.getLogger("app.foreground_gate").debug(
"heartbeat task stop failed",
exc_info=True,
)
logging.getLogger("app.foreground_gate").debug("heartbeat task stop failed", exc_info=True)
asyncio.create_task(_stop_background())
return {"ok": True}
@@ -703,7 +692,7 @@ from routes.history.history_routes import setup_history_routes
app.include_router(setup_history_routes(session_manager, upload_handler=upload_handler))
# Search
from routes.search.search_routes import setup_search_routes
from routes.search_routes import setup_search_routes
app.include_router(setup_search_routes(config))
# Presets
@@ -750,7 +739,7 @@ app.include_router(setup_stt_routes(stt_service))
logger.info("STT service initialized (provider managed via settings)")
# Documents (artifacts/canvas)
from routes.document.document_routes import setup_document_routes
from routes.document_routes import setup_document_routes
document_router = setup_document_routes(session_manager, upload_handler)
app.include_router(document_router)
@@ -816,7 +805,7 @@ app.include_router(setup_font_routes())
# MCP (Model Context Protocol)
from src.mcp_manager import McpManager
from src.agent_tools import set_mcp_manager
from routes.mcp.mcp_routes import setup_mcp_routes
from routes.mcp_routes import setup_mcp_routes
mcp_manager = McpManager()
set_mcp_manager(mcp_manager)
@@ -831,7 +820,7 @@ set_ai_rag_manager(rag_manager, personal_docs_mgr)
logger.info("AI interaction tools initialized (session, memory, RAG, UI control)")
# Webhooks
from routes.webhook.webhook_routes import setup_webhook_routes
from routes.webhook_routes import setup_webhook_routes
app.include_router(setup_webhook_routes(webhook_manager, auth_manager, session_manager, api_key_manager))
# API Tokens
@@ -863,7 +852,7 @@ app.include_router(setup_codex_routes(
))
app.include_router(setup_claude_routes())
from routes.vault.vault_routes import setup_vault_routes
from routes.vault_routes import setup_vault_routes
app.include_router(setup_vault_routes())
# Contacts (CardDAV)
+4 -8
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@@ -15,21 +15,17 @@ from __future__ import annotations
import json
import os
import uuid
from typing import Any, Optional
def atomic_write_json(path: str, data: Any, *, indent: Optional[int] = None) -> None:
"""Atomically persist `data` as JSON at `path`.
The temp file uses a random suffix so two concurrent writers saving the
same file don't collide on the rename target. A PID suffix does not do
this: the PID is constant for the life of a process, so two writers on
the same path within one process (or one single-process container, where
the PID never changes at all) still race for the same temp file.
The temp file uses the live PID as a suffix so two processes saving the
same file (e.g. unit tests) don't collide on the rename target.
"""
os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(path) or ".", exist_ok=True)
tmp = f"{path}.tmp.{uuid.uuid4().hex}"
tmp = f"{path}.tmp.{os.getpid()}"
with open(tmp, "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:
json.dump(data, f, indent=indent)
f.flush()
@@ -41,7 +37,7 @@ def atomic_write_text(path: str, text: str) -> None:
if not isinstance(text, str):
raise TypeError("atomic_write_text expects a string")
os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(path) or ".", exist_ok=True)
tmp = f"{path}.tmp.{uuid.uuid4().hex}"
tmp = f"{path}.tmp.{os.getpid()}"
with open(tmp, "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:
f.write(text)
f.flush()
+62 -237
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@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ from datetime import datetime, timezone
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Optional
from urllib.parse import unquote, urlparse
from sqlalchemy import DDL, event, create_engine, Column, String, Text, Boolean, DateTime, Integer, ForeignKey, JSON, Index, func, inspect, text
from sqlalchemy import event, create_engine, Column, String, Text, Boolean, DateTime, Integer, ForeignKey, JSON, Index, func, text
from sqlalchemy.engine import Engine, make_url
from sqlalchemy.types import TypeDecorator
from sqlalchemy.ext.declarative import declarative_base, declared_attr
@@ -430,93 +430,6 @@ class EmailAccount(TimestampMixin, Base):
)
class EmailAccountOwnerLock(Base):
"""Durable per-owner mutex for email-account default mutations.
Row-locking databases serialize mutations by locking this row before they
inspect or stage EmailAccount changes. SQLite uses ``BEGIN IMMEDIATE``
instead, because it ignores ``SELECT ... FOR UPDATE``; keeping the table in
the shared metadata still makes the non-SQLite path available without a
separate migration. The empty key represents the normalized legacy /
unconfigured scope shared by ``owner IS NULL`` and ``owner = ''`` rows.
"""
__tablename__ = "email_account_owner_locks"
owner_key = Column(String, primary_key=True)
_EMAIL_ACCOUNT_DEFAULT_INDEX = "ux_email_accounts_one_default_per_owner"
_EMAIL_ACCOUNT_DEFAULT_INDEX_DDL = {
"sqlite": (
f"CREATE UNIQUE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS {_EMAIL_ACCOUNT_DEFAULT_INDEX} "
"ON email_accounts (COALESCE(owner, '')) WHERE is_default = 1"
),
"postgresql": (
f"CREATE UNIQUE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS {_EMAIL_ACCOUNT_DEFAULT_INDEX} "
"ON email_accounts ((COALESCE(owner, ''))) WHERE is_default IS TRUE"
),
}
# SQLAlchemy cannot express one portable partial, functional index across the
# two supported database families. Register dialect-specific DDL so fresh
# databases get the invariant as part of create_all(); the startup migration
# below installs the same index on existing databases after normalizing legacy
# duplicate rows.
for _dialect_name, _index_ddl in _EMAIL_ACCOUNT_DEFAULT_INDEX_DDL.items():
event.listen(
EmailAccount.__table__,
"after_create",
DDL(_index_ddl).execute_if(dialect=_dialect_name),
)
def lock_email_account_owner_mutations(db, *owners: str) -> None:
"""Lock normalized email-account owner scopes in canonical order.
``NULL`` and the empty string are one legacy/single-user owner partition,
matching the unique default-account index. SQLite has only a database
writer reservation, while row-locking databases use durable mutex rows.
Sorting all requested owner keys keeps multi-owner operations such as user
rename from deadlocking with another mutation that requests the same keys
in the opposite order.
"""
from sqlalchemy.exc import IntegrityError
owner_keys = sorted({owner or "" for owner in owners} or {""})
if db.get_bind().dialect.name == "sqlite":
db.execute(text("BEGIN IMMEDIATE"))
return
for owner_key in owner_keys:
lock_row = db.get(
EmailAccountOwnerLock,
owner_key,
with_for_update=True,
)
if lock_row is not None:
continue
inserted = False
try:
with db.begin_nested():
db.add(EmailAccountOwnerLock(owner_key=owner_key))
db.flush()
inserted = True
except IntegrityError:
# A competing transaction created the mutex row first. Once its
# insert commits, lock that durable row before touching accounts.
pass
if not inserted:
(
db.query(EmailAccountOwnerLock)
.filter(EmailAccountOwnerLock.owner_key == owner_key)
.with_for_update()
.one()
)
class ModelEndpoint(TimestampMixin, Base):
"""Admin-configured model endpoints. Models are auto-discovered via /v1/models."""
__tablename__ = "model_endpoints"
@@ -1491,25 +1404,8 @@ def _migrate_assign_legacy_owner():
with open(prefs_path, "r", encoding="utf-8") as f:
prefs = _json.load(f)
if "_users" not in prefs and prefs:
# Flat format → nest ordinary preferences under the admin
# user. Foreground fallback is an explicit per-owner opt-in,
# so auth-disabled consent must remain inert at the flat root
# rather than becoming consent for the first named owner.
foreground_keys = {
"foreground_fallback_enabled",
"foreground_model_fallbacks",
}
named_prefs = {
key: value
for key, value in prefs.items()
if key not in foreground_keys
}
new_prefs = {
key: prefs[key]
for key in foreground_keys
if key in prefs
}
new_prefs["_users"] = {admin_user: named_prefs}
# Flat format → nest under admin user
new_prefs = {"_users": {admin_user: prefs}}
with open(prefs_path, "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:
_json.dump(new_prefs, f, indent=2)
logger.info(f"Migrated user_prefs.json to per-user format under '{admin_user}'")
@@ -1916,142 +1812,72 @@ class Integration(TimestampMixin, Base):
def _migrate_email_account_default_invariant():
"""Normalize legacy duplicates and install durable at-most-one enforcement.
Older databases only had a non-unique ``(owner, is_default)`` lookup index.
Keep the oldest default deterministically in each normalized owner scope,
then add the same partial functional unique index used for fresh schemas.
"""
dialect_name = engine.dialect.name
index_ddl = _EMAIL_ACCOUNT_DEFAULT_INDEX_DDL.get(dialect_name)
if index_ddl is None:
logger.warning(
"Email-account default uniqueness is not available for database "
"dialect %s; mutations remain serialized but are not protected by "
"a database constraint",
dialect_name,
)
return
try:
with engine.begin() as conn:
if not inspect(conn).has_table(EmailAccount.__tablename__):
return
default_rows = conn.execute(text("""
SELECT id, owner
FROM email_accounts
WHERE is_default IS TRUE
ORDER BY
COALESCE(owner, ''),
CASE WHEN created_at IS NULL THEN 1 ELSE 0 END,
created_at,
id
""")).mappings()
seen_owner_keys = set()
duplicate_ids = []
for row in default_rows:
owner_key = row["owner"] or ""
if owner_key in seen_owner_keys:
duplicate_ids.append(row["id"])
else:
seen_owner_keys.add(owner_key)
for account_id in duplicate_ids:
conn.execute(
text("UPDATE email_accounts SET is_default = :value WHERE id = :id"),
{"value": False, "id": account_id},
)
conn.execute(text(index_ddl))
if duplicate_ids:
logger.warning(
"Normalized %d duplicate default email account(s) before "
"installing %s",
len(duplicate_ids),
_EMAIL_ACCOUNT_DEFAULT_INDEX,
)
except Exception:
# Starting without the constraint would silently retain the race this
# migration is intended to close. Fail startup so an operator sees and
# can repair an incompatible schema instead of accepting unsafe writes.
logger.exception("Failed to enforce the email-account default invariant")
raise
def _migrate_seed_email_account():
"""Atomically seed one legacy default account when no account exists.
Reading settings is intentionally done before taking the owner mutex. The
decisive emptiness check and insert share one locked transaction, so two
application workers starting together cannot both seed a default row.
"""
import json as _json
import uuid as _uuid
settings_file = Path(SETTINGS_FILE)
if not settings_file.exists():
return
"""If email_accounts is empty and settings.json has legacy flat imap_host/smtp_host
keys, create a single default account from them so nothing breaks for users who
upgraded. Safe to run repeatedly — it short-circuits once any row exists."""
try:
s = _json.loads(settings_file.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
except Exception:
return
with engine.connect() as conn:
tables = [r[0] for r in conn.execute(text(
"SELECT name FROM sqlite_master WHERE type='table' AND name='email_accounts'"
))]
if "email_accounts" not in tables:
return
existing = conn.execute(text("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM email_accounts")).scalar() or 0
if existing > 0:
return
imap_host = (s.get("imap_host") or "").strip()
smtp_host = (s.get("smtp_host") or "").strip()
if not imap_host and not smtp_host:
return
import json as _json
import uuid as _uuid
from pathlib import Path
settings_file = Path(SETTINGS_FILE)
if not settings_file.exists():
return
try:
s = _json.loads(settings_file.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
except Exception:
return
db = None
try:
if not inspect(engine).has_table(EmailAccount.__tablename__):
return
db = SessionLocal()
lock_email_account_owner_mutations(db, "")
existing = db.execute(text("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM email_accounts")).scalar() or 0
if existing > 0:
return
imap_host = (s.get("imap_host") or "").strip()
smtp_host = (s.get("smtp_host") or "").strip()
if not imap_host and not smtp_host:
return # nothing to migrate
now = utcnow_naive()
db.execute(text("""
INSERT INTO email_accounts
(id, owner, name, is_default, enabled,
imap_host, imap_port, imap_user, imap_password, imap_starttls,
smtp_host, smtp_port, smtp_user, smtp_password,
from_address, created_at, updated_at)
VALUES
(:id, :owner, :name, :is_default, :enabled,
:imap_host, :imap_port, :imap_user, :imap_password, :imap_starttls,
:smtp_host, :smtp_port, :smtp_user, :smtp_password,
:from_address, :created_at, :updated_at)
"""), {
"id": _uuid.uuid4().hex,
"owner": None,
"name": "Default",
"is_default": True,
"enabled": True,
"imap_host": imap_host,
"imap_port": int(s.get("imap_port") or 993),
"imap_user": s.get("imap_user") or "",
"imap_password": s.get("imap_password") or "",
"imap_starttls": bool(s.get("imap_starttls", True)),
"smtp_host": smtp_host,
"smtp_port": int(s.get("smtp_port") or 465),
"smtp_user": s.get("smtp_user") or "",
"smtp_password": s.get("smtp_password") or "",
"from_address": s.get("email_from") or "",
"created_at": now,
"updated_at": now,
})
db.commit()
logger.info("Seeded email_accounts 'Default' from settings.json")
with engine.begin() as conn:
conn.execute(text("""
INSERT INTO email_accounts
(id, owner, name, is_default, enabled,
imap_host, imap_port, imap_user, imap_password, imap_starttls,
smtp_host, smtp_port, smtp_user, smtp_password,
from_address, created_at, updated_at)
VALUES
(:id, :owner, :name, :is_default, :enabled,
:imap_host, :imap_port, :imap_user, :imap_password, :imap_starttls,
:smtp_host, :smtp_port, :smtp_user, :smtp_password,
:from_address, :created_at, :updated_at)
"""), {
"id": _uuid.uuid4().hex,
"owner": None,
"name": "Default",
"is_default": True,
"enabled": True,
"imap_host": imap_host,
"imap_port": int(s.get("imap_port") or 993),
"imap_user": s.get("imap_user") or "",
"imap_password": s.get("imap_password") or "",
"imap_starttls": bool(s.get("imap_starttls", True)),
"smtp_host": smtp_host,
"smtp_port": int(s.get("smtp_port") or 465),
"smtp_user": s.get("smtp_user") or "",
"smtp_password": s.get("smtp_password") or "",
"from_address": s.get("email_from") or "",
"created_at": now,
"updated_at": now,
})
logging.getLogger(__name__).info("Seeded email_accounts 'Default' from settings.json")
except Exception as e:
if db is not None:
db.rollback()
logger.warning("seed email account migration: %s", e)
finally:
if db is not None:
db.close()
logging.getLogger(__name__).warning(f"seed email account migration: {e}")
# WARNING: Foreign-key enforcement is enabled globally for all SQLite connections.
@@ -2134,7 +1960,6 @@ def init_db():
_migrate_add_crew_member_id()
_migrate_add_assistant_columns()
_migrate_add_email_smtp_security()
_migrate_email_account_default_invariant()
_migrate_seed_email_account()
_migrate_add_calendar_metadata()
_migrate_add_calendar_is_utc()
+12 -41
View File
@@ -194,12 +194,7 @@ class SessionManager:
is_important=getattr(db_session, 'is_important', False) or False,
)
# The rows just loaded are the whole transcript, so they — not the
# denormalized sessions.message_count column — are the truth for this
# cached object. get_session's hydration gate compares against this
# number; seeding it from a drifted column would ask for a reload that
# can never close the gap.
session.message_count = len(history)
session.message_count = getattr(db_session, 'message_count', len(history))
return session
# ------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -403,50 +398,30 @@ class SessionManager:
# ------------------------------------------------------------------
def get_session(self, session_id: str) -> Session:
"""Get a session by ID, loading complete DB history when needed.
"""Get a session by ID, loading from DB if needed.
Sessions seeded by ``load_sessions`` start with empty history, and a
cached session can also become partially stale. Refresh metadata first,
then hydrate whenever the cached transcript is short of the stored rows.
Model-send routes enter through this method before building context,
while paginated display history reads SQLite directly.
The gate compares against ``sync_session_metadata``'s reconciled count
(the real ``chat_messages`` total), never the denormalized column, so a
hydrate always closes the gap and the next read is a cache hit.
Sessions seeded by `load_sessions` start with empty history. The
first read here hydrates them with the message rows.
"""
if session_id not in self.sessions:
self._load_session_from_db(session_id)
else:
cached = self.sessions[session_id]
# Lazy hydrate: metadata-only entries get their messages on first read.
if not cached.history and getattr(cached, "message_count", 0) > 0:
self._load_session_from_db(session_id)
# Keep model/endpoint metadata fresh. Endpoint deletion can clear the
# DB row while a session object is still cached in RAM. Refreshing first
# also exposes the authoritative message count before completeness is
# checked.
# DB row while a session object is still cached in RAM.
self.sync_session_metadata(session_id)
cached = self.sessions[session_id]
cached_count = len(cached.history or [])
stored_count = int(getattr(cached, "message_count", 0) or 0)
if cached_count < stored_count:
self._load_session_from_db(session_id)
# Update last_accessed
self._touch_session(session_id)
return self.sessions[session_id]
def sync_session_metadata(self, session_id: str) -> bool:
"""Refresh non-message session fields from the DB into the cached object.
``message_count`` is reconciled against the real ``chat_messages`` rows
rather than copied from the denormalized ``sessions.message_count``
column. That column drifts in normal operation — ``_persist_message``
swallows a failed insert but ``add_message`` has already appended in
memory, so the next successful persist writes rows+1, and a persist for
an uncached session writes 0. Hydration keys off this number: a
drifted-high column would reload the whole transcript on every warm
read, and a drifted-low one would leave the model a truncated one.
"""
"""Refresh non-message session fields from the DB into the cached object."""
session = self.sessions.get(session_id)
if session is None:
return False
@@ -469,11 +444,7 @@ class SessionManager:
session.archived = db_session.archived
session.owner = getattr(db_session, "owner", None)
session.is_important = getattr(db_session, "is_important", False) or False
session.message_count = (
db.query(DbChatMessage)
.filter(DbChatMessage.session_id == session_id)
.count()
)
session.message_count = getattr(db_session, "message_count", session.message_count) or 0
return True
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"Error syncing session metadata {session_id}: {e}")
+34
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@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
# Odysseus discovery maps
Compact, code-grounded discovery maps of cross-cutting systems in the checked-in Odysseus codebase. They preserve investigation context and open factual questions; they are not canonical subsystem specifications, a feature certification, or a substitute for normal testing.
> [!IMPORTANT]
> Checked-in code is the source of truth for current behaviour. Mature subsystem specifications, where they exist, are the canonical documentation of accepted subsystem behaviour. Check code, tests, and configuration before reconciling a discovery finding. Discovery remains non-canonical.
## Explore the maps
| Document | Purpose |
|---|---|
| [Current system map](system-map.md) | Records evidence locations, confirmed local observations, and factual open questions about subsystem boundaries. |
| [Safety boundaries](safety-boundaries.md) | Records evidence about broad authority, safeguards, confirmed risks or gaps, and unverified behaviour. |
## Working rules
- **Trace the code first.** Confirm the current path in source before recording a claim.
- **Promote selectively.** When an owning mature specification exists, add a fact only when it is verified, useful, and not already represented there.
- **Record missing ownership.** When no owning specification exists, retain the verified finding in discovery and record missing documentation ownership as a follow-up.
- **Retain uncertainty here.** Keep unresolved questions and useful investigation context in discovery rather than treating them as canonical truth.
- **Keep specifications current-state only.** Do not record intentions, design direction, refactor plans, decision history, priority, ownership, or sequencing here.
- **Investigate with cause.** Do not exhaustively revalidate existing functionality without a report, visible failure, relevant change, or high-authority review need.
- **Review authority carefully.** Give execution, data access, external tools, credentials, destructive operations, and unattended work focused review.
- **Use stable locations.** Cite modules, routes, classes, and functions instead of fragile line ranges or generated evidence tables.
## Reconciliation flow
1. Start with the relevant map and trace the cited code.
2. Classify the finding against current source evidence and an owning mature specification where one exists.
3. Promote only verified, useful facts that are missing from an existing owning specification.
4. When no owning specification exists, retain the verified finding here and record missing documentation ownership as a follow-up; otherwise retain unresolved context here and correct stale wording.
> [!NOTE]
> This package intentionally contains no generator, validator, maturity scale, feature database, or parallel work tracker. The [architecture runtime inventory](./architecture-runtime-inventory.md) preserves dated structural metrics, investigation context, and historical planning as an explicitly non-canonical snapshot.
+331
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@@ -0,0 +1,331 @@
# Architecture runtime inventory
> [!WARNING]
> This document is a dated structural snapshot, not a canonical runtime specification.
> Counts, paths, and implementation details may drift as the repository changes.
> Verify implementation-sensitive claims against the current code and tests.
- **Branch:** `discovery`
- **Commit:** `c762efe1c97a`
- **Generated:** `2026-07-28T05:38:14+01:00`
- **Historical context:** readability and refactor planning in [#4071](https://github.com/odysseus-dev/odysseus/issues/4071) and [#4082](https://github.com/odysseus-dev/odysseus/issues/4082)
## Disposition
> [!NOTE]
> Reviewed for documentation classification. Stable runtime structure and
> subsystem ownership have been transferred to the proposed canonical
> destination, [`docs/ARCHITECTURE.md`](../docs/ARCHITECTURE.md), for
> maintainer review.
>
> This document retains dated metrics, rankings, investigation context,
> refactor-sensitive observations, and historical planning. Those contents are
> non-canonical and belong under `discovery/`.
| Content | Authority and destination |
|---|---|
| Stable runtime structure | Proposed canonical destination: `docs/ARCHITECTURE.md` |
| Stable subsystem boundaries | Proposed canonical destination: `docs/ARCHITECTURE.md` |
| Frontend module organization | `static/js/MODULE_SUMMARY.md` |
| Counts, line totals, and rankings | This non-canonical inventory |
| Investigation context and open questions | `discovery/` |
| Refactor options and prioritization | Issues, Plane, or non-canonical discovery material |
The transfer preserves the stable facts without promoting generated metrics or
historical prioritization into canonical documentation.
## Purpose
This inventory provides a reviewable map of the current repository structure,
large runtime modules, major subsystem boundaries, and refactor-sensitive areas.
It does not:
- define accepted subsystem behaviour;
- certify runtime correctness;
- prescribe a committed refactor sequence;
- replace focused specifications, tests, or source review.
For cross-cutting implementation evidence, see the [discovery maps](./README.md).
## Top-level runtime structure
| Area | Role |
|---|---|
| `app.py` | FastAPI application composition and entry point |
| `launcher.py` | Application launch support |
| `setup.py` | Native setup workflow |
| `core/` | Authentication, middleware, persistence, sessions, and platform primitives |
| `routes/` | HTTP and API route handlers |
| `src/` | Application services, orchestration, tools, providers, and runtime helpers |
| `services/` | Domain-oriented service packages |
| `mcp_servers/` | Built-in MCP server implementations |
| `scripts/` | CLI tools, diagnostics, maintenance, and migration helpers |
| `static/` | No-build browser frontend and bundled assets |
| `tests/` | Automated test suite and supporting test infrastructure |
## Directory snapshot
| Directory | Tracked files | Tracked Python files | Direct subdirectories |
|---|---:|---:|---|
| `src/` | 143 | 143 | `agent_tools/`, `model_capability_readers/`, `search/`, `tools/` |
| `routes/` | 73 | 73 | `admin_wipe/`, `cleanup/`, `compare/`, `contacts/`, `gallery/`, `history/`, `memory/`, `note/`, `research/` |
| `core/` | 11 | 11 | None |
| `services/` | 42 | 40 | `docs/`, `faces/`, `hwfit/`, `memory/`, `research/`, `search/`, `shell/`, `stt/`, `tts/`, `youtube/` |
| `mcp_servers/` | 5 | 5 | None |
| `scripts/` | 44 | 17 | `_completion/`, `_lib/`, `demo_email/` |
| `static/js/` | 154 | 0 | `calendar/`, `color/`, `compare/`, `editor/`, `emailLibrary/`, `markdown/`, `model/`, `research/`, `util/` |
| `tests/` | 768 | 758 | `cli/`, `helpers/`, `streaming/`, `tools/` |
> [!NOTE]
> Counts in this table use `git ls-files`, so generated caches, virtual
> environments, and other untracked local files are excluded.
## Largest backend modules
Large files are review signals, not proof that a module should be split.
Coupling, ownership, import compatibility, tests, and runtime authority matter more
than line count alone.
| Rank | File | Lines | Classes | Top-level functions | Review signal |
|---:|---|---:|---:|---:|---|
| 1 | `routes/email_routes.py` | 6032 | 1 | 58 | High |
| 2 | `src/agent_loop.py` | 5248 | 0 | 63 | High |
| 3 | `routes/cookbook_routes.py` | 4545 | 0 | 16 | High |
| 4 | `mcp_servers/email_server.py` | 2920 | 0 | 77 | High |
| 5 | `src/llm_core.py` | 2895 | 3 | 85 | High |
| 6 | `src/builtin_actions.py` | 2845 | 2 | 27 | High |
| 7 | `routes/model_routes.py` | 2743 | 0 | 65 | High |
| 8 | `src/task_scheduler.py` | 2627 | 1 | 8 | Medium |
| 9 | `core/database.py` | 2562 | 28 | 67 | High |
| 10 | `routes/gallery/gallery_routes.py` | 2325 | 0 | 16 | Medium |
| 11 | `routes/chat_routes.py` | 2063 | 0 | 18 | Medium |
| 12 | `routes/shell_routes.py` | 1971 | 1 | 21 | Medium |
| 13 | `src/visual_report.py` | 1933 | 0 | 11 | Medium |
| 14 | `routes/email_helpers.py` | 1888 | 3 | 48 | Medium |
| 15 | `routes/document_routes.py` | 1810 | 0 | 5 | Medium |
| 16 | `src/tools/cookbook.py` | 1705 | 0 | 34 | Medium |
| 17 | `routes/calendar_routes.py` | 1667 | 2 | 19 | Medium |
| 18 | `routes/skills_routes.py` | 1662 | 3 | 19 | Medium |
| 19 | `src/tool_schemas.py` | 1595 | 0 | 3 | Medium |
| 20 | `routes/email_pollers.py` | 1551 | 0 | 23 | Medium |
The largest current backend concentrations include:
- email routing and helper logic;
- agent-loop orchestration;
- Cookbook lifecycle and serving logic;
- provider and model routing;
- task scheduling;
- shared database models and persistence helpers.
These areas require focused ownership and compatibility analysis before structural
changes are attempted.
## Largest frontend modules
| Rank | File | Lines |
|---:|---|---:|
| 1 | `static/style.css` | 41132 |
| 2 | `static/js/document.js` | 11200 |
| 3 | `static/js/emailLibrary.js` | 8505 |
| 4 | `static/js/slashCommands.js` | 6520 |
| 5 | `static/js/chat.js` | 6001 |
| 6 | `static/js/settings.js` | 5819 |
| 7 | `static/js/notes.js` | 5365 |
| 8 | `static/app.js` | 4681 |
| 9 | `static/js/cookbookRunning.js` | 4433 |
| 10 | `static/js/galleryEditor.js` | 4386 |
| 11 | `static/js/cookbookServe.js` | 4305 |
| 12 | `static/js/calendar.js` | 3722 |
| 13 | `static/js/cookbook.js` | 3677 |
| 14 | `static/js/sessions.js` | 3665 |
| 15 | `static/js/documentLibrary.js` | 3422 |
| 16 | `static/js/tasks.js` | 3187 |
| 17 | `static/js/admin.js` | 3144 |
| 18 | `static/js/gallery.js` | 2958 |
| 19 | `static/js/cookbook-hwfit.js` | 2826 |
| 20 | `static/js/chatRenderer.js` | 2808 |
The browser frontend remains a no-build ES-module application. Its current source
tree is authoritative; the maintained structural summary is available in
[`static/js/MODULE_SUMMARY.md`](../static/js/MODULE_SUMMARY.md).
CSS modularization remains tracked separately in
[#2617](https://github.com/odysseus-dev/odysseus/issues/2617).
## Major subsystem boundaries
| Subsystem | Primary implementation locations |
|---|---|
| Application startup | `app.py`, `src/app_initializer.py`, `core/` |
| Authentication and sessions | `core/auth.py`, `core/middleware.py`, `core/session_manager.py`, `routes/auth_routes.py` |
| Chat and streaming | `routes/chat_routes.py`, `routes/chat_helpers.py`, `src/chat_handler.py`, `src/chat_processor.py`, `src/llm_core.py` |
| Agents and tools | `src/agent_loop.py`, `src/tool_execution.py`, `src/agent_tools/`, `src/tools/`, `src/tool_policy.py`, `src/tool_security.py` |
| Models and providers | `routes/model_routes.py`, `src/model_discovery.py`, `src/model_capabilities.py`, `src/endpoint_resolver.py`, `src/llm_core.py` |
| Cookbook and hardware fit | `routes/cookbook_routes.py`, `routes/cookbook_helpers.py`, `src/cookbook_serve_lifecycle.py`, `services/hwfit/` |
| Search and research | `routes/search_routes.py`, `services/search/`, `routes/research/`, `services/research/`, `src/deep_research.py` |
| Documents and retrieval | `routes/document_routes.py`, `src/document_processor.py`, `src/personal_docs.py`, `src/rag_manager.py`, `src/pdf_runtime.py` |
| Memory and skills | `routes/memory/`, `services/memory/`, `routes/skills_routes.py` |
| Email | `routes/email_routes.py`, `routes/email_helpers.py`, `routes/email_pollers.py`, `mcp_servers/email_server.py` |
| Calendar, contacts, notes, and tasks | `routes/calendar_routes.py`, `routes/contacts/`, `routes/note/`, `routes/task_routes.py`, `src/task_scheduler.py` |
| Media and speech | `routes/gallery/`, `routes/stt_routes.py`, `routes/tts_routes.py`, `services/stt/`, `services/tts/` |
| Persistence and operations | `core/database.py`, `src/runtime_paths.py`, `src/bg_jobs.py`, `routes/backup_routes.py`, `routes/cleanup/` |
For a broader evidence map, see
[`system-map.md`](./system-map.md).
## Refactor-sensitive areas
### Shared persistence
`core/database.py` is a central dependency containing models and shared persistence
helpers. Changes can affect routes, services, background work, tests, migrations,
and import compatibility.
A split should not begin from file size alone. It requires:
- an importer inventory;
- model and helper ownership decisions;
- migration compatibility checks;
- stable re-export or migration strategy;
- focused and full-suite validation.
### Agent orchestration
`src/agent_loop.py` coordinates model interaction, tool selection, policy decisions,
multi-round execution, and background behaviour. Extraction work must preserve tool
event semantics, policy enforcement, cancellation, and test patch points.
Historical agent-loop modularization discussion is tracked in
[#3266](https://github.com/odysseus-dev/odysseus/issues/3266).
### Tool implementation boundaries
Tool implementation is no longer represented by one proposed future package alone.
Current responsibilities are distributed across:
- `src/tool_execution.py`;
- `src/tool_schemas.py`;
- `src/tool_index.py`;
- `src/tool_policy.py`;
- `src/tool_security.py`;
- `src/agent_tools/`;
- `src/tools/`;
- remaining compatibility surfaces such as `src/tool_implementations.py`.
Historical tool modularization work is tracked in
[#3629](https://github.com/odysseus-dev/odysseus/issues/3629).
### Route ownership
`routes/` now contains both flat modules and domain packages. Existing package
boundaries should be extended only through focused changes. Broad mechanical route
movement would affect registration, imports, tests, monkeypatch targets, and
compatibility paths.
### Frontend concentration
The no-build frontend contains several large JavaScript modules and one central CSS
file. Refactors should preserve module load order, global compatibility exports,
DOM contracts, deep-link handling, and browser behaviour.
## Non-implemented architecture options
> [!NOTE]
> The paths below are historical or possible design directions. They do not describe
> the current repository and are not approved implementation plans.
Earlier planning discussed:
- renaming `app.py` to `main.py`;
- moving agent orchestration into a new `src/agent/` package;
- introducing broad `src/domain/`, `src/infra/`, `src/api/`, or `src/pkg/` layers;
- moving all routes into domain subpackages;
- splitting database models into a new infrastructure hierarchy.
These options should be reconsidered against the current tree rather than copied
forward as assumed targets.
## Refactor guardrails
- Keep structural changes behaviour-preserving.
- Change one ownership boundary at a time.
- Do not mix file movement with unrelated feature work.
- Preserve existing import and monkeypatch paths where compatibility is required.
- Identify focused tests before modifying high-authority modules.
- Validate startup, imports, and affected runtime paths.
- Avoid repository-wide package reorganizations without maintainer agreement.
- Treat generated metrics as snapshots, not architectural decisions.
## Reproduce the snapshot
Run these commands from the repository root.
```bash
# Tracked directory totals
for dir in src routes core services mcp_servers scripts static/js tests; do
files="$(git ls-files "$dir" | wc -l)"
python_files="$(git ls-files "$dir" '*.py' | wc -l)"
printf '%-14s tracked=%-5s python=%-5s\n' \
"$dir" \
"$files" \
"$python_files"
done
# Largest tracked backend files
git ls-files \
'app.py' \
'launcher.py' \
'setup.py' \
'core/*.py' \
'core/**/*.py' \
'routes/*.py' \
'routes/**/*.py' \
'services/*.py' \
'services/**/*.py' \
'src/*.py' \
'src/**/*.py' \
'mcp_servers/*.py' \
'scripts/*.py' \
'scripts/**/*.py' |
xargs wc -l |
sort -nr |
head -31
# Largest tracked frontend source files
git ls-files \
'static/*.js' \
'static/*.css' \
'static/*.html' \
'static/**/*.js' \
'static/**/*.css' \
'static/**/*.html' |
grep -vE '\.min\.js$' |
xargs wc -l |
sort -nr |
head -31
```
## Validation for architecture changes
Use the smallest relevant checks first, then expand according to risk:
```bash
python3 -m compileall -q app.py core routes services src
venv/bin/python -m pytest tests/<focused-test-file>.py -q
venv/bin/python -m pytest -q
```
Startup, browser, Docker, and integration checks may also be required depending on
the affected boundary.
## Related documentation
- [Documentation style](../docs/STYLE.md)
- [Discovery maps](../discovery/README.md)
- [Current system map](../discovery/system-map.md)
- [Safety boundaries](../discovery/safety-boundaries.md)
- [Frontend module summary](../static/js/MODULE_SUMMARY.md)
- [Testing standard](../tests/TESTING_STANDARD.md)
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@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
# Safety boundaries
> [!IMPORTANT]
> This non-canonical discovery map records code-grounded safeguards, confirmed risks or gaps, and unverified behaviour. Broad authority does not by itself establish a vulnerability. Verify the cited source before relying on a finding. No destructive test, external connection, or real credential was used for this map.
## Navigate the boundaries
- [Shell and subprocess execution](#shell-and-subprocess-execution)
- [Filesystem access and workspace confinement](#filesystem-access-and-workspace-confinement)
- [Agent-controlled tool dispatch](#agent-controlled-tool-dispatch)
- [MCP and external tool servers](#mcp-and-external-tool-servers)
- [Outbound network requests and URL validation](#outbound-network-requests-and-url-validation)
- [Secrets, credentials, and vault sessions](#secrets-credentials-and-vault-sessions)
- [Authentication and privileged administration](#authentication-and-privileged-administration)
- [Deletion, wipe, backup, and restore](#deletion-wipe-backup-and-restore)
- [Background jobs and unattended task execution](#background-jobs-and-unattended-task-execution)
## Shell and subprocess execution
- **Boundary:** Shell routes, agent `bash` and `python` tools, local model serving, and detached background jobs.
- **Available authority:** Commands run as the application process user and can create child processes.
- **User-controlled inputs:** Direct shell requests, model-produced tool arguments, scheduled-task prompts, and model-serving configuration.
- **Current safeguards:** Agent dispatch applies owner/admin checks and tool policy; process helpers use timeouts or bounded background-job lifecycle where implemented.
- **Confirmed risks or gaps:** Intentional authority with a confirmed gap: the agent shell starts in its workspace but is not sandboxed to it, and has no egress sandbox. This is documented in source and the threat model; it is not a newly demonstrated bypass.
- **Unverified behaviour:** Role-gate and disabled-tool outcomes, direct shell-route behaviour, and timeout, cancellation, and output handling for foreground and detached processes remain unverified.
## Filesystem access and workspace confinement
- **Boundary:** Agent read, write, patch, listing, glob, and grep tools.
- **Available authority:** Read and modify files within active workspace confinement or fallback allowlisted roots.
- **User-controlled inputs:** Tool paths, patches, file contents, search patterns, and workspace selection passed into the tool dispatcher.
- **Current safeguards:** [`src/tool_execution.py`](../src/tool_execution.py) resolves paths, blocks sensitive subpaths, applies allowlist containment, and tightens paths to the active workspace when one is bound. File tools use those resolvers.
- **Confirmed risks or gaps:** Intentional authority with safeguards. The file-tool policy does not sandbox the shell; treating a workspace as a whole-process containment boundary would be incorrect.
- **Unverified behaviour:** Traversal, symlink, sensitive-name, absolute-path, and workspace-switch behaviour remains unverified.
## Agent-controlled tool dispatch
- **Boundary:** Model output becomes native or parsed tool calls and is dispatched by the agent loop.
- **Available authority:** The authority of every enabled tool, including privileged built-ins and external tools.
- **User-controlled inputs:** Chat content, attached/retrieved content that may influence the model, tool arguments, per-request tool selection, and policy toggles.
- **Current safeguards:** [`src/tool_security.py`](../src/tool_security.py) blocks protected tools for non-admin users and fails closed for malformed tool names; [`src/tool_policy.py`](../src/tool_policy.py) supports disabled and guide-only policy; prompt-security helpers label untrusted context.
- **Confirmed risks or gaps:** Credible risk requiring verification: aliases, legacy text tools, native function calls, and MCP-qualified names must all reach the same policy outcome. The code has specific alias handling for email/MCP names, which makes this a sensitive compatibility seam.
- **Unverified behaviour:** The current policy outcomes for owner role, request mode, disabled state, native versus parsed invocation, qualified aliases, and external-content entry points remain unverified.
## MCP and external tool servers
- **Boundary:** Configured MCP servers and their tools are exposed to the agent through the MCP manager and routes.
- **Available authority:** Depends on the server: external network access, local process access, messaging, or data mutation may be delegated outside the application.
- **User-controlled inputs:** Server configuration, remote OAuth completion, tool arguments, and model-selected MCP calls.
- **Current safeguards:** MCP routes are registered through [`routes/mcp_routes.py`](../routes/mcp_routes.py); MCP-qualified tools are denied to non-admin users by [`src/tool_security.py`](../src/tool_security.py). OAuth state and token persistence are handled in [`src/mcp_oauth.py`](../src/mcp_oauth.py).
- **Confirmed risks or gaps:** Credible risk requiring verification: an MCP server authority is broader than the application can infer from its tool name. This map does not establish a trust or approval model for server installation and individual tool invocation.
- **Unverified behaviour:** Server onboarding, credential storage, server-origin trust, OAuth callback deployment, tool disablement, and invocation audit behaviour remain unverified.
## Outbound network requests and URL validation
- **Boundary:** Search/content fetch, research, webhooks, skill import, provider endpoints, and other HTTP clients.
- **Available authority:** The application can make outbound requests from its network position.
- **User-controlled inputs:** Search/fetch URLs, imported skill URLs, webhook configuration, and some endpoint settings.
- **Current safeguards:** [`src/url_security.py`](../src/url_security.py) validates untrusted public HTTP URLs and fails closed on unsuitable schemes or private addresses. [`services/search/content.py`](../services/search/content.py) resolves and rejects non-public hosts, pins resolved addresses for fetches, caps bodies, and limits redirects.
- **Confirmed risks or gaps:** Intentional split: administrator-created model endpoints may target private providers, while untrusted URLs use public-address checks. That distinction is required for self-hosted deployments but needs explicit call-site review.
- **Unverified behaviour:** The URL-source classification for outbound clients and the current handling of redirects and DNS changes remain unverified.
## Secrets, credentials, and vault sessions
- **Boundary:** Application-managed encrypted secrets, API keys, provider credentials, and Bitwarden/Vaultwarden CLI sessions.
- **Available authority:** Credentials unlock remote providers and connected personal services.
- **User-controlled inputs:** Administrative configuration, login/unlock requests, imported settings, and agent vault tool arguments.
- **Current safeguards:** [`src/secret_storage.py`](../src/secret_storage.py) uses a locally stored Fernet key with restrictive permissions for supported database secrets. Vault routes require an administrator, avoid passing master passwords in command arguments, and set restrictive permissions on the vault-session file.
- **Confirmed risks or gaps:** Confirmed current boundary: vault session data is persisted through the vault path, not through [`src/secret_storage.py`](../src/secret_storage.py). This is an unresolved question about current security semantics, not a confirmed exposure.
- **Unverified behaviour:** Current encryption-at-rest, owner scope, rotation, lock/logout, backup/restore, and log/tool-result exposure behaviour remains unverified.
## Authentication and privileged administration
- **Boundary:** Session authentication, API tokens, privileged routes, and internal tool loopback.
- **Available authority:** Administrative identity can access execution, settings, integrations, data deletion, and secrets.
- **User-controlled inputs:** Login/signup data, session cookies, API tokens, authentication configuration, and requests to privileged routes.
- **Current safeguards:** [`core/auth.py`](../core/auth.py), [`core/middleware.py`](../core/middleware.py), and route-level checks establish identity and administrator gates. [`app.py`](../app.py) warns when localhost bypass is configured; [`SECURITY.md`](../SECURITY.md) documents deployment requirements.
- **Confirmed risks or gaps:** Intentional authority with safeguards. Security depends on deployments keeping authentication enabled and internal services private; this map does not audit reverse-proxy or environment configuration.
- **Unverified behaviour:** Setup, anonymous, non-admin, admin, token, and internal-loopback behaviour, including privileged-route gate consistency, remains unverified.
## Deletion, wipe, backup, and restore
- **Boundary:** Administrative wipe, cleanup, backup import/export, and the backup restore command.
- **Available authority:** Delete or replace user data and credentials.
- **User-controlled inputs:** Administrative HTTP requests, cleanup choices, backup payloads, archive paths, and restore command options.
- **Current safeguards:** Administrative wipe routes use the administrative boundary. Cleanup exposes a preview route before mutation. The documented backup tool requires explicit restore confirmation, stages the old data directory, and validates archive members before extraction.
- **Confirmed risks or gaps:** Intentional destructive authority. Backup archives contain secrets by design, as documented in [`docs/backup-restore.md`](../docs/backup-restore.md); this is an operator confidentiality responsibility, not a code defect established here.
- **Unverified behaviour:** Role-gate, confirmation, archive-rejection, staged-recovery, and owner-isolation behaviour remains unverified. No destructive runtime test was performed.
## Background jobs and unattended task execution
- **Boundary:** Scheduled tasks, background-job monitor, startup tasks, and notification/delivery work that continue without an active browser request.
- **Available authority:** Scheduled agent work can obtain model access and, for eligible owners, shell and file tools; task output can interact with connected services.
- **User-controlled inputs:** Stored task prompt, schedule, model/crew selection, enabled-tool configuration, output target, and prior persisted state.
- **Current safeguards:** [`src/task_scheduler.py`](../src/task_scheduler.py) serializes execution, records task runs, associates work with an owner, and applies the agent owner-based tool gate. [`src/bg_jobs.py`](../src/bg_jobs.py) keeps bounded state and can terminate overlong subprocess jobs.
- **Confirmed risks or gaps:** Credible risk requiring verification: authority is inherited and exercised later, so changes to roles, task configuration, and disabled tools must be checked at execution time rather than assumed from task creation.
- **Unverified behaviour:** Creation, editing, role-change, scheduling, cancellation, restart-recovery, and execution behaviour remains unverified, including whether current policy is re-evaluated before privileged action.
+139
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@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
# Current system map
> [!NOTE]
> This non-canonical discovery map is an evidence guide, not an exhaustive feature catalog or runtime certification. Verify the cited source before relying on a finding. Each section records local implementation observations, evidence locations, confirmed current problems, and unresolved factual questions.
## Navigate the system
- [Startup and application composition](#startup-and-application-composition)
- [Frontend shell and browser interaction](#frontend-shell-and-browser-interaction)
- [Chat, sessions, and streaming](#chat-sessions-and-streaming)
- [Agents, tools, and execution](#agents-tools-and-execution)
- [Models, providers, and local serving](#models-providers-and-local-serving)
- [Search and research](#search-and-research)
- [Documents, retrieval, and personal knowledge](#documents-retrieval-and-personal-knowledge)
- [Memory and skills](#memory-and-skills)
- [Email, calendar, contacts, notes, and tasks](#email-calendar-contacts-notes-and-tasks)
- [Media, speech, and image work](#media-speech-and-image-work)
- [Authentication, secrets, and privileged administration](#authentication-secrets-and-privileged-administration)
- [Persistence, background work, and operations](#persistence-background-work-and-operations)
## Startup and application composition
- **How it works:** [`app.py`](../app.py) creates the application, mounts static assets, constructs shared services, registers route factories, and owns lifespan startup and shutdown. [`src/app_initializer.py`](../src/app_initializer.py) prepares application state; [`core/`](../core/) provides persistence, authentication, middleware, sessions, and platform helpers.
- **Evidence locations:** [`app.py`](../app.py); [`src/app_initializer.py`](../src/app_initializer.py); [`core/database.py`](../core/database.py); [`core/auth.py`](../core/auth.py); [`core/middleware.py`](../core/middleware.py); [`routes/`](../routes/).
- **Known problems:** None recorded by this mapping.
- **Open question:** Which component currently owns startup and shutdown for each long-lived service?
## Frontend shell and browser interaction
- **How it works:** [`static/index.html`](../static/index.html) is served by the root and SPA deep-link routes in [`app.py`](../app.py); [`static/app.js`](../static/app.js), [`static/style.css`](../static/style.css), and [`static/js/`](../static/js/) implement the client surface.
- **Evidence locations:** [`static/index.html`](../static/index.html); [`static/app.js`](../static/app.js); [`static/js/`](../static/js/); [`static/style.css`](../static/style.css); [`app.py`](../app.py) deep-link handlers.
- **Known problems:** The `/backgrounds` route in [`app.py`](../app.py) calls `serve_html_with_nonce` for `static/backgrounds.html`, but that file is absent from [`static/`](../static/). This is a confirmed broken prototype route, not evidence about the rest of the frontend.
- **Open question:** Is `/backgrounds` currently an intentionally supported route or an obsolete prototype?
## Chat, sessions, and streaming
- **How it works:** [`routes/chat_routes.py`](../routes/chat_routes.py) and [`routes/chat_helpers.py`](../routes/chat_helpers.py) coordinate requests, session state, and SSE delivery. [`src/chat_handler.py`](../src/chat_handler.py), [`src/chat_processor.py`](../src/chat_processor.py), [`src/llm_core.py`](../src/llm_core.py), and [`src/session_actions.py`](../src/session_actions.py) provide message preparation, provider interaction, and session operations.
- **Evidence locations:** [`routes/chat_routes.py`](../routes/chat_routes.py); [`routes/chat_helpers.py`](../routes/chat_helpers.py); [`routes/session_routes.py`](../routes/session_routes.py); [`src/chat_handler.py`](../src/chat_handler.py); [`src/chat_processor.py`](../src/chat_processor.py); [`src/llm_core.py`](../src/llm_core.py); [`core/session_manager.py`](../core/session_manager.py).
- **Known problems:** [`src/agent_loop.py`](../src/agent_loop.py) annotates `_resolved_tool_event_name` with `Any` but imports no `Any` and does not enable postponed annotation evaluation. Python evaluates that annotation while importing the module, so this is an import-time defect at the checked baseline.
- **Open question:** No end-to-end provider or browser streaming run was performed for this map.
## Agents, tools, and execution
- **How it works:** [`src/agent_loop.py`](../src/agent_loop.py) drives multi-round tool use. [`src/tool_execution.py`](../src/tool_execution.py) dispatches calls and binds workspace context. [`src/agent_tools/`](../src/agent_tools/) contains individual implementations; [`src/tool_security.py`](../src/tool_security.py) and [`src/tool_policy.py`](../src/tool_policy.py) apply role and request policies. Long-running command work is represented by [`src/bg_jobs.py`](../src/bg_jobs.py).
- **Evidence locations:** [`src/agent_loop.py`](../src/agent_loop.py); [`src/tool_execution.py`](../src/tool_execution.py); [`src/agent_tools/`](../src/agent_tools/); [`src/tool_security.py`](../src/tool_security.py); [`src/tool_policy.py`](../src/tool_policy.py); [`src/tool_schemas.py`](../src/tool_schemas.py); [`src/bg_jobs.py`](../src/bg_jobs.py).
- **Known problems:** The import-time annotation defect above blocks the main agent/tool path. The shell is intentionally not a filesystem or network sandbox; that is an authority boundary, not by itself a vulnerability claim.
- **Open question:** Which native, legacy, and MCP-qualified invocation paths reach each policy gate?
## Models, providers, and local serving
- **How it works:** Model routes delegate to discovery, capabilities, endpoint resolution, and LLM core modules. Cookbook routes and hardware-fit services handle model lifecycle and local-serving support.
- **Evidence locations:** [`routes/model_routes.py`](../routes/model_routes.py); [`src/model_discovery.py`](../src/model_discovery.py); [`src/model_capabilities.py`](../src/model_capabilities.py); [`src/endpoint_resolver.py`](../src/endpoint_resolver.py); [`src/llm_core.py`](../src/llm_core.py); [`routes/cookbook_routes.py`](../routes/cookbook_routes.py); [`src/cookbook_serve_lifecycle.py`](../src/cookbook_serve_lifecycle.py); [`services/hwfit/`](../services/hwfit/).
- **Known problems:** None recorded by this mapping.
- **Open question:** Which endpoint inputs are administrator-created and permitted to use private provider addresses?
## Search and research
- **How it works:** HTTP search routes use [`services/search/`](../services/search/); research is exposed through [`routes/research/`](../routes/research/) and implemented in [`services/research/`](../services/research/), [`src/deep_research.py`](../src/deep_research.py), and related helpers. [`src/search/`](../src/search/) remains an import-compatibility layer for callers not yet moved to `services.search`.
- **Evidence locations:** [`routes/search_routes.py`](../routes/search_routes.py); [`services/search/`](../services/search/); [`routes/research/research_routes.py`](../routes/research/research_routes.py); [`services/research/`](../services/research/); [`src/deep_research.py`](../src/deep_research.py); [`src/search/`](../src/search/).
- **Known problems:** None recorded by this mapping.
- **Open question:** No live provider request was made; provider configuration and network access remain unverified.
## Documents, retrieval, and personal knowledge
- **How it works:** Document routes coordinate upload handling, document processing, and editor actions. Personal-document and RAG modules use Chroma and embedding clients. PDF viewing uses the optional-dependency loader in [`src/pdf_runtime.py`](../src/pdf_runtime.py); form extraction and filling live separately in [`src/pdf_forms.py`](../src/pdf_forms.py) and [`src/pdf_form_doc.py`](../src/pdf_form_doc.py).
- **Evidence locations:** [`routes/document_routes.py`](../routes/document_routes.py); [`src/upload_handler.py`](../src/upload_handler.py); [`src/document_processor.py`](../src/document_processor.py); [`src/document_actions.py`](../src/document_actions.py); [`src/personal_docs.py`](../src/personal_docs.py); [`src/rag_manager.py`](../src/rag_manager.py); [`src/embeddings.py`](../src/embeddings.py); [`src/pdf_runtime.py`](../src/pdf_runtime.py); [`src/pdf_forms.py`](../src/pdf_forms.py); [`src/pdf_form_doc.py`](../src/pdf_form_doc.py).
- **Known problems:** PDF viewing/runtime loading and PDF form processing are separate implementations. That separation is confirmed and intentional in the source; it is not a defect without a reported behavioural failure.
- **Open question:** Optional PDF dependencies and representative uploaded documents were not exercised.
## Memory and skills
- **How it works:** Memory routes use [`services/memory/`](../services/memory/) and vector helpers. Skills are exposed through [`routes/skills_routes.py`](../routes/skills_routes.py), stored and managed in [`services/memory/skills.py`](../services/memory/skills.py), and may be imported through [`services/memory/skill_importer.py`](../services/memory/skill_importer.py).
- **Evidence locations:** [`routes/memory/memory_routes.py`](../routes/memory/memory_routes.py); [`services/memory/`](../services/memory/); [`src/memory.py`](../src/memory.py); [`src/memory_vector.py`](../src/memory_vector.py); [`routes/skills_routes.py`](../routes/skills_routes.py); [`services/memory/skills.py`](../services/memory/skills.py); [`services/memory/skill_importer.py`](../services/memory/skill_importer.py).
- **Known problems:** None recorded by this mapping.
- **Open question:** Which imported skill content can reach execution-capable paths, and which validation occurs before that point?
## Email, calendar, contacts, notes, and tasks
- **How it works:** Dedicated route modules own email, CalDAV calendar, CardDAV contacts, notes, and tasks. Supporting modules include email helpers and pollers, CalDAV sync and writeback, and the task scheduler.
- **Evidence locations:** [`routes/email_routes.py`](../routes/email_routes.py); [`routes/calendar_routes.py`](../routes/calendar_routes.py); [`routes/contacts/contacts_routes.py`](../routes/contacts/contacts_routes.py); [`routes/note/note_routes.py`](../routes/note/note_routes.py); [`routes/task_routes.py`](../routes/task_routes.py); [`routes/assistant_routes.py`](../routes/assistant_routes.py); [`src/caldav_sync.py`](../src/caldav_sync.py); [`src/caldav_writeback.py`](../src/caldav_writeback.py); [`src/task_scheduler.py`](../src/task_scheduler.py).
- **Known problems:** None recorded by this mapping.
- **Open question:** External account behaviour, writeback, and delivery require controlled credentials and are not runtime-validated here.
## Media, speech, and image work
- **How it works:** Gallery and image routes coordinate media features. Service modules own speech and media integrations; [`src/generated_images.py`](../src/generated_images.py) and [`src/visual_report.py`](../src/visual_report.py) support artifact handling and presentation.
- **Evidence locations:** [`routes/gallery/gallery_routes.py`](../routes/gallery/gallery_routes.py); [`routes/stt_routes.py`](../routes/stt_routes.py); [`routes/tts_routes.py`](../routes/tts_routes.py); [`src/generated_images.py`](../src/generated_images.py); [`services/stt/`](../services/stt/); [`services/tts/`](../services/tts/); [`services/faces/`](../services/faces/); [`src/visual_report.py`](../src/visual_report.py).
- **Known problems:** None recorded by this mapping.
- **Open question:** Hardware- and provider-dependent media workflows were not exercised.
## Authentication, secrets, and privileged administration
- **How it works:** [`core/auth.py`](../core/auth.py) and [`core/middleware.py`](../core/middleware.py) provide identity and request gates. [`src/secret_storage.py`](../src/secret_storage.py) encrypts application-managed database secrets with a local Fernet key. Vault handling is separate: [`routes/vault_routes.py`](../routes/vault_routes.py) and [`src/tools/vault.py`](../src/tools/vault.py) invoke the Bitwarden CLI and persist its session data in the application data area.
- **Evidence locations:** [`core/auth.py`](../core/auth.py); [`core/middleware.py`](../core/middleware.py); [`routes/auth_routes.py`](../routes/auth_routes.py); [`routes/api_token_routes.py`](../routes/api_token_routes.py); [`src/secret_storage.py`](../src/secret_storage.py); [`routes/vault_routes.py`](../routes/vault_routes.py); [`src/tools/vault.py`](../src/tools/vault.py); [`routes/admin_wipe/admin_wipe_routes.py`](../routes/admin_wipe/admin_wipe_routes.py).
- **Known problems:** Vault-command handling and local application secret storage are distinct paths with different storage mechanisms. This is a source-confirmed boundary, not evidence that either path is compromised.
- **Open question:** What are the current confidentiality, ownership, rotation, and backup semantics for vault session data?
## Persistence, background work, and operations
- **How it works:** SQLite models and persistence are centred in [`core/database.py`](../core/database.py); managers use application data paths. The scheduler and background-job monitor can continue work outside a live browser request. Operational routes cover cleanup, backup, and administrative wipe; the repository also provides a backup script and user documentation.
- **Evidence locations:** [`core/database.py`](../core/database.py); [`src/runtime_paths.py`](../src/runtime_paths.py); [`src/task_scheduler.py`](../src/task_scheduler.py); [`src/bg_jobs.py`](../src/bg_jobs.py); [`src/bg_monitor.py`](../src/bg_monitor.py); [`routes/backup_routes.py`](../routes/backup_routes.py); [`routes/cleanup/cleanup_routes.py`](../routes/cleanup/cleanup_routes.py); [`routes/admin_wipe/admin_wipe_routes.py`](../routes/admin_wipe/admin_wipe_routes.py); [`scripts/odysseus-backup`](../scripts/odysseus-backup); [`docs/backup-restore.md`](../docs/backup-restore.md).
- **Known problems:** None recorded by this mapping.
- **Open question:** What current behaviour applies to background execution, cancellation, retries, and authority inheritance?
-6
View File
@@ -67,7 +67,6 @@ services:
- ODYSSEUS_EMAIL_COMPOSE_UPLOAD_MAX_BYTES=${ODYSSEUS_EMAIL_COMPOSE_UPLOAD_MAX_BYTES:-26214400}
- ODYSSEUS_STT_MAX_AUDIO_BYTES=${ODYSSEUS_STT_MAX_AUDIO_BYTES:-26214400}
- ODYSSEUS_ICS_MAX_BYTES=${ODYSSEUS_ICS_MAX_BYTES:-10485760}
- ODYSSEUS_TTS_CACHE_MAX_BYTES=${ODYSSEUS_TTS_CACHE_MAX_BYTES}
- DATA_BRAVE_API_KEY=${DATA_BRAVE_API_KEY:-}
- GOOGLE_API_KEY=${GOOGLE_API_KEY:-}
- GOOGLE_PSE_CX=${GOOGLE_PSE_CX:-}
@@ -129,17 +128,12 @@ services:
fi
sed "s|__SEARXNG_SECRET__|$$secret|g" /tmp/searxng-settings.yml.template > /etc/searxng/settings.yml
fi
# Advisory: a settings file the migration cannot parse or rewrite must
# not be what stops searxng from booting. It explains itself on stderr
# and we carry on, letting searxng report anything genuinely wrong.
/usr/local/searxng/.venv/bin/python /tmp/migrate-searxng-settings.py /etc/searxng/settings.yml || true
exec /usr/local/searxng/entrypoint.sh
ports:
- "127.0.0.1:8080:8080"
volumes:
- searxng-data:/etc/searxng
- ./config/searxng/settings.yml:/tmp/searxng-settings.yml.template:ro,z
- ./scripts/migrate_searxng_settings.py:/tmp/migrate-searxng-settings.py:ro,z
environment:
- SEARXNG_BASE_URL=http://localhost:8080/
- SEARXNG_SECRET=${SEARXNG_SECRET:-}
-6
View File
@@ -66,7 +66,6 @@ services:
- ODYSSEUS_EMAIL_COMPOSE_UPLOAD_MAX_BYTES=${ODYSSEUS_EMAIL_COMPOSE_UPLOAD_MAX_BYTES:-26214400}
- ODYSSEUS_STT_MAX_AUDIO_BYTES=${ODYSSEUS_STT_MAX_AUDIO_BYTES:-26214400}
- ODYSSEUS_ICS_MAX_BYTES=${ODYSSEUS_ICS_MAX_BYTES:-10485760}
- ODYSSEUS_TTS_CACHE_MAX_BYTES=${ODYSSEUS_TTS_CACHE_MAX_BYTES}
- DATA_BRAVE_API_KEY=${DATA_BRAVE_API_KEY:-}
- GOOGLE_API_KEY=${GOOGLE_API_KEY:-}
- GOOGLE_PSE_CX=${GOOGLE_PSE_CX:-}
@@ -132,17 +131,12 @@ services:
fi
sed "s|__SEARXNG_SECRET__|$$secret|g" /tmp/searxng-settings.yml.template > /etc/searxng/settings.yml
fi
# Advisory: a settings file the migration cannot parse or rewrite must
# not be what stops searxng from booting. It explains itself on stderr
# and we carry on, letting searxng report anything genuinely wrong.
/usr/local/searxng/.venv/bin/python /tmp/migrate-searxng-settings.py /etc/searxng/settings.yml || true
exec /usr/local/searxng/entrypoint.sh
ports:
- "127.0.0.1:8080:8080"
volumes:
- searxng-data:/etc/searxng
- ./config/searxng/settings.yml:/tmp/searxng-settings.yml.template:ro,z
- ./scripts/migrate_searxng_settings.py:/tmp/migrate-searxng-settings.py:ro,z
environment:
- SEARXNG_BASE_URL=http://localhost:8080/
- SEARXNG_SECRET=${SEARXNG_SECRET:-}
-6
View File
@@ -55,7 +55,6 @@ services:
- ODYSSEUS_EMAIL_COMPOSE_UPLOAD_MAX_BYTES=${ODYSSEUS_EMAIL_COMPOSE_UPLOAD_MAX_BYTES:-26214400}
- ODYSSEUS_STT_MAX_AUDIO_BYTES=${ODYSSEUS_STT_MAX_AUDIO_BYTES:-26214400}
- ODYSSEUS_ICS_MAX_BYTES=${ODYSSEUS_ICS_MAX_BYTES:-10485760}
- ODYSSEUS_TTS_CACHE_MAX_BYTES=${ODYSSEUS_TTS_CACHE_MAX_BYTES}
- DATA_BRAVE_API_KEY=${DATA_BRAVE_API_KEY:-}
- GOOGLE_API_KEY=${GOOGLE_API_KEY:-}
- GOOGLE_PSE_CX=${GOOGLE_PSE_CX:-}
@@ -110,17 +109,12 @@ services:
fi
sed "s|__SEARXNG_SECRET__|$$secret|g" /tmp/searxng-settings.yml.template > /etc/searxng/settings.yml
fi
# Advisory: a settings file the migration cannot parse or rewrite must
# not be what stops searxng from booting. It explains itself on stderr
# and we carry on, letting searxng report anything genuinely wrong.
/usr/local/searxng/.venv/bin/python /tmp/migrate-searxng-settings.py /etc/searxng/settings.yml || true
exec /usr/local/searxng/entrypoint.sh
ports:
- "127.0.0.1:8080:8080"
volumes:
- searxng-data:/etc/searxng
- ./config/searxng/settings.yml:/tmp/searxng-settings.yml.template:ro,z
- ./scripts/migrate_searxng_settings.py:/tmp/migrate-searxng-settings.py:ro,z
environment:
- SEARXNG_BASE_URL=http://localhost:8080/
- SEARXNG_SECRET=${SEARXNG_SECRET:-}
+87
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
# Architecture
> [!NOTE]
> This document is the proposed canonical destination for stable high-level
> architecture facts. It remains subject to maintainer review. Source code,
> tests, and configuration remain authoritative for implementation-sensitive
> behaviour.
## Purpose
This document identifies the stable runtime boundaries and primary ownership
locations used to navigate and extend Odysseus.
It intentionally excludes generated metrics, file-size rankings, refactor
priorities, unresolved investigation findings, and proposed package layouts.
## Runtime structure
| Area | Responsibility |
|---|---|
| `app.py` | FastAPI application composition and primary application entry point |
| `launcher.py` | Application launch support |
| `setup.py` | Native setup workflow |
| `core/` | Authentication, middleware, persistence, sessions, and platform primitives |
| `routes/` | HTTP and API route handlers |
| `src/` | Application orchestration, tools, providers, and runtime helpers |
| `services/` | Domain-oriented service implementations |
| `mcp_servers/` | Built-in MCP server implementations |
| `scripts/` | CLI tools, diagnostics, maintenance, and migration helpers |
| `static/` | No-build browser frontend and bundled assets |
| `tests/` | Automated tests and supporting test infrastructure |
## Subsystem boundaries
| Subsystem | Primary implementation locations |
|---|---|
| Application startup | `app.py`, `src/app_initializer.py`, `core/` |
| Authentication and sessions | `core/auth.py`, `core/middleware.py`, `core/session_manager.py`, `routes/auth_routes.py` |
| Chat and streaming | `routes/chat_routes.py`, `routes/chat_helpers.py`, `src/chat_handler.py`, `src/chat_processor.py`, `src/llm_core.py` |
| Agents and tools | `src/agent_loop.py`, `src/tool_execution.py`, `src/agent_tools/`, `src/tools/`, `src/tool_policy.py`, `src/tool_security.py` |
| Models and providers | `routes/model_routes.py`, `src/model_discovery.py`, `src/model_capabilities.py`, `src/endpoint_resolver.py`, `src/llm_core.py` |
| Cookbook and hardware fit | `routes/cookbook_routes.py`, `routes/cookbook_helpers.py`, `src/cookbook_serve_lifecycle.py`, `services/hwfit/` |
| Search and research | `routes/search_routes.py`, `services/search/`, `routes/research/`, `services/research/`, `src/deep_research.py` |
| Documents and retrieval | `routes/document_routes.py`, `src/document_processor.py`, `src/personal_docs.py`, `src/rag_manager.py`, `src/pdf_runtime.py` |
| Memory and skills | `routes/memory/`, `services/memory/`, `routes/skills_routes.py` |
| Email | `routes/email_routes.py`, `routes/email_helpers.py`, `routes/email_pollers.py`, `mcp_servers/email_server.py` |
| Calendar, contacts, notes, and tasks | `routes/calendar_routes.py`, `routes/contacts/`, `routes/note/`, `routes/task_routes.py`, `src/task_scheduler.py` |
| Media and speech | `routes/gallery/`, `routes/stt_routes.py`, `routes/tts_routes.py`, `services/stt/`, `services/tts/` |
| Persistence and operations | `core/database.py`, `src/runtime_paths.py`, `src/bg_jobs.py`, `routes/backup_routes.py`, `routes/cleanup/` |
## Architectural constraints
- Preserve established import and compatibility paths unless a focused change
explicitly migrates them.
- Keep HTTP concerns in route modules and reusable domain behaviour in runtime
or service modules.
- Treat shared persistence, agent orchestration, tool execution, and application
startup as high-authority boundaries.
- Change one ownership boundary at a time.
- Do not mix structural movement with unrelated feature behaviour.
- Validate affected imports, startup paths, compatibility surfaces, and tests.
## Frontend
The browser frontend is a no-build ES-module application under `static/`.
Its maintained module-level structure is documented in
[`static/js/MODULE_SUMMARY.md`](../static/js/MODULE_SUMMARY.md).
## Investigation and snapshots
Non-canonical investigation material is maintained under [`discovery/`](../discovery/).
The following documents may contain dated observations, metrics, unresolved
questions, or historical planning and must not be treated as specifications:
- [`discovery/system-map.md`](../discovery/system-map.md)
- [`discovery/architecture-runtime-inventory.md`](../discovery/architecture-runtime-inventory.md)
## Documentation authority
- Code, tests, and configuration define implemented behaviour.
- Mature specifications define accepted subsystem behaviour where they exist.
- Following maintainer acceptance, this document will define the high-level
architecture map.
- Discovery documents preserve evidence and uncertainty but remain
non-canonical.
+72
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@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
# Documentation style
This guide defines the shared structure and writing conventions for Odysseus documentation.
## Principles
- Write for a clear audience and purpose.
- State whether a document is canonical, informational, a snapshot, or planning material.
- Prefer current behaviour over historical explanation.
- Link to source files, tests, issues, or other documentation when useful.
- Separate verified behaviour from assumptions, open questions, and future work.
- Keep headings descriptive and consistent.
- Use Markdown callouts where status or risk must be visible.
- Do not use emojis.
## Document status
Use a status callout near the top when the document is not normal canonical guidance.
### Canonical documentation
> [!IMPORTANT]
> This document describes accepted current behaviour. Verify implementation-sensitive details against the current code and tests.
### Discovery material
> [!NOTE]
> This is non-canonical discovery material. It records code-grounded observations and open questions.
### Snapshot or inventory
> [!WARNING]
> This document is a dated snapshot. Counts, paths, and implementation details may drift as the codebase changes.
### Planning material
> [!NOTE]
> This document records planning context. It does not define current runtime behaviour or guarantee future implementation.
## Recommended structure
Use the following sections where relevant:
1. Title
2. Purpose or status callout
3. Scope
4. Current behaviour or guidance
5. Safety, limitations, or known gaps
6. Validation or evidence
7. Related documentation
Not every document needs every section.
## Writing style
- Use concise sentences.
- Prefer direct language.
- Avoid jokes, filler, and informal warnings.
- Avoid repeating the same guidance across several files.
- Link to the owning document instead of duplicating large sections.
- Use lists for procedures, requirements, and comparisons.
- Use tables only when they improve scanning.
- Use fenced code blocks with an appropriate language identifier.
- Use relative repository links for internal files.
## Authority
The current code, tests, and configuration are the source of truth for implemented behaviour.
Canonical documentation describes accepted behaviour and supported workflows.
Discovery, inventory, and planning documents must identify themselves explicitly and must not silently become behavioural specifications.
+34 -2
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,13 @@
# Attachment References and Upload Storage
Odysseus stores uploaded bytes once under the configured upload directory and
passes stable references through chat history, tools, and future artifact work.
> [!NOTE]
> This document records the current attachment-reference and upload-lifecycle
> contract proposed for maintainer acceptance. Source code, tests, and
> configuration remain authoritative for implementation-sensitive behaviour.
Odysseus stores chat and document attachment bytes under the configured upload
directory and passes stable references through chat history, document flows, and
tool context.
The goal is to avoid duplicating large inline media payloads in
`chat_messages.content` or the SQLite FTS index.
@@ -54,6 +60,32 @@ External MCP/custom tools should treat the URI and attachment ID as the stable
contract and request bytes through an owner-checked server path, not by assuming
host filesystem layout.
## Implementation evidence
The current contract is implemented primarily through:
- `src/upload_handler.py` for upload metadata, owner-aware resolution,
reservations, cleanup, and deletion;
- `src/attachment_refs.py` for compact persisted references and search-index
sanitization;
- `src/document_processor.py` for resolving attachments into chat/model context;
- `src/tool_execution.py` for attachment manifests exposed to tools;
- `routes/upload_routes.py` and `routes/document_helpers.py` for upload and
retrieval paths.
Focused regression coverage includes:
- `tests/test_attachment_refs.py`;
- `tests/test_upload_handler_cleanup.py`;
- `tests/test_replace_messages_upload_reservations.py`;
- `tests/test_resolve_upload_path_nondict.py`;
- `tests/test_chat_preprocess_tool_policy.py`;
- the upload, attachment, and PDF-marker cases in
`tests/test_security_regressions.py`.
These tests cover compact persistence, owner isolation, path containment,
cleanup safety, reservation-before-write behaviour, and traversal resistance.
## Retention and Deletion
Current retention behavior is conservative:
+2 -2
View File
@@ -181,8 +181,8 @@ Dirty, blocked, conflicting, and unknown merge states are shown as risk/caution
## Validation
```bash
python3 -m py_compile scripts/pr_blocker_audit.py tests/test_pr_blocker_audit.py
python3 -m pytest tests/test_pr_blocker_audit.py -q
venv/bin/python -m py_compile scripts/pr_blocker_audit.py tests/test_pr_blocker_audit.py
venv/bin/python -m pytest tests/test_pr_blocker_audit.py -q
python3 scripts/pr_blocker_audit.py --help
git diff --check
```
+35 -190
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,28 @@
# Odysseus Setup Guide
This page keeps the detailed install, deployment, troubleshooting, and configuration notes out of the front README.
This guide covers installation, deployment, troubleshooting, and configuration.
For a minimal Docker installation, start with the
[repository README](../README.md#quick-start).
## On this page
- [Quick Start](#quick-start)
- [Docker](#docker-recommended)
- [Native Linux and macOS](#native-linux--macos)
- [Apple Silicon](#apple-silicon)
- [Native Windows](#native-windows)
- [Troubleshooting and advanced setup](#troubleshooting--advanced-setup)
- [Security notes](#security-notes)
- [Configuration](#configuration)
- [Architecture](#architecture)
- [Data and backups](#data)
Related guidance:
- [Security policy](../SECURITY.md)
- [Architecture overview](ARCHITECTURE.md)
- [Backup and restore guide](backup-restore.md)
- [Contributing guide](../CONTRIBUTING.md)
## Quick Start
@@ -15,8 +37,8 @@ On first setup, Odysseus creates an admin account (`admin` unless
For Docker installs, the same line is in `docker compose logs odysseus`.
Use that for the first login, then change it in **Settings**.
Contributing? See [CONTRIBUTING.md](../CONTRIBUTING.md) for setup, testing, and
pull request guidelines.
Contributing? See the [contributing guide](../CONTRIBUTING.md) for development
setup, testing, and pull request guidelines.
### Docker (recommended)
```bash
@@ -309,32 +331,6 @@ container. Cookbook **Serve** is a separate workflow for serving downloaded
models through Odysseus/llama.cpp, so Windows users with an existing Ollama
install usually only need to add the endpoint in Settings.
**Tool calls not firing on a manually-added Ollama `/v1` endpoint.** By
design, a local Ollama `/v1` endpoint defaults to the conservative
text-based (fenced-block) tool-calling path rather than native structured
tool calls, since some locally-served models mishandle native schemas (see
#1567). This is correct for most local setups, but if you know your specific
model reliably supports native tool calling (check `ollama show <model>` for
`tools` under Capabilities), you can opt that endpoint in explicitly. There
is currently no UI control for this on manually-added endpoints (see #5192);
the flag can still be set directly against the existing API, from a browser
console on an authenticated admin session:
```js
fetch('/api/model-endpoints/<endpoint-id>', {
method: 'PATCH',
credentials: 'same-origin',
headers: {'Content-Type': 'application/json'},
body: JSON.stringify({supports_tools: true})
}).then(r => r.json()).then(console.log)
```
Find `<endpoint-id>` by inspecting the `/api/model-endpoints` response (or
your browser's network tab while Settings loads the endpoint list). Send
`supports_tools: false` to disable native structured tool calls and force the
conservative fenced/text path, or `supports_tools: null` to return the endpoint
to the Auto heuristic.
**Useful checks.**
```bash
@@ -467,8 +463,8 @@ uv pip sync requirements.lock # reproduce it exactly la
### Outlook / Office 365 email
Odysseus email accounts currently use IMAP/SMTP username-password auth. Outlook
and Microsoft 365 generally require OAuth instead, so normal Microsoft mailbox
passwords will fail. See [docs/email-outlook.md](docs/email-outlook.md) for the
current limitation and the planned integration direction.
passwords will fail. See the [Outlook and Microsoft 365 email guide](email-outlook.md)
for the current limitation and planned integration direction.
## Security Notes
Odysseus is a self-hosted workspace with powerful local tools: shell access, file uploads, model downloads, web research, email/calendar integrations, and API tokens. Treat it like an admin console.
@@ -497,154 +493,6 @@ Odysseus serves plain HTTP on its app port. Docker Compose binds Odysseus and th
Cloudflare Access, Tailscale, Caddy, nginx, and Traefik can all fit this pattern; none are required by Odysseus. If your access layer reaches Odysseus on the same host, proxy to `http://127.0.0.1:7000` and keep `AUTH_ENABLED=true`, `LOCALHOST_BYPASS=false`, and `SECURE_COOKIES=true`.
`ALLOWED_ORIGINS` lists exact permitted origins for cross-origin browser/API clients; ordinary same-origin reverse-proxy access usually does not need a special CORS entry.
#### Faster over the network: HTTP/2
The frontend is raw ES modules with no bundler, so a page load is a few hundred
small same-origin requests. Over HTTP/1.1 browsers typically allow only a small
number of concurrent connections per host (commonly around six), so many of
those requests are serialized across multiple round trips. On localhost that
costs almost nothing. Over a LAN, VPN, or remote link it can become a major
part of load time, especially as latency increases.
HTTP/2 multiplexes them onto one connection and the serialisation disappears.
Odysseus needs no changes for this — uvicorn keeps speaking HTTP/1.1 on
loopback and the proxy speaks HTTP/2 to the browser. Mainstream browsers
negotiate HTTP/2 for normal web pages over TLS; they do not use the cleartext
h2c mode here, so browser-facing HTTP/2 requires a certificate. The
`--ssl-certfile` route in *HTTPS + LAN/Tailscale exposure* above gives you
HTTPS but not HTTP/2 — uvicorn does not speak it.
**1. Install Caddy.** See the [install docs](https://caddyserver.com/docs/install)
for your platform; on macOS, `brew install caddy`.
**2. Write a `Caddyfile`.** Pick the block that matches how you reach the
machine. Replace `7000` if Odysseus listens elsewhere — the macOS start script
uses `7860`.
Public domain, Caddy obtains and renews the certificate itself:
```
odysseus.example.com {
reverse_proxy 127.0.0.1:7000
}
```
Tailscale, no public DNS needed — `tailscale cert` issues a browser-trusted
certificate for a tailnet name and writes `<domain>.crt` and `<domain>.key`:
```bash
tailscale cert myhost.tailnet-name.ts.net
```
```
myhost.tailnet-name.ts.net {
tls /path/to/myhost.tailnet-name.ts.net.crt /path/to/myhost.tailnet-name.ts.net.key
reverse_proxy 127.0.0.1:7000
}
```
LAN with your own certificate — same shape, your own files:
```
odysseus.lan {
tls /path/to/cert.pem /path/to/key.pem
reverse_proxy 127.0.0.1:7000
}
```
Give `tls` absolute paths: a service starts in a working directory you did not
choose. If port 443 is already taken, append a port to the site address
(`odysseus.example.com:8443`) and use it in the URL. That alone does not free
port 80 — Caddy still binds it for the HTTP-to-HTTPS redirect, and fails to
start with `listen tcp :80: bind: address already in use` if something else
holds it. Turn the redirect off with a global block at the top of the file:
```
{
auto_https disable_redirects
}
```
**3. Run it in the foreground first:**
```bash
caddy run --config ./Caddyfile
```
Once that works, run it as a service:
```bash
brew services start caddy # macOS — reads $(brew --prefix)/etc/Caddyfile, not ./Caddyfile
sudo systemctl enable --now caddy # Linux, if your package installed the unit
```
Odysseus's own service is unchanged; the proxy runs alongside it. Under Docker,
run the proxy as another container, or on the host pointing at the published
port.
**4. Point Odysseus at the new origin** in `.env`, then restart it:
```bash
SECURE_COOKIES=true
# only if you use remote MCP servers with OAuth:
OAUTH_REDIRECT_BASE_URL=https://odysseus.example.com
```
Gmail OAuth needs nothing here when the proxy runs on the same host: the
redirect URI is built from the incoming request, and uvicorn rewrites the
scheme from `X-Forwarded-Proto` for proxies it trusts — by default only
`127.0.0.1`. A proxy in a separate container or on another machine is not
trusted, so pin the URI there:
```bash
GOOGLE_OAUTH_REDIRECT_URI=https://odysseus.example.com/api/email/oauth/google/callback
```
(uvicorn's own `FORWARDED_ALLOW_IPS` widens that trust, but it has to be in the
environment uvicorn starts with — `.env` is read by the app afterwards, too
late for it to take effect.)
**5. Confirm HTTP/2 is really on:**
```bash
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_version}\n' https://odysseus.example.com/
# 2
```
The status code is not the thing to check here — a logged-out request redirects
to the login page, so `curl -I` shows `HTTP/2 302`, and the `HTTP/2` prefix is
the part that matters. The browser reports the same in the Network panel's
Protocol column (`h2`); in Chrome and Firefox that column is hidden until you
enable it by right-clicking the column headers.
Three things bite when moving an existing install behind TLS:
- Set `SECURE_COOKIES=true` **at the same time** you stop serving plain HTTP,
not before. The flag is applied to every login regardless of the scheme the
request arrived on, so while an HTTP entrypoint is still reachable the
browser will reject the `Secure` cookie there and login will appear to loop.
- `OAUTH_REDIRECT_BASE_URL` defaults to `http://localhost:7000`. Unlike the
Gmail redirect URI it cannot be derived from a request — it is registered
with each MCP authorization server up front — so set it to the external
origin if you use remote MCP servers over OAuth.
- Odysseus sends `Strict-Transport-Security` once it sees `X-Forwarded-Proto:
https`. HSTS applies to the whole hostname and ignores the port, so any other
plain-HTTP service on that same hostname becomes unreachable in browsers that
have visited Odysseus. Give Odysseus its own hostname, or strip the header at
the proxy (`header_down -Strict-Transport-Security` in Caddy).
Server-sent events are not buffered by this configuration, so chat streaming
arrives token by token; add `flush_interval -1` inside the `reverse_proxy`
block if you want that pinned explicitly. nginx needs `proxy_buffering off;`
for the same reason.
Changing the external origin also affects state scoped to it. Service workers
and their caches are origin-scoped, so moving to a different origin starts with
a cold load. Cookies follow their own domain/path/security rules rather than
being port-scoped: changing the hostname normally requires a new login, while
changing only the scheme or port does not by itself guarantee that existing
cookies disappear.
Common internal-only ports from the default docs/compose setup:
| Port | Service |
@@ -704,19 +552,16 @@ npx -y @playwright/mcp@latest --version
That installs `@playwright/mcp` plus Playwright (~300MB total). Restart Odysseus and the server will register at startup.
## Architecture
```
app.py # FastAPI entry point
core/ auth, database, middleware, constants
src/ llm_core, agent_loop, agent_tools, chat_processor, search/
routes/ chat, session, document, memory, model … endpoints
services/ docs, memory, search, hwfit (Cookbook) …
static/ index.html + app.js + style.css + js/ (modular front-end)
docs/ landing page (index.html) + preview clips
```
For stable high-level runtime structure, subsystem boundaries, and documentation
authority, see the [architecture overview](ARCHITECTURE.md).
Source code, tests, and configuration remain authoritative for
implementation-sensitive behaviour.
## Data
All user data lives in `data/` (gitignored): `app.db` (sessions, messages, documents),
`memory.json`, `presets.json`, `uploads/`, `personal_docs/`, `chroma/`, `settings.json`.
To back up or restore everything in `data/`, see the
[Backup & Restore guide](backup-restore.md).
To protect or recover this data, follow the
[backup and restore guide](backup-restore.md).
+8
View File
@@ -1802,6 +1802,7 @@ async def _ai_draft_reply_to_email(uid, folder="INBOX", reply_all=False, account
from src.endpoint_resolver import (
resolve_endpoint,
resolve_utility_fallback_candidates,
resolve_chat_fallback_candidates,
)
from src.llm_core import llm_call_async_with_fallback
except Exception as exc:
@@ -1842,6 +1843,13 @@ async def _ai_draft_reply_to_email(uid, folder="INBOX", reply_all=False, account
utility_fallbacks = resolve_utility_fallback_candidates() or []
for cand in utility_fallbacks:
_add(*cand)
try:
chat_fallbacks = resolve_chat_fallback_candidates(owner=None) or []
except TypeError:
chat_fallbacks = resolve_chat_fallback_candidates() or []
for cand in chat_fallbacks:
_add(*cand)
if not candidates:
return {"error": "No LLM endpoint configured for AI reply"}
+4 -22
View File
@@ -17,8 +17,6 @@ from mcp.types import Tool, TextContent
sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
from src.memory import MemoryStoreUnreadable
server = Server("memory")
# Late-initialized managers (set during first tool call)
@@ -31,10 +29,6 @@ _OWNER_SCOPE_ERROR = (
"Error: Memory MCP owner is not configured for an owner-scoped memory store. "
"Set ODYSSEUS_MCP_MEMORY_OWNER for this server or use the owner-aware native memory tool."
)
_UNREADABLE_STORE_ERROR = (
"Error: Memory store is temporarily unreadable — nothing was saved. "
"Repair or restore memory.json, then retry."
)
def _configured_owner() -> str | None:
@@ -57,21 +51,9 @@ def _owner_scoped_store(entries: list[dict]) -> bool:
return any(_entry_owner(entry) for entry in entries if isinstance(entry, dict))
def _scope_entries(for_update: bool = False) -> tuple[str | None, list[dict], list[dict], str | None]:
"""Return configured owner, all entries, visible entries, and optional error.
``for_update=True`` is for read-modify-write callers. They save the ``all
entries`` list back, so an unreadable store must be reported as an error
instead of degrading to ``[]`` otherwise the save writes their one new
entry over the whole store (issue #5673).
"""
if for_update:
try:
entries = _memory_manager.load_all_for_update()
except MemoryStoreUnreadable as e:
return None, [], [], f"{_UNREADABLE_STORE_ERROR} ({e})"
else:
entries = _memory_manager.load_all()
def _scope_entries() -> tuple[str | None, list[dict], list[dict], str | None]:
"""Return configured owner, all entries, visible entries, and optional error."""
entries = _memory_manager.load_all()
owner = _configured_owner()
if owner is None and _owner_scoped_store(entries):
return None, entries, [], _OWNER_SCOPE_ERROR
@@ -179,7 +161,7 @@ async def call_tool(name: str, arguments: dict) -> list[TextContent]:
category = arguments.get("category", "fact")
if not text:
return _text_result("Error: Memory text cannot be empty")
owner, memories, _visible, scope_error = _scope_entries(for_update=True)
owner, memories, _visible, scope_error = _scope_entries()
if scope_error:
return _text_result(scope_error)
entry = _memory_manager.add_entry(text, source="ai_agent", category=category, owner=owner)
+1 -4
View File
@@ -38,10 +38,7 @@ python-dateutil
caldav
cryptography
bcrypt
# Built-in servers use the v1 low-level Server decorator API. MCP SDK v2 is a
# breaking rewrite, so keep fresh installs on the maintained v1 line until the
# servers are migrated together.
mcp<2
mcp
pyotp
qrcode[pil]
croniter
+3 -59
View File
@@ -22,8 +22,6 @@ from src.settings import (
load_features as _load_features,
save_features as _save_features,
DEFAULT_SETTINGS,
RETIRED_SETTING_KEYS,
without_retired_settings,
)
from src.integrations import (
load_integrations,
@@ -347,61 +345,9 @@ def setup_auth_routes(auth_manager: AuthManager) -> APIRouter:
# docs, email accounts, tasks, etc.
try:
from sqlalchemy import func
from core.database import (
Base,
EmailAccount,
SessionLocal,
lock_email_account_owner_mutations,
)
from core.database import Base, SessionLocal
db = SessionLocal()
try:
# Email-account defaults are protected by per-owner mutex rows.
# A rename crosses two owner partitions, so lock both in the
# shared helper's canonical order before inspecting either.
lock_email_account_owner_mutations(
db, old_username, new_username
)
source_default_ids = [
row[0]
for row in (
db.query(EmailAccount.id)
.filter(
func.lower(EmailAccount.owner) == old_username,
EmailAccount.is_default == True, # noqa: E712
)
.order_by(EmailAccount.created_at.asc(), EmailAccount.id.asc())
.all()
)
]
destination_default_ids = [
row[0]
for row in (
db.query(EmailAccount.id)
.filter(
func.lower(EmailAccount.owner) == new_username,
EmailAccount.is_default == True, # noqa: E712
)
.order_by(EmailAccount.created_at.asc(), EmailAccount.id.asc())
.all()
)
]
if destination_default_ids:
clear_default_ids = (
destination_default_ids[1:] + source_default_ids
)
else:
clear_default_ids = source_default_ids[1:]
if clear_default_ids:
(
db.query(EmailAccount)
.filter(EmailAccount.id.in_(clear_default_ids))
.update(
{EmailAccount.is_default: False},
synchronize_session=False,
)
)
for mapper in Base.registry.mappers:
model = mapper.class_
if not hasattr(model, "owner"):
@@ -691,7 +637,7 @@ def setup_auth_routes(auth_manager: AuthManager) -> APIRouter:
a scrubbed copy with secret keys blanked. The frontend uses this
for keybinds + TTS prefs, so it stays callable without admin."""
user = _get_current_user(request)
settings = without_retired_settings(_load_settings())
settings = _load_settings()
if user and auth_manager.is_admin(user):
return settings
return scrub_settings(settings)
@@ -711,8 +657,6 @@ def setup_auth_routes(auth_manager: AuthManager) -> APIRouter:
"agent_max_tool_calls": (0, 1000), # 0 = unlimited
}
for key in DEFAULT_SETTINGS:
if key in RETIRED_SETTING_KEYS:
continue
if key not in body:
continue
val = body[key]
@@ -725,7 +669,7 @@ def setup_auth_routes(auth_manager: AuthManager) -> APIRouter:
val = max(lo, min(val, hi))
current[key] = val
_save_settings(current)
return without_retired_settings(current)
return current
# ---- Integrations CRUD ----
+1 -10
View File
@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ from datetime import datetime
from fastapi import APIRouter, HTTPException, Request, Response
from core.middleware import require_admin
from services.memory import MemoryStoreUnreadable
from src.auth_helpers import get_current_user
from src.settings import load_settings, save_settings, load_features, save_features
@@ -77,15 +76,7 @@ def setup_backup_routes(memory_manager, preset_manager, skills_manager) -> APIRo
# ── Memories ──
if "memories" in body and isinstance(body["memories"], list):
# Strict load: importing on top of an unreadable store would write
# only the incoming rows back and drop everything already saved.
try:
existing = memory_manager.load_all_for_update()
except MemoryStoreUnreadable as e:
logger.error("Refusing to import memories: %s", e)
raise HTTPException(
503, "Memory store is temporarily unreadable — nothing was imported."
)
existing = memory_manager.load_all()
# Dedup against THIS user's own memories only. Using every tenant's
# rows (load_all) meant a memory whose text matched any other
# user's was silently skipped, so the importing user lost their own
+7 -115
View File
@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@ from typing import Optional, List
from fastapi import APIRouter, HTTPException, Request, UploadFile, File
from pydantic import BaseModel
from sqlalchemy import or_, and_
from sqlalchemy.exc import IntegrityError
from dateutil.rrule import rrulestr
from core.database import SessionLocal, CalendarCal, CalendarDeletedEvent, CalendarEvent
@@ -222,125 +221,22 @@ class EventUpdate(BaseModel):
# ── Helpers ──
_DEFAULT_CALENDAR_NAMESPACE = uuid.UUID("4840613a-9847-4a3b-bd75-19e6bc5fc3ce")
def _default_calendar_id(owner: str, collision_index: int = 0) -> str:
"""Return one stable primary-key candidate for an owner's lazy default.
Slot zero preserves the original owner-derived identifier. Later slots
let a username be reused after its prior calendar was migrated to another
owner during a rename, without making concurrent first use choose random
and therefore divergent identifiers.
"""
if collision_index == 0:
candidate_name = owner
else:
candidate_name = json.dumps(
[owner, collision_index],
ensure_ascii=False,
separators=(",", ":"),
)
return str(uuid.uuid5(_DEFAULT_CALENDAR_NAMESPACE, candidate_name))
def _begin_sqlite_default_write(db) -> None:
"""Serialize an absent-default check with other SQLite writers.
SQLite's default deferred transactions allow two workers to both read an
empty calendar set before either writes. ``BEGIN IMMEDIATE`` acquires the
writer reservation before the second, authoritative lookup. We issue it
only when the driver has not already opened a write transaction; a caller
with a pending write already owns the required reservation.
"""
connection = db.connection()
dbapi_connection = connection.connection
driver_connection = getattr(
dbapi_connection,
"driver_connection",
dbapi_connection,
)
if not getattr(driver_connection, "in_transaction", False):
connection.exec_driver_sql("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
def _ensure_default_calendar(db, owner: str = None) -> CalendarCal:
"""Return the owner's calendar, staging a default in the caller's transaction.
A stable owner-derived primary key makes concurrent first-use inserts
converge on one row on every SQL backend. SQLite additionally serializes
the absent-row check because its deferred transactions otherwise permit
both workers to read the gap before either writes. Other backends recover
a lost insert race inside a savepoint so the caller's event transaction
remains usable and atomic.
"""
"""Create default calendar if none exist for this owner."""
owner = owner or FALLBACK_OWNER
cal = db.query(CalendarCal).filter(CalendarCal.owner == owner).first()
if cal:
return cal
dialect = db.get_bind().dialect.name
if dialect == "sqlite":
_begin_sqlite_default_write(db)
# Another worker may have committed while BEGIN IMMEDIATE waited.
cal = db.query(CalendarCal).filter(CalendarCal.owner == owner).first()
if cal:
return cal
collision_index = 0
while True:
default_id = _default_calendar_id(owner, collision_index)
if dialect == "sqlite":
# BEGIN IMMEDIATE above makes this occupancy check authoritative:
# another SQLite writer cannot rename, delete, or claim this slot
# until the caller commits or rolls back.
occupant = db.query(CalendarCal).filter(
CalendarCal.id == default_id,
).first()
if occupant is not None:
if occupant.owner == owner:
return occupant
collision_index += 1
continue
if not cal:
cal = CalendarCal(
id=default_id,
id=str(uuid.uuid4()),
owner=owner,
name="Personal",
color="#5b8abf",
source="local",
)
if dialect == "sqlite":
db.add(cal)
db.flush()
return cal
try:
# A uniqueness failure rolls back only this savepoint, not an event
# or reminder already staged by the caller's outer transaction.
with db.begin_nested():
db.add(cal)
db.flush()
return cal
except IntegrityError:
# Use a locking/current read so repeatable-read backends can observe
# the row that won after our transaction's original empty snapshot.
occupant = db.query(CalendarCal).filter(
CalendarCal.id == default_id,
).with_for_update().first()
if occupant is None:
# Do not misclassify an unrelated integrity failure as an ID
# collision and loop forever. A concurrently deleted winner is
# safe for the caller to retry as a fresh transaction.
raise
if occupant.owner == owner:
return occupant
# A renamed calendar owns this deterministic slot. Advance to the
# next stable slot; concurrent callers for this owner will still
# converge there.
collision_index += 1
db.add(cal)
db.commit()
db.refresh(cal)
return cal
# Per-request user time context. chat_routes sets this from browser timezone
@@ -1119,9 +1015,6 @@ def setup_calendar_routes(upload_handler=None) -> APIRouter:
db = SessionLocal()
try:
_ensure_default_calendar(db, owner)
# Listing calendars intentionally lazily creates a durable default.
# Other callers commit it with the event they are creating.
db.commit()
cals = db.query(CalendarCal).filter(CalendarCal.owner == owner).all()
return {"calendars": [
{"name": c.name, "href": c.id, "color": c.color, "source": c.source}
@@ -1130,7 +1023,6 @@ def setup_calendar_routes(upload_handler=None) -> APIRouter:
except HTTPException:
raise
except Exception as e:
db.rollback()
logger.error("Failed to list calendars: %s", e)
raise HTTPException(500, "Failed to list calendars")
finally:
+100 -47
View File
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ from core.database import Session as DBSession, ModelEndpoint
from src.llm_core import normalize_model_id
from src.endpoint_resolver import normalize_base
from src.context_compactor import maybe_compact, trim_for_context
from src.model_context import estimate_tokens, get_context_length
from src.model_context import estimate_tokens
from src.auth_helpers import effective_user
from src.prompt_security import untrusted_context_message
from src.attachment_refs import attachment_ref
@@ -152,38 +152,10 @@ class ChatContext:
# Uploads attached to this user turn, resolved and owner-checked for the
# agent's private context. This is not emitted to the browser.
uploaded_files: list = field(default_factory=list)
# Route-neutral prompt before any model-window compaction/trimming. This is
# retained only when explicit foreground fallbacks are enabled so each
# concrete candidate can apply its own context budget independently.
route_messages: list = field(default_factory=list)
# ── Helpers ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── #
def _allowed_models_from_privileges(privs: dict) -> Optional[frozenset[str]]:
if privs.get("block_all_models"):
return frozenset()
allowed_raw = privs.get("allowed_models")
allowed = allowed_raw if isinstance(allowed_raw, list) else []
restricted = bool(privs.get("allowed_models_restricted")) or bool(allowed)
return frozenset(model for model in allowed if isinstance(model, str)) if restricted else None
def _allowed_models_for_request(request) -> Optional[frozenset[str]]:
"""Return the caller's model allowlist, or ``None`` when unrestricted."""
try:
user = effective_user(request)
except Exception:
user = None
if not user:
return None
auth_manager = getattr(getattr(request.app, "state", None), "auth_manager", None)
if not auth_manager:
return None
privs = auth_manager.get_privileges(user) or {}
return _allowed_models_from_privileges(privs)
def _enforce_chat_privileges(request, sess) -> None:
"""Apply the per-user privilege gates (allowed_models + max_messages_per_day)
that both /api/chat and /api/chat_stream must enforce BEFORE any LLM work.
@@ -213,8 +185,10 @@ def _enforce_chat_privileges(request, sess) -> None:
if privs.get("block_all_models"):
raise HTTPException(403, f"Your account is not allowed to use model '{sess.model}'.")
allowed_models = _allowed_models_from_privileges(privs)
if allowed_models is not None and sess.model and sess.model not in allowed_models:
allowed_raw = privs.get("allowed_models")
allowed = allowed_raw if isinstance(allowed_raw, list) else []
restricted = bool(privs.get("allowed_models_restricted")) or bool(allowed)
if restricted and sess.model and sess.model not in allowed:
raise HTTPException(403, f"Your account is not allowed to use model '{sess.model}'.")
cap = int(privs.get("max_messages_per_day") or 0)
@@ -313,6 +287,96 @@ async def auto_name_session(session_manager, sess):
logger.error(f"Auto-name failed for {sess.id}: {e}\n{traceback.format_exc()}")
def try_fallback_endpoint(sess, session_id: str) -> dict | None:
"""Find an alternative working endpoint when the current one fails.
Returns {"model": ..., "endpoint_url": ..., "endpoint_name": ...} or None.
"""
import requests as _req
from src.endpoint_resolver import (
build_chat_url,
build_headers,
build_models_url,
normalize_base,
resolve_endpoint_runtime,
)
from src.chatgpt_subscription import is_chatgpt_subscription_base
current_url = sess.endpoint_url or ""
owner = getattr(sess, "owner", None)
db = SessionLocal()
try:
q = db.query(ModelEndpoint).filter(
ModelEndpoint.is_enabled == True
)
if owner:
from src.auth_helpers import owner_filter
q = owner_filter(q, ModelEndpoint, owner)
endpoints = q.all()
finally:
db.close()
for ep in endpoints:
base = normalize_base(ep.base_url)
# Skip current endpoint
if current_url and base in current_url:
continue
try:
base, api_key = resolve_endpoint_runtime(ep, owner=owner)
except Exception:
continue
ping_url = build_models_url(base)
headers = build_headers(api_key, base)
try:
if ping_url:
r = _req.get(ping_url, headers=headers, timeout=5)
r.raise_for_status()
data = r.json()
models = [m.get("id") for m in (data.get("data") or []) if m.get("id")]
if not models:
models = [
m.get("name") or m.get("model")
for m in (data.get("models") or [])
if m.get("name") or m.get("model")
]
else:
models = json.loads(ep.cached_models or "[]")
if not models:
continue
# Found a working endpoint — update session
new_model = models[0]
chat_url = build_chat_url(base)
new_headers = build_headers(api_key, base)
persisted_headers = {} if is_chatgpt_subscription_base(base) else new_headers
sess.model = new_model
sess.endpoint_url = chat_url
sess.headers = new_headers
# Persist
_db = SessionLocal()
try:
_db.query(DBSession).filter(DBSession.id == session_id).update({
"model": new_model,
"endpoint_url": chat_url,
"headers": persisted_headers,
})
_db.commit()
finally:
_db.close()
logger.info(f"Fallback: switched session {session_id} from {current_url} to {ep.name} ({new_model})")
return {
"model": new_model,
"endpoint_url": chat_url,
"endpoint_name": ep.name,
}
except Exception:
continue
return None
def extract_preset(chat_handler, preset_id) -> PresetInfo:
"""Extract preset parameters via chat_handler."""
temperature, max_tokens, system_prompt, char_name = (
@@ -623,7 +687,6 @@ async def build_chat_context(
use_enhanced_message: bool = False,
agent_mode: bool = False,
allow_tool_preprocessing: bool = True,
defer_context_shaping: bool = False,
) -> ChatContext:
"""Build the full context (preface + messages) for an LLM call.
@@ -767,22 +830,13 @@ async def build_chat_context(
except Exception:
logger.debug("Failed to add current date/time context", exc_info=True)
route_messages = list(messages)
# Explicit fallback routing must shape from the same route-neutral prompt
# for every candidate. Running selected-model compaction here would mutate
# session history before we know which route can answer and would make a
# later larger-context candidate unable to recover discarded history.
if defer_context_shaping:
context_length = get_context_length(sess.endpoint_url, sess.model)
was_compacted = False
else:
messages, context_length, was_compacted = await maybe_compact(
sess, sess.endpoint_url, sess.model, messages, sess.headers, owner=user,
)
# Auto-compact
messages, context_length, was_compacted = await maybe_compact(
sess, sess.endpoint_url, sess.model, messages, sess.headers, owner=user,
)
_before_trim_messages = len(messages)
_before_trim_tokens = estimate_tokens(messages)
if not defer_context_shaping:
messages = trim_for_context(messages, context_length)
messages = trim_for_context(messages, context_length)
_after_trim_messages = len(messages)
_after_trim_tokens = estimate_tokens(messages)
_context_trimmed = _after_trim_messages < _before_trim_messages or _after_trim_tokens < _before_trim_tokens
@@ -806,7 +860,6 @@ async def build_chat_context(
context_tokens_after_trim=_after_trim_tokens,
auto_opened_docs=auto_opened_docs,
uploaded_files=uploaded_files,
route_messages=route_messages,
)
+45 -569
View File
@@ -15,28 +15,12 @@ from pydantic import ValidationError
from core.models import ChatMessage
from src.request_models import ChatRequest
from src.llm_core import (
_normalize_http_status,
llm_call_async,
llm_call_async_with_route_fallback,
stream_llm,
stream_llm_with_fallback,
)
from src.llm_core import llm_call_async, stream_llm, stream_llm_with_fallback
from src.agent_loop import stream_agent_loop
from src import agent_runs
from src.model_context import estimate_tokens
from src.context_compactor import (
apply_compaction_state,
maybe_compact,
trim_for_context,
)
from src.chat_helpers import coerce_message_and_session
from src.endpoint_resolver import normalize_base as _normalize_base, build_chat_url
from src.foreground_model_routing import (
build_foreground_model_candidates,
build_foreground_route_descriptors,
resolve_foreground_model_policy,
)
from src.session_search import search_session_messages
from src.prompt_security import untrusted_context_message
from core.exceptions import SessionNotFoundError
@@ -54,9 +38,7 @@ from routes.chat_helpers import (
build_chat_context,
save_assistant_response,
run_post_response_tasks,
accumulate_token_usage,
clean_thinking_for_save,
_allowed_models_for_request,
_enforce_chat_privileges,
)
from src.action_intents import ToolIntent, classify_tool_intent as _classify_tool_intent
@@ -74,74 +56,6 @@ logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
_active_streams: Dict[str, dict] = {}
def _stream_failure_status(chunk: str) -> Optional[int]:
"""Extract a provider status without retaining provider-supplied detail."""
try:
for line in str(chunk or "").splitlines():
if not line.startswith("data: "):
continue
status = json.loads(line[6:]).get("status")
return _normalize_http_status(status)
except json.JSONDecodeError:
return None
return None
def _chat_candidate_request_factory(
messages,
fallback_context_length: int = 0,
*,
session=None,
owner: Optional[str] = None,
):
"""Shape one route-neutral Chat prompt for each candidate window."""
state = {
"requests": {},
"context_lengths": {},
"trim_stats": {},
"compactions": {},
"was_compacted": {},
}
async def factory(index, candidate_url, candidate_model, candidate_headers):
compaction_state = {}
candidate_messages, context_length, was_compacted = await maybe_compact(
session,
candidate_url,
candidate_model,
list(messages),
candidate_headers,
owner=owner,
persist=False,
compaction_state=compaction_state,
)
if not context_length:
context_length = fallback_context_length
request_messages = trim_for_context(candidate_messages, context_length)
state["requests"][index] = request_messages
state["context_lengths"][index] = context_length
state["compactions"][index] = compaction_state
state["was_compacted"][index] = was_compacted
state["trim_stats"][index] = {
"messages_before": len(messages),
"messages_after": len(request_messages),
"tokens_before": estimate_tokens(messages),
"tokens_after": estimate_tokens(request_messages),
}
return {"messages": request_messages}
return factory, state
def _candidate_index(candidates, actual_candidate) -> int:
for index, candidate in enumerate(candidates):
if candidate == actual_candidate:
return index
return 0
def _stream_set(session_id: str, **fields) -> None:
"""Update fields on the active-stream entry for `session_id`, or
no-op if the entry has already been popped. Using .get() avoids a
@@ -675,8 +589,8 @@ def setup_chat_routes(
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ #
# POST /api/chat (non-streaming)
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ #
@router.post("/api/chat", response_model=Dict[str, Any])
async def chat_endpoint(request: Request, chat_request: ChatRequest) -> Dict[str, Any]:
@router.post("/api/chat", response_model=Dict[str, str])
async def chat_endpoint(request: Request, chat_request: ChatRequest) -> Dict[str, str]:
_set_user_time_from_request(request)
message = chat_request.message
@@ -708,8 +622,6 @@ def setup_chat_routes(
400,
"No model selected for this chat. Open the model picker and choose one before sending.",
)
if not (getattr(sess, "endpoint_url", "") or "").strip():
raise HTTPException(400, "Selected model endpoint is not configured")
# Same allowed_models + daily-cap gate as chat_stream (mirror so the
# non-streaming path can't be used to bypass).
@@ -725,11 +637,6 @@ def setup_chat_routes(
if memory_response:
return {"response": memory_response}
foreground_policy = resolve_foreground_model_policy(
owner=owner,
allowed_models=_allowed_models_for_request(request),
)
# Build shared context (preset, preprocess, preface, compact)
ctx = await build_chat_context(
sess, request, chat_handler, chat_processor,
@@ -741,7 +648,6 @@ def setup_chat_routes(
time_filter=time_filter,
webhook_manager=webhook_manager,
allow_tool_preprocessing=allow_tool_preprocessing,
defer_context_shaping=foreground_policy.enabled,
)
# Research injection
@@ -755,88 +661,24 @@ def setup_chat_routes(
research_ctx = await research_handler.call_research_service(
message, _r_ep, _r_model, llm_headers=_r_headers
)
research_message = untrusted_context_message("research context", research_ctx)
ctx.messages.insert(len(ctx.preface), research_message)
if foreground_policy.enabled:
getattr(ctx, "route_messages", ctx.messages).insert(
len(ctx.preface),
research_message,
)
ctx.messages.insert(
len(ctx.preface),
untrusted_context_message("research context", research_ctx),
)
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"Research failed: {e}")
foreground_candidates = build_foreground_model_candidates(
reply = await llm_call_async(
sess.endpoint_url,
sess.model,
sess.headers,
owner=owner,
policy=foreground_policy,
)
route_descriptors = build_foreground_route_descriptors(
sess.endpoint_url,
sess.model,
sess.headers,
owner=owner,
policy=foreground_policy,
selected_endpoint_id=chat_request.selected_endpoint_id,
)
candidate_request_factory = None
selected_context_length = getattr(ctx, "context_length", 0)
candidate_request_state = {
"context_lengths": {0: selected_context_length},
"requests": {0: ctx.messages},
"trim_stats": {},
}
request_messages = ctx.messages
if foreground_policy.enabled:
request_messages = getattr(ctx, "route_messages", ctx.messages)
candidate_request_factory, candidate_request_state = _chat_candidate_request_factory(
request_messages,
selected_context_length,
session=sess,
owner=owner,
)
requested_model = sess.model
reply, actual_candidate, actual_model = await llm_call_async_with_route_fallback(
foreground_candidates,
request_messages,
fallback_statuses=foreground_policy.eligible_statuses,
candidate_request_factory=candidate_request_factory,
ctx.messages,
headers=sess.headers,
temperature=ctx.preset.temperature,
max_tokens=ctx.preset.max_tokens,
prompt_type=preset_id,
session_id=session,
)
actual_index = _candidate_index(foreground_candidates, actual_candidate)
apply_compaction_state(
sess,
candidate_request_state.get("compactions", {}).get(actual_index),
)
requested_route = route_descriptors[0]
actual_route = route_descriptors[actual_index]
actual_trim = candidate_request_state.get("trim_stats", {}).get(actual_index, {})
_clean_reply, _clean_md = clean_thinking_for_save(
reply,
{
"model": actual_model,
"requested_model": requested_model,
"endpoint_id": actual_route.get("endpoint_id"),
"endpoint_label": actual_route.get("endpoint_label"),
"requested_endpoint_id": requested_route.get("endpoint_id"),
"requested_endpoint_label": requested_route.get("endpoint_label"),
"context_length": candidate_request_state["context_lengths"].get(
actual_index,
selected_context_length,
),
"context_trimmed": bool(
actual_trim
and (
actual_trim.get("messages_after") < actual_trim.get("messages_before")
or actual_trim.get("tokens_after") < actual_trim.get("tokens_before")
)
),
},
)
_clean_reply, _clean_md = clean_thinking_for_save(reply, {"model": sess.model})
sess.add_message(ChatMessage("assistant", _clean_reply, metadata=_clean_md))
from core.database import update_session_last_accessed
@@ -852,15 +694,7 @@ def setup_chat_routes(
allow_background_extraction=not tool_policy.block_all_tool_calls,
)
return {
"response": reply,
"requested_model": requested_model,
"model": actual_model,
"requested_endpoint_id": requested_route.get("endpoint_id"),
"requested_endpoint_label": requested_route.get("endpoint_label"),
"endpoint_id": actual_route.get("endpoint_id"),
"endpoint_label": actual_route.get("endpoint_label"),
}
return {"response": reply}
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ #
# POST /api/chat_stream
@@ -889,11 +723,6 @@ def setup_chat_routes(
use_research = form_data.get("use_research")
time_filter = form_data.get("time_filter")
preset_id = form_data.get("preset_id")
selected_endpoint_id = str(
form_data.get("selected_endpoint_id")
or (body or {}).get("selected_endpoint_id")
or ""
).strip()
# Issue #3229: API callers send JSON, not FormData. Read from the
# JSON body as fallback so callers who send {"allow_bash": true}
# actually get bash enabled.
@@ -1066,8 +895,6 @@ def setup_chat_routes(
400,
"No model selected for this chat. Open the model picker and choose one before sending.",
)
if not (getattr(sess, "endpoint_url", "") or "").strip():
raise HTTPException(400, "Selected model endpoint is not configured")
if (
chat_mode == "chat"
and isinstance(message, str)
@@ -1143,10 +970,6 @@ def setup_chat_routes(
last_user_message=message,
)
allow_tool_preprocessing = not pre_context_tool_policy.block_all_tool_calls
foreground_policy = resolve_foreground_model_policy(
owner=owner,
allowed_models=_allowed_models_for_request(request),
)
# Build shared context (stream path uses enhanced_message for context preface)
ctx = await build_chat_context(
@@ -1169,7 +992,6 @@ def setup_chat_routes(
# index would be useless / unwanted noise.
agent_mode=(chat_mode == "agent"),
allow_tool_preprocessing=allow_tool_preprocessing,
defer_context_shaping=foreground_policy.enabled,
)
_research_flags = {"do": do_research} # Mutable container for generator scope
@@ -1469,8 +1291,6 @@ def setup_chat_routes(
"what aspects matter most, are they comparing to something, what's their context "
"(moving, traveling, curiosity). Be conversational. Keep it short."
})
if foreground_policy.enabled:
getattr(ctx, "route_messages", ctx.messages).insert(0, dict(ctx.messages[0]))
_skip_research = True
else:
_skip_research = False
@@ -1567,12 +1387,7 @@ def setup_chat_routes(
_active_streams.pop(session, None)
return
context_source = (
getattr(ctx, "route_messages", ctx.messages)
if foreground_policy.enabled
else ctx.messages
)
messages = _ensure_current_request_is_latest_user(context_source, message)
messages = _ensure_current_request_is_latest_user(ctx.messages, message)
# Auto-compact notification
if ctx.was_compacted:
@@ -1584,56 +1399,25 @@ def setup_chat_routes(
thinking_response = ""
last_metrics = None
# Foreground Chat and Agent requests share one explicit owner-aware
# policy. Strict mode is the default; legacy values are unrelated.
_foreground_policy = foreground_policy
_foreground_candidates = build_foreground_model_candidates(
sess.endpoint_url,
sess.model,
sess.headers,
owner=_user,
policy=_foreground_policy,
)
_foreground_route_descriptors = build_foreground_route_descriptors(
sess.endpoint_url,
sess.model,
sess.headers,
owner=_user,
policy=_foreground_policy,
selected_endpoint_id=selected_endpoint_id,
)
_chat_request_factory = None
_selected_context_length = getattr(ctx, "context_length", 0)
_chat_request_state = {
"context_lengths": {0: _selected_context_length},
"requests": {0: messages},
"trim_stats": {},
}
if _foreground_policy.enabled:
_chat_request_factory, _chat_request_state = _chat_candidate_request_factory(
messages,
_selected_context_length,
session=sess,
owner=_user,
)
# Configured fallback chain for the default chat model. Tried in
# order if the session's primary model fails before producing
# output. Resolved once per request.
try:
from src.endpoint_resolver import resolve_chat_fallback_candidates
_fallback_candidates = resolve_chat_fallback_candidates(owner=_user)
except Exception:
_fallback_candidates = []
# Send model name early so the frontend can show it during streaming
_model_suffix = "Research" if effective_do_research else None
_selected_route = _foreground_route_descriptors[0]
_model_info = {
"type": "model_info",
"model": sess.model,
"endpoint_id": _selected_route.get("endpoint_id"),
"endpoint_label": _selected_route.get("endpoint_label"),
}
_model_info = {"type": "model_info", "model": sess.model}
if _model_suffix:
_model_info["suffix"] = _model_suffix
if ctx.preset.character_name:
_model_info["character_name"] = ctx.preset.character_name
yield f'data: {json.dumps(_model_info)}\n\n'
_terminal_saved = False
if _is_image_generation_session(sess, owner=_user):
if image_generation_session:
from src.settings import get_setting
if tool_policy.blocks("generate_image"):
_blocked_msg = tool_policy.reason_for("generate_image")
@@ -1736,20 +1520,11 @@ def setup_chat_routes(
_answered_by = None # set if the selected model failed and a fallback answered
_requested_model = sess.model
_actual_model = None
_requested_route = _foreground_route_descriptors[0]
_actual_route = _requested_route
_actual_candidate_index = 0
_chat_terminal_saved = False
def _commit_chat_compaction(candidate_index: int) -> bool:
return apply_compaction_state(
sess,
_chat_request_state.get("compactions", {}).get(candidate_index),
)
# ── Chat mode: call stream_llm directly, NO tools, NO document access ──
try:
_chat_candidates = [(sess.endpoint_url, sess.model, sess.headers)] + _fallback_candidates
async for chunk in stream_llm_with_fallback(
_foreground_candidates,
_chat_candidates,
messages,
temperature=ctx.preset.temperature,
# Respect the preset; 0/unset = let the server decide (no
@@ -1761,21 +1536,11 @@ def setup_chat_routes(
prompt_type=preset_id,
tools=None,
session_id=session,
fallback_statuses=_foreground_policy.eligible_statuses,
fallback_on_empty=_foreground_policy.fallback_on_empty,
candidate_request_factory=_chat_request_factory,
candidate_route_descriptors=_foreground_route_descriptors,
):
if chunk.startswith("data: ") and not chunk.startswith("data: [DONE]"):
try:
data = json.loads(chunk[6:])
if "delta" in data:
if _commit_chat_compaction(_actual_candidate_index):
_compacted_length = _chat_request_state["context_lengths"].get(
_actual_candidate_index,
_selected_context_length,
)
yield f'data: {json.dumps({"type": "compacted", "context_length": _compacted_length})}\n\n'
# Reasoning tokens arrive flagged thinking:true.
# Forward them so the client can show a thinking
# indicator, but don't fold them into the saved
@@ -1791,82 +1556,29 @@ def setup_chat_routes(
# Forward the notice and remember the real model.
_answered_by = data.get("answered_by") or _answered_by
_actual_model = _actual_model or _answered_by
_actual_candidate_index = data.get("candidate_index", 0)
if not isinstance(_actual_candidate_index, int):
_actual_candidate_index = 0
if 0 <= _actual_candidate_index < len(_foreground_route_descriptors):
_actual_route = _foreground_route_descriptors[_actual_candidate_index]
if _commit_chat_compaction(_actual_candidate_index):
_compacted_length = _chat_request_state["context_lengths"].get(
_actual_candidate_index,
_selected_context_length,
)
yield f'data: {json.dumps({"type": "compacted", "context_length": _compacted_length})}\n\n'
data["selected_model"] = data.get("selected_model") or _requested_model
yield f'data: {json.dumps(data)}\n\n'
yield chunk
elif data.get("type") == "model_actual":
if _commit_chat_compaction(_actual_candidate_index):
_compacted_length = _chat_request_state["context_lengths"].get(
_actual_candidate_index,
_selected_context_length,
)
yield f'data: {json.dumps({"type": "compacted", "context_length": _compacted_length})}\n\n'
_actual_model = data.get("model") or _actual_model
data["requested_model"] = _requested_model
data["requested_endpoint_id"] = _requested_route.get("endpoint_id")
data["requested_endpoint_label"] = _requested_route.get("endpoint_label")
data["endpoint_id"] = _actual_route.get("endpoint_id")
data["endpoint_label"] = _actual_route.get("endpoint_label")
yield f'data: {json.dumps(data)}\n\n'
elif data.get("type") == "usage":
if _commit_chat_compaction(_actual_candidate_index):
_compacted_length = _chat_request_state["context_lengths"].get(
_actual_candidate_index,
_selected_context_length,
)
yield f'data: {json.dumps({"type": "compacted", "context_length": _compacted_length})}\n\n'
last_metrics = data.get("data", {})
_reported_model = last_metrics.get("model")
last_metrics["requested_model"] = _requested_model
last_metrics["model"] = _reported_model or _actual_model or _answered_by or _requested_model
last_metrics["requested_endpoint_id"] = _requested_route.get("endpoint_id")
last_metrics["requested_endpoint_label"] = _requested_route.get("endpoint_label")
last_metrics["endpoint_id"] = _actual_route.get("endpoint_id")
last_metrics["endpoint_label"] = _actual_route.get("endpoint_label")
if isinstance(
_actual_route.get("endpoint_cost_tracked"),
bool,
):
last_metrics["endpoint_cost_tracked"] = _actual_route.get(
"endpoint_cost_tracked"
)
_actual_context_length = _chat_request_state["context_lengths"].get(
_actual_candidate_index,
_selected_context_length,
)
_route_trim = _chat_request_state.get("trim_stats", {}).get(
_actual_candidate_index,
{},
)
if _route_trim and (
_route_trim.get("messages_after") < _route_trim.get("messages_before")
or _route_trim.get("tokens_after") < _route_trim.get("tokens_before")
):
last_metrics["context_trimmed"] = True
last_metrics["context_messages_before_trim"] = _route_trim.get("messages_before")
last_metrics["context_messages_after_trim"] = _route_trim.get("messages_after")
last_metrics["context_tokens_before_trim"] = _route_trim.get("tokens_before")
last_metrics["context_tokens_after_trim"] = _route_trim.get("tokens_after")
elif ctx.context_trimmed:
if ctx.context_trimmed:
last_metrics["context_trimmed"] = True
last_metrics["context_messages_before_trim"] = ctx.context_messages_before_trim
last_metrics["context_messages_after_trim"] = ctx.context_messages_after_trim
last_metrics["context_tokens_before_trim"] = ctx.context_tokens_before_trim
last_metrics["context_tokens_after_trim"] = ctx.context_tokens_after_trim
if _actual_context_length and last_metrics.get("input_tokens"):
pct = min(round((last_metrics["input_tokens"] / _actual_context_length) * 100, 1), 100.0)
request_context_tokens = ctx.context_tokens_after_trim or estimate_tokens(messages)
last_metrics["request_context_tokens"] = request_context_tokens
if ctx.context_length and request_context_tokens:
pct = min(round((request_context_tokens / ctx.context_length) * 100, 1), 100.0)
last_metrics["context_percent"] = pct
last_metrics["context_length"] = _actual_context_length
last_metrics["context_length"] = ctx.context_length
# The frontend reads `tokens_per_second`; the raw usage event
# carries the backend's true gen speed as `gen_tps` (llama.cpp
# timings). Map it through so this direct-chat path shows real
@@ -1881,121 +1593,17 @@ def setup_chat_routes(
yield chunk
elif chunk.startswith("event: error"):
logger.warning(f"Stream error for {sess.model} on {sess.endpoint_url}: {chunk!r}")
if (
not _chat_terminal_saved
and (full_response.strip() or thinking_response.strip())
):
_failure_status = _stream_failure_status(chunk)
_failure_message = (
f"Model request failed (HTTP {_failure_status})"
if _failure_status is not None
else "Model request failed"
)
_terminal_content = full_response.strip()
_failure_note = f"[Response stopped: {_failure_message}]"
_terminal_content = (
f"{_terminal_content}\n\n{_failure_note}"
if _terminal_content
else _failure_note
)
_had_terminal_usage = bool(last_metrics)
_terminal_metrics = dict(last_metrics or {})
if not _had_terminal_usage:
_actual_request_messages = _chat_request_state["requests"].get(
_actual_candidate_index,
messages,
)
_actual_context_length = _chat_request_state["context_lengths"].get(
_actual_candidate_index,
_selected_context_length,
)
_estimated_input = estimate_tokens(_actual_request_messages)
_estimated_output = max(
len(full_response + thinking_response) // 4,
0,
)
_terminal_metrics.update({
"input_tokens": _estimated_input,
"output_tokens": _estimated_output,
"total_tokens": _estimated_input + _estimated_output,
"usage_source": "estimated",
"response_time": round(time.time() - _chat_start, 2),
"context_length": _actual_context_length,
"context_percent": (
min(
round(
(_estimated_input / _actual_context_length) * 100,
1,
),
100.0,
)
if _actual_context_length
else 0
),
})
_terminal_metrics.update({
"failed": True,
"failure": {
"status": _failure_status,
"message": _failure_message,
},
"model": _actual_model or _answered_by or _requested_model,
"requested_model": _requested_model,
"endpoint_id": _actual_route.get("endpoint_id"),
"endpoint_label": _actual_route.get("endpoint_label"),
"requested_endpoint_id": _requested_route.get("endpoint_id"),
"requested_endpoint_label": _requested_route.get("endpoint_label"),
})
if isinstance(
_actual_route.get("endpoint_cost_tracked"),
bool,
):
_terminal_metrics["endpoint_cost_tracked"] = _actual_route.get(
"endpoint_cost_tracked"
)
if thinking_response.strip():
_terminal_metrics["thinking"] = thinking_response.strip()
_commit_chat_compaction(_actual_candidate_index)
_saved_id = save_assistant_response(
sess,
session_manager,
session,
_terminal_content,
_terminal_metrics,
character_name=ctx.preset.character_name,
incognito=incognito,
)
accumulate_token_usage(session, _terminal_metrics)
_chat_terminal_saved = True
_stream_set(session, status="error")
if _saved_id:
yield f'data: {json.dumps({"type": "message_saved", "id": _saved_id})}\n\n'
yield f'data: {json.dumps({"type": "chat_terminal", "data": _terminal_metrics})}\n\n'
yield chunk
elif chunk.startswith("event: "):
yield chunk
elif chunk == "data: [DONE]\n\n":
if _chat_terminal_saved:
# Some providers append DONE after a terminal
# error. The failed partial is already saved;
# never re-save/post-process it as a success or
# advertise successful completion to the client.
continue
# Generate fallback metrics if LLM didn't send usage
if not last_metrics and full_response:
_elapsed = time.time() - _chat_start
_est_in = estimate_tokens(messages)
_est_out = len(full_response) // 4
_tps = round(_est_out / _elapsed, 2) if _elapsed > 0 else 0
_actual_context_length = _chat_request_state["context_lengths"].get(
_actual_candidate_index,
_selected_context_length,
)
_actual_request_messages = _chat_request_state["requests"].get(
_actual_candidate_index,
messages,
)
_est_in = estimate_tokens(_actual_request_messages)
_ctx_pct = min(round((_est_in / _actual_context_length) * 100, 1), 100.0) if _actual_context_length else 0
_ctx_pct = min(round((_est_in / ctx.context_length) * 100, 1), 100.0) if ctx.context_length else 0
last_metrics = {
"response_time": round(_elapsed, 2),
"input_tokens": _est_in,
@@ -2003,25 +1611,13 @@ def setup_chat_routes(
"tokens_per_second": _tps,
"request_context_tokens": _est_in,
"context_percent": _ctx_pct,
"context_length": _actual_context_length,
"context_length": ctx.context_length,
"model": _actual_model or _answered_by or _requested_model,
"requested_model": _requested_model,
"requested_endpoint_id": _requested_route.get("endpoint_id"),
"requested_endpoint_label": _requested_route.get("endpoint_label"),
"endpoint_id": _actual_route.get("endpoint_id"),
"endpoint_label": _actual_route.get("endpoint_label"),
"usage_source": "estimated",
}
if isinstance(
_actual_route.get("endpoint_cost_tracked"),
bool,
):
last_metrics["endpoint_cost_tracked"] = _actual_route.get(
"endpoint_cost_tracked"
)
yield f'data: {json.dumps({"type": "metrics", "data": last_metrics})}\n\n'
if full_response:
_commit_chat_compaction(_actual_candidate_index)
_metrics_to_save = dict(last_metrics or {})
if thinking_response.strip() and not _metrics_to_save.get("thinking"):
_metrics_to_save["thinking"] = thinking_response.strip()
@@ -2056,10 +1652,6 @@ def setup_chat_routes(
"stopped": True,
"model": _actual_model or _answered_by or _requested_model,
"requested_model": _requested_model,
"endpoint_id": _actual_route.get("endpoint_id"),
"endpoint_label": _actual_route.get("endpoint_label"),
"requested_endpoint_id": _requested_route.get("endpoint_id"),
"requested_endpoint_label": _requested_route.get("endpoint_label"),
},
)
sess.add_message(ChatMessage("assistant", _stopped_content, metadata=_stopped_md))
@@ -2074,12 +1666,6 @@ def setup_chat_routes(
_answered_by = None # set if the selected model failed and a fallback answered
_requested_model = sess.model
_actual_model = None
_agent_requested_route = _foreground_route_descriptors[0]
_agent_actual_endpoint_id = _agent_requested_route.get("endpoint_id")
_agent_actual_endpoint_label = _agent_requested_route.get("endpoint_label")
_agent_round_models = {1: _requested_model}
_agent_round_endpoint_ids = {1: _agent_actual_endpoint_id}
_agent_round_endpoint_labels = {1: _agent_actual_endpoint_label}
try:
from src.settings import get_setting
from src.agent_tools import MAX_AGENT_ROUNDS as _DEFAULT_ROUNDS
@@ -2117,24 +1703,19 @@ def setup_chat_routes(
prompt_type=preset_id,
max_tool_calls=_tool_budget,
max_rounds=_max_rounds,
context_length=_selected_context_length,
context_length=ctx.context_length,
active_document=active_doc,
active_email=active_email_ctx,
session_id=session,
history_session=sess,
disabled_tools=disabled_tools if disabled_tools else None,
tool_policy=tool_policy,
owner=_user,
fallbacks=_foreground_candidates[1:],
route_descriptors=_foreground_route_descriptors,
fallback_statuses=_foreground_policy.eligible_statuses,
fallback_on_empty=_foreground_policy.fallback_on_empty,
fallbacks=_fallback_candidates,
plan_mode=plan_mode,
approved_plan=approved_plan or None,
workspace=workspace or None,
forced_tools=_forced_tools,
uploaded_files=ctx.uploaded_files,
defer_context_shaping=_foreground_policy.enabled,
):
if chunk.startswith("data: ") and not chunk.startswith("data: [DONE]"):
try:
@@ -2163,20 +1744,7 @@ def setup_chat_routes(
"plan_update",
):
if data.get("type") == "agent_step":
_event_round = data.get("round", 1)
_agent_rounds = max(_agent_rounds, _event_round)
_agent_round_models.setdefault(
_event_round,
_actual_model or _answered_by or _requested_model,
)
_agent_round_endpoint_ids.setdefault(
_event_round,
_agent_actual_endpoint_id,
)
_agent_round_endpoint_labels.setdefault(
_event_round,
_agent_actual_endpoint_label,
)
_agent_rounds = max(_agent_rounds, data.get("round", 1))
elif data.get("type") == "tool_start":
_agent_tool_calls += 1
yield chunk
@@ -2186,70 +1754,13 @@ def setup_chat_routes(
# model so metrics reflect it, not the masked
# selected model.
_answered_by = data.get("answered_by") or _answered_by
_actual_model = _answered_by or _actual_model
if "answered_by_endpoint_id" in data:
_agent_actual_endpoint_id = data.get("answered_by_endpoint_id")
if data.get("answered_by_endpoint_label"):
_agent_actual_endpoint_label = data.get("answered_by_endpoint_label")
_event_round = data.get("round") or max(_agent_rounds, 1)
_agent_round_models[_event_round] = _answered_by or _requested_model
_agent_round_endpoint_ids[_event_round] = _agent_actual_endpoint_id
_agent_round_endpoint_labels[_event_round] = _agent_actual_endpoint_label
_actual_model = _actual_model or _answered_by
data["selected_model"] = data.get("selected_model") or _requested_model
yield chunk
elif data.get("type") == "model_actual":
_actual_model = data.get("model") or _actual_model
if "endpoint_id" in data:
_agent_actual_endpoint_id = data.get("endpoint_id")
if data.get("endpoint_label"):
_agent_actual_endpoint_label = data.get("endpoint_label")
_event_round = data.get("round") or max(_agent_rounds, 1)
_agent_round_models[_event_round] = _actual_model or _requested_model
_agent_round_endpoint_ids[_event_round] = _agent_actual_endpoint_id
_agent_round_endpoint_labels[_event_round] = _agent_actual_endpoint_label
data["requested_model"] = _requested_model
yield f'data: {json.dumps(data)}\n\n'
elif data.get("type") == "agent_terminal":
terminal_metadata = dict(data.get("data") or {})
last_metrics = terminal_metadata
failure = terminal_metadata.get("failure") or {}
failure_status = _normalize_http_status(
failure.get("status")
)
failure_message = (
f"Model request failed (HTTP {failure_status})"
if failure_status is not None
else "Model request failed"
)
terminal_metadata["failure"] = {
"status": failure_status,
"message": failure_message,
}
terminal_content = full_response.strip()
failure_note = f"[Agent stopped: {failure_message}]"
if terminal_content:
terminal_content = f"{terminal_content}\n\n{failure_note}"
else:
terminal_content = failure_note
if not _terminal_saved:
_saved_id = save_assistant_response(
sess,
session_manager,
session,
terminal_content,
terminal_metadata,
character_name=ctx.preset.character_name,
web_sources=web_sources,
rag_sources=ctx.rag_sources,
used_memories=ctx.used_memories,
incognito=incognito,
)
_terminal_saved = True
accumulate_token_usage(session, terminal_metadata)
_stream_set(session, status="error")
if _saved_id:
yield f'data: {json.dumps({"type": "message_saved", "id": _saved_id})}\n\n'
yield chunk
elif data.get("type") == "metrics":
last_metrics = data.get("data", {})
_reported_model = last_metrics.get("model")
@@ -2261,16 +1772,7 @@ def setup_chat_routes(
last_metrics["context_messages_after_trim"] = ctx.context_messages_after_trim
last_metrics["context_tokens_before_trim"] = ctx.context_tokens_before_trim
last_metrics["context_tokens_after_trim"] = ctx.context_tokens_after_trim
_metrics_event = {"type": "metrics", "data": last_metrics}
# Inline teacher escalation marks its
# recursively emitted events at the SSE
# envelope. Preserve that non-secret marker
# when normalizing metrics so the browser's
# replay-stable ledger keeps primary and
# teacher segments distinct.
if data.get("teacher") is True:
_metrics_event["teacher"] = True
yield f'data: {json.dumps(_metrics_event)}\n\n'
yield f'data: {json.dumps({"type": "metrics", "data": last_metrics})}\n\n'
except json.JSONDecodeError:
yield chunk
elif chunk.startswith("event: "):
@@ -2322,22 +1824,6 @@ def setup_chat_routes(
"stopped": True,
"model": _actual_model or _answered_by or _requested_model,
"requested_model": _requested_model,
"endpoint_id": _agent_actual_endpoint_id,
"endpoint_label": _agent_actual_endpoint_label,
"requested_endpoint_id": _agent_requested_route.get("endpoint_id"),
"requested_endpoint_label": _agent_requested_route.get("endpoint_label"),
"round_models": [
_agent_round_models.get(i, _actual_model or _requested_model)
for i in range(1, max(_agent_round_models, default=1) + 1)
],
"round_endpoint_ids": [
_agent_round_endpoint_ids.get(i)
for i in range(1, max(_agent_round_models, default=1) + 1)
],
"round_endpoint_labels": [
_agent_round_endpoint_labels.get(i)
for i in range(1, max(_agent_round_models, default=1) + 1)
],
},
)
sess.add_message(ChatMessage("assistant", _stopped_content2, metadata=_stopped_md2))
@@ -2380,12 +1866,8 @@ def setup_chat_routes(
if compare_mode:
return StreamingResponse(_safe_stream(), media_type="text/event-stream")
_detached_run = agent_runs.start(session, _safe_stream())
return StreamingResponse(
agent_runs.subscribe(session, _detached_run),
media_type="text/event-stream",
headers={"X-Odysseus-Run-Id": _detached_run.run_id},
)
agent_runs.start(session, _safe_stream())
return StreamingResponse(agent_runs.subscribe(session), media_type="text/event-stream")
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ #
# GET /api/chat/resume — reconnect to a detached run that's still going
@@ -2394,14 +1876,9 @@ def setup_chat_routes(
@router.get("/api/chat/resume/{session_id}")
async def chat_resume(request: Request, session_id: str) -> StreamingResponse:
_verify_session_owner(request, session_id)
_active_run = agent_runs.get_active_run(session_id)
if _active_run is None:
if not agent_runs.is_active(session_id):
raise HTTPException(404, "No active run for this session")
return StreamingResponse(
agent_runs.subscribe(session_id, _active_run),
media_type="text/event-stream",
headers={"X-Odysseus-Run-Id": _active_run.run_id},
)
return StreamingResponse(agent_runs.subscribe(session_id), media_type="text/event-stream")
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ #
# POST /api/chat/stop — cancel a detached run (Stop button). Closing the SSE
@@ -2410,8 +1887,7 @@ def setup_chat_routes(
@router.post("/api/chat/stop/{session_id}")
async def chat_stop(request: Request, session_id: str) -> Dict[str, Any]:
_verify_session_owner(request, session_id)
_expected_run_id = request.headers.get("X-Odysseus-Run-Id")
stopped = agent_runs.stop(session_id, _expected_run_id)
stopped = agent_runs.stop(session_id)
return {"stopped": stopped}
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ #
+2 -40
View File
@@ -73,30 +73,6 @@ _HF_TOKEN_STATUS_SNIPPET = (
)
def _windows_local_pid_record_line(pid_path: Path, ready_path: Path) -> str:
"""Build the Git Bash prelude that records a Win32-stoppable PID.
Python publishes the detached outer process's Win32 PID first, then touches
``ready_path``. The inner Git Bash runner waits for that publication before
replacing the fallback with its own Win32 PID from /proc/<msys-pid>/winpid.
Missing, malformed, or late mappings leave the valid outer PID untouched.
"""
pp = shlex.quote(pid_path.as_posix())
rp = shlex.quote(ready_path.as_posix())
return (
"i=0; "
f"while [ ! -e {rp} ] && [ \"$i\" -lt 500 ]; do "
"i=$((i+1)); sleep 0.01; done; "
f"if [ -e {rp} ]; then "
"winpid=\"$(cat /proc/$$/winpid 2>/dev/null || true)\"; "
"case \"$winpid\" in ''|*[!0-9]*) ;; "
f"*) printf '%s\\n' \"$winpid\" > {pp} ;; esac; "
"fi; "
f"rm -f {rp}"
)
def _append_mlx_image_server_script(runner_lines: list[str]) -> None:
"""Write the MLX image API helper next to the tmux runner on remote hosts."""
script_path = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] / "scripts" / "mlx_image_server.py"
@@ -1002,18 +978,15 @@ def setup_cookbook_routes() -> APIRouter:
directly (simple commands only). Returns the launched job record."""
log_path = TMUX_LOG_DIR / f"{session_id}.log"
pid_path = TMUX_LOG_DIR / f"{session_id}.pid"
pid_ready_path: Path | None = None
bash = find_bash()
if bash:
# Run the existing bash wrapper verbatim through Git Bash, redirecting
# all output to the log the poller reads. Paths handed to bash use
# POSIX form + shell-quoting so drive paths / spaces survive.
inner = TMUX_LOG_DIR / f"{session_id}_run.sh"
pid_ready_path = TMUX_LOG_DIR / f"{session_id}.pid.ready"
pid_ready_path.unlink(missing_ok=True)
pp = shlex.quote(pid_path.as_posix())
inner.write_text(
_windows_local_pid_record_line(pid_path, pid_ready_path) + "\n"
+ "\n".join(bash_lines) + "\n",
f"printf '%s\\n' \"$$\" > {pp}\n" + "\n".join(bash_lines) + "\n",
encoding="utf-8",
)
lp = shlex.quote(log_path.as_posix())
@@ -1047,18 +1020,7 @@ def setup_cookbook_routes() -> APIRouter:
env=env,
**detached_popen_kwargs(),
)
# Publish a valid Win32 ancestor first. The Git Bash runner may then
# replace it with its own Win32 pid, but never before this fallback exists.
pid_path.write_text(str(proc.pid), encoding="utf-8")
if pid_ready_path is not None:
try:
pid_ready_path.touch()
except OSError as e:
logger.warning(
"Could not publish Windows local PID handoff for %s: %s",
session_id,
e,
)
return {"pid": proc.pid, "log_path": str(log_path)}
@router.post("/api/model/download")
-6
View File
@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
"""Document route domain package (slice 2m, #4082/#4071).
Contains document_routes.py and document_helpers.py, migrated from the flat
routes/ directory. Backward-compat shims at routes/document_routes.py and
routes/document_helpers.py re-export from here.
"""
-243
View File
@@ -1,243 +0,0 @@
"""document_helpers.py — Pydantic models, doc serializers, owner gating, file-locator helpers shared with document_routes.py."""
"""Document routes — CRUD for living documents with version history."""
import logging
import os
import re
from typing import Any, Dict, Optional
from fastapi import HTTPException, Request
from pydantic import BaseModel
from core.database import Document, DocumentVersion
from core.database import Session as DbSession
from src.auth_helpers import _auth_disabled
from src.upload_handler import UploadHandler
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
# ---- Request schemas ----
class DocumentCreate(BaseModel):
session_id: Optional[str] = None
title: str = "Untitled"
language: Optional[str] = None
content: str = ""
class DocumentUpdate(BaseModel):
content: str
summary: Optional[str] = None
force_version: bool = False
class DocumentPatch(BaseModel):
title: Optional[str] = None
language: Optional[str] = None
session_id: Optional[str] = None # link/unlink document to a session
# ---- Helpers ----
def _doc_to_dict(doc: Document) -> Dict[str, Any]:
return {
"id": doc.id,
"session_id": doc.session_id,
"title": doc.title,
"language": doc.language,
"current_content": doc.current_content,
"version_count": doc.version_count,
"is_active": doc.is_active,
"archived": bool(getattr(doc, "archived", False)),
"created_at": (doc.created_at.isoformat() + "Z") if doc.created_at else None,
"updated_at": (doc.updated_at.isoformat() + "Z") if doc.updated_at else None,
# Source-email provenance (set when doc was created from an email
# attachment) — drives the "Send signed reply" menu item.
"source_email_uid": getattr(doc, "source_email_uid", None),
"source_email_folder": getattr(doc, "source_email_folder", None),
"source_email_account_id": getattr(doc, "source_email_account_id", None),
"source_email_message_id": getattr(doc, "source_email_message_id", None),
}
def _version_to_dict(v: DocumentVersion) -> Dict[str, Any]:
return {
"id": v.id,
"document_id": v.document_id,
"version_number": v.version_number,
"content": v.content,
"summary": v.summary,
"source": v.source,
"created_at": v.created_at.isoformat() if v.created_at else None,
}
def _verify_doc_owner(db, doc: Document, user: str):
"""Verify `user` owns this document. Raise 404 if not.
Documents now carry their own `owner` column, so a doc whose session
was deleted (session_id NULL) can still prove ownership and stay
openable / cloneable. We trust that column first and only fall back to
the session join for any not-yet-backfilled legacy row.
"""
if user is None:
if _auth_disabled():
return # Single-user / no-auth mode: allow access
raise HTTPException(403, "Authentication required")
if doc.owner is not None:
if doc.owner != user:
raise HTTPException(404, "Document not found")
return
# Legacy fallback: derive ownership from the linked session.
if not doc.session_id:
raise HTTPException(404, "Document not found")
session = db.query(DbSession).filter(DbSession.id == doc.session_id).first()
if not session or session.owner != user:
raise HTTPException(404, "Document not found")
def _owner_session_filter(q, user):
"""Restrict a documents query to those owned by `user`.
Documents now carry their own `owner` column (backfilled at boot from
the linked session, or assigned to the admin user for legacy/orphaned
docs). We filter on that directly rather than on a session join, so a
document whose session was deleted (session_id NULL) still shows up
for its owner instead of silently vanishing from the Library + search.
The owner backfill runs in init_db before the app serves requests, so
by the time this filter is live there are no NULL-owner rows to leak;
we therefore match the owner strictly for authenticated callers."""
if not user:
if user == "" or _auth_disabled():
return q
return q.filter(False)
return q.filter(Document.owner == user)
def _slug(name: str) -> str:
"""Filesystem-friendly version of a document title.
Whitespace becomes underscores; other unsafe punctuation is dropped.
Preserves letters, digits, dot, hyphen, underscore. Idempotent.
"""
import re as _re
s = (name or "").strip()
# Drop the trailing extension if the title happens to include one
s = _re.sub(r'\.pdf$', '', s, flags=_re.IGNORECASE)
s = _re.sub(r'\s+', '_', s)
s = _re.sub(r'[^A-Za-z0-9._-]', '', s)
s = _re.sub(r'_+', '_', s).strip('_')
return s or "form"
# DPI scale for the interactive PDF view. ~150 DPI (2x of 72 PDF user-units).
_PDF_RENDER_SCALE = 2.0
def _upload_path_inside(upload_dir: str, path: str) -> bool:
base = os.path.realpath(upload_dir)
p = os.path.realpath(path)
try:
return os.path.commonpath([base, p]) == base
except Exception:
return False
def _resolve_user_upload_path(
upload_handler: Any,
upload_id: str,
owner: Optional[str],
auth_manager=None,
) -> Optional[str]:
"""Resolve an upload id to a filesystem path the caller may read."""
if upload_handler is None:
return None
resolved = upload_handler.resolve_upload(
upload_id,
owner=owner,
auth_manager=auth_manager,
)
if not isinstance(resolved, dict) or not resolved:
return None
path = resolved.get("path")
upload_dir = getattr(upload_handler, "upload_dir", None)
if path and upload_dir and not _upload_path_inside(upload_dir, path):
logger.warning("Upload path outside upload directory: %s", path)
return None
return path
def _locate_upload(
upload_dir: str,
file_id: str,
owner: Optional[str] = None,
auth_manager=None,
upload_handler: Any = None,
):
"""Find an upload by its filename ID via UploadHandler.resolve_upload."""
if upload_handler is None:
from src.upload_handler import UploadHandler
base_dir = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(upload_dir))
upload_handler = UploadHandler(base_dir, upload_dir)
return _resolve_user_upload_path(upload_handler, file_id, owner, auth_manager)
def _assert_pdf_marker_upload_owned(
request: Request,
content: str,
user: Optional[str],
upload_handler: Any,
) -> None:
"""Reject document content whose pdf_source marker points at another user's upload."""
if upload_handler is None:
return
from src.pdf_form_doc import find_source_upload_id
upload_id = find_source_upload_id(content or "")
if not upload_id:
return
auth_manager = getattr(getattr(request.app, "state", None), "auth_manager", None)
if not _resolve_user_upload_path(upload_handler, upload_id, user, auth_manager):
raise HTTPException(
400,
"Document PDF marker references an upload you do not own",
)
def _derive_title(content: str) -> str:
"""Derive a title from document content."""
import re
if not isinstance(content, str):
return "Untitled"
text = content.strip()
if not text:
return "Untitled"
# Markdown header
md = re.match(r'^#{1,3}\s+(.+)', text, re.MULTILINE)
if md:
title = md.group(1).strip()
if len(title) > 50:
title = title[:48] + ""
return title
# HTML heading
html = re.search(r'<h[1-3][^>]*>([^<]+)</h[1-3]>', text, re.IGNORECASE)
if html:
title = html.group(1).strip()
if len(title) > 50:
title = title[:48] + ""
return title
# First non-empty line (if short enough)
for line in text.split('\n'):
line = line.strip()
if line and 2 <= len(line) <= 60:
title = re.sub(r'[:#*`]+$', '', line).strip()
if title and len(title) > 50:
title = title[:48] + ""
return title or "Untitled"
return "Untitled"
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+239 -10
View File
@@ -1,14 +1,243 @@
"""Backward-compat shim — canonical location is routes/document/document_helpers.py.
"""document_helpers.py — Pydantic models, doc serializers, owner gating, file-locator helpers shared with document_routes.py."""
This module is replaced in ``sys.modules`` by the canonical module object so
that ``import routes.document_helpers``, ``from routes.document_helpers import
X``, and the ``sys.modules.pop("routes.document_helpers")`` + re-import
pattern used by test_security_regressions.py all operate on the *same* object.
Keeps existing import paths working after slice 2m (#4082/#4071).
"""
"""Document routes — CRUD for living documents with version history."""
import sys as _sys
import logging
import os
import re
from typing import Any, Dict, Optional
from routes.document import document_helpers as _canonical # noqa: F401
from fastapi import HTTPException, Request
from pydantic import BaseModel
_sys.modules[__name__] = _canonical
from core.database import Document, DocumentVersion
from core.database import Session as DbSession
from src.auth_helpers import _auth_disabled
from src.upload_handler import UploadHandler
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
# ---- Request schemas ----
class DocumentCreate(BaseModel):
session_id: Optional[str] = None
title: str = "Untitled"
language: Optional[str] = None
content: str = ""
class DocumentUpdate(BaseModel):
content: str
summary: Optional[str] = None
force_version: bool = False
class DocumentPatch(BaseModel):
title: Optional[str] = None
language: Optional[str] = None
session_id: Optional[str] = None # link/unlink document to a session
# ---- Helpers ----
def _doc_to_dict(doc: Document) -> Dict[str, Any]:
return {
"id": doc.id,
"session_id": doc.session_id,
"title": doc.title,
"language": doc.language,
"current_content": doc.current_content,
"version_count": doc.version_count,
"is_active": doc.is_active,
"archived": bool(getattr(doc, "archived", False)),
"created_at": (doc.created_at.isoformat() + "Z") if doc.created_at else None,
"updated_at": (doc.updated_at.isoformat() + "Z") if doc.updated_at else None,
# Source-email provenance (set when doc was created from an email
# attachment) — drives the "Send signed reply" menu item.
"source_email_uid": getattr(doc, "source_email_uid", None),
"source_email_folder": getattr(doc, "source_email_folder", None),
"source_email_account_id": getattr(doc, "source_email_account_id", None),
"source_email_message_id": getattr(doc, "source_email_message_id", None),
}
def _version_to_dict(v: DocumentVersion) -> Dict[str, Any]:
return {
"id": v.id,
"document_id": v.document_id,
"version_number": v.version_number,
"content": v.content,
"summary": v.summary,
"source": v.source,
"created_at": v.created_at.isoformat() if v.created_at else None,
}
def _verify_doc_owner(db, doc: Document, user: str):
"""Verify `user` owns this document. Raise 404 if not.
Documents now carry their own `owner` column, so a doc whose session
was deleted (session_id NULL) can still prove ownership and stay
openable / cloneable. We trust that column first and only fall back to
the session join for any not-yet-backfilled legacy row.
"""
if user is None:
if _auth_disabled():
return # Single-user / no-auth mode: allow access
raise HTTPException(403, "Authentication required")
if doc.owner is not None:
if doc.owner != user:
raise HTTPException(404, "Document not found")
return
# Legacy fallback: derive ownership from the linked session.
if not doc.session_id:
raise HTTPException(404, "Document not found")
session = db.query(DbSession).filter(DbSession.id == doc.session_id).first()
if not session or session.owner != user:
raise HTTPException(404, "Document not found")
def _owner_session_filter(q, user):
"""Restrict a documents query to those owned by `user`.
Documents now carry their own `owner` column (backfilled at boot from
the linked session, or assigned to the admin user for legacy/orphaned
docs). We filter on that directly rather than on a session join, so a
document whose session was deleted (session_id NULL) still shows up
for its owner instead of silently vanishing from the Library + search.
The owner backfill runs in init_db before the app serves requests, so
by the time this filter is live there are no NULL-owner rows to leak;
we therefore match the owner strictly for authenticated callers."""
if not user:
if user == "" or _auth_disabled():
return q
return q.filter(False)
return q.filter(Document.owner == user)
def _slug(name: str) -> str:
"""Filesystem-friendly version of a document title.
Whitespace becomes underscores; other unsafe punctuation is dropped.
Preserves letters, digits, dot, hyphen, underscore. Idempotent.
"""
import re as _re
s = (name or "").strip()
# Drop the trailing extension if the title happens to include one
s = _re.sub(r'\.pdf$', '', s, flags=_re.IGNORECASE)
s = _re.sub(r'\s+', '_', s)
s = _re.sub(r'[^A-Za-z0-9._-]', '', s)
s = _re.sub(r'_+', '_', s).strip('_')
return s or "form"
# DPI scale for the interactive PDF view. ~150 DPI (2x of 72 PDF user-units).
_PDF_RENDER_SCALE = 2.0
def _upload_path_inside(upload_dir: str, path: str) -> bool:
base = os.path.realpath(upload_dir)
p = os.path.realpath(path)
try:
return os.path.commonpath([base, p]) == base
except Exception:
return False
def _resolve_user_upload_path(
upload_handler: Any,
upload_id: str,
owner: Optional[str],
auth_manager=None,
) -> Optional[str]:
"""Resolve an upload id to a filesystem path the caller may read."""
if upload_handler is None:
return None
resolved = upload_handler.resolve_upload(
upload_id,
owner=owner,
auth_manager=auth_manager,
)
if not isinstance(resolved, dict) or not resolved:
return None
path = resolved.get("path")
upload_dir = getattr(upload_handler, "upload_dir", None)
if path and upload_dir and not _upload_path_inside(upload_dir, path):
logger.warning("Upload path outside upload directory: %s", path)
return None
return path
def _locate_upload(
upload_dir: str,
file_id: str,
owner: Optional[str] = None,
auth_manager=None,
upload_handler: Any = None,
):
"""Find an upload by its filename ID via UploadHandler.resolve_upload."""
if upload_handler is None:
from src.upload_handler import UploadHandler
base_dir = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(upload_dir))
upload_handler = UploadHandler(base_dir, upload_dir)
return _resolve_user_upload_path(upload_handler, file_id, owner, auth_manager)
def _assert_pdf_marker_upload_owned(
request: Request,
content: str,
user: Optional[str],
upload_handler: Any,
) -> None:
"""Reject document content whose pdf_source marker points at another user's upload."""
if upload_handler is None:
return
from src.pdf_form_doc import find_source_upload_id
upload_id = find_source_upload_id(content or "")
if not upload_id:
return
auth_manager = getattr(getattr(request.app, "state", None), "auth_manager", None)
if not _resolve_user_upload_path(upload_handler, upload_id, user, auth_manager):
raise HTTPException(
400,
"Document PDF marker references an upload you do not own",
)
def _derive_title(content: str) -> str:
"""Derive a title from document content."""
import re
if not isinstance(content, str):
return "Untitled"
text = content.strip()
if not text:
return "Untitled"
# Markdown header
md = re.match(r'^#{1,3}\s+(.+)', text, re.MULTILINE)
if md:
title = md.group(1).strip()
if len(title) > 50:
title = title[:48] + ""
return title
# HTML heading
html = re.search(r'<h[1-3][^>]*>([^<]+)</h[1-3]>', text, re.IGNORECASE)
if html:
title = html.group(1).strip()
if len(title) > 50:
title = title[:48] + ""
return title
# First non-empty line (if short enough)
for line in text.split('\n'):
line = line.strip()
if line and 2 <= len(line) <= 60:
title = re.sub(r'[:#*`]+$', '', line).strip()
if title and len(title) > 50:
title = title[:48] + ""
return title or "Untitled"
return "Untitled"
+1806 -13
View File
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
-120
View File
@@ -247,7 +247,6 @@ import re as _re_reply
_REPLY_OPEN_RE = _re_reply.compile(r"<<<\s*(?:REPLY|SUMMARY|OUTPUT)\s*>>+", _re_reply.I)
_REPLY_CLOSE_RE = _re_reply.compile(r"<<<\s*END\s*>>+", _re_reply.I)
_REPLY_ROLE_MARKER_RE = _re_reply.compile(r"</?\|(?:assistant|assistan|user|system|tool)\|>?|</\|end\|>?", _re_reply.I)
_SUMMARY_BULLET_RE = _re_reply.compile(r"^(?:[-*\u2022]\s+|\d+[.)]\s+)")
def _extract_reply(text: str) -> str:
@@ -278,125 +277,6 @@ def _extract_reply(text: str) -> str:
return _strip_think(t).strip()
def _build_email_summary_messages(sender: str, subject: str, body_for_llm: str) -> list[dict[str, str]]:
return [
{
"role": "system",
"content": (
"You are an email summarizer. Format: 1-3 short bullet points "
"(use '- '). Cover: main point, action items, deadlines. If the "
"email has attachments (marked '--- ATTACHMENTS ---'), USE THEIR "
"CONTENTS - pull invoice totals, deadlines, key clauses, concrete "
"numbers/dates from PDFs/docs into the bullets. Be terse.\n\n"
"OUTPUT FORMAT: Put ONLY the bullet points between these exact "
"markers, each on its own line:\n"
"<<<SUMMARY>>>\n"
"- ...\n"
"<<<END>>>\n"
"Any reasoning must come BEFORE <<<SUMMARY>>> (ideally inside "
"<think>...</think>). Only the text between the markers is kept."
),
},
{
"role": "user",
"content": (
f"From: {sender}\nSubject: {subject}\n\n{body_for_llm[:12000]}"
"\n\n---\n\nSummarize the email. Output the bullets between "
"<<<SUMMARY>>> and <<<END>>>."
),
},
]
async def _generate_email_summary(
url: str,
model: str,
sender: str,
subject: str,
body_for_llm: str,
*,
headers: dict | None = None,
max_tokens: int = 8192,
timeout: int = 180,
) -> str:
"""Generate an interactive email summary through the shared LLM adapter."""
from src.llm_core import llm_call_async
raw = await llm_call_async(
url=url,
model=model,
messages=_build_email_summary_messages(sender, subject, body_for_llm),
temperature=0.3,
max_tokens=max_tokens,
headers=headers,
timeout=timeout,
workload="foreground",
)
return _normalize_email_summary(raw)
async def _generate_scheduled_email_summary(
url: str,
model: str,
sender: str,
subject: str,
body_for_llm: str,
*,
headers: dict | None = None,
owner: str | None = None,
max_tokens: int = 8192,
timeout: int = 180,
) -> str:
"""Generate a scheduled summary through the background task candidate chain."""
from src.task_endpoint import task_llm_call_async
raw = await task_llm_call_async(
messages=_build_email_summary_messages(sender, subject, body_for_llm),
fallback_url=url,
fallback_model=model,
fallback_headers=headers,
owner=owner,
temperature=0.3,
max_tokens=max_tokens,
timeout=timeout,
)
return _normalize_email_summary(raw)
def _normalize_email_summary(raw) -> str:
"""Extract a stable cache/UI summary from provider output."""
raw_text = raw or ""
if _REPLY_OPEN_RE.search(raw_text):
summary = _extract_reply(raw_text)
if summary:
return summary
cleaned = _strip_think(raw_text).strip()
bullets = [
line.strip()
for line in cleaned.splitlines()
if _SUMMARY_BULLET_RE.match(line.strip())
]
if bullets:
return "\n".join(bullets)
return cleaned.strip()
EMAIL_SUMMARY_ERROR_CODE = "email_summary_unavailable"
EMAIL_SUMMARY_ERROR_MESSAGE = "Failed to summarize"
def _email_summary_failure_log_detail(exc: BaseException) -> str:
"""Return useful provider-failure metadata without echoing exception text."""
detail = f"type={type(exc).__name__}"
status = getattr(exc, "status_code", None)
if status is None:
status = getattr(getattr(exc, "response", None), "status_code", None)
if isinstance(status, int):
detail += f" status={status}"
return detail
def _apply_email_style_mechanics(text: str) -> str:
"""Enforce deterministic writing-style mechanics that models often miss."""
if not text:
+9 -23
View File
@@ -40,7 +40,6 @@ from routes.email_helpers import (
_pre_retrieve_context,
_attach_compose_uploads, _cleanup_compose_uploads, _q,
SCHEDULED_DB, _EMAIL_REPLY_SYS_PROMPT_BASE, _email_cache_owner_clause,
_generate_scheduled_email_summary, _email_summary_failure_log_detail,
)
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
@@ -654,7 +653,6 @@ async def _auto_summarize_pass_single(days_back: int = 1, account_id: str | None
no_msgid = 0
examined = 0
_summaries_created = 0
_summary_failed = 0
_events_created = 0
_replies_drafted = 0
_reply_failed = 0
@@ -787,17 +785,16 @@ async def _auto_summarize_pass_single(days_back: int = 1, account_id: str | None
if need_sum:
try:
summary = await _generate_scheduled_email_summary(
url=url,
model=model,
sender=sender,
subject=subject,
body_for_llm=body_for_llm,
headers=req_headers,
summary = await task_llm_call_async(
messages=[
{"role": "system", "content": "You are an email summarizer. Format: 1-3 short bullet points (use '- '). Cover: main point, action items, deadlines. If the email has attachments (marked '--- ATTACHMENTS ---'), USE THEIR CONTENTS — pull out invoice totals, deadlines, key clauses, any concrete numbers/dates in PDFs/docs, and reflect them in the bullets. Be terse.\n\nOUTPUT FORMAT: Put ONLY the bullet points between these exact markers, each on its own line:\n<<<SUMMARY>>>\n- ...\n<<<END>>>\nAny reasoning or planning must come BEFORE <<<SUMMARY>>> (ideally inside <think>...</think>). Only the text between the markers is kept."},
{"role": "user", "content": f"From: {sender}\nSubject: {subject}\n\n{body_for_llm[:12000]}\n\n---\n\nSummarize the email. Output the bullets between <<<SUMMARY>>> and <<<END>>>."},
],
fallback_url=url, fallback_model=model, fallback_headers=headers,
owner=account_owner or None,
max_tokens=16384,
timeout=240,
temperature=0.3, max_tokens=16384, timeout=240,
)
summary = _extract_reply((summary or "").strip())
if summary:
_c = _sql3.connect(SCHEDULED_DB)
_c.execute("""
@@ -811,19 +808,10 @@ async def _auto_summarize_pass_single(days_back: int = 1, account_id: str | None
_summaries_created += 1
_uid_text = uid.decode() if isinstance(uid, bytes) else str(uid)
_detail_lines.append(f"summary · {_folder}#{_uid_text} · {subject or '(no subject)'}{sender or '(unknown sender)'}")
else:
_summary_failed += 1
_uid_text = uid.decode() if isinstance(uid, bytes) else str(uid)
_detail_lines.append(f"summary empty · {_folder}#{_uid_text} · {subject or '(no subject)'}{sender or '(unknown sender)'}")
except Exception as e:
_summary_failed += 1
_uid_text = uid.decode() if isinstance(uid, bytes) else str(uid)
_detail_lines.append(f"summary failed · {_folder}#{_uid_text} · {subject or '(no subject)'}{sender or '(unknown sender)'}")
logger.warning(
"Auto-summary uid=%s failed %s",
_uid_text,
_email_summary_failure_log_detail(e),
)
logger.warning(f"Auto-summary {uid} failed: {e}")
if need_reply:
await _emit_progress(progress_cb, f"Drafting reply {processed + 1}/{_max_process} · checked {examined}/{len(uid_list)}")
@@ -1332,8 +1320,6 @@ async def _auto_summarize_pass_single(days_back: int = 1, account_id: str | None
parts.append(f"processed {processed} new")
if auto_sum:
parts.append(f"summarized {_summaries_created}")
if _summary_failed:
parts.append(f"{_summary_failed} summary failed")
if auto_reply_draft:
parts.append(f"drafted {_replies_drafted} repl" + ("y" if _replies_drafted == 1 else "ies"))
if _reply_failed:
+121 -241
View File
@@ -45,7 +45,6 @@ from src.upload_limits import read_upload_limited, EMAIL_COMPOSE_UPLOAD_MAX_BYTE
from routes.email_helpers import (
_strip_think, _extract_reply, _apply_email_style_mechanics, require_owner, require_user, _assert_owns_account,
_account_visible_to_owner,
_q, _attach_compose_uploads, _cleanup_compose_uploads,
_load_settings, _save_settings, _get_email_config,
_send_smtp_message, _smtp_security_mode,
@@ -58,8 +57,7 @@ from routes.email_helpers import (
_extract_attachment_to_disk, _extract_html, _extract_text,
_fetch_sender_thread_context, _pre_retrieve_context,
_EMAIL_REPLY_SYS_PROMPT_BASE, _POOL_HOOKS,
_friendly_email_auth_error, _email_summary_failure_log_detail,
_generate_email_summary, EMAIL_SUMMARY_ERROR_CODE, EMAIL_SUMMARY_ERROR_MESSAGE,
_friendly_email_auth_error,
SendEmailRequest, ExtractStyleRequest,
ATTACHMENTS_DIR, COMPOSE_UPLOADS_DIR, SCHEDULED_DB,
attachment_extract_dir, _email_cache_owner_clause, email_translation_body_hash,
@@ -196,64 +194,6 @@ def _coerce_port(value, default):
return None, f"Invalid port {value!r}; must be a whole number"
def _lock_email_account_owner_mutation(db, *owners: str) -> None:
"""Delegate account/default serialization to the shared DB primitive."""
from core.database import lock_email_account_owner_mutations
lock_email_account_owner_mutations(db, *owners)
def _email_account_owner_scope(query, owner: str):
"""Restrict a query to one normalized EmailAccount owner partition."""
from core.database import EmailAccount
from sqlalchemy import or_
if owner:
return query.filter(EmailAccount.owner == owner)
return query.filter(or_(EmailAccount.owner == None, EmailAccount.owner == "")) # noqa: E711
def _discover_email_account_mutation_scope(account_id: str, owner: str) -> str:
"""Read the initial lock key and fail closed before a mutation session."""
from core.database import EmailAccount, SessionLocal
db = SessionLocal()
try:
row = db.get(EmailAccount, account_id)
if row is None or (owner and not _account_visible_to_owner(row, owner)):
raise HTTPException(404, "Account not found")
return row.owner or ""
except HTTPException:
raise
except Exception as exc:
logger.error("Account-owner mutation check failed: %s", exc)
raise HTTPException(503, "Account check failed")
finally:
db.close()
def _lock_and_reload_email_account(db, account_id: str, owner: str, scope: str):
"""Lock, reload, and revalidate an account, retrying if its owner moved."""
from core.database import EmailAccount
owner_scopes = {scope or ""}
while True:
_lock_email_account_owner_mutation(db, *owner_scopes)
row = db.get(EmailAccount, account_id, populate_existing=True)
if row is None or (owner and not _account_visible_to_owner(row, owner)):
raise HTTPException(404, "Account not found")
current_scope = row.owner or ""
if current_scope in owner_scopes or db.get_bind().dialect.name == "sqlite":
return row
# The account changed owner after discovery but before lock acquisition.
# Release the partial lock set and reacquire all observed scopes in the
# shared helper's canonical order, then validate from the database again.
db.rollback()
owner_scopes.add(current_scope)
def _email_tag_owner_aliases(account_id: str | None, owner: str = "") -> list[str]:
aliases = [owner or ""]
try:
@@ -2920,22 +2860,13 @@ def setup_email_routes():
return indexed_response
return {"emails": [], "total": 0, "error": "Mail operation failed"}
def _read_email_sync(uid, folder, account_id, owner, mark_seen=False, full=False):
def _read_email_sync(uid, folder, account_id, owner, mark_seen=True, full=False):
"""Sync IMAP read — wrapped in to_thread by the async handler.
The normal reader path fetches the headers plus a bounded body prefix.
That avoids downloading multi-megabyte attachments just to open a
message. Full-message fetch remains available for flows that need
attachment metadata immediately, such as forwarding.
`mark_seen` defaults to False because it mutates provider state: it
selects the mailbox read-write and issues a STORE. Only a foreground
open should ask for it, and it has to ask explicitly.
A failed \\Seen transition is reported as `mark_seen_failed` on an
otherwise normal response, never as an error. The body has already been
fetched at that point, so refusing to return it would turn a cosmetic
flag failure into an unreadable message.
"""
import time as _t
_t0 = _t.monotonic()
@@ -2943,28 +2874,9 @@ def setup_email_routes():
preview_bytes = 384 * 1024
_t_select = 0.0
_t_fetch = 0.0
mark_seen_failed = False
try:
with _imap(account_id, owner=owner) as conn:
# A foreground open owns both the body fetch and the \Seen
# transition. Keep them on one read-write IMAP selection so the
# route never schedules a second connection that can race the
# response. Prefetch/read-only callers retain BODY.PEEK and a
# read-only mailbox selection.
try:
conn.select(_q(folder), readonly=not mark_seen)
except Exception as select_exc:
if not mark_seen:
raise
# Read-only mailboxes (shared archives, some provider
# folders) reject a read-write SELECT. Serve the message
# read-only and report the flag failure.
logger.warning(
f"read-write SELECT rejected for {folder!r}; "
f"serving read-only without \\Seen: {select_exc}"
)
conn.select(_q(folder), readonly=True)
mark_seen_failed = True
conn.select(_q(folder), readonly=True)
_t_select = _t.monotonic() - _t0
fetch_query = "(BODY.PEEK[])" if full else f"(BODY.PEEK[HEADER] BODY.PEEK[TEXT]<0.{preview_bytes}>)"
status, msg_data = _imap_uid_fetch(conn, uid, fetch_query)
@@ -2990,44 +2902,22 @@ def setup_email_routes():
header_part = msg_data[0][1] or b""
raw = header_part + b"\r\n" + text_part
# Parse the fetched payload before mutating provider state. If
# the message is malformed enough that the reader cannot build
# a response, the caller gets an error while the message stays
# unread instead of receiving a false optimistic rollback.
msg = email_mod.message_from_bytes(raw)
msg = email_mod.message_from_bytes(raw)
subject = _decode_header(msg.get("Subject", "(no subject)"))
sender = _decode_header(msg.get("From", "unknown"))
to = _decode_header(msg.get("To", ""))
cc = _decode_header(msg.get("Cc", ""))
date_str = msg.get("Date", "")
message_id = msg.get("Message-ID", "")
in_reply_to = msg.get("In-Reply-To", "")
references = msg.get("References", "")
body = _extract_text(msg)
body_html = _extract_html(msg)
sender_name, sender_addr = email.utils.parseaddr(sender)
parsed_date = email.utils.parsedate_to_datetime(date_str) if date_str else None
attachments = _list_attachments_from_msg(msg) if full else (_email_attachment_meta_cache_get(owner, account_id, folder, uid) or [])
if mark_seen and not mark_seen_failed:
seen_status, _ = conn.uid("STORE", _uid_bytes(uid), "+FLAGS", "(\\Seen)")
if seen_status != "OK":
# Report, don't raise. The parsed body below is still a
# valid response; only the flag claim is untrue.
logger.warning(
f"IMAP STORE \\Seen failed for UID {uid} in {folder!r}: {seen_status}"
)
mark_seen_failed = True
# Only record the local flag transition when the provider actually
# accepted it, so the index and list cache cannot drift ahead of
# the mailbox.
if mark_seen and not mark_seen_failed:
_email_index_update_flags(owner, account_id, folder, uid, "\\Seen", True)
_update_list_cache_seen(account_id, folder, uid, True)
subject = _decode_header(msg.get("Subject", "(no subject)"))
sender = _decode_header(msg.get("From", "unknown"))
to = _decode_header(msg.get("To", ""))
cc = _decode_header(msg.get("Cc", ""))
date_str = msg.get("Date", "")
message_id = msg.get("Message-ID", "")
in_reply_to = msg.get("In-Reply-To", "")
references = msg.get("References", "")
body = _extract_text(msg)
body_html = _extract_html(msg)
sender_name, sender_addr = email.utils.parseaddr(sender)
parsed_date = email.utils.parsedate_to_datetime(date_str) if date_str else None
attachments = _list_attachments_from_msg(msg) if full else (_email_attachment_meta_cache_get(owner, account_id, folder, uid) or [])
related_attachments = []
if full and not _has_visible_attachments(msg):
related_attachments = _related_thread_attachments_sync(
@@ -3148,29 +3038,20 @@ def setup_email_routes():
"boundaries": cached_boundaries,
"thread_turns": cached_turns,
"sender_signature": cached_sender_sig,
# Per-request, not part of the message: the route strips this
# before caching so a one-off flag failure is never replayed to
# later readers.
"mark_seen_failed": mark_seen_failed,
}
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"Failed to read email {uid}: {e}")
return {"error": "Mail operation failed"}
def _mark_email_seen_sync(uid, folder, account_id, owner):
"""Synchronously mark a cached email seen and report success."""
try:
with _imap(account_id, owner=owner) as conn:
conn.select(_q(folder), readonly=False)
status, _ = conn.uid("STORE", _uid_bytes(uid), "+FLAGS", "(\\Seen)")
if status != "OK":
return False
conn.select(_q(folder))
conn.uid("STORE", _uid_bytes(uid), "+FLAGS", "\\Seen")
_email_index_update_flags(owner, account_id, folder, uid, "\\Seen", True)
_update_list_cache_seen(account_id, folder, uid, True)
return True
except Exception as e:
logger.warning(f"mark-seen after cached read failed uid={uid}: {e}")
return False
logger.debug(f"mark-seen after cached read failed uid={uid}: {e}")
@router.get("/read/{uid}")
async def read_email_by_uid(
@@ -3196,32 +3077,32 @@ def setup_email_routes():
if cached.get("attachment_version") != EMAIL_READ_ATTACHMENT_VERSION:
cached = None
if cached is not None:
# A cache hit already holds a complete, valid message. Await the
# STORE so the response reports the real flag state, but never let
# a failed STORE withhold a body we are holding in memory.
if mark_seen and not await _asyncio.to_thread(
_mark_email_seen_sync, uid, folder, account_id, owner
):
return {**cached, "mark_seen_failed": True}
if mark_seen:
try:
_asyncio.create_task(_asyncio.to_thread(_mark_email_seen_sync, uid, folder, account_id, owner))
except RuntimeError:
pass
return cached
if not full:
persisted = _email_preview_cache_get(owner, account_id, folder, uid)
if persisted and persisted.get("attachment_version") == EMAIL_READ_ATTACHMENT_VERSION:
_read_cache_put(ck, persisted)
if mark_seen and not await _asyncio.to_thread(
_mark_email_seen_sync, uid, folder, account_id, owner
):
return {**persisted, "mark_seen_failed": True}
if mark_seen:
try:
_asyncio.create_task(_asyncio.to_thread(_mark_email_seen_sync, uid, folder, account_id, owner))
except RuntimeError:
pass
return persisted
result = await _asyncio.to_thread(_read_email_sync, uid, folder, account_id, owner, mark_seen, full)
if result and not result.get("error"):
# `mark_seen_failed` describes this request, not the message, so it
# must not enter either cache — a later reader would otherwise be
# told a STORE failed that it never issued.
cacheable = {k: v for k, v in result.items() if k != "mark_seen_failed"}
_read_cache_put(ck, cacheable)
_read_cache_put(ck, result)
if not full:
_email_preview_cache_put(owner, account_id, folder, uid, cacheable)
_email_preview_cache_put(owner, account_id, folder, uid, result)
if mark_seen:
try:
_asyncio.create_task(_asyncio.to_thread(_mark_email_seen_sync, uid, folder, account_id, owner))
except RuntimeError:
pass
return result
def _schedule_recent_email_warm(emails: list, folder: str, account_id: str | None, owner: str):
@@ -4885,6 +4766,8 @@ def setup_email_routes():
"""Generate a quick AI summary of an email body."""
try:
from src.endpoint_resolver import resolve_endpoint
from src.llm_core import _uses_max_completion_tokens, _restricts_temperature
import requests as _req
body = data.get("body", "")
subject = data.get("subject", "")
@@ -4895,11 +4778,7 @@ def setup_email_routes():
if account_id:
_assert_owns_account(account_id, owner)
if not body:
return {
"success": False,
"error": "No body provided",
"error_code": "email_summary_missing_body",
}
return {"success": False, "error": "No body provided"}
# If we know which UID this is, fetch the raw message and pull
# attachment text so the summary can reference invoice totals,
@@ -4928,43 +4807,53 @@ def setup_email_routes():
if not url:
url, model, headers = resolve_endpoint("default", owner=owner)
if not url or not model:
return {
"success": False,
"error": "No model configured for email summaries",
"error_code": "email_summary_not_configured",
}
return {"success": False, "error": "No LLM endpoint configured"}
req_headers = {"Content-Type": "application/json"}
if headers:
req_headers.update(headers)
try:
content = await _generate_email_summary(
url=url,
model=model,
sender=sender,
subject=subject,
body_for_llm=body_for_llm,
headers=req_headers,
max_tokens=8192,
timeout=180,
)
except Exception as e:
logger.warning(
"Email summary LLM call failed %s",
_email_summary_failure_log_detail(e),
)
return {
"success": False,
"error": EMAIL_SUMMARY_ERROR_MESSAGE,
"error_code": EMAIL_SUMMARY_ERROR_CODE,
}
tok_key = "max_completion_tokens" if _uses_max_completion_tokens(model) else "max_tokens"
payload = {
"model": model,
"messages": [
{"role": "system", "content": "You are an email summarizer. Format: 1-3 short bullet points (use '- '). Cover: main point, action items, deadlines. If the email has attachments (marked '--- ATTACHMENTS ---'), USE THEIR CONTENTS — pull invoice totals, deadlines, key clauses, concrete numbers/dates from PDFs/docs into the bullets. Be terse.\n\nOUTPUT FORMAT: Put ONLY the bullet points between these exact markers, each on its own line:\n<<<SUMMARY>>>\n- ...\n<<<END>>>\nAny reasoning must come BEFORE <<<SUMMARY>>> (ideally inside <think>...</think>). Only the text between the markers is kept."},
{"role": "user", "content": f"From: {sender}\nSubject: {subject}\n\n{body_for_llm[:12000]}\n\n---\n\nSummarize the email. Output the bullets between <<<SUMMARY>>> and <<<END>>>."},
],
tok_key: 8192,
"temperature": 0.3,
"stream": False,
}
# Reasoning models (o1/o3/o4/gpt-5) reject an explicit temperature.
if _restricts_temperature(model):
payload.pop("temperature", None)
resp = await asyncio.to_thread(
_req.post, url, json=payload, headers=req_headers, timeout=180
)
if not resp.ok:
return {"success": False, "error": f"LLM HTTP {resp.status_code}"}
rdata = resp.json()
msg = (rdata.get("choices") or [{}])[0].get("message", {})
content = (msg.get("content") or "").strip()
content = _extract_reply(content)
if not content:
return {
"success": False,
"error": "The model returned an empty summary",
"error_code": "email_summary_empty",
}
# Model put everything in reasoning_content — extract bullet points
rc = (msg.get("reasoning_content") or "").strip()
# Find bullet-point style output (lines starting with -, •, *, or numbered)
bullet_lines = []
for line in rc.split("\n"):
stripped = line.strip()
if re.match(r"^[-•*]\s+|^\d+[.)]\s+", stripped):
bullet_lines.append(stripped)
if bullet_lines:
content = "\n".join(bullet_lines)
else:
# Last resort: take the last paragraph
paragraphs = [p.strip() for p in rc.split("\n\n") if p.strip()]
content = paragraphs[-1] if paragraphs else rc[:500]
if not content:
return {"success": False, "error": "Empty response from model"}
# Cache the summary if we have a message_id
mid = data.get("message_id", "")
@@ -4987,15 +4876,8 @@ def setup_email_routes():
return {"success": True, "summary": content, "model_used": model}
except Exception as e:
logger.error(
"Email summary route failed %s",
_email_summary_failure_log_detail(e),
)
return {
"success": False,
"error": EMAIL_SUMMARY_ERROR_MESSAGE,
"error_code": EMAIL_SUMMARY_ERROR_CODE,
}
logger.error(f"Failed to summarize: {e}")
return {"success": False, "error": "Mail operation failed"}
@router.post("/translate")
async def translate_email(data: dict, owner: str = Depends(require_owner)):
@@ -5004,6 +4886,7 @@ def setup_email_routes():
from src.endpoint_resolver import (
resolve_endpoint,
resolve_utility_fallback_candidates,
resolve_chat_fallback_candidates,
)
from src.llm_core import llm_call_async_with_fallback
@@ -5065,6 +4948,8 @@ def setup_email_routes():
pass
for cand in resolve_utility_fallback_candidates(owner=owner) or []:
_add(*cand)
for cand in resolve_chat_fallback_candidates(owner=owner) or []:
_add(*cand)
if not candidates:
return {"success": False, "error": "No LLM endpoint configured"}
@@ -5324,11 +5209,13 @@ def setup_email_routes():
# Build a candidate chain so a stale session-stored API key
# (the most common cause of "authentication failed" here)
# doesn't kill AI Reply outright — fall through to the
# user's Utility / Default endpoints and active Utility fallback
# chain. Dedupe by url+model so we don't retry the same endpoint.
# user's Utility / Default endpoints AND their configured
# fallback chains. Dedupe by url+model so we don't retry
# the same broken endpoint.
from src.llm_core import llm_call_async_with_fallback
from src.endpoint_resolver import (
resolve_utility_fallback_candidates,
resolve_chat_fallback_candidates,
)
_seen = set()
_candidates = []
@@ -5353,9 +5240,11 @@ def setup_email_routes():
_add(_d_url, _d_model, _d_headers)
except Exception:
pass
# Active Utility fallbacks last.
# Configured fallback chains last.
for cand in resolve_utility_fallback_candidates(owner=owner) or []:
_add(*cand)
for cand in resolve_chat_fallback_candidates(owner=owner) or []:
_add(*cand)
_messages = [
{"role": "system", "content": system_prompt},
{"role": "user", "content": user_msg},
@@ -5539,9 +5428,9 @@ def setup_email_routes():
import uuid as _uuid
db = SessionLocal()
try:
_lock_email_account_owner_mutation(db, owner)
q = db.query(EmailAccount).filter(EmailAccount.is_default == True) # noqa: E712
q = _email_account_owner_scope(q, owner)
if owner:
q = q.filter(EmailAccount.owner == owner)
row = q.first()
if row is None:
row = EmailAccount(id=_uuid.uuid4().hex, owner=owner, name="Default", is_default=True, enabled=True)
@@ -5567,7 +5456,8 @@ def setup_email_routes():
if data.get("smtp_password"):
row.smtp_password = _enc(data["smtp_password"])
clear_q = db.query(EmailAccount).filter(EmailAccount.id != row.id)
clear_q = _email_account_owner_scope(clear_q, owner)
if owner:
clear_q = clear_q.filter(EmailAccount.owner == owner)
clear_q.update({EmailAccount.is_default: False})
db.commit()
finally:
@@ -5662,7 +5552,6 @@ def setup_email_routes():
return {"ok": False, "error": port_err}
db = SessionLocal()
try:
_lock_email_account_owner_mutation(db, owner)
row = EmailAccount(
id=_uuid.uuid4().hex,
name=name,
@@ -5689,7 +5578,9 @@ def setup_email_routes():
# the one-default invariant — but scope it to THIS user's accounts,
# otherwise creating a default would clear every other user's
# default flag too.
scope_q = _email_account_owner_scope(db.query(EmailAccount), owner)
scope_q = db.query(EmailAccount)
if owner:
scope_q = scope_q.filter(EmailAccount.owner == owner)
existing_count = scope_q.count()
if row.is_default or existing_count == 0:
scope_q.update({EmailAccount.is_default: False})
@@ -5740,39 +5631,28 @@ def setup_email_routes():
@router.delete("/accounts/{account_id}")
async def delete_email_account(account_id: str, owner: str = Depends(require_user)):
initial_scope = _discover_email_account_mutation_scope(account_id, owner)
_assert_owns_account(account_id, owner)
from core.database import SessionLocal, EmailAccount
db = SessionLocal()
try:
row = _lock_and_reload_email_account(
db, account_id, owner, initial_scope
)
row_scope = row.owner or ""
row = db.get(EmailAccount, account_id)
if not row:
return {"ok": False, "error": "Account not found"}
was_default = bool(row.is_default)
db.delete(row)
# Flush the removal before staging a replacement default. The
# partial unique index is checked statement-by-statement, and the
# ORM is otherwise free to UPDATE the promoted row before DELETE.
db.flush()
db.commit()
# If the deleted row was default, promote the next-oldest enabled
# row owned by THIS user. Without the owner filter we'd promote
# another user's account and the deleter would silently inherit
# it as their default.
if was_default:
promote_q = db.query(EmailAccount).filter(
EmailAccount.id != account_id,
EmailAccount.enabled == True, # noqa: E712
)
promote_q = _email_account_owner_scope(promote_q, row_scope)
promote = promote_q.order_by(
EmailAccount.created_at.asc(), EmailAccount.id.asc()
).first()
promote_q = db.query(EmailAccount).filter(EmailAccount.enabled == True) # noqa: E712
if owner:
promote_q = promote_q.filter(EmailAccount.owner == owner)
promote = promote_q.order_by(EmailAccount.created_at.asc()).first()
if promote:
promote.is_default = True
# Deletion and any replacement promotion are one durable state
# transition, so another worker can never observe or race the old
# split-commit gap.
db.commit()
db.commit()
return {"ok": True}
finally:
db.close()
@@ -5985,18 +5865,18 @@ def setup_email_routes():
@router.post("/accounts/{account_id}/set-default")
async def set_default_account(account_id: str, owner: str = Depends(require_user)):
initial_scope = _discover_email_account_mutation_scope(account_id, owner)
_assert_owns_account(account_id, owner)
from core.database import SessionLocal, EmailAccount
db = SessionLocal()
try:
row = _lock_and_reload_email_account(
db, account_id, owner, initial_scope
)
# Scope the sweep to the target row's normalized owner partition;
# this also handles visible legacy NULL/empty-owner accounts.
clear_q = _email_account_owner_scope(
db.query(EmailAccount), row.owner or ""
)
row = db.get(EmailAccount, account_id)
if not row:
return {"ok": False, "error": "Account not found"}
# SECURITY: scope the "clear other defaults" sweep to this user's
# accounts so we don't unset another user's default flag.
clear_q = db.query(EmailAccount)
if owner:
clear_q = clear_q.filter(EmailAccount.owner == owner)
clear_q.update({EmailAccount.is_default: False})
row.is_default = True
db.commit()
@@ -6015,7 +5895,7 @@ def setup_email_routes():
raise HTTPException(400, "GOOGLE_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID not set — add it to .env")
redirect_uri = (
os.environ.get("GOOGLE_OAUTH_REDIRECT_URI")
or f"{request.url.scheme}://{request.headers.get('host', 'localhost:7000')}/api/email/oauth/google/callback"
or f"http://{request.headers.get('host', 'localhost:7000')}/api/email/oauth/google/callback"
)
state = make_oauth_state(account_id, owner)
params = urllib.parse.urlencode({
@@ -6052,7 +5932,7 @@ def setup_email_routes():
client_secret = os.environ.get("GOOGLE_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET", "")
redirect_uri = (
os.environ.get("GOOGLE_OAUTH_REDIRECT_URI")
or f"{request.url.scheme}://{request.headers.get('host', 'localhost:7000')}/api/email/oauth/google/callback"
or f"http://{request.headers.get('host', 'localhost:7000')}/api/email/oauth/google/callback"
)
import httpx as _httpx
try:
+8 -21
View File
@@ -127,25 +127,6 @@ def _load_grounding_backend():
return cached
def _model_input_to_device(value, device: str, torch):
if not hasattr(value, "to"):
return value
if (
device == "mps"
and hasattr(torch, "float64")
and getattr(value, "dtype", None) == torch.float64
):
return value.to(device=device, dtype=torch.float32)
return value.to(device)
def _model_inputs_to_device(inputs, device: str, torch) -> Dict[str, Any]:
return {
key: _model_input_to_device(value, device, torch)
for key, value in inputs.items()
}
def _ground_text_to_box(image, text: str, *, threshold: float = 0.05):
query = (text or "").strip()
if not query:
@@ -161,7 +142,10 @@ def _ground_text_to_box(image, text: str, *, threshold: float = 0.05):
labels.append(f"a photo of {query}")
try:
inputs = processor(text=[labels], images=image, return_tensors="pt")
model_inputs = _model_inputs_to_device(inputs, device, torch)
model_inputs = {
k: (v.to(device) if hasattr(v, "to") else v)
for k, v in inputs.items()
}
with torch.no_grad():
outputs = model(**model_inputs)
target_sizes = torch.tensor([[image.height, image.width]])
@@ -1885,7 +1869,10 @@ def setup_gallery_routes() -> APIRouter:
try:
inputs = processor(image, **kwargs)
model_inputs = _model_inputs_to_device(inputs, device, torch)
model_inputs = {
k: (v.to(device) if hasattr(v, "to") else v)
for k, v in inputs.items()
}
with torch.no_grad():
outputs = model(**model_inputs)
masks = processor.image_processor.post_process_masks(
+58 -16
View File
@@ -137,6 +137,44 @@ def setup_history_routes(session_manager, upload_handler=None) -> APIRouter:
entry["metadata"] = meta
return entry
def _db_message_metadata(m: DbChatMessage) -> Dict[str, Any]:
meta = {}
if m.meta_data:
try:
meta = json.loads(m.meta_data) or {}
except (json.JSONDecodeError, ValueError):
meta = {}
if m.timestamp and "timestamp" not in meta:
meta["timestamp"] = m.timestamp.isoformat() + "Z"
return meta
def _hydrate_session_history_from_db(session_id: str, rows: list[DbChatMessage]) -> None:
"""Rebuild in-memory context from raw DB rows after a history load.
The browser history endpoint can return paged/display-trimmed messages,
but the next model call reads ``session.history``. After a restart or a
stale in-memory session, selecting an old chat through the paged endpoint
used to show the transcript while the model only saw fresh context.
"""
if not rows:
return
try:
session = session_manager.get_session(session_id)
except KeyError:
return
session.history = [
ChatMessage(role=m.role, content=m.content, metadata=_db_message_metadata(m) or None)
for m in rows
]
session.message_count = len(session.history)
def _session_needs_db_history_hydration(session_id: str, total: int) -> bool:
try:
session = session_manager.get_session(session_id)
except KeyError:
return False
return len(session.history or []) < int(total or 0)
@router.get("/api/history/{session_id}")
async def get_session_history(
request: Request,
@@ -160,8 +198,6 @@ def setup_history_routes(session_manager, upload_handler=None) -> APIRouter:
)
page_offset = int(offset) if offset is not None else max(total - page_limit, 0)
page_offset = max(0, min(page_offset, total))
# Keep display pagination page-scoped. ``get_session`` is the
# full model-context hydration seam and must not be entered here.
rows = (
db.query(DbChatMessage)
.filter(DbChatMessage.session_id == session_id)
@@ -170,6 +206,14 @@ def setup_history_routes(session_manager, upload_handler=None) -> APIRouter:
.limit(page_limit)
.all()
)
if _session_needs_db_history_hydration(session_id, total):
full_rows = (
db.query(DbChatMessage)
.filter(DbChatMessage.session_id == session_id)
.order_by(DbChatMessage.timestamp)
.all()
)
_hydrate_session_history_from_db(session_id, full_rows)
history_dict = [
entry for entry in (_db_history_entry(m) for m in rows)
if not (entry.get("metadata") or {}).get("hidden")
@@ -214,10 +258,7 @@ def setup_history_routes(session_manager, upload_handler=None) -> APIRouter:
entry["metadata"] = msg["metadata"]
history_dict.append(entry)
# Fallback: load from DB if in-memory renders empty. Display only —
# get_session above is the hydration seam, so nothing here writes back
# into session.history — rebuilding it from raw rows would overwrite
# parsed multimodal content and the _db_id edit/delete keys it just set.
# Fallback: load from DB if in-memory is empty
if not history_dict:
db = SessionLocal()
try:
@@ -227,10 +268,17 @@ def setup_history_routes(session_manager, upload_handler=None) -> APIRouter:
.order_by(DbChatMessage.timestamp)
.all()
)
db_history = []
for m in db_messages:
db_history.append(_db_history_entry(m))
if db_history:
# Rebuild in-memory history from the full set so hidden
# messages (e.g. compaction summaries) are kept for AI context.
_hydrate_session_history_from_db(session_id, db_messages)
# Response excludes hidden messages, matching the in-memory path.
history_dict = [
entry for entry in (_db_history_entry(m) for m in db_messages)
if not (entry.get("metadata") or {}).get("hidden")
m for m in db_history
if not (m.get("metadata") or {}).get("hidden")
]
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"DB fallback failed for {session_id}: {e}")
@@ -597,14 +645,8 @@ def setup_history_routes(session_manager, upload_handler=None) -> APIRouter:
body = await request.json()
keep_count = body.get("keep_count", 0)
# Get the source session. keep_count indexes into source.history,
# so this must go through get_session — reading the cache directly
# forks an empty transcript out of a metadata-only session after a
# restart (display pagination no longer hydrates it).
try:
source = session_manager.get_session(session_id)
except KeyError:
raise HTTPException(404, "Session not found")
# Get the source session
source = session_manager.sessions.get(session_id)
if not source:
raise HTTPException(404, "Session not found")
-5
View File
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
"""MCP route domain package (slice 2o, #4082/#4071).
Contains mcp_routes.py, migrated from the flat routes/ directory.
Backward-compat shim at routes/mcp_routes.py re-exports from here.
"""
-697
View File
@@ -1,697 +0,0 @@
# routes/mcp_routes.py
"""MCP (Model Context Protocol) server management routes."""
import json
import os
import uuid
import urllib.parse
import html
from pathlib import Path
from fastapi import APIRouter, Form, HTTPException, Request
from fastapi.responses import RedirectResponse, HTMLResponse
import logging
import httpx
from core.database import McpServer, SessionLocal
from core.middleware import require_admin
from src.constants import DATA_DIR, MCP_OAUTH_DIR
from src.mcp_manager import McpManager
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
router = APIRouter(prefix="/api/mcp", tags=["mcp"])
def _mcp_oauth_base_dir() -> Path:
"""Directory that may contain OAuth files managed by Odysseus."""
return Path(MCP_OAUTH_DIR).resolve(strict=False)
def _resolve_mcp_oauth_path(raw_path, field_name: str) -> str:
"""Resolve an MCP OAuth path and keep it under DATA_DIR/mcp_oauth."""
raw = str(raw_path or "").strip()
if not raw:
return ""
base = _mcp_oauth_base_dir()
path = Path(os.path.expanduser(raw))
if not path.is_absolute():
path = base / path
resolved = path.resolve(strict=False)
try:
resolved.relative_to(base)
except ValueError as exc:
raise HTTPException(
400,
f"Invalid OAuth {field_name}: path must stay under {base}",
) from exc
return str(resolved)
def _sanitize_mcp_oauth_config(oauth_cfg):
"""Return an OAuth config copy with file paths confined to mcp_oauth."""
if not oauth_cfg:
return oauth_cfg
if not isinstance(oauth_cfg, dict):
return {}
sanitized = dict(oauth_cfg)
for field_name in ("keys_file", "token_file"):
if sanitized.get(field_name):
sanitized[field_name] = _resolve_mcp_oauth_path(
sanitized[field_name],
field_name,
)
return sanitized
def _mcp_oauth_token_missing(oauth_cfg, *, strict: bool = True) -> bool:
"""Check token existence without letting legacy bad paths break listing."""
if not isinstance(oauth_cfg, dict):
return False
try:
token_file = _resolve_mcp_oauth_path(oauth_cfg.get("token_file", ""), "token_file")
except HTTPException:
if strict:
raise
logger.warning("Ignoring MCP OAuth config with unsafe token_file")
return True
return bool(token_file and not os.path.exists(token_file))
def _apply_mcp_oauth_env(env: dict, oauth_cfg) -> None:
"""Pass sanitized Gmail package paths to MCP servers that honor them."""
if not oauth_cfg or not isinstance(env, dict):
return
keys_file = oauth_cfg.get("keys_file")
token_file = oauth_cfg.get("token_file")
if keys_file:
env["GMAIL_OAUTH_PATH"] = keys_file
if token_file:
env["GMAIL_CREDENTIALS_PATH"] = token_file
def _load_disabled_map():
"""Load per-server disabled tool sets from DB."""
db = SessionLocal()
try:
disabled_map = {}
for srv in db.query(McpServer).all():
if srv.disabled_tools:
try:
names = json.loads(srv.disabled_tools)
if names:
disabled_map[srv.id] = set(names)
except (json.JSONDecodeError, TypeError):
pass
return disabled_map
finally:
db.close()
def _mcp_oauth_redirect_uri() -> str:
"""Shared callback URL for legacy Google and generic MCP OAuth flows."""
from src.mcp_oauth import REDIRECT_URI
return REDIRECT_URI
def setup_mcp_routes(mcp_manager: McpManager):
"""Setup MCP routes with the provided manager."""
@router.get("/servers")
def list_servers(request: Request):
"""List all configured MCP servers with connection status."""
require_admin(request)
db = SessionLocal()
try:
servers = db.query(McpServer).all()
result = []
for srv in servers:
status = mcp_manager.get_server_status(srv.id)
oauth_cfg = json.loads(srv.oauth_config) if srv.oauth_config else None
needs_oauth = False
if oauth_cfg:
needs_oauth = _mcp_oauth_token_missing(oauth_cfg, strict=False)
disabled_list = json.loads(srv.disabled_tools) if srv.disabled_tools else []
total_tools = status.get("tool_count", 0)
result.append({
"id": srv.id,
"name": srv.name,
"transport": srv.transport,
"command": srv.command,
"args": json.loads(srv.args) if srv.args else [],
"env": json.loads(srv.env) if srv.env else {},
"url": srv.url,
"is_enabled": srv.is_enabled,
"status": status.get("status", "disconnected"),
"tool_count": total_tools,
"disabled_tool_count": len(disabled_list),
"enabled_tool_count": max(0, total_tools - len(disabled_list)),
"error": status.get("error"),
"auth_url": status.get("auth_url"),
"has_oauth": oauth_cfg is not None,
"needs_oauth": needs_oauth,
})
return result
finally:
db.close()
@router.post("/servers")
async def add_server(
request: Request,
name: str = Form(...),
transport: str = Form("stdio"),
command: str = Form(None),
args: str = Form("[]"),
env: str = Form("{}"),
url: str = Form(None),
oauth_file: str = Form(None),
oauth_config: str = Form(None),
):
"""Add a new MCP server config and attempt connection. Admin-only:
registering a stdio server is equivalent to executing arbitrary
binaries on the host."""
require_admin(request)
server_id = str(uuid.uuid4())[:8]
# Validate
if transport == "stdio" and not command:
raise HTTPException(400, "command is required for stdio transport")
if transport == "sse" and not url:
raise HTTPException(400, "url is required for SSE transport")
if transport == "http" and not url:
raise HTTPException(400, "url is required for HTTP transport")
# Parse JSON fields
try:
parsed_args = json.loads(args) if args else []
except json.JSONDecodeError:
parsed_args = []
try:
parsed_env = json.loads(env) if env else {}
except json.JSONDecodeError:
parsed_env = {}
if not isinstance(parsed_env, dict):
parsed_env = {}
# Parse OAuth config
parsed_oauth_config = None
if oauth_config:
try:
parsed_oauth_config = _sanitize_mcp_oauth_config(json.loads(oauth_config))
except json.JSONDecodeError:
pass
_apply_mcp_oauth_env(parsed_env, parsed_oauth_config)
# Write OAuth credentials file if provided (for Google MCP servers)
logger.info(f"MCP add_server: oauth_file={oauth_file!r}")
if oauth_file:
try:
oauth_data = json.loads(oauth_file)
oauth_dir = _resolve_mcp_oauth_path(oauth_data.get("dir", ""), "dir")
oauth_filename = oauth_data.get("filename", "")
client_id = oauth_data.get("client_id", "")
client_secret = oauth_data.get("client_secret", "")
if oauth_dir and oauth_filename and client_id and client_secret:
filepath = _resolve_mcp_oauth_path(
Path(oauth_dir) / str(oauth_filename),
"filename",
)
os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(filepath), exist_ok=True)
creds = {
"installed": {
"client_id": client_id,
"client_secret": client_secret,
"redirect_uris": ["http://localhost"],
"auth_uri": "https://accounts.google.com/o/oauth2/auth",
"token_uri": "https://accounts.google.com/o/oauth2/token",
}
}
with open(filepath, "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:
json.dump(creds, f, indent=2)
logger.info(f"Wrote OAuth credentials to {filepath}")
parsed_env.pop("GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID", None)
parsed_env.pop("GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET", None)
except (json.JSONDecodeError, OSError) as e:
logger.warning(f"Failed to write OAuth file: {e}")
# Save to DB
db = SessionLocal()
try:
srv = McpServer(
id=server_id,
name=name,
transport=transport,
command=command,
args=json.dumps(parsed_args),
env=json.dumps(parsed_env),
url=url,
is_enabled=True,
oauth_config=json.dumps(parsed_oauth_config) if parsed_oauth_config else None,
)
db.add(srv)
db.commit()
finally:
db.close()
# Check if OAuth token already exists — skip connection attempt if not
needs_oauth = False
if parsed_oauth_config:
needs_oauth = _mcp_oauth_token_missing(parsed_oauth_config)
connected = False
if not needs_oauth:
connected = await mcp_manager.connect_server(
server_id=server_id,
name=name,
transport=transport,
command=command,
args=parsed_args,
env=parsed_env,
url=url,
)
status = mcp_manager.get_server_status(server_id)
needs_auth = status.get("status") == "needs_auth"
return {
"id": server_id,
"name": name,
"connected": connected,
"status": "needs_oauth" if needs_oauth else status.get("status", "disconnected"),
"tool_count": status.get("tool_count", 0),
"error": "OAuth authorization required" if needs_oauth else status.get("error"),
"needs_oauth": needs_oauth,
"needs_auth": needs_auth,
"auth_url": status.get("auth_url"),
}
@router.post("/servers/{server_id}/reconnect")
async def reconnect_server(server_id: str, request: Request):
"""Reconnect to an MCP server."""
require_admin(request)
db = SessionLocal()
try:
srv = db.query(McpServer).filter(McpServer.id == server_id).first()
if not srv:
raise HTTPException(404, "Server not found")
await mcp_manager.disconnect_server(server_id)
args = json.loads(srv.args) if srv.args else []
env = json.loads(srv.env) if srv.env else {}
connected = await mcp_manager.connect_server(
server_id=server_id,
name=srv.name,
transport=srv.transport,
command=srv.command,
args=args,
env=env,
url=srv.url,
)
status = mcp_manager.get_server_status(server_id)
return {
"connected": connected,
"status": status.get("status", "disconnected"),
"tool_count": status.get("tool_count", 0),
"error": status.get("error"),
"auth_url": status.get("auth_url"),
"needs_auth": status.get("status") == "needs_auth",
}
finally:
db.close()
@router.patch("/servers/{server_id}")
async def toggle_server(server_id: str, request: Request, is_enabled: str = Form(...)):
"""Enable or disable an MCP server."""
require_admin(request)
db = SessionLocal()
try:
srv = db.query(McpServer).filter(McpServer.id == server_id).first()
if not srv:
raise HTTPException(404, "Server not found")
enabled = str(is_enabled).lower() == "true"
srv.is_enabled = enabled
db.commit()
if enabled:
args = json.loads(srv.args) if srv.args else []
env = json.loads(srv.env) if srv.env else {}
await mcp_manager.connect_server(
server_id=server_id,
name=srv.name,
transport=srv.transport,
command=srv.command,
args=args,
env=env,
url=srv.url,
)
else:
await mcp_manager.disconnect_server(server_id)
return {"id": server_id, "is_enabled": enabled}
finally:
db.close()
@router.delete("/servers/{server_id}")
async def delete_server(server_id: str, request: Request):
"""Remove an MCP server."""
require_admin(request)
db = SessionLocal()
try:
srv = db.query(McpServer).filter(McpServer.id == server_id).first()
if not srv:
raise HTTPException(404, "Server not found")
await mcp_manager.disconnect_server(server_id)
db.delete(srv)
db.commit()
return {"status": "deleted"}
finally:
db.close()
@router.get("/tools")
def list_tools(request: Request):
"""List all discovered MCP tools across all connected servers."""
require_admin(request)
disabled_map = _load_disabled_map()
return mcp_manager.get_all_tools(disabled_map)
@router.get("/servers/{server_id}/tools")
def list_server_tools(server_id: str, request: Request):
"""List all tools for a specific MCP server with enabled/disabled state."""
require_admin(request)
db = SessionLocal()
try:
srv = db.query(McpServer).filter(McpServer.id == server_id).first()
if not srv:
raise HTTPException(404, "Server not found")
disabled_list = json.loads(srv.disabled_tools) if srv.disabled_tools else []
disabled_set = set(disabled_list)
finally:
db.close()
all_tools = mcp_manager.get_all_tools()
server_tools = [t for t in all_tools if t["server_id"] == server_id]
for t in server_tools:
t["is_disabled"] = t["name"] in disabled_set
return server_tools
@router.patch("/servers/{server_id}/tools")
async def update_disabled_tools(server_id: str, request: Request):
"""Bulk update disabled tools list for a server.
Expects JSON body: {"disabled": ["tool_name_1", "tool_name_2"]}
"""
require_admin(request)
db = SessionLocal()
try:
srv = db.query(McpServer).filter(McpServer.id == server_id).first()
if not srv:
raise HTTPException(404, "Server not found")
body = await request.json()
disabled = body.get("disabled", [])
if not isinstance(disabled, list):
raise HTTPException(400, "disabled must be a list of tool names")
srv.disabled_tools = json.dumps(disabled) if disabled else None
db.commit()
return {"id": server_id, "disabled_count": len(disabled)}
finally:
db.close()
# ── OAuth flow for Google MCP servers ──────────────────────────
@router.get("/oauth/authorize/{server_id}")
def oauth_authorize(server_id: str, request: Request):
"""Show OAuth authorization page with Google sign-in link."""
require_admin(request)
db = SessionLocal()
try:
srv = db.query(McpServer).filter(McpServer.id == server_id).first()
if not srv:
raise HTTPException(404, "Server not found")
if not srv.oauth_config:
raise HTTPException(400, "Server has no OAuth config")
oauth_cfg = _sanitize_mcp_oauth_config(json.loads(srv.oauth_config))
keys_file = oauth_cfg.get("keys_file", "")
if not keys_file or not os.path.exists(keys_file):
raise HTTPException(400, "OAuth keys file not found")
with open(keys_file, encoding="utf-8") as f:
keys_data = json.load(f)
keys = keys_data.get("installed") or keys_data.get("web")
if not keys:
raise HTTPException(400, "Invalid OAuth keys file format")
client_id = keys["client_id"]
scopes = oauth_cfg.get("scopes", [])
# For Desktop App creds, default to localhost — the user will
# paste the resulting URL back if they're on a different device.
redirect_uri = _mcp_oauth_redirect_uri()
params = {
"client_id": client_id,
"redirect_uri": redirect_uri,
"response_type": "code",
"scope": " ".join(scopes),
"access_type": "offline",
"prompt": "consent",
"state": server_id,
}
auth_url = "https://accounts.google.com/o/oauth2/v2/auth?" + urllib.parse.urlencode(params)
# Determine if user is accessing from the same machine
host = request.headers.get("host", "")
is_local = host.startswith("localhost") or host.startswith("127.0.0.1")
if is_local:
# Same machine — just redirect, callback will work directly
return RedirectResponse(auth_url)
else:
# Remote device — show paste-back page
return HTMLResponse(_oauth_authorize_page(auth_url, server_id, host, redirect_uri))
finally:
db.close()
@router.get("/oauth/callback")
async def oauth_callback(code: str, state: str, request: Request):
"""Handle OAuth callback. Generic MCP OAuth flows resolve via the
pending-state registry; Google flows fall through to the legacy path."""
require_admin(request)
from src.mcp_oauth import resolve_pending
if resolve_pending(state, code):
return HTMLResponse(_oauth_result_page(
"Authorization Successful",
"The MCP server is connecting. You can close this window and return to Odysseus.",
success=True,
))
# Legacy Google path: state is the server_id
return await _exchange_and_connect(state, code, request)
@router.post("/oauth/exchange/{server_id}")
async def oauth_exchange(server_id: str, request: Request, callback_url: str = Form(...)):
"""Manual code exchange — user pastes the callback URL from their browser."""
require_admin(request)
try:
parsed = urllib.parse.urlparse(callback_url)
params = urllib.parse.parse_qs(parsed.query)
code = params.get("code", [None])[0]
if not code:
return HTMLResponse(_oauth_result_page("Error", "No authorization code found in the URL. Make sure you copied the full URL from your browser."), status_code=400)
except Exception:
return HTMLResponse(_oauth_result_page("Error", "Invalid URL format."), status_code=400)
# Generic MCP OAuth: if the pasted URL carries a state we are waiting on,
# resolve it directly (the background connect finishes the handshake).
state = params.get("state", [None])[0]
from src.mcp_oauth import resolve_pending
if state and resolve_pending(state, code):
return HTMLResponse(_oauth_result_page(
"Authorization Successful",
"The MCP server is connecting. You can close this window and return to Odysseus.",
success=True,
))
return await _exchange_and_connect(server_id, code, request)
async def _exchange_and_connect(server_id: str, code: str, request: Request):
"""Exchange auth code for tokens and connect the MCP server."""
db = SessionLocal()
try:
srv = db.query(McpServer).filter(McpServer.id == server_id).first()
if not srv:
return HTMLResponse(_oauth_result_page("Error", "Server not found."), status_code=404)
if not srv.oauth_config:
return HTMLResponse(_oauth_result_page("Error", "No OAuth config."), status_code=400)
oauth_cfg = _sanitize_mcp_oauth_config(json.loads(srv.oauth_config))
keys_file = oauth_cfg.get("keys_file", "")
token_file = oauth_cfg.get("token_file", "")
if not keys_file or not token_file:
raise HTTPException(400, "OAuth keys/token file not configured")
with open(keys_file, encoding="utf-8") as f:
keys_data = json.load(f)
keys = keys_data.get("installed") or keys_data.get("web")
client_id = keys["client_id"]
client_secret = keys["client_secret"]
redirect_uri = _mcp_oauth_redirect_uri()
async with httpx.AsyncClient() as client:
resp = await client.post(
"https://oauth2.googleapis.com/token",
data={
"code": code,
"client_id": client_id,
"client_secret": client_secret,
"redirect_uri": redirect_uri,
"grant_type": "authorization_code",
},
)
if resp.status_code != 200:
err = resp.text
logger.error(f"OAuth token exchange failed: {err}")
return HTMLResponse(_oauth_result_page("Authorization Failed", f"Google returned an error: {err}"), status_code=400)
tokens = resp.json()
logger.info(f"OAuth tokens received for server {server_id}")
# Save tokens to the file the MCP package expects
os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(token_file), exist_ok=True)
with open(token_file, "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:
json.dump(tokens, f, indent=2)
logger.info(f"Saved OAuth tokens to {token_file}")
# Attempt to connect the MCP server now
args = json.loads(srv.args) if srv.args else []
env = json.loads(srv.env) if srv.env else {}
connected = await mcp_manager.connect_server(
server_id=server_id,
name=srv.name,
transport=srv.transport,
command=srv.command,
args=args,
env=env,
url=srv.url,
)
if connected:
status = mcp_manager.get_server_status(server_id)
tool_count = status.get("tool_count", 0)
return HTMLResponse(_oauth_result_page(
"Authorization Successful",
f"{srv.name} connected with {tool_count} tools. You can close this window.",
success=True,
))
else:
status = mcp_manager.get_server_status(server_id)
return HTMLResponse(_oauth_result_page(
"Authorized but Connection Failed",
f"Tokens saved, but the server failed to connect: {status.get('error', 'unknown error')}. Try reconnecting from Settings.",
))
except HTTPException as e:
logger.warning(f"OAuth callback rejected: {e.detail}")
return HTMLResponse(_oauth_result_page("Error", str(e.detail)), status_code=e.status_code)
except Exception as e:
logger.exception(f"OAuth callback error: {e}")
return HTMLResponse(_oauth_result_page("Error", str(e)), status_code=500)
finally:
db.close()
return router
def _oauth_authorize_page(
auth_url: str,
server_id: str,
host: str,
redirect_uri: str = "http://localhost:7000/api/mcp/oauth/callback",
) -> str:
"""Page with Google sign-in link and URL paste-back form for remote access."""
# Escape values interpolated into the page: `host` comes from the request
# Host header and `server_id` from the OAuth state — neither is trusted.
auth_url = html.escape(auth_url, quote=True)
server_id = html.escape(server_id, quote=True)
host = html.escape(host, quote=True)
redirect_uri = html.escape(redirect_uri, quote=True)
return f"""<!DOCTYPE html>
<html><head>
<meta charset="UTF-8"><title>Authorize Odysseus</title>
<style>
body {{ font-family: 'Fira Code', monospace; background: #0f0f0f; color: #e0e0e0;
display: flex; justify-content: center; align-items: center; min-height: 100vh; }}
.card {{ background: #1a1a1a; border: 1px solid #333; border-radius: 12px;
padding: 2rem; max-width: 480px; text-align: center; }}
h2 {{ color: #e06c75; margin-bottom: 0.5rem; font-size: 1.1rem; }}
p {{ color: #aaa; font-size: 0.82rem; line-height: 1.6; margin: 0.8rem 0; }}
.step {{ text-align: left; color: #ccc; font-size: 0.82rem; line-height: 1.7; margin: 1rem 0; }}
.step b {{ color: #e06c75; }}
a.auth-link {{
display: inline-block; margin: 1rem 0; padding: 0.6rem 1.5rem;
background: #e06c75; color: #fff; text-decoration: none; border-radius: 6px;
font-weight: 600; font-size: 0.9rem;
}}
a.auth-link:hover {{ background: #c55; }}
input[type=text] {{
width: 100%; padding: 0.5rem; margin: 0.5rem 0;
background: #0f0f0f; border: 1px solid #333; border-radius: 6px;
color: #e0e0e0; font-family: 'Fira Code', monospace; font-size: 0.8rem;
}}
input:focus {{ outline: none; border-color: #e06c75; }}
button {{
padding: 0.5rem 1.5rem; border: none; border-radius: 6px;
background: #e06c75; color: #fff; font-weight: 600; cursor: pointer;
font-family: 'Fira Code', monospace; font-size: 0.85rem; margin-top: 0.3rem;
}}
button:hover {{ background: #c55; }}
.divider {{ border-top: 1px solid #333; margin: 1.2rem 0; }}
</style></head>
<body><div class="card">
<h2>Authorize Google Account</h2>
<div class="step">
<b>1.</b> Click the button below to sign in with Google<br>
<b>2.</b> After approving, your browser will show an error page that's normal<br>
<b>3.</b> Copy the full URL from your browser's address bar<br>
<b>4.</b> Paste it below and click Connect
</div>
<a class="auth-link" href="{auth_url}" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Sign in with Google</a>
<div class="divider"></div>
<form method="POST" action="http://{host}/api/mcp/oauth/exchange/{server_id}">
<p>Paste the URL from your browser after signing in:</p>
<input type="text" name="callback_url" placeholder="{redirect_uri}?code=..." required>
<br><button type="submit">Connect</button>
</form>
</div></body></html>"""
def _oauth_result_page(title: str, message: str, success: bool = False) -> str:
"""Generate a simple HTML page for the OAuth result."""
safe_title = html.escape(title)
safe_message = html.escape(message)
color = "#00661a" if success else "#e06c75"
icon = "&#10003;" if success else "&#10007;"
return f"""<!DOCTYPE html>
<html><head>
<meta charset="UTF-8"><title>{safe_title}</title>
<style>
body {{ font-family: 'Fira Code', monospace; background: #0f0f0f; color: #e0e0e0;
display: flex; justify-content: center; align-items: center; min-height: 100vh; }}
.card {{ background: #1a1a1a; border: 1px solid #333; border-radius: 12px;
padding: 2rem; max-width: 420px; text-align: center; }}
.icon {{ font-size: 3rem; color: {color}; margin-bottom: 1rem; }}
h2 {{ color: {color}; margin-bottom: 0.5rem; font-size: 1.1rem; }}
p {{ color: #aaa; font-size: 0.85rem; line-height: 1.5; }}
</style></head>
<body><div class="card">
<div class="icon">{icon}</div>
<h2>{safe_title}</h2>
<p>{safe_message}</p>
</div></body></html>"""
+693 -14
View File
@@ -1,18 +1,697 @@
"""Backward-compat shim — canonical location is routes/mcp/mcp_routes.py.
# routes/mcp_routes.py
"""MCP (Model Context Protocol) server management routes."""
import json
import os
import uuid
import urllib.parse
import html
from pathlib import Path
from fastapi import APIRouter, Form, HTTPException, Request
from fastapi.responses import RedirectResponse, HTMLResponse
import logging
import httpx
This module is replaced in ``sys.modules`` by the canonical module object so
that ``import routes.mcp_routes``, ``from routes.mcp_routes import X``,
``importlib.import_module("routes.mcp_routes")``, the
``sys.modules.pop("routes.mcp_routes")`` + re-import pattern in
test_security_regressions.py, and the ``monkeypatch.setattr(mcp_routes,
"MCP_OAUTH_DIR", ...)`` pattern all operate on the *same* object. This also
makes ``mcp_routes.__file__`` resolve to the canonical file (which the
source-introspection at line 839 reads). Keeps existing import paths working
after slice 2o (#4082/#4071).
"""
from core.database import McpServer, SessionLocal
from core.middleware import require_admin
from src.constants import DATA_DIR, MCP_OAUTH_DIR
from src.mcp_manager import McpManager
import sys as _sys
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
from routes.mcp import mcp_routes as _canonical # noqa: F401
router = APIRouter(prefix="/api/mcp", tags=["mcp"])
_sys.modules[__name__] = _canonical
def _mcp_oauth_base_dir() -> Path:
"""Directory that may contain OAuth files managed by Odysseus."""
return Path(MCP_OAUTH_DIR).resolve(strict=False)
def _resolve_mcp_oauth_path(raw_path, field_name: str) -> str:
"""Resolve an MCP OAuth path and keep it under DATA_DIR/mcp_oauth."""
raw = str(raw_path or "").strip()
if not raw:
return ""
base = _mcp_oauth_base_dir()
path = Path(os.path.expanduser(raw))
if not path.is_absolute():
path = base / path
resolved = path.resolve(strict=False)
try:
resolved.relative_to(base)
except ValueError as exc:
raise HTTPException(
400,
f"Invalid OAuth {field_name}: path must stay under {base}",
) from exc
return str(resolved)
def _sanitize_mcp_oauth_config(oauth_cfg):
"""Return an OAuth config copy with file paths confined to mcp_oauth."""
if not oauth_cfg:
return oauth_cfg
if not isinstance(oauth_cfg, dict):
return {}
sanitized = dict(oauth_cfg)
for field_name in ("keys_file", "token_file"):
if sanitized.get(field_name):
sanitized[field_name] = _resolve_mcp_oauth_path(
sanitized[field_name],
field_name,
)
return sanitized
def _mcp_oauth_token_missing(oauth_cfg, *, strict: bool = True) -> bool:
"""Check token existence without letting legacy bad paths break listing."""
if not isinstance(oauth_cfg, dict):
return False
try:
token_file = _resolve_mcp_oauth_path(oauth_cfg.get("token_file", ""), "token_file")
except HTTPException:
if strict:
raise
logger.warning("Ignoring MCP OAuth config with unsafe token_file")
return True
return bool(token_file and not os.path.exists(token_file))
def _apply_mcp_oauth_env(env: dict, oauth_cfg) -> None:
"""Pass sanitized Gmail package paths to MCP servers that honor them."""
if not oauth_cfg or not isinstance(env, dict):
return
keys_file = oauth_cfg.get("keys_file")
token_file = oauth_cfg.get("token_file")
if keys_file:
env["GMAIL_OAUTH_PATH"] = keys_file
if token_file:
env["GMAIL_CREDENTIALS_PATH"] = token_file
def _load_disabled_map():
"""Load per-server disabled tool sets from DB."""
db = SessionLocal()
try:
disabled_map = {}
for srv in db.query(McpServer).all():
if srv.disabled_tools:
try:
names = json.loads(srv.disabled_tools)
if names:
disabled_map[srv.id] = set(names)
except (json.JSONDecodeError, TypeError):
pass
return disabled_map
finally:
db.close()
def _mcp_oauth_redirect_uri() -> str:
"""Shared callback URL for legacy Google and generic MCP OAuth flows."""
from src.mcp_oauth import REDIRECT_URI
return REDIRECT_URI
def setup_mcp_routes(mcp_manager: McpManager):
"""Setup MCP routes with the provided manager."""
@router.get("/servers")
def list_servers(request: Request):
"""List all configured MCP servers with connection status."""
require_admin(request)
db = SessionLocal()
try:
servers = db.query(McpServer).all()
result = []
for srv in servers:
status = mcp_manager.get_server_status(srv.id)
oauth_cfg = json.loads(srv.oauth_config) if srv.oauth_config else None
needs_oauth = False
if oauth_cfg:
needs_oauth = _mcp_oauth_token_missing(oauth_cfg, strict=False)
disabled_list = json.loads(srv.disabled_tools) if srv.disabled_tools else []
total_tools = status.get("tool_count", 0)
result.append({
"id": srv.id,
"name": srv.name,
"transport": srv.transport,
"command": srv.command,
"args": json.loads(srv.args) if srv.args else [],
"env": json.loads(srv.env) if srv.env else {},
"url": srv.url,
"is_enabled": srv.is_enabled,
"status": status.get("status", "disconnected"),
"tool_count": total_tools,
"disabled_tool_count": len(disabled_list),
"enabled_tool_count": max(0, total_tools - len(disabled_list)),
"error": status.get("error"),
"auth_url": status.get("auth_url"),
"has_oauth": oauth_cfg is not None,
"needs_oauth": needs_oauth,
})
return result
finally:
db.close()
@router.post("/servers")
async def add_server(
request: Request,
name: str = Form(...),
transport: str = Form("stdio"),
command: str = Form(None),
args: str = Form("[]"),
env: str = Form("{}"),
url: str = Form(None),
oauth_file: str = Form(None),
oauth_config: str = Form(None),
):
"""Add a new MCP server config and attempt connection. Admin-only:
registering a stdio server is equivalent to executing arbitrary
binaries on the host."""
require_admin(request)
server_id = str(uuid.uuid4())[:8]
# Validate
if transport == "stdio" and not command:
raise HTTPException(400, "command is required for stdio transport")
if transport == "sse" and not url:
raise HTTPException(400, "url is required for SSE transport")
if transport == "http" and not url:
raise HTTPException(400, "url is required for HTTP transport")
# Parse JSON fields
try:
parsed_args = json.loads(args) if args else []
except json.JSONDecodeError:
parsed_args = []
try:
parsed_env = json.loads(env) if env else {}
except json.JSONDecodeError:
parsed_env = {}
if not isinstance(parsed_env, dict):
parsed_env = {}
# Parse OAuth config
parsed_oauth_config = None
if oauth_config:
try:
parsed_oauth_config = _sanitize_mcp_oauth_config(json.loads(oauth_config))
except json.JSONDecodeError:
pass
_apply_mcp_oauth_env(parsed_env, parsed_oauth_config)
# Write OAuth credentials file if provided (for Google MCP servers)
logger.info(f"MCP add_server: oauth_file={oauth_file!r}")
if oauth_file:
try:
oauth_data = json.loads(oauth_file)
oauth_dir = _resolve_mcp_oauth_path(oauth_data.get("dir", ""), "dir")
oauth_filename = oauth_data.get("filename", "")
client_id = oauth_data.get("client_id", "")
client_secret = oauth_data.get("client_secret", "")
if oauth_dir and oauth_filename and client_id and client_secret:
filepath = _resolve_mcp_oauth_path(
Path(oauth_dir) / str(oauth_filename),
"filename",
)
os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(filepath), exist_ok=True)
creds = {
"installed": {
"client_id": client_id,
"client_secret": client_secret,
"redirect_uris": ["http://localhost"],
"auth_uri": "https://accounts.google.com/o/oauth2/auth",
"token_uri": "https://accounts.google.com/o/oauth2/token",
}
}
with open(filepath, "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:
json.dump(creds, f, indent=2)
logger.info(f"Wrote OAuth credentials to {filepath}")
parsed_env.pop("GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID", None)
parsed_env.pop("GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET", None)
except (json.JSONDecodeError, OSError) as e:
logger.warning(f"Failed to write OAuth file: {e}")
# Save to DB
db = SessionLocal()
try:
srv = McpServer(
id=server_id,
name=name,
transport=transport,
command=command,
args=json.dumps(parsed_args),
env=json.dumps(parsed_env),
url=url,
is_enabled=True,
oauth_config=json.dumps(parsed_oauth_config) if parsed_oauth_config else None,
)
db.add(srv)
db.commit()
finally:
db.close()
# Check if OAuth token already exists — skip connection attempt if not
needs_oauth = False
if parsed_oauth_config:
needs_oauth = _mcp_oauth_token_missing(parsed_oauth_config)
connected = False
if not needs_oauth:
connected = await mcp_manager.connect_server(
server_id=server_id,
name=name,
transport=transport,
command=command,
args=parsed_args,
env=parsed_env,
url=url,
)
status = mcp_manager.get_server_status(server_id)
needs_auth = status.get("status") == "needs_auth"
return {
"id": server_id,
"name": name,
"connected": connected,
"status": "needs_oauth" if needs_oauth else status.get("status", "disconnected"),
"tool_count": status.get("tool_count", 0),
"error": "OAuth authorization required" if needs_oauth else status.get("error"),
"needs_oauth": needs_oauth,
"needs_auth": needs_auth,
"auth_url": status.get("auth_url"),
}
@router.post("/servers/{server_id}/reconnect")
async def reconnect_server(server_id: str, request: Request):
"""Reconnect to an MCP server."""
require_admin(request)
db = SessionLocal()
try:
srv = db.query(McpServer).filter(McpServer.id == server_id).first()
if not srv:
raise HTTPException(404, "Server not found")
await mcp_manager.disconnect_server(server_id)
args = json.loads(srv.args) if srv.args else []
env = json.loads(srv.env) if srv.env else {}
connected = await mcp_manager.connect_server(
server_id=server_id,
name=srv.name,
transport=srv.transport,
command=srv.command,
args=args,
env=env,
url=srv.url,
)
status = mcp_manager.get_server_status(server_id)
return {
"connected": connected,
"status": status.get("status", "disconnected"),
"tool_count": status.get("tool_count", 0),
"error": status.get("error"),
"auth_url": status.get("auth_url"),
"needs_auth": status.get("status") == "needs_auth",
}
finally:
db.close()
@router.patch("/servers/{server_id}")
async def toggle_server(server_id: str, request: Request, is_enabled: str = Form(...)):
"""Enable or disable an MCP server."""
require_admin(request)
db = SessionLocal()
try:
srv = db.query(McpServer).filter(McpServer.id == server_id).first()
if not srv:
raise HTTPException(404, "Server not found")
enabled = str(is_enabled).lower() == "true"
srv.is_enabled = enabled
db.commit()
if enabled:
args = json.loads(srv.args) if srv.args else []
env = json.loads(srv.env) if srv.env else {}
await mcp_manager.connect_server(
server_id=server_id,
name=srv.name,
transport=srv.transport,
command=srv.command,
args=args,
env=env,
url=srv.url,
)
else:
await mcp_manager.disconnect_server(server_id)
return {"id": server_id, "is_enabled": enabled}
finally:
db.close()
@router.delete("/servers/{server_id}")
async def delete_server(server_id: str, request: Request):
"""Remove an MCP server."""
require_admin(request)
db = SessionLocal()
try:
srv = db.query(McpServer).filter(McpServer.id == server_id).first()
if not srv:
raise HTTPException(404, "Server not found")
await mcp_manager.disconnect_server(server_id)
db.delete(srv)
db.commit()
return {"status": "deleted"}
finally:
db.close()
@router.get("/tools")
def list_tools(request: Request):
"""List all discovered MCP tools across all connected servers."""
require_admin(request)
disabled_map = _load_disabled_map()
return mcp_manager.get_all_tools(disabled_map)
@router.get("/servers/{server_id}/tools")
def list_server_tools(server_id: str, request: Request):
"""List all tools for a specific MCP server with enabled/disabled state."""
require_admin(request)
db = SessionLocal()
try:
srv = db.query(McpServer).filter(McpServer.id == server_id).first()
if not srv:
raise HTTPException(404, "Server not found")
disabled_list = json.loads(srv.disabled_tools) if srv.disabled_tools else []
disabled_set = set(disabled_list)
finally:
db.close()
all_tools = mcp_manager.get_all_tools()
server_tools = [t for t in all_tools if t["server_id"] == server_id]
for t in server_tools:
t["is_disabled"] = t["name"] in disabled_set
return server_tools
@router.patch("/servers/{server_id}/tools")
async def update_disabled_tools(server_id: str, request: Request):
"""Bulk update disabled tools list for a server.
Expects JSON body: {"disabled": ["tool_name_1", "tool_name_2"]}
"""
require_admin(request)
db = SessionLocal()
try:
srv = db.query(McpServer).filter(McpServer.id == server_id).first()
if not srv:
raise HTTPException(404, "Server not found")
body = await request.json()
disabled = body.get("disabled", [])
if not isinstance(disabled, list):
raise HTTPException(400, "disabled must be a list of tool names")
srv.disabled_tools = json.dumps(disabled) if disabled else None
db.commit()
return {"id": server_id, "disabled_count": len(disabled)}
finally:
db.close()
# ── OAuth flow for Google MCP servers ──────────────────────────
@router.get("/oauth/authorize/{server_id}")
def oauth_authorize(server_id: str, request: Request):
"""Show OAuth authorization page with Google sign-in link."""
require_admin(request)
db = SessionLocal()
try:
srv = db.query(McpServer).filter(McpServer.id == server_id).first()
if not srv:
raise HTTPException(404, "Server not found")
if not srv.oauth_config:
raise HTTPException(400, "Server has no OAuth config")
oauth_cfg = _sanitize_mcp_oauth_config(json.loads(srv.oauth_config))
keys_file = oauth_cfg.get("keys_file", "")
if not keys_file or not os.path.exists(keys_file):
raise HTTPException(400, "OAuth keys file not found")
with open(keys_file, encoding="utf-8") as f:
keys_data = json.load(f)
keys = keys_data.get("installed") or keys_data.get("web")
if not keys:
raise HTTPException(400, "Invalid OAuth keys file format")
client_id = keys["client_id"]
scopes = oauth_cfg.get("scopes", [])
# For Desktop App creds, default to localhost — the user will
# paste the resulting URL back if they're on a different device.
redirect_uri = _mcp_oauth_redirect_uri()
params = {
"client_id": client_id,
"redirect_uri": redirect_uri,
"response_type": "code",
"scope": " ".join(scopes),
"access_type": "offline",
"prompt": "consent",
"state": server_id,
}
auth_url = "https://accounts.google.com/o/oauth2/v2/auth?" + urllib.parse.urlencode(params)
# Determine if user is accessing from the same machine
host = request.headers.get("host", "")
is_local = host.startswith("localhost") or host.startswith("127.0.0.1")
if is_local:
# Same machine — just redirect, callback will work directly
return RedirectResponse(auth_url)
else:
# Remote device — show paste-back page
return HTMLResponse(_oauth_authorize_page(auth_url, server_id, host, redirect_uri))
finally:
db.close()
@router.get("/oauth/callback")
async def oauth_callback(code: str, state: str, request: Request):
"""Handle OAuth callback. Generic MCP OAuth flows resolve via the
pending-state registry; Google flows fall through to the legacy path."""
require_admin(request)
from src.mcp_oauth import resolve_pending
if resolve_pending(state, code):
return HTMLResponse(_oauth_result_page(
"Authorization Successful",
"The MCP server is connecting. You can close this window and return to Odysseus.",
success=True,
))
# Legacy Google path: state is the server_id
return await _exchange_and_connect(state, code, request)
@router.post("/oauth/exchange/{server_id}")
async def oauth_exchange(server_id: str, request: Request, callback_url: str = Form(...)):
"""Manual code exchange — user pastes the callback URL from their browser."""
require_admin(request)
try:
parsed = urllib.parse.urlparse(callback_url)
params = urllib.parse.parse_qs(parsed.query)
code = params.get("code", [None])[0]
if not code:
return HTMLResponse(_oauth_result_page("Error", "No authorization code found in the URL. Make sure you copied the full URL from your browser."), status_code=400)
except Exception:
return HTMLResponse(_oauth_result_page("Error", "Invalid URL format."), status_code=400)
# Generic MCP OAuth: if the pasted URL carries a state we are waiting on,
# resolve it directly (the background connect finishes the handshake).
state = params.get("state", [None])[0]
from src.mcp_oauth import resolve_pending
if state and resolve_pending(state, code):
return HTMLResponse(_oauth_result_page(
"Authorization Successful",
"The MCP server is connecting. You can close this window and return to Odysseus.",
success=True,
))
return await _exchange_and_connect(server_id, code, request)
async def _exchange_and_connect(server_id: str, code: str, request: Request):
"""Exchange auth code for tokens and connect the MCP server."""
db = SessionLocal()
try:
srv = db.query(McpServer).filter(McpServer.id == server_id).first()
if not srv:
return HTMLResponse(_oauth_result_page("Error", "Server not found."), status_code=404)
if not srv.oauth_config:
return HTMLResponse(_oauth_result_page("Error", "No OAuth config."), status_code=400)
oauth_cfg = _sanitize_mcp_oauth_config(json.loads(srv.oauth_config))
keys_file = oauth_cfg.get("keys_file", "")
token_file = oauth_cfg.get("token_file", "")
if not keys_file or not token_file:
raise HTTPException(400, "OAuth keys/token file not configured")
with open(keys_file, encoding="utf-8") as f:
keys_data = json.load(f)
keys = keys_data.get("installed") or keys_data.get("web")
client_id = keys["client_id"]
client_secret = keys["client_secret"]
redirect_uri = _mcp_oauth_redirect_uri()
async with httpx.AsyncClient() as client:
resp = await client.post(
"https://oauth2.googleapis.com/token",
data={
"code": code,
"client_id": client_id,
"client_secret": client_secret,
"redirect_uri": redirect_uri,
"grant_type": "authorization_code",
},
)
if resp.status_code != 200:
err = resp.text
logger.error(f"OAuth token exchange failed: {err}")
return HTMLResponse(_oauth_result_page("Authorization Failed", f"Google returned an error: {err}"), status_code=400)
tokens = resp.json()
logger.info(f"OAuth tokens received for server {server_id}")
# Save tokens to the file the MCP package expects
os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(token_file), exist_ok=True)
with open(token_file, "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:
json.dump(tokens, f, indent=2)
logger.info(f"Saved OAuth tokens to {token_file}")
# Attempt to connect the MCP server now
args = json.loads(srv.args) if srv.args else []
env = json.loads(srv.env) if srv.env else {}
connected = await mcp_manager.connect_server(
server_id=server_id,
name=srv.name,
transport=srv.transport,
command=srv.command,
args=args,
env=env,
url=srv.url,
)
if connected:
status = mcp_manager.get_server_status(server_id)
tool_count = status.get("tool_count", 0)
return HTMLResponse(_oauth_result_page(
"Authorization Successful",
f"{srv.name} connected with {tool_count} tools. You can close this window.",
success=True,
))
else:
status = mcp_manager.get_server_status(server_id)
return HTMLResponse(_oauth_result_page(
"Authorized but Connection Failed",
f"Tokens saved, but the server failed to connect: {status.get('error', 'unknown error')}. Try reconnecting from Settings.",
))
except HTTPException as e:
logger.warning(f"OAuth callback rejected: {e.detail}")
return HTMLResponse(_oauth_result_page("Error", str(e.detail)), status_code=e.status_code)
except Exception as e:
logger.exception(f"OAuth callback error: {e}")
return HTMLResponse(_oauth_result_page("Error", str(e)), status_code=500)
finally:
db.close()
return router
def _oauth_authorize_page(
auth_url: str,
server_id: str,
host: str,
redirect_uri: str = "http://localhost:7000/api/mcp/oauth/callback",
) -> str:
"""Page with Google sign-in link and URL paste-back form for remote access."""
# Escape values interpolated into the page: `host` comes from the request
# Host header and `server_id` from the OAuth state — neither is trusted.
auth_url = html.escape(auth_url, quote=True)
server_id = html.escape(server_id, quote=True)
host = html.escape(host, quote=True)
redirect_uri = html.escape(redirect_uri, quote=True)
return f"""<!DOCTYPE html>
<html><head>
<meta charset="UTF-8"><title>Authorize Odysseus</title>
<style>
body {{ font-family: 'Fira Code', monospace; background: #0f0f0f; color: #e0e0e0;
display: flex; justify-content: center; align-items: center; min-height: 100vh; }}
.card {{ background: #1a1a1a; border: 1px solid #333; border-radius: 12px;
padding: 2rem; max-width: 480px; text-align: center; }}
h2 {{ color: #e06c75; margin-bottom: 0.5rem; font-size: 1.1rem; }}
p {{ color: #aaa; font-size: 0.82rem; line-height: 1.6; margin: 0.8rem 0; }}
.step {{ text-align: left; color: #ccc; font-size: 0.82rem; line-height: 1.7; margin: 1rem 0; }}
.step b {{ color: #e06c75; }}
a.auth-link {{
display: inline-block; margin: 1rem 0; padding: 0.6rem 1.5rem;
background: #e06c75; color: #fff; text-decoration: none; border-radius: 6px;
font-weight: 600; font-size: 0.9rem;
}}
a.auth-link:hover {{ background: #c55; }}
input[type=text] {{
width: 100%; padding: 0.5rem; margin: 0.5rem 0;
background: #0f0f0f; border: 1px solid #333; border-radius: 6px;
color: #e0e0e0; font-family: 'Fira Code', monospace; font-size: 0.8rem;
}}
input:focus {{ outline: none; border-color: #e06c75; }}
button {{
padding: 0.5rem 1.5rem; border: none; border-radius: 6px;
background: #e06c75; color: #fff; font-weight: 600; cursor: pointer;
font-family: 'Fira Code', monospace; font-size: 0.85rem; margin-top: 0.3rem;
}}
button:hover {{ background: #c55; }}
.divider {{ border-top: 1px solid #333; margin: 1.2rem 0; }}
</style></head>
<body><div class="card">
<h2>Authorize Google Account</h2>
<div class="step">
<b>1.</b> Click the button below to sign in with Google<br>
<b>2.</b> After approving, your browser will show an error page that's normal<br>
<b>3.</b> Copy the full URL from your browser's address bar<br>
<b>4.</b> Paste it below and click Connect
</div>
<a class="auth-link" href="{auth_url}" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Sign in with Google</a>
<div class="divider"></div>
<form method="POST" action="http://{host}/api/mcp/oauth/exchange/{server_id}">
<p>Paste the URL from your browser after signing in:</p>
<input type="text" name="callback_url" placeholder="{redirect_uri}?code=..." required>
<br><button type="submit">Connect</button>
</form>
</div></body></html>"""
def _oauth_result_page(title: str, message: str, success: bool = False) -> str:
"""Generate a simple HTML page for the OAuth result."""
safe_title = html.escape(title)
safe_message = html.escape(message)
color = "#00661a" if success else "#e06c75"
icon = "&#10003;" if success else "&#10007;"
return f"""<!DOCTYPE html>
<html><head>
<meta charset="UTF-8"><title>{safe_title}</title>
<style>
body {{ font-family: 'Fira Code', monospace; background: #0f0f0f; color: #e0e0e0;
display: flex; justify-content: center; align-items: center; min-height: 100vh; }}
.card {{ background: #1a1a1a; border: 1px solid #333; border-radius: 12px;
padding: 2rem; max-width: 420px; text-align: center; }}
.icon {{ font-size: 3rem; color: {color}; margin-bottom: 1rem; }}
h2 {{ color: {color}; margin-bottom: 0.5rem; font-size: 1.1rem; }}
p {{ color: #aaa; font-size: 0.85rem; line-height: 1.5; }}
</style></head>
<body><div class="card">
<div class="icon">{icon}</div>
<h2>{safe_title}</h2>
<p>{safe_message}</p>
</div></body></html>"""
+5 -21
View File
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ def _strip_list_prefix(text: str) -> str:
return text
return _LIST_PREFIX_RE.sub("", text, count=1).strip()
from services.memory import MemoryManager, MemoryStoreUnreadable
from services.memory import MemoryManager
from core.session_manager import SessionManager
from src.request_models import MemoryAddRequest
from core.database import SessionLocal
@@ -35,22 +35,6 @@ from src.upload_limits import read_upload_limited, MEMORY_IMPORT_MAX_BYTES
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
def _load_for_update(memory_manager) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
"""Load the whole store for a read-modify-write cycle.
A transient read failure must not look like an empty store: the caller
would append to ``[]`` and save that back, atomically destroying every
existing memory (issue #5673). Surface it as a 503 and change nothing.
"""
try:
return memory_manager.load_all_for_update()
except MemoryStoreUnreadable as e:
logger.error("Refusing to rewrite the memory store: %s", e)
raise HTTPException(
503, "Memory store is temporarily unreadable — no changes were made."
)
def setup_memory_routes(memory_manager: MemoryManager, session_manager: SessionManager, memory_vector=None):
"""Set up memory-related routes."""
router = APIRouter(prefix="/api/memory", tags=["memory"])
@@ -132,7 +116,7 @@ def setup_memory_routes(memory_manager: MemoryManager, session_manager: SessionM
new_entry = memory_manager.add_entry(text, memory_data.source, memory_data.category, owner=user)
if memory_data.session_id:
new_entry["session_id"] = memory_data.session_id
all_mem = _load_for_update(memory_manager)
all_mem = memory_manager.load_all()
all_mem.append(new_entry)
memory_manager.save(all_mem)
# Sync vector index
@@ -503,7 +487,7 @@ def setup_memory_routes(memory_manager: MemoryManager, session_manager: SessionM
def pin_memory(request: Request, memory_id: str, pinned: bool = Form(True)):
"""Pin or unpin a memory. Pinned memories are always included in context."""
user = _owner(request)
all_mem = _load_for_update(memory_manager)
all_mem = memory_manager.load_all()
for i, memory in enumerate(all_mem):
if memory["id"] == memory_id:
_verify_memory_owner(memory, user)
@@ -528,7 +512,7 @@ def setup_memory_routes(memory_manager: MemoryManager, session_manager: SessionM
def update_memory(request: Request, memory_id: str, text: str = Form(...), category: str = Form(None)):
"""Update an existing memory item with new text and optional category."""
user = _owner(request)
all_mem = _load_for_update(memory_manager)
all_mem = memory_manager.load_all()
for i, memory in enumerate(all_mem):
if memory["id"] == memory_id:
_verify_memory_owner(memory, user)
@@ -550,7 +534,7 @@ def setup_memory_routes(memory_manager: MemoryManager, session_manager: SessionM
def delete_memory(request: Request, memory_id: str):
"""Delete a memory item by its ID."""
user = _owner(request)
all_mem = _load_for_update(memory_manager)
all_mem = memory_manager.load_all()
# Find and verify ownership before deleting
target = next((m for m in all_mem if m["id"] == memory_id), None)
+33 -9
View File
@@ -46,12 +46,10 @@ _ENDPOINT_SETTING_FIELDS = {
}
_ENDPOINT_FALLBACK_FIELDS = {
"foreground_model_fallbacks": "Foreground Model Fallbacks",
"default_model_fallbacks": "Default Model Fallbacks",
"utility_model_fallbacks": "Utility Model Fallbacks",
"vision_model_fallbacks": "Vision Model Fallbacks",
}
# `default_model_fallbacks` is intentionally absent. The legacy data remains
# stored as-is even when an endpoint is removed, but no longer affects routing.
def _speech_settings_using_endpoint(settings: dict, ep_id: str) -> list:
@@ -181,12 +179,7 @@ def _clear_user_pref_endpoint_refs(all_prefs: dict, ep_id: str) -> int:
if not isinstance(all_prefs, dict):
return 0
users = all_prefs.get("_users")
# A mixed store can contain auth-disabled foreground policy at the root
# alongside named-owner preferences. Both are active namespaces; legacy
# `default_model_fallbacks` remains untouched by the field allowlist.
pref_sets = [all_prefs]
if isinstance(users, dict):
pref_sets.extend(users.values())
pref_sets = users.values() if isinstance(users, dict) else [all_prefs]
cleared_users = 0
for prefs in pref_sets:
if isinstance(prefs, dict) and _clear_endpoint_settings_for_endpoint(prefs, ep_id):
@@ -2444,6 +2437,7 @@ def setup_model_routes(model_discovery):
_user_prefs = _load_for_user(_user) or {}
ep_id = (_user_prefs.get("default_endpoint_id") or "").strip()
model = (_user_prefs.get("default_model") or "").strip()
_fallbacks = _user_prefs.get("default_model_fallbacks") or []
# If user has no personal default, fall back to global default
# But only based on the "share_defaults_with_users" flag
# (only if share_defaults_with_users is enabled)
@@ -2452,9 +2446,12 @@ def setup_model_routes(model_discovery):
ep_id = settings.get("default_endpoint_id", "")
if not model:
model = settings.get("default_model", "")
if not _fallbacks:
_fallbacks = settings.get("default_model_fallbacks") or []
else:
ep_id = settings.get("default_endpoint_id", "")
model = settings.get("default_model", "")
_fallbacks = settings.get("default_model_fallbacks") or []
db = SessionLocal()
try:
ep = None
@@ -2469,6 +2466,33 @@ def setup_model_routes(model_discovery):
if _user and not _is_admin:
ep_q = owner_filter(ep_q, ModelEndpoint, _user)
ep = ep_q.first()
# Configured fallback chain — when the chosen default endpoint is
# gone/disabled, honor the user's configured `default_model_fallbacks`
# in order BEFORE arbitrarily grabbing the first enabled endpoint.
# (Previously this jumped straight to "first enabled", which is why
# deleting/changing the main endpoint silently reassigned the default
# chat to some unrelated endpoint instead of the fallback.)
if not ep:
for entry in _fallbacks:
if not isinstance(entry, dict):
continue
fid = (entry.get("endpoint_id") or "").strip()
if not fid:
continue
cand_q = db.query(ModelEndpoint).filter(
ModelEndpoint.id == fid, ModelEndpoint.is_enabled == True
)
if _user and not _is_admin:
cand_q = owner_filter(cand_q, ModelEndpoint, _user)
cand = cand_q.first()
if cand:
ep = cand
# Use the fallback entry's model. Reset even when empty
# so we don't carry the prior endpoint's stale model onto
# this fallback — the cached-models lookup below then
# fills it from the fallback endpoint.
model = (entry.get("model") or "").strip()
break
# Last resort: first enabled endpoint owned by THIS user. Do not
# include null-owner/shared endpoints here: a brand-new user with
# no explicit default should not auto-open a pending chat using an
+93 -164
View File
@@ -1,13 +1,11 @@
# routes/personal_routes.py
"""Routes for personal documents management."""
import asyncio
import os
import logging
import shutil
import uuid
from typing import Any, Dict, List, Tuple
from fastapi import APIRouter, HTTPException, Query, Request, UploadFile, File, Depends
from fastapi.concurrency import run_in_threadpool
from src.request_models import DirectoryRequest
from core.constants import BASE_DIR, PERSONAL_DIR, PERSONAL_UPLOADS_DIR
from src.rag_singleton import get_rag_manager
@@ -20,6 +18,7 @@ UPLOADS_DIR = PERSONAL_UPLOADS_DIR
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
def _personal_upload_dir_for_owner(owner: str | None, *, create: bool = True) -> str:
"""Return the per-owner upload directory used for direct RAG uploads."""
owner_segment = secure_filename((owner or "local").strip())[:80] or "local"
@@ -142,22 +141,6 @@ def setup_personal_routes(personal_docs_manager, rag_manager, rag_available):
"""
router = APIRouter(prefix="/api/personal")
# Serializes directory index jobs across requests. Indexing runs in the
# threadpool (#5558), so concurrent requests would otherwise run in parallel
# and race PersonalDocsManager's unsynchronized list mutations and file
# writes; before the threadpool move they serialized on the blocked event
# loop, so one-at-a-time is behavior parity.
#
# An asyncio.Lock acquired in the async handler BEFORE offloading: a waiting
# request parks on the event loop instead of pinning a threadpool worker (an
# earlier threading.Lock taken INSIDE the worker meant queued jobs held pool
# tokens while blocked, starving every other run_in_threadpool caller).
# add/remove/reload all take this lock, so their mutations never interleave.
# Per-router (not module-global) so each app binds it to its own event loop.
# Scope is the single process: multi-worker deployments would need a shared
# lock (out of scope for #5558).
_index_job_lock = asyncio.Lock()
def _rag():
"""Get the current RAG manager, retrying init if needed."""
return get_rag_manager()
@@ -189,12 +172,8 @@ def setup_personal_routes(personal_docs_manager, rag_manager, rag_available):
return {"files": files, "directories": directories}
@router.post("/reload")
async def api_personal_reload(owner: str = Depends(require_user), _admin: None = Depends(require_admin)):
# refresh_index() re-extracts text across every tracked directory —
# blocking work. Take the shared job lock (so it cannot race an add /
# remove) and run it off the event loop.
async with _index_job_lock:
await run_in_threadpool(personal_docs_manager.refresh_index)
def api_personal_reload(owner: str = Depends(require_user), _admin: None = Depends(require_admin)):
personal_docs_manager.refresh_index()
return {"ok": True, "count": len(personal_docs_manager.index)}
@router.post("/add_directory")
@@ -228,26 +207,12 @@ def setup_personal_routes(personal_docs_manager, rag_manager, rag_available):
# Use the RAGManager to index the directory
rag = _rag()
if rag:
def _index_directory():
result = rag.index_personal_documents(directory, owner=owner)
if result["success"]:
# Also update the personal_docs_manager to track this
# directory. Kept inside the offloaded call: it triggers
# refresh_index(), which re-extracts text across tracked
# directories.
personal_docs_manager.add_directory(directory, index=False)
return result
# Indexing walks, embeds, and stores the whole tree — minutes
# on a real directory. The handler is async, so calling it
# inline runs it on the event loop and every other request
# queues behind it until it finishes (#5558). Serialize on the
# async job lock BEFORE offloading so a queued request parks on
# the loop instead of pinning a threadpool worker.
async with _index_job_lock:
result = await run_in_threadpool(_index_directory)
result = rag.index_personal_documents(directory, owner=owner)
if result["success"]:
# Also update the personal_docs_manager to track this directory
personal_docs_manager.add_directory(directory, index=False)
return {
"success": True,
"message": f"Successfully indexed {result['indexed_count']} chunks from {directory}",
@@ -286,25 +251,17 @@ def setup_personal_routes(personal_docs_manager, rag_manager, rag_available):
logger.info(f"Removing directory from RAG: {directory}")
# Always remove from personal_docs_manager tracking
if hasattr(personal_docs_manager, 'remove_directory'):
personal_docs_manager.remove_directory(directory)
# Remove from RAG vector store (best-effort)
rag = _rag()
def _remove_directory():
# Always remove from personal_docs_manager tracking. This
# mutates the same unsynchronized list/index an add job touches
# and re-extracts text (refresh_index), so it is blocking work.
if hasattr(personal_docs_manager, 'remove_directory'):
personal_docs_manager.remove_directory(directory)
# Remove from RAG vector store (best-effort).
if rag:
try:
rag.remove_directory(directory)
except Exception as e:
logger.warning(f"RAG removal failed for directory {directory}: {e}")
# Same job lock as add/reload so remove cannot interleave with an
# in-flight add; offloaded off the event loop.
async with _index_job_lock:
await run_in_threadpool(_remove_directory)
if rag:
try:
rag.remove_directory(directory)
except Exception as e:
logger.warning(f"RAG removal failed for directory {directory}: {e}")
return {
"success": True,
@@ -332,73 +289,54 @@ def setup_personal_routes(personal_docs_manager, rag_manager, rag_available):
total_failed = 0
uploaded_files = []
# Chunking, embedding and the tracking update are blocking work over the
# same vector/tracking state add_directory mutates (#5634). Take the
# shared job lock BEFORE offloading so a queued request parks on the loop
# instead of pinning a threadpool worker, matching add_directory.
# Read and process one capped payload at a time so a multi-file request
# cannot retain len(files) * PERSONAL_UPLOAD_MAX_BYTES in memory.
async with _index_job_lock:
for upload in files:
try:
file_path, stored_name, safe_name = _unique_personal_upload_path(
upload_dir, upload.filename
)
content_bytes = await upload.read(PERSONAL_UPLOAD_MAX_BYTES + 1)
if len(content_bytes) > PERSONAL_UPLOAD_MAX_BYTES:
logger.warning(f"Rejected oversized personal upload: {upload.filename!r}")
total_failed += 1
continue
def _index_upload():
with open(file_path, "wb") as f:
f.write(content_bytes)
ext = os.path.splitext(safe_name)[1].lower()
if ext == ".pdf":
from src.personal_docs import extract_pdf_text
text = extract_pdf_text(file_path)
else:
text = content_bytes.decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
if not text or not text.strip():
return 0, 1, None
indexed = 0
failed = 0
chunks = rag._split_into_chunks(text, chunk_size=500)
for i, chunk in enumerate(chunks):
metadata = {
"source": file_path,
"filename": safe_name,
"stored_filename": stored_name,
"directory": upload_dir,
"type": ext,
"chunk_id": i,
}
if user:
metadata["owner"] = user
if rag.add_document(chunk, metadata):
indexed += 1
else:
failed += 1
return indexed, failed, safe_name
indexed, failed, uploaded_name = await run_in_threadpool(_index_upload)
total_indexed += indexed
total_failed += failed
if uploaded_name:
uploaded_files.append(uploaded_name)
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"Failed to upload/index {upload.filename}: {e}")
for upload in files:
try:
file_path, stored_name, safe_name = _unique_personal_upload_path(upload_dir, upload.filename)
content_bytes = await upload.read(PERSONAL_UPLOAD_MAX_BYTES + 1)
if len(content_bytes) > PERSONAL_UPLOAD_MAX_BYTES:
logger.warning(f"Rejected oversized personal upload: {upload.filename!r}")
total_failed += 1
continue
with open(file_path, "wb") as f:
f.write(content_bytes)
# Same transition, same lock: the tracking update must not land
# while another job is mid-write over the same state.
if uploaded_files and hasattr(personal_docs_manager, "add_directory"):
await run_in_threadpool(
personal_docs_manager.add_directory, upload_dir, index=False
)
ext = os.path.splitext(safe_name)[1].lower()
if ext == ".pdf":
from src.personal_docs import extract_pdf_text
text = extract_pdf_text(file_path)
else:
text = content_bytes.decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
if not text or not text.strip():
total_failed += 1
continue
# Chunk and index
chunks = rag._split_into_chunks(text, chunk_size=500)
for i, chunk in enumerate(chunks):
metadata = {
"source": file_path,
"filename": safe_name,
"stored_filename": stored_name,
"directory": upload_dir,
"type": ext,
"chunk_id": i,
}
if user:
metadata["owner"] = user
if rag.add_document(chunk, metadata):
total_indexed += 1
else:
total_failed += 1
uploaded_files.append(safe_name)
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"Failed to upload/index {upload.filename}: {e}")
total_failed += 1
# Track uploads directory
if uploaded_files and hasattr(personal_docs_manager, "add_directory"):
personal_docs_manager.add_directory(upload_dir, index=False)
return {
"success": True,
@@ -411,47 +349,38 @@ def setup_personal_routes(personal_docs_manager, rag_manager, rag_available):
async def delete_file_from_rag(filepath: str = Query(...), owner: str = Depends(require_user), _admin: None = Depends(require_admin)):
"""Delete a specific file from RAG index and optionally from disk."""
try:
def _delete_file():
# Remove chunks from RAG vector store (best-effort)
removed = 0
rag = _rag()
if rag:
try:
removed = rag.delete_by_source(filepath)
except Exception as e:
logger.warning(f"RAG removal failed for {filepath}: {e}")
# Delete file from disk if it's in the caller's own uploads dir.
# Scope to the per-owner subdir, not the shared uploads root, so one
# admin can't delete another user's personal files by path.
deleted_from_disk = False
# Remove chunks from RAG vector store (best-effort)
removed = 0
rag = _rag()
if rag:
try:
abs_target = os.path.realpath(filepath)
base_abs = os.path.realpath(_personal_upload_dir_for_owner(owner, create=False))
in_uploads = (
abs_target == base_abs
or os.path.commonpath([abs_target, base_abs]) == base_abs
)
except ValueError:
# commonpath raises on mixed drives / non-comparable paths
in_uploads = False
if in_uploads and abs_target != base_abs:
try:
os.remove(abs_target)
deleted_from_disk = True
except FileNotFoundError:
pass # already gone — race with another request or cleanup
removed = rag.delete_by_source(filepath)
except Exception as e:
logger.warning(f"RAG removal failed for {filepath}: {e}")
# Exclude the file from the listing (persists across restarts)
personal_docs_manager.exclude_file(filepath)
return removed, deleted_from_disk
# Delete file from disk if it's in the caller's own uploads dir.
# Scope to the per-owner subdir, not the shared uploads root, so one
# admin can't delete another user's personal files by path.
deleted_from_disk = False
try:
abs_target = os.path.realpath(filepath)
base_abs = os.path.realpath(_personal_upload_dir_for_owner(owner, create=False))
in_uploads = (
abs_target == base_abs
or os.path.commonpath([abs_target, base_abs]) == base_abs
)
except ValueError:
# commonpath raises on mixed drives / non-comparable paths
in_uploads = False
if in_uploads and abs_target != base_abs:
try:
os.remove(abs_target)
deleted_from_disk = True
except FileNotFoundError:
pass # already gone — race with another request or cleanup
# Vector removal, the disk unlink and the exclusion write are one
# transition over the same state add_directory mutates (#5634), and
# all three block. Take the shared job lock BEFORE offloading, as
# add_directory does.
async with _index_job_lock:
removed, deleted_from_disk = await run_in_threadpool(_delete_file)
# Exclude the file from the listing (persists across restarts)
personal_docs_manager.exclude_file(filepath)
return {
"success": True,
+19 -53
View File
@@ -1,16 +1,12 @@
"""User preferences API — per-user key/value store backed by a JSON file."""
import json
import os
from typing import Optional
from fastapi import APIRouter, Request
from core.atomic_io import atomic_write_json
from src.auth_helpers import get_current_user
from src.constants import USER_PREFS_FILE
PREFS_FILE = USER_PREFS_FILE
_FOREGROUND_POLICY_KEYS = (
"foreground_fallback_enabled",
"foreground_model_fallbacks",
)
def _load():
@@ -24,33 +20,26 @@ def _load():
def _save(prefs):
atomic_write_json(PREFS_FILE, prefs, indent=2)
os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(PREFS_FILE) or ".", exist_ok=True)
tmp = f"{PREFS_FILE}.tmp.{os.getpid()}"
with open(tmp, "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:
json.dump(prefs, f, indent=2)
f.flush()
os.fsync(f.fileno())
os.replace(tmp, PREFS_FILE)
def _load_for_user(user: Optional[str] = None) -> dict:
"""Load preferences for a specific user."""
all_prefs = _load()
users = all_prefs.get("_users")
if isinstance(users, dict):
if "_users" in all_prefs:
if user is None:
# Auth disabled — return first user's prefs for backward compat
prefs = dict(next(iter(users.values()), {}))
# Foreground fallback consent is never borrowed from a named
# owner. Auth-disabled operation has a separate flat/root opt-in
# that remains inert when authentication is enabled again.
for key in _FOREGROUND_POLICY_KEYS:
prefs.pop(key, None)
if key in all_prefs:
prefs[key] = all_prefs[key]
return prefs
prefs = users.get(user, {})
return dict(prefs) if isinstance(prefs, dict) else {}
# A legacy flat store belongs only to auth-disabled single-user mode.
# Copying it into the first named user's new `_users` record during an
# auth transition would silently transfer another user's preferences and,
# critically, foreground fallback consent. Named owners therefore start
# with an empty record and must write their own preferences explicitly.
return dict(all_prefs) if user is None else {}
users = all_prefs["_users"]
return dict(next(iter(users.values()), {}))
return dict(all_prefs["_users"].get(user, {}))
# Legacy flat format — return as-is
return dict(all_prefs)
def _save_for_user(user: Optional[str], prefs: dict):
@@ -62,40 +51,17 @@ def _save_for_user(user: Optional[str], prefs: dict):
# `prefs` flat would overwrite the whole `_users` map and destroy every
# other user's preferences. Instead write back into the same (first)
# slot _load_for_user(None) reads from, preserving the others.
users = all_prefs.get("_users")
if isinstance(users, dict):
if "_users" in all_prefs:
users = all_prefs["_users"]
first_key = next(iter(users), None)
if first_key is not None:
existing_named = users.get(first_key)
existing_named = (
dict(existing_named)
if isinstance(existing_named, dict)
else {}
)
named_foreground = {
key: existing_named[key]
for key in _FOREGROUND_POLICY_KEYS
if key in existing_named
}
users[first_key] = {
key: value
for key, value in prefs.items()
if key not in _FOREGROUND_POLICY_KEYS
}
users[first_key].update(named_foreground)
for key in _FOREGROUND_POLICY_KEYS:
if key in prefs:
all_prefs[key] = prefs[key]
users[first_key] = prefs
_save(all_prefs)
return
_save(prefs)
return
if not isinstance(all_prefs.get("_users"), dict):
# Preserve the flat single-user object as inert legacy data while
# creating the first named-owner namespace. In particular, historical
# fallback values must not be deleted or copied into the new owner.
all_prefs = dict(all_prefs)
all_prefs["_users"] = {}
if "_users" not in all_prefs:
all_prefs = {"_users": {}}
all_prefs["_users"][user] = prefs
_save(all_prefs)
-5
View File
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
"""Search route domain package (slice 2j, #4082/#4071).
Contains search_routes.py, migrated from the flat routes/ directory.
Backward-compat shim at routes/search_routes.py re-exports from here.
"""
-111
View File
@@ -1,111 +0,0 @@
"""Search routes — /api/search/config GET, /api/search POST."""
import logging
from typing import Dict, Any
from fastapi import APIRouter, Request
import time
from services.search import get_search_config, comprehensive_web_search, PROVIDER_INFO
from services.search.core import _call_provider
from services.search.providers import _get_provider_key, _get_search_instance
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
async def _request_values(request: Request) -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""Accept JSON, form data, or query params for search endpoints.
The browser UI posts FormData, while the agent's generic app_api tool
posts JSON. FastAPI Form(...) rejects JSON with a 422 before our handler
runs, which made the model think SearXNG was broken.
"""
values: Dict[str, Any] = dict(request.query_params)
content_type = (request.headers.get("content-type") or "").lower()
try:
if "application/json" in content_type:
body = await request.json()
if isinstance(body, dict):
values.update(body)
else:
form = await request.form()
values.update(dict(form))
except Exception:
pass
return values
def setup_search_routes(config) -> APIRouter:
router = APIRouter(tags=["search"])
@router.get("/api/search/config")
async def get_search_settings() -> Dict[str, Any]:
return get_search_config()
@router.post("/api/search")
async def do_web_search(request: Request) -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""Standalone web search — returns context string + source list.
Used by Compare mode to pre-search once and share results across panes.
"""
values = await _request_values(request)
query = str(values.get("query") or values.get("q") or "").strip()
if not query:
return {"context": "", "sources": [], "error": "query is required"}
time_filter = values.get("time_filter") or values.get("freshness")
if time_filter is not None:
time_filter = str(time_filter).strip() or None
try:
context, sources = comprehensive_web_search(
query, return_sources=True, time_filter=time_filter,
)
return {"context": context, "sources": sources}
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"Standalone web search failed: {e}")
return {"context": "", "sources": [], "error": str(e)}
@router.get("/api/search/providers")
async def list_search_providers():
"""Return available search providers with config status."""
providers = []
for pid, (label, needs_key, needs_url) in PROVIDER_INFO.items():
if pid == "disabled":
continue
available = True
if needs_key and not _get_provider_key(pid):
available = False
if needs_url and pid == "searxng" and not _get_search_instance():
available = False
providers.append({
"id": pid,
"label": label,
"available": available,
})
return providers
@router.post("/api/search/query")
async def search_with_provider(request: Request) -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""Search using a specific provider. Used by compare search mode."""
values = await _request_values(request)
query = str(values.get("query") or values.get("q") or "").strip()
provider = str(values.get("provider") or "").strip()
try:
count = int(values.get("count") or values.get("limit") or 10)
except Exception:
count = 10
if not query:
return {"results": [], "provider": provider, "error": "query is required"}
if provider not in PROVIDER_INFO or provider == "disabled":
return {"results": [], "provider": provider, "error": "Unknown provider"}
t0 = time.time()
try:
results = _call_provider(provider, query, min(count, 20))
elapsed = round(time.time() - t0, 2)
return {"results": results, "provider": provider, "time": elapsed}
except Exception as e:
elapsed = round(time.time() - t0, 2)
logger.error(f"Search provider {provider} failed: {e}")
return {"results": [], "provider": provider, "time": elapsed, "error": str(e)}
return router
+107 -9
View File
@@ -1,13 +1,111 @@
"""Backward-compat shim — canonical location is routes/search/search_routes.py.
"""Search routes — /api/search/config GET, /api/search POST."""
This module is replaced in ``sys.modules`` by the canonical module object so
that ``import routes.search_routes`` and ``from routes.search_routes import X``
keep resolving to the canonical module. Keeps existing import paths working
after slice 2j (#4082/#4071).
"""
import logging
from typing import Dict, Any
import sys as _sys
from fastapi import APIRouter, Request
from routes.search import search_routes as _canonical # noqa: F401
import time
_sys.modules[__name__] = _canonical
from services.search import get_search_config, comprehensive_web_search, PROVIDER_INFO
from services.search.core import _call_provider
from services.search.providers import _get_provider_key, _get_search_instance
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
async def _request_values(request: Request) -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""Accept JSON, form data, or query params for search endpoints.
The browser UI posts FormData, while the agent's generic app_api tool
posts JSON. FastAPI Form(...) rejects JSON with a 422 before our handler
runs, which made the model think SearXNG was broken.
"""
values: Dict[str, Any] = dict(request.query_params)
content_type = (request.headers.get("content-type") or "").lower()
try:
if "application/json" in content_type:
body = await request.json()
if isinstance(body, dict):
values.update(body)
else:
form = await request.form()
values.update(dict(form))
except Exception:
pass
return values
def setup_search_routes(config) -> APIRouter:
router = APIRouter(tags=["search"])
@router.get("/api/search/config")
async def get_search_settings() -> Dict[str, Any]:
return get_search_config()
@router.post("/api/search")
async def do_web_search(request: Request) -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""Standalone web search — returns context string + source list.
Used by Compare mode to pre-search once and share results across panes.
"""
values = await _request_values(request)
query = str(values.get("query") or values.get("q") or "").strip()
if not query:
return {"context": "", "sources": [], "error": "query is required"}
time_filter = values.get("time_filter") or values.get("freshness")
if time_filter is not None:
time_filter = str(time_filter).strip() or None
try:
context, sources = comprehensive_web_search(
query, return_sources=True, time_filter=time_filter,
)
return {"context": context, "sources": sources}
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"Standalone web search failed: {e}")
return {"context": "", "sources": [], "error": str(e)}
@router.get("/api/search/providers")
async def list_search_providers():
"""Return available search providers with config status."""
providers = []
for pid, (label, needs_key, needs_url) in PROVIDER_INFO.items():
if pid == "disabled":
continue
available = True
if needs_key and not _get_provider_key(pid):
available = False
if needs_url and pid == "searxng" and not _get_search_instance():
available = False
providers.append({
"id": pid,
"label": label,
"available": available,
})
return providers
@router.post("/api/search/query")
async def search_with_provider(request: Request) -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""Search using a specific provider. Used by compare search mode."""
values = await _request_values(request)
query = str(values.get("query") or values.get("q") or "").strip()
provider = str(values.get("provider") or "").strip()
try:
count = int(values.get("count") or values.get("limit") or 10)
except Exception:
count = 10
if not query:
return {"results": [], "provider": provider, "error": "query is required"}
if provider not in PROVIDER_INFO or provider == "disabled":
return {"results": [], "provider": provider, "error": "Unknown provider"}
t0 = time.time()
try:
results = _call_provider(provider, query, min(count, 20))
elapsed = round(time.time() - t0, 2)
return {"results": results, "provider": provider, "time": elapsed}
except Exception as e:
elapsed = round(time.time() - t0, 2)
logger.error(f"Search provider {provider} failed: {e}")
return {"results": [], "provider": provider, "time": elapsed, "error": str(e)}
return router
+9
View File
@@ -801,6 +801,15 @@ def setup_session_routes(
finally:
db.close()
@router.get("/history/{sid}")
def get_history(request: Request, sid: str):
_verify_session_owner(request, sid)
try:
session = session_manager.get_session(sid)
except KeyError:
raise HTTPException(404, f"Session {sid} not found")
return {"history": [msg.to_dict() for msg in session.history]}
@router.get("/session/{sid}/export")
def export_session(request: Request, sid: str, fmt: str = "md", filename: str = ""):
"""Export conversation history as a downloadable file.
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1409,7 +1409,7 @@ def setup_skills_routes(skills_manager: SkillsManager) -> APIRouter:
# Prefer the configured DEFAULT (→ Utility) model — not the current chat
# session's model. Fall back to the caller's session model only if unset.
url, model, headers = resolve_endpoint("utility", owner=user)
url, model, headers = resolve_endpoint("default", owner=user)
if not url or not model:
url = url or ((body.get("endpoint_url") or "").strip() or None)
model = model or ((body.get("model") or "").strip() or None)
-5
View File
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
"""Vault route domain package (slice 2k, #4082/#4071).
Contains vault_routes.py, migrated from the flat routes/ directory.
Backward-compat shim at routes/vault_routes.py re-exports from here.
"""
-242
View File
@@ -1,242 +0,0 @@
"""
vault_routes.py
Vaultwarden / Bitwarden CLI integration config and unlock endpoints.
Stores the BW_SESSION key in data/vault.json with restrictive permissions.
"""
import json
import logging
import os
import shutil
import asyncio
from pathlib import Path
from datetime import datetime
from fastapi import APIRouter, Request
from pydantic import BaseModel
from core.middleware import require_admin
from core.platform_compat import IS_WINDOWS, safe_chmod, which_tool
from src.constants import VAULT_FILE as _VAULT_FILE
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
VAULT_FILE = Path(_VAULT_FILE)
def _find_bw() -> str:
"""Locate the bw binary, checking PATH and common npm-global locations.
On Windows the Bitwarden CLI shim is `bw.cmd`/`bw.exe`, resolved by
which_tool via PATHEXT.
"""
p = which_tool("bw")
if p:
return p
if IS_WINDOWS:
appdata = os.environ.get("APPDATA", os.path.expanduser("~"))
for candidate in (
os.path.join(appdata, "npm", "bw.cmd"),
os.path.join(appdata, "npm", "bw.exe"),
):
if os.path.isfile(candidate):
return candidate
return "bw"
home = os.path.expanduser("~")
for candidate in (
f"{home}/.npm-global/bin/bw",
f"{home}/.nvm/versions/node/*/bin/bw",
"/usr/local/bin/bw",
"/opt/homebrew/bin/bw",
):
if "*" in candidate:
import glob
for m in glob.glob(candidate):
if os.path.isfile(m) and os.access(m, os.X_OK):
return m
elif os.path.isfile(candidate) and os.access(candidate, os.X_OK):
return candidate
return "bw" # fall back to PATH lookup (will FileNotFoundError, handled below)
def _load_config() -> dict:
if VAULT_FILE.exists():
try:
data = json.loads(VAULT_FILE.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
return data if isinstance(data, dict) else {}
except Exception:
pass
return {}
def _save_config(cfg: dict):
VAULT_FILE.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
VAULT_FILE.write_text(json.dumps(cfg, indent=2), encoding="utf-8")
# POSIX: restrict the BW_SESSION store to 0o600. Windows: no-op (profile dir
# is ACL-restricted already).
safe_chmod(str(VAULT_FILE), 0o600)
async def _run_bw(args: list, session: str = None, input_text: str = None,
bw_password: str = None) -> tuple:
env = {}
env.update(os.environ)
if session:
env["BW_SESSION"] = session
# Secrets must never be passed as argv — process arguments are world-readable
# via `ps` / `/proc/<pid>/cmdline` to any local user. Keep --passwordenv
# support for bw commands that need it; unlock/login callers should prefer
# stdin so the master password is not left in the child environment either.
if bw_password is not None:
env["BW_PASSWORD"] = bw_password
bw_path = _find_bw()
try:
proc = await asyncio.create_subprocess_exec(
bw_path, *args,
stdin=asyncio.subprocess.PIPE if input_text else None,
stdout=asyncio.subprocess.PIPE,
stderr=asyncio.subprocess.PIPE,
env=env,
)
except FileNotFoundError:
return "", "bw CLI not installed (install `nodejs-bitwarden-cli` or `bitwarden-cli`)", 127
except Exception as e:
return "", f"Failed to launch bw: {e}", 1
try:
stdout, stderr = await proc.communicate(input=input_text.encode() if input_text else None)
except Exception as e:
return "", f"bw subprocess error: {e}", 1
return stdout.decode(errors="replace").strip(), stderr.decode(errors="replace").strip(), proc.returncode
class VaultConfig(BaseModel):
server_url: str = ""
email: str = ""
class VaultUnlockRequest(BaseModel):
master_password: str
class VaultLoginRequest(BaseModel):
email: str
master_password: str
def setup_vault_routes():
router = APIRouter(prefix="/api/vault", tags=["vault"])
@router.get("/config")
async def get_config(request: Request):
"""Return vault config (no sensitive fields)."""
require_admin(request)
cfg = _load_config()
return {
"server_url": cfg.get("server_url", ""),
"email": cfg.get("email", ""),
"unlocked": bool(cfg.get("session")),
"unlocked_at": cfg.get("unlocked_at", ""),
"bw_installed": await _check_bw_installed(),
}
@router.post("/config")
async def save_config(req: VaultConfig, request: Request):
"""Save vault URL + email. Runs 'bw config server' to point at Vaultwarden."""
require_admin(request)
cfg = _load_config()
cfg["server_url"] = req.server_url.strip().rstrip("/")
cfg["email"] = req.email.strip()
if cfg["server_url"]:
_, stderr, rc = await _run_bw(["config", "server", cfg["server_url"]])
if rc != 0:
return {"ok": False, "error": f"bw config failed: {stderr[:300]}"}
_save_config(cfg)
return {"ok": True}
@router.post("/login")
async def login(req: VaultLoginRequest, request: Request):
"""Log in to Vaultwarden (required once per account)."""
require_admin(request)
cfg = _load_config()
# Update email
cfg["email"] = req.email
_save_config(cfg)
stdout, stderr, rc = await _run_bw(
["login", req.email, "--raw"],
input_text=req.master_password + "\n",
)
if rc != 0:
# Already logged in is OK
if "already logged in" in stderr.lower():
return {"ok": True, "already": True}
return {"ok": False, "error": f"Login failed: {stderr[:300]}"}
# bw login --raw prints session key on success (when 2FA disabled)
if stdout:
cfg["session"] = stdout
cfg["unlocked_at"] = datetime.utcnow().isoformat()
_save_config(cfg)
return {"ok": True}
@router.post("/unlock")
async def unlock(req: VaultUnlockRequest, request: Request):
"""Unlock the vault and save the session key."""
require_admin(request)
# Pass the master password on stdin, not argv. argv is visible through
# `ps` / /proc/<pid>/cmdline; stdin also avoids leaving the secret in
# the child process environment.
stdout, stderr, rc = await _run_bw(
["unlock", "--raw"],
input_text=req.master_password + "\n",
)
if rc != 0:
return {"ok": False, "error": f"Unlock failed: {stderr[:300]}"}
session = stdout.strip()
if not session:
return {"ok": False, "error": "bw returned empty session"}
cfg = _load_config()
cfg["session"] = session
cfg["unlocked_at"] = datetime.utcnow().isoformat()
_save_config(cfg)
return {"ok": True, "message": "Vault unlocked"}
@router.post("/lock")
async def lock(request: Request):
"""Lock the vault (clear session from config)."""
require_admin(request)
cfg = _load_config()
cfg.pop("session", None)
cfg.pop("unlocked_at", None)
_save_config(cfg)
# Also tell bw to lock
await _run_bw(["lock"])
return {"ok": True, "message": "Vault locked"}
@router.post("/logout")
async def logout(request: Request):
"""Log out of the Bitwarden CLI completely."""
require_admin(request)
await _run_bw(["logout"])
cfg = _load_config()
cfg.pop("session", None)
cfg.pop("email", None)
cfg.pop("unlocked_at", None)
_save_config(cfg)
return {"ok": True}
return router
async def _check_bw_installed() -> bool:
try:
proc = await asyncio.create_subprocess_exec(
_find_bw(), "--version",
stdout=asyncio.subprocess.PIPE,
stderr=asyncio.subprocess.PIPE,
)
await proc.communicate()
return proc.returncode == 0
except Exception:
return False
+237 -9
View File
@@ -1,14 +1,242 @@
"""Backward-compat shim — canonical location is routes/vault/vault_routes.py.
"""
vault_routes.py
This module is replaced in ``sys.modules`` by the canonical module object so
that ``import routes.vault_routes``, ``from routes.vault_routes import X``,
and the ``import ... as vr`` + ``monkeypatch.setattr(vr, ...)`` pattern used
by test_vault_password_not_in_argv.py all operate on the *same* object.
Keeps existing import paths working after slice 2k (#4082/#4071).
Vaultwarden / Bitwarden CLI integration config and unlock endpoints.
Stores the BW_SESSION key in data/vault.json with restrictive permissions.
"""
import sys as _sys
import json
import logging
import os
import shutil
import asyncio
from pathlib import Path
from datetime import datetime
from fastapi import APIRouter, Request
from pydantic import BaseModel
from routes.vault import vault_routes as _canonical # noqa: F401
from core.middleware import require_admin
from core.platform_compat import IS_WINDOWS, safe_chmod, which_tool
from src.constants import VAULT_FILE as _VAULT_FILE
_sys.modules[__name__] = _canonical
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
VAULT_FILE = Path(_VAULT_FILE)
def _find_bw() -> str:
"""Locate the bw binary, checking PATH and common npm-global locations.
On Windows the Bitwarden CLI shim is `bw.cmd`/`bw.exe`, resolved by
which_tool via PATHEXT.
"""
p = which_tool("bw")
if p:
return p
if IS_WINDOWS:
appdata = os.environ.get("APPDATA", os.path.expanduser("~"))
for candidate in (
os.path.join(appdata, "npm", "bw.cmd"),
os.path.join(appdata, "npm", "bw.exe"),
):
if os.path.isfile(candidate):
return candidate
return "bw"
home = os.path.expanduser("~")
for candidate in (
f"{home}/.npm-global/bin/bw",
f"{home}/.nvm/versions/node/*/bin/bw",
"/usr/local/bin/bw",
"/opt/homebrew/bin/bw",
):
if "*" in candidate:
import glob
for m in glob.glob(candidate):
if os.path.isfile(m) and os.access(m, os.X_OK):
return m
elif os.path.isfile(candidate) and os.access(candidate, os.X_OK):
return candidate
return "bw" # fall back to PATH lookup (will FileNotFoundError, handled below)
def _load_config() -> dict:
if VAULT_FILE.exists():
try:
data = json.loads(VAULT_FILE.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
return data if isinstance(data, dict) else {}
except Exception:
pass
return {}
def _save_config(cfg: dict):
VAULT_FILE.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
VAULT_FILE.write_text(json.dumps(cfg, indent=2), encoding="utf-8")
# POSIX: restrict the BW_SESSION store to 0o600. Windows: no-op (profile dir
# is ACL-restricted already).
safe_chmod(str(VAULT_FILE), 0o600)
async def _run_bw(args: list, session: str = None, input_text: str = None,
bw_password: str = None) -> tuple:
env = {}
env.update(os.environ)
if session:
env["BW_SESSION"] = session
# Secrets must never be passed as argv — process arguments are world-readable
# via `ps` / `/proc/<pid>/cmdline` to any local user. Keep --passwordenv
# support for bw commands that need it; unlock/login callers should prefer
# stdin so the master password is not left in the child environment either.
if bw_password is not None:
env["BW_PASSWORD"] = bw_password
bw_path = _find_bw()
try:
proc = await asyncio.create_subprocess_exec(
bw_path, *args,
stdin=asyncio.subprocess.PIPE if input_text else None,
stdout=asyncio.subprocess.PIPE,
stderr=asyncio.subprocess.PIPE,
env=env,
)
except FileNotFoundError:
return "", "bw CLI not installed (install `nodejs-bitwarden-cli` or `bitwarden-cli`)", 127
except Exception as e:
return "", f"Failed to launch bw: {e}", 1
try:
stdout, stderr = await proc.communicate(input=input_text.encode() if input_text else None)
except Exception as e:
return "", f"bw subprocess error: {e}", 1
return stdout.decode(errors="replace").strip(), stderr.decode(errors="replace").strip(), proc.returncode
class VaultConfig(BaseModel):
server_url: str = ""
email: str = ""
class VaultUnlockRequest(BaseModel):
master_password: str
class VaultLoginRequest(BaseModel):
email: str
master_password: str
def setup_vault_routes():
router = APIRouter(prefix="/api/vault", tags=["vault"])
@router.get("/config")
async def get_config(request: Request):
"""Return vault config (no sensitive fields)."""
require_admin(request)
cfg = _load_config()
return {
"server_url": cfg.get("server_url", ""),
"email": cfg.get("email", ""),
"unlocked": bool(cfg.get("session")),
"unlocked_at": cfg.get("unlocked_at", ""),
"bw_installed": await _check_bw_installed(),
}
@router.post("/config")
async def save_config(req: VaultConfig, request: Request):
"""Save vault URL + email. Runs 'bw config server' to point at Vaultwarden."""
require_admin(request)
cfg = _load_config()
cfg["server_url"] = req.server_url.strip().rstrip("/")
cfg["email"] = req.email.strip()
if cfg["server_url"]:
_, stderr, rc = await _run_bw(["config", "server", cfg["server_url"]])
if rc != 0:
return {"ok": False, "error": f"bw config failed: {stderr[:300]}"}
_save_config(cfg)
return {"ok": True}
@router.post("/login")
async def login(req: VaultLoginRequest, request: Request):
"""Log in to Vaultwarden (required once per account)."""
require_admin(request)
cfg = _load_config()
# Update email
cfg["email"] = req.email
_save_config(cfg)
stdout, stderr, rc = await _run_bw(
["login", req.email, "--raw"],
input_text=req.master_password + "\n",
)
if rc != 0:
# Already logged in is OK
if "already logged in" in stderr.lower():
return {"ok": True, "already": True}
return {"ok": False, "error": f"Login failed: {stderr[:300]}"}
# bw login --raw prints session key on success (when 2FA disabled)
if stdout:
cfg["session"] = stdout
cfg["unlocked_at"] = datetime.utcnow().isoformat()
_save_config(cfg)
return {"ok": True}
@router.post("/unlock")
async def unlock(req: VaultUnlockRequest, request: Request):
"""Unlock the vault and save the session key."""
require_admin(request)
# Pass the master password on stdin, not argv. argv is visible through
# `ps` / /proc/<pid>/cmdline; stdin also avoids leaving the secret in
# the child process environment.
stdout, stderr, rc = await _run_bw(
["unlock", "--raw"],
input_text=req.master_password + "\n",
)
if rc != 0:
return {"ok": False, "error": f"Unlock failed: {stderr[:300]}"}
session = stdout.strip()
if not session:
return {"ok": False, "error": "bw returned empty session"}
cfg = _load_config()
cfg["session"] = session
cfg["unlocked_at"] = datetime.utcnow().isoformat()
_save_config(cfg)
return {"ok": True, "message": "Vault unlocked"}
@router.post("/lock")
async def lock(request: Request):
"""Lock the vault (clear session from config)."""
require_admin(request)
cfg = _load_config()
cfg.pop("session", None)
cfg.pop("unlocked_at", None)
_save_config(cfg)
# Also tell bw to lock
await _run_bw(["lock"])
return {"ok": True, "message": "Vault locked"}
@router.post("/logout")
async def logout(request: Request):
"""Log out of the Bitwarden CLI completely."""
require_admin(request)
await _run_bw(["logout"])
cfg = _load_config()
cfg.pop("session", None)
cfg.pop("email", None)
cfg.pop("unlocked_at", None)
_save_config(cfg)
return {"ok": True}
return router
async def _check_bw_installed() -> bool:
try:
proc = await asyncio.create_subprocess_exec(
_find_bw(), "--version",
stdout=asyncio.subprocess.PIPE,
stderr=asyncio.subprocess.PIPE,
)
await proc.communicate()
return proc.returncode == 0
except Exception:
return False
-5
View File
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
"""Webhook route domain package (slice 2l, #4082/#4071).
Contains webhook_routes.py, migrated from the flat routes/ directory.
Backward-compat shim at routes/webhook_routes.py re-exports from here.
"""
-395
View File
@@ -1,395 +0,0 @@
"""Webhook, API Token, and sync chat routes."""
import uuid
import logging
from typing import Optional
import httpx
from fastapi import APIRouter, HTTPException, Request, Form
from pydantic import BaseModel, Field
from core.database import SessionLocal, Webhook, ModelEndpoint
from src.auth_helpers import owner_filter
from src.url_security import validate_public_http_url
from src.webhook_manager import WebhookManager, validate_webhook_url, validate_events
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
router = APIRouter(prefix="/api", tags=["webhooks"])
# Input limits
MAX_NAME_LEN = 100
MAX_URL_LEN = 2048
MAX_SECRET_LEN = 256
MAX_MESSAGE_LEN = 32_000
from core.middleware import require_admin as _require_admin
def _select_api_chat_fallback_endpoint(db, token_owner: Optional[str]):
"""First enabled ModelEndpoint visible to token_owner — their own rows plus
legacy null-owner ("shared") rows. Owner-scoped: an unscoped .first() would
let a chat-scoped token fall back onto another user's private endpoint and
silently spend that owner's API key/quota. Prefer owner rows before shared
rows. Fails closed to null-owner rows only when token_owner is absent.
Does not validate base_url admin-configured local/LAN endpoints remain allowed.
"""
query = db.query(ModelEndpoint).filter(ModelEndpoint.is_enabled == True) # noqa: E712
if token_owner:
query = owner_filter(query, ModelEndpoint, token_owner)
return query.order_by(ModelEndpoint.owner.desc(), ModelEndpoint.created_at).first()
return query.filter(ModelEndpoint.owner == None).order_by(ModelEndpoint.created_at).first() # noqa: E711
def _caller_owns_session(sess_owner, caller) -> bool:
"""Strict session-ownership gate for the token-authenticated sync-chat
endpoint (`POST /api/v1/chat`).
Mirrors ``_verify_session_owner`` in session_routes.py and the null-owner
gates in notes/calendar/gallery: a caller may resume a session ONLY when
its owner matches them exactly. A null/empty session owner (legacy or
migrated rows) is deliberately NOT resumable by an arbitrary token the
old ``sess_owner and sess_owner != caller`` form skipped the check whenever
``sess_owner`` was falsy, so any chat-scoped token (e.g. a paired mobile
device) could resume such a session, inject a message, and read back its
history and reuse the owner's endpoint credentials. Fail closed: an
unresolvable caller also returns False.
"""
if not caller:
return False
return sess_owner == caller
def setup_webhook_routes(
webhook_manager: WebhookManager,
auth_manager,
session_manager=None,
api_key_manager=None,
) -> APIRouter:
@router.get("/webhooks")
def list_webhooks(request: Request):
_require_admin(request)
db = SessionLocal()
try:
hooks = db.query(Webhook).all()
return [
{
"id": w.id,
"name": w.name,
"url": w.url,
"has_secret": bool(w.secret),
"events": w.events.split(",") if w.events else [],
"is_active": w.is_active,
"last_triggered_at": w.last_triggered_at.isoformat() if w.last_triggered_at else None,
"last_status_code": w.last_status_code,
"last_error": w.last_error,
"created_at": w.created_at.isoformat() if w.created_at else None,
}
for w in hooks
]
finally:
db.close()
@router.post("/webhooks")
def create_webhook(
request: Request,
name: str = Form(""),
url: str = Form(""),
secret: str = Form(""),
events: str = Form(""),
):
_require_admin(request)
name = name.strip()[:MAX_NAME_LEN]
if not name:
raise HTTPException(400, "Webhook name is required")
try:
url = validate_webhook_url(url)
except ValueError as e:
raise HTTPException(400, str(e))
try:
events = validate_events(events)
except ValueError as e:
raise HTTPException(400, str(e))
secret_val = secret.strip()[:MAX_SECRET_LEN] or None
# Encrypt the secret at rest using the same Fernet key as API keys
encrypted_secret = None
if secret_val and api_key_manager:
encrypted_secret = api_key_manager.encrypt_api_key(secret_val)
elif secret_val:
encrypted_secret = secret_val # Fallback if no encryption available
webhook_id = str(uuid.uuid4())[:8]
db = SessionLocal()
try:
db.add(Webhook(
id=webhook_id,
name=name,
url=url,
secret=encrypted_secret,
events=events,
is_active=True,
))
db.commit()
finally:
db.close()
return {"id": webhook_id, "name": name}
@router.post("/webhooks/{webhook_id}/test")
async def test_webhook(request: Request, webhook_id: str):
_require_admin(request)
db = SessionLocal()
try:
wh = db.query(Webhook).filter(Webhook.id == webhook_id).first()
if not wh:
raise HTTPException(404, "Webhook not found")
url, secret = wh.url, wh.secret
finally:
db.close()
await webhook_manager.deliver_test(webhook_id, url, secret)
return {"status": "sent"}
@router.patch("/webhooks/{webhook_id}")
def toggle_webhook(request: Request, webhook_id: str):
_require_admin(request)
db = SessionLocal()
try:
wh = db.query(Webhook).filter(Webhook.id == webhook_id).first()
if not wh:
raise HTTPException(404, "Webhook not found")
wh.is_active = not wh.is_active
db.commit()
return {"id": webhook_id, "is_active": wh.is_active}
finally:
db.close()
@router.delete("/webhooks/{webhook_id}")
def delete_webhook(request: Request, webhook_id: str):
_require_admin(request)
db = SessionLocal()
try:
deleted = db.query(Webhook).filter(Webhook.id == webhook_id).delete()
db.commit()
if not deleted:
raise HTTPException(404, "Webhook not found")
finally:
db.close()
return {"status": "deleted"}
# ================================================================
# Sync Chat Endpoint (for n8n / Make / Activepieces)
# ================================================================
# Known provider base URLs — auto-resolved from api_key prefix or model name
KNOWN_PROVIDERS = {
"deepseek": "https://api.deepseek.com/v1",
"openai": "https://api.openai.com/v1",
"mistral": "https://api.mistral.ai/v1",
"groq": "https://api.groq.com/openai/v1",
"together": "https://api.together.xyz/v1",
"openrouter": "https://openrouter.ai/api/v1",
"ollama": "https://ollama.com/api",
"opencode-zen": "https://opencode.ai/zen/v1",
"opencode-go": "https://opencode.ai/zen/go/v1",
"fireworks": "https://api.fireworks.ai/inference/v1",
"venice": "https://api.venice.ai/api/v1",
"kimi-code": "https://api.kimi.com/coding/v1",
"kimicode": "https://api.kimi.com/coding/v1",
}
# Model prefix → provider mapping for auto-detection
MODEL_PROVIDER_MAP = {
"deepseek": "deepseek",
"gpt-": "openai",
"o1": "openai",
"o3": "openai",
"o4": "openai",
"mistral": "mistral",
"llama": "groq",
"mixtral": "groq",
"kimi-for-coding": "kimi-code",
"kimi": "kimi-code",
}
def _resolve_base_url(model: Optional[str], provider: Optional[str]) -> Optional[str]:
"""Try to auto-resolve a base URL from provider name or model prefix."""
if provider and provider.lower() in KNOWN_PROVIDERS:
return KNOWN_PROVIDERS[provider.lower()]
if model:
model_lower = model.lower()
for prefix, prov in MODEL_PROVIDER_MAP.items():
if model_lower.startswith(prefix):
return KNOWN_PROVIDERS[prov]
return None
class SyncChatRequest(BaseModel):
message: str = Field(..., max_length=MAX_MESSAGE_LEN)
model: Optional[str] = Field(None, max_length=200)
session: Optional[str] = Field(None, max_length=100)
api_key: Optional[str] = Field(None, max_length=256)
base_url: Optional[str] = Field(None, max_length=MAX_URL_LEN)
provider: Optional[str] = Field(None, max_length=50)
@router.post("/v1/chat")
async def sync_chat(request: Request, body: SyncChatRequest):
if not getattr(request.state, "api_token", False):
raise HTTPException(403, "This endpoint requires an API token")
scopes = set(getattr(request.state, "api_token_scopes", []) or [])
if "chat" not in scopes:
raise HTTPException(403, "API token is not scoped for chat")
token_owner = getattr(request.state, "api_token_owner", None)
from core.models import ChatMessage
from src.llm_core import llm_call_async
from src.endpoint_resolver import build_chat_url, build_headers, build_models_url, normalize_base
message = body.message.strip()
if not message:
raise HTTPException(400, "Message is required")
session_id = body.session
sess = None
# --- Case 1: Resume an existing session ---
if session_id and session_manager:
try:
sess = session_manager.get_session(session_id)
except (KeyError, Exception):
raise HTTPException(404, "Session not found")
# SECURITY: verify the API-token's user owns this session — without
# this any token holder could resume any user's chat by passing its
# ID. The token's user is on request.state.user (set by API-token
# middleware); fall back to require_user if not present.
try:
from src.auth_helpers import get_current_user as _gcu
_tok_user = token_owner or getattr(request.state, "user", None) or _gcu(request)
except Exception:
_tok_user = None
# Strict ownership (see _caller_owns_session): fail closed so a
# null-owner / cross-owner session can't be resumed by an arbitrary
# chat-scoped token.
_sess_owner = getattr(sess, "owner", None)
if not _caller_owns_session(_sess_owner, _tok_user):
raise HTTPException(404, "Session not found")
# --- Case 2: Direct API key + model (no pre-configured endpoint needed) ---
if not sess and body.api_key:
api_key = body.api_key.strip()
model = body.model or "deepseek-chat"
# Validate only token-supplied direct base_url; auto-resolved known-provider
# URLs are not subject to extra local/LAN blocking beyond existing provider logic.
direct_base_url = body.base_url.strip().rstrip("/") if body.base_url else None
if direct_base_url:
try:
base_url = validate_public_http_url(direct_base_url)
except ValueError as e:
detail = str(e).replace("URL", "base_url", 1)
raise HTTPException(400, detail)
else:
base_url = _resolve_base_url(model, body.provider)
if not base_url:
raise HTTPException(400,
"Could not auto-detect provider. Pass base_url (e.g. 'https://api.deepseek.com/v1') "
"or provider ('deepseek', 'openai', 'groq', etc.)")
base_url = normalize_base(base_url)
endpoint_url = build_chat_url(base_url)
if not session_manager:
raise HTTPException(500, "Session manager not available")
sid = str(uuid.uuid4())
sess = session_manager.create_session(
session_id=sid, name="API Chat", endpoint_url=endpoint_url,
model=model, owner=token_owner,
)
sess.headers = build_headers(api_key, base_url)
session_manager.save_sessions()
session_id = sid
# --- Case 3: Fall back to first configured ModelEndpoint ---
if not sess:
db = SessionLocal()
try:
ep = _select_api_chat_fallback_endpoint(db, token_owner)
finally:
db.close()
if not ep:
raise HTTPException(400,
"No session, api_key, or configured endpoints. "
"Pass api_key + model, or configure an endpoint in Admin.")
base_url = normalize_base(ep.base_url)
endpoint_url = build_chat_url(base_url)
model = body.model or "auto"
api_key = ep.api_key
if getattr(ep, "provider_auth_id", None):
try:
from src.endpoint_resolver import resolve_endpoint_runtime
base_url, api_key = resolve_endpoint_runtime(ep, owner=token_owner)
endpoint_url = build_chat_url(base_url)
except Exception:
raise HTTPException(500, "Could not resolve endpoint credentials")
if model == "auto":
try:
async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=5) as client:
models_url = build_models_url(base_url)
hdrs = build_headers(api_key, base_url)
if models_url:
resp = await client.get(models_url, headers=hdrs)
resp.raise_for_status()
data = resp.json()
items = data if isinstance(data, list) else (data.get("data") or [])
ids = [m.get("id") for m in items if isinstance(m, dict) and m.get("id")]
if not ids and isinstance(data, dict):
ids = [
m.get("name") or m.get("model")
for m in (data.get("models") or [])
if m.get("name") or m.get("model")
]
else:
import json as _json
ids = _json.loads(ep.cached_models or "[]")
model = ids[0] if ids else "auto"
except Exception:
raise HTTPException(500, "Could not discover models from endpoint")
if not session_manager:
raise HTTPException(500, "Session manager not available")
sid = str(uuid.uuid4())
sess = session_manager.create_session(
session_id=sid, name="API Chat", endpoint_url=endpoint_url,
model=model, owner=token_owner,
)
if api_key:
sess.headers = build_headers(api_key, base_url)
session_manager.save_sessions()
session_id = sid
# --- Send message and get response ---
sess.add_message(ChatMessage("user", message))
messages = [{"role": m.role, "content": m.content} for m in sess.history]
reply = await llm_call_async(
sess.endpoint_url, sess.model, messages,
headers=sess.headers, timeout=120,
)
sess.add_message(ChatMessage("assistant", reply))
session_manager.save_sessions()
webhook_manager.fire_and_forget("chat.completed", {
"session_id": session_id, "model": sess.model,
"user_message": message[:2000], "response": reply[:2000],
})
return {"response": reply, "session_id": session_id, "model": sess.model}
return router
+391 -12
View File
@@ -1,16 +1,395 @@
"""Backward-compat shim — canonical location is routes/webhook/webhook_routes.py.
"""Webhook, API Token, and sync chat routes."""
This module is replaced in ``sys.modules`` by the canonical module object so
that ``import routes.webhook_routes``, ``from routes.webhook_routes import X``,
``importlib.import_module("routes.webhook_routes")``, and the
``__import__("routes.webhook_routes", fromlist=[...])`` + ``setattr(wh_mod,
...)`` pattern used by test_null_owner_gates.py all operate on the *same*
object. Keeps existing import paths working after slice 2l (#4082/#4071).
Source-introspection tests read the canonical file by path.
"""
import uuid
import logging
from typing import Optional
import sys as _sys
import httpx
from fastapi import APIRouter, HTTPException, Request, Form
from pydantic import BaseModel, Field
from routes.webhook import webhook_routes as _canonical # noqa: F401
from core.database import SessionLocal, Webhook, ModelEndpoint
from src.auth_helpers import owner_filter
from src.url_security import validate_public_http_url
from src.webhook_manager import WebhookManager, validate_webhook_url, validate_events
_sys.modules[__name__] = _canonical
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
router = APIRouter(prefix="/api", tags=["webhooks"])
# Input limits
MAX_NAME_LEN = 100
MAX_URL_LEN = 2048
MAX_SECRET_LEN = 256
MAX_MESSAGE_LEN = 32_000
from core.middleware import require_admin as _require_admin
def _select_api_chat_fallback_endpoint(db, token_owner: Optional[str]):
"""First enabled ModelEndpoint visible to token_owner — their own rows plus
legacy null-owner ("shared") rows. Owner-scoped: an unscoped .first() would
let a chat-scoped token fall back onto another user's private endpoint and
silently spend that owner's API key/quota. Prefer owner rows before shared
rows. Fails closed to null-owner rows only when token_owner is absent.
Does not validate base_url admin-configured local/LAN endpoints remain allowed.
"""
query = db.query(ModelEndpoint).filter(ModelEndpoint.is_enabled == True) # noqa: E712
if token_owner:
query = owner_filter(query, ModelEndpoint, token_owner)
return query.order_by(ModelEndpoint.owner.desc(), ModelEndpoint.created_at).first()
return query.filter(ModelEndpoint.owner == None).order_by(ModelEndpoint.created_at).first() # noqa: E711
def _caller_owns_session(sess_owner, caller) -> bool:
"""Strict session-ownership gate for the token-authenticated sync-chat
endpoint (`POST /api/v1/chat`).
Mirrors ``_verify_session_owner`` in session_routes.py and the null-owner
gates in notes/calendar/gallery: a caller may resume a session ONLY when
its owner matches them exactly. A null/empty session owner (legacy or
migrated rows) is deliberately NOT resumable by an arbitrary token the
old ``sess_owner and sess_owner != caller`` form skipped the check whenever
``sess_owner`` was falsy, so any chat-scoped token (e.g. a paired mobile
device) could resume such a session, inject a message, and read back its
history and reuse the owner's endpoint credentials. Fail closed: an
unresolvable caller also returns False.
"""
if not caller:
return False
return sess_owner == caller
def setup_webhook_routes(
webhook_manager: WebhookManager,
auth_manager,
session_manager=None,
api_key_manager=None,
) -> APIRouter:
@router.get("/webhooks")
def list_webhooks(request: Request):
_require_admin(request)
db = SessionLocal()
try:
hooks = db.query(Webhook).all()
return [
{
"id": w.id,
"name": w.name,
"url": w.url,
"has_secret": bool(w.secret),
"events": w.events.split(",") if w.events else [],
"is_active": w.is_active,
"last_triggered_at": w.last_triggered_at.isoformat() if w.last_triggered_at else None,
"last_status_code": w.last_status_code,
"last_error": w.last_error,
"created_at": w.created_at.isoformat() if w.created_at else None,
}
for w in hooks
]
finally:
db.close()
@router.post("/webhooks")
def create_webhook(
request: Request,
name: str = Form(""),
url: str = Form(""),
secret: str = Form(""),
events: str = Form(""),
):
_require_admin(request)
name = name.strip()[:MAX_NAME_LEN]
if not name:
raise HTTPException(400, "Webhook name is required")
try:
url = validate_webhook_url(url)
except ValueError as e:
raise HTTPException(400, str(e))
try:
events = validate_events(events)
except ValueError as e:
raise HTTPException(400, str(e))
secret_val = secret.strip()[:MAX_SECRET_LEN] or None
# Encrypt the secret at rest using the same Fernet key as API keys
encrypted_secret = None
if secret_val and api_key_manager:
encrypted_secret = api_key_manager.encrypt_api_key(secret_val)
elif secret_val:
encrypted_secret = secret_val # Fallback if no encryption available
webhook_id = str(uuid.uuid4())[:8]
db = SessionLocal()
try:
db.add(Webhook(
id=webhook_id,
name=name,
url=url,
secret=encrypted_secret,
events=events,
is_active=True,
))
db.commit()
finally:
db.close()
return {"id": webhook_id, "name": name}
@router.post("/webhooks/{webhook_id}/test")
async def test_webhook(request: Request, webhook_id: str):
_require_admin(request)
db = SessionLocal()
try:
wh = db.query(Webhook).filter(Webhook.id == webhook_id).first()
if not wh:
raise HTTPException(404, "Webhook not found")
url, secret = wh.url, wh.secret
finally:
db.close()
await webhook_manager.deliver_test(webhook_id, url, secret)
return {"status": "sent"}
@router.patch("/webhooks/{webhook_id}")
def toggle_webhook(request: Request, webhook_id: str):
_require_admin(request)
db = SessionLocal()
try:
wh = db.query(Webhook).filter(Webhook.id == webhook_id).first()
if not wh:
raise HTTPException(404, "Webhook not found")
wh.is_active = not wh.is_active
db.commit()
return {"id": webhook_id, "is_active": wh.is_active}
finally:
db.close()
@router.delete("/webhooks/{webhook_id}")
def delete_webhook(request: Request, webhook_id: str):
_require_admin(request)
db = SessionLocal()
try:
deleted = db.query(Webhook).filter(Webhook.id == webhook_id).delete()
db.commit()
if not deleted:
raise HTTPException(404, "Webhook not found")
finally:
db.close()
return {"status": "deleted"}
# ================================================================
# Sync Chat Endpoint (for n8n / Make / Activepieces)
# ================================================================
# Known provider base URLs — auto-resolved from api_key prefix or model name
KNOWN_PROVIDERS = {
"deepseek": "https://api.deepseek.com/v1",
"openai": "https://api.openai.com/v1",
"mistral": "https://api.mistral.ai/v1",
"groq": "https://api.groq.com/openai/v1",
"together": "https://api.together.xyz/v1",
"openrouter": "https://openrouter.ai/api/v1",
"ollama": "https://ollama.com/api",
"opencode-zen": "https://opencode.ai/zen/v1",
"opencode-go": "https://opencode.ai/zen/go/v1",
"fireworks": "https://api.fireworks.ai/inference/v1",
"venice": "https://api.venice.ai/api/v1",
"kimi-code": "https://api.kimi.com/coding/v1",
"kimicode": "https://api.kimi.com/coding/v1",
}
# Model prefix → provider mapping for auto-detection
MODEL_PROVIDER_MAP = {
"deepseek": "deepseek",
"gpt-": "openai",
"o1": "openai",
"o3": "openai",
"o4": "openai",
"mistral": "mistral",
"llama": "groq",
"mixtral": "groq",
"kimi-for-coding": "kimi-code",
"kimi": "kimi-code",
}
def _resolve_base_url(model: Optional[str], provider: Optional[str]) -> Optional[str]:
"""Try to auto-resolve a base URL from provider name or model prefix."""
if provider and provider.lower() in KNOWN_PROVIDERS:
return KNOWN_PROVIDERS[provider.lower()]
if model:
model_lower = model.lower()
for prefix, prov in MODEL_PROVIDER_MAP.items():
if model_lower.startswith(prefix):
return KNOWN_PROVIDERS[prov]
return None
class SyncChatRequest(BaseModel):
message: str = Field(..., max_length=MAX_MESSAGE_LEN)
model: Optional[str] = Field(None, max_length=200)
session: Optional[str] = Field(None, max_length=100)
api_key: Optional[str] = Field(None, max_length=256)
base_url: Optional[str] = Field(None, max_length=MAX_URL_LEN)
provider: Optional[str] = Field(None, max_length=50)
@router.post("/v1/chat")
async def sync_chat(request: Request, body: SyncChatRequest):
if not getattr(request.state, "api_token", False):
raise HTTPException(403, "This endpoint requires an API token")
scopes = set(getattr(request.state, "api_token_scopes", []) or [])
if "chat" not in scopes:
raise HTTPException(403, "API token is not scoped for chat")
token_owner = getattr(request.state, "api_token_owner", None)
from core.models import ChatMessage
from src.llm_core import llm_call_async
from src.endpoint_resolver import build_chat_url, build_headers, build_models_url, normalize_base
message = body.message.strip()
if not message:
raise HTTPException(400, "Message is required")
session_id = body.session
sess = None
# --- Case 1: Resume an existing session ---
if session_id and session_manager:
try:
sess = session_manager.get_session(session_id)
except (KeyError, Exception):
raise HTTPException(404, "Session not found")
# SECURITY: verify the API-token's user owns this session — without
# this any token holder could resume any user's chat by passing its
# ID. The token's user is on request.state.user (set by API-token
# middleware); fall back to require_user if not present.
try:
from src.auth_helpers import get_current_user as _gcu
_tok_user = token_owner or getattr(request.state, "user", None) or _gcu(request)
except Exception:
_tok_user = None
# Strict ownership (see _caller_owns_session): fail closed so a
# null-owner / cross-owner session can't be resumed by an arbitrary
# chat-scoped token.
_sess_owner = getattr(sess, "owner", None)
if not _caller_owns_session(_sess_owner, _tok_user):
raise HTTPException(404, "Session not found")
# --- Case 2: Direct API key + model (no pre-configured endpoint needed) ---
if not sess and body.api_key:
api_key = body.api_key.strip()
model = body.model or "deepseek-chat"
# Validate only token-supplied direct base_url; auto-resolved known-provider
# URLs are not subject to extra local/LAN blocking beyond existing provider logic.
direct_base_url = body.base_url.strip().rstrip("/") if body.base_url else None
if direct_base_url:
try:
base_url = validate_public_http_url(direct_base_url)
except ValueError as e:
detail = str(e).replace("URL", "base_url", 1)
raise HTTPException(400, detail)
else:
base_url = _resolve_base_url(model, body.provider)
if not base_url:
raise HTTPException(400,
"Could not auto-detect provider. Pass base_url (e.g. 'https://api.deepseek.com/v1') "
"or provider ('deepseek', 'openai', 'groq', etc.)")
base_url = normalize_base(base_url)
endpoint_url = build_chat_url(base_url)
if not session_manager:
raise HTTPException(500, "Session manager not available")
sid = str(uuid.uuid4())
sess = session_manager.create_session(
session_id=sid, name="API Chat", endpoint_url=endpoint_url,
model=model, owner=token_owner,
)
sess.headers = build_headers(api_key, base_url)
session_manager.save_sessions()
session_id = sid
# --- Case 3: Fall back to first configured ModelEndpoint ---
if not sess:
db = SessionLocal()
try:
ep = _select_api_chat_fallback_endpoint(db, token_owner)
finally:
db.close()
if not ep:
raise HTTPException(400,
"No session, api_key, or configured endpoints. "
"Pass api_key + model, or configure an endpoint in Admin.")
base_url = normalize_base(ep.base_url)
endpoint_url = build_chat_url(base_url)
model = body.model or "auto"
api_key = ep.api_key
if getattr(ep, "provider_auth_id", None):
try:
from src.endpoint_resolver import resolve_endpoint_runtime
base_url, api_key = resolve_endpoint_runtime(ep, owner=token_owner)
endpoint_url = build_chat_url(base_url)
except Exception:
raise HTTPException(500, "Could not resolve endpoint credentials")
if model == "auto":
try:
async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=5) as client:
models_url = build_models_url(base_url)
hdrs = build_headers(api_key, base_url)
if models_url:
resp = await client.get(models_url, headers=hdrs)
resp.raise_for_status()
data = resp.json()
items = data if isinstance(data, list) else (data.get("data") or [])
ids = [m.get("id") for m in items if isinstance(m, dict) and m.get("id")]
if not ids and isinstance(data, dict):
ids = [
m.get("name") or m.get("model")
for m in (data.get("models") or [])
if m.get("name") or m.get("model")
]
else:
import json as _json
ids = _json.loads(ep.cached_models or "[]")
model = ids[0] if ids else "auto"
except Exception:
raise HTTPException(500, "Could not discover models from endpoint")
if not session_manager:
raise HTTPException(500, "Session manager not available")
sid = str(uuid.uuid4())
sess = session_manager.create_session(
session_id=sid, name="API Chat", endpoint_url=endpoint_url,
model=model, owner=token_owner,
)
if api_key:
sess.headers = build_headers(api_key, base_url)
session_manager.save_sessions()
session_id = sid
# --- Send message and get response ---
sess.add_message(ChatMessage("user", message))
messages = [{"role": m.role, "content": m.content} for m in sess.history]
reply = await llm_call_async(
sess.endpoint_url, sess.model, messages,
headers=sess.headers, timeout=120,
)
sess.add_message(ChatMessage("assistant", reply))
session_manager.save_sessions()
webhook_manager.fire_and_forget("chat.completed", {
"session_id": session_id, "model": sess.model,
"user_message": message[:2000], "response": reply[:2000],
})
return {"response": reply, "session_id": session_id, "model": sess.model}
return router
+10 -104
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Create/remove the switchable 'Demo' EmailAccount in Odysseus.
"""Create/remove the switchable, non-default 'Demo' EmailAccount in Odysseus.
Mirrors the existing local-Dovecot account (localhost:31143, STARTTLS) but points
at the throwaway demo@odysseus.local mailbox. Password is stored Fernet-encrypted
@@ -20,14 +20,7 @@ from pathlib import Path
ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent.parent
sys.path.insert(0, str(ROOT))
from core.database import ( # noqa: E402
Base,
EmailAccount,
SessionLocal,
engine,
lock_email_account_owner_mutations,
)
from sqlalchemy import or_ # noqa: E402
from core.database import SessionLocal, EmailAccount, Base, engine # noqa: E402
from src.secret_storage import encrypt # noqa: E402
NAME = "Demo"
@@ -38,98 +31,18 @@ IMAP_PASSWORD = "demodemo"
OWNER = ""
def _owner_scope(query, owner: str):
if owner:
return query.filter(EmailAccount.owner == owner)
return query.filter(or_(EmailAccount.owner == None, EmailAccount.owner == "")) # noqa: E711
def _discover_demo_scopes() -> set[str]:
db = SessionLocal()
try:
return {
row.owner or ""
for row in db.query(EmailAccount).filter(
EmailAccount.name == NAME,
EmailAccount.imap_user == IMAP_USER,
).all()
}
finally:
db.close()
def _lock_and_load_demo_rows(db, scopes: set[str]):
"""Reload Demo rows under every observed owner lock."""
scopes = set(scopes) or {OWNER}
while True:
lock_email_account_owner_mutations(db, *scopes)
rows = (
db.query(EmailAccount)
.filter(
EmailAccount.name == NAME,
EmailAccount.imap_user == IMAP_USER,
)
.order_by(EmailAccount.created_at.asc(), EmailAccount.id.asc())
.all()
)
current_scopes = {row.owner or "" for row in rows}
if current_scopes.issubset(scopes) or db.get_bind().dialect.name == "sqlite":
return rows
db.rollback()
scopes.update(current_scopes)
def _promote_oldest_enabled(db, owner: str, excluded_ids: list[str]) -> None:
remaining = _owner_scope(
db.query(EmailAccount).filter(
EmailAccount.enabled == True, # noqa: E712
~EmailAccount.id.in_(excluded_ids),
),
owner,
)
if remaining.filter(EmailAccount.is_default == True).first() is not None: # noqa: E712
return
promote = remaining.order_by(
EmailAccount.created_at.asc(), EmailAccount.id.asc()
).first()
if promote is not None:
promote.is_default = True
def setup() -> int:
Base.metadata.create_all(bind=engine)
scopes = _discover_demo_scopes() | {OWNER}
db = SessionLocal()
try:
rows = _lock_and_load_demo_rows(db, scopes)
acct = rows[0] if rows else None
acct = db.query(EmailAccount).filter(
EmailAccount.name == NAME, EmailAccount.imap_user == IMAP_USER
).first()
if acct is None:
acct = EmailAccount(id=uuid.uuid4().hex, name=NAME)
db.add(acct)
old_scope = acct.owner or ""
was_default = bool(acct.is_default)
if old_scope != OWNER:
# Move a non-default row first so the unique index cannot see two
# defaults transiently while SQLAlchemy flushes the owner move and
# old-scope promotion in separate UPDATE statements.
acct.is_default = False
acct.owner = OWNER
db.flush()
if was_default:
_promote_oldest_enabled(db, old_scope, [acct.id])
target_default = _owner_scope(
db.query(EmailAccount).filter(
EmailAccount.id != acct.id,
EmailAccount.is_default == True, # noqa: E712
),
OWNER,
).first()
acct.owner = OWNER
# Keep Demo non-default when a real default exists. If it is the only
# enabled account, it must be default to preserve normal create
# semantics and avoid leaving the owner partition without one.
acct.is_default = target_default is None
acct.is_default = False # never default — user switches to it
acct.enabled = True
acct.imap_host = "localhost"
acct.imap_port = 31143
@@ -144,27 +57,20 @@ def setup() -> int:
acct.smtp_password = encrypt(IMAP_PASSWORD)
acct.from_address = IMAP_USER
db.commit()
state = "default" if acct.is_default else "non-default"
print(f"'{NAME}' account ready (id={acct.id}, {state}, switchable).")
print(f"'{NAME}' account ready (id={acct.id}, non-default, switchable).")
return 0
finally:
db.close()
def teardown() -> int:
scopes = _discover_demo_scopes()
db = SessionLocal()
try:
rows = _lock_and_load_demo_rows(db, scopes)
deleted_ids = [row.id for row in rows]
default_scopes = {row.owner or "" for row in rows if row.is_default}
rows = db.query(EmailAccount).filter(
EmailAccount.name == NAME, EmailAccount.imap_user == IMAP_USER
).all()
for r in rows:
db.delete(r)
# Ensure the old default DELETE reaches the database before a
# replacement UPDATE; the unique index is enforced per statement.
db.flush()
for owner in default_scopes:
_promote_oldest_enabled(db, owner, deleted_ids)
db.commit()
print(f"removed {len(rows)} '{NAME}' account row(s).")
return 0
-166
View File
@@ -1,166 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Make retained SearXNG settings inherit defaults without replacing them."""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import stat
import sys
import tempfile
from pathlib import Path
import yaml
from yaml.nodes import MappingNode
from yaml.tokens import BlockMappingStartToken, FlowMappingStartToken
_UTF8_BOM = b"\xef\xbb\xbf"
def _parse_root_mapping(text: str) -> tuple[MappingNode | None, dict]:
"""Parse settings with the same safe YAML semantics SearXNG uses."""
try:
loaded = yaml.safe_load(text)
node = yaml.compose(text, Loader=yaml.SafeLoader)
except yaml.YAMLError:
raise ValueError("settings file is not valid single-document YAML") from None
if loaded is None and node is None:
return None, {}
if not isinstance(loaded, dict) or not isinstance(node, MappingNode):
raise ValueError("settings root is not a mapping")
return node, loaded
def _flow_mapping_start(text: str) -> int:
"""Return the root flow mapping's opening-brace character offset."""
try:
for token in yaml.scan(text, Loader=yaml.SafeLoader):
if isinstance(token, FlowMappingStartToken):
return token.start_mark.index
except yaml.YAMLError:
pass
raise ValueError("flow-style settings mapping has no opening brace")
def _newline_for(contents: bytes) -> bytes:
first_lf = contents.find(b"\n")
if first_lf > 0 and contents[first_lf - 1 : first_lf + 1] == b"\r\n":
return b"\r\n"
return b"\n"
def _block_mapping_position(text: str, root: MappingNode | None) -> tuple[int, int]:
"""Return a safe character offset and indent for a root block mapping key."""
if root is None:
return len(text), 0
try:
for token in yaml.scan(text, Loader=yaml.SafeLoader):
if not isinstance(token, BlockMappingStartToken):
continue
line_start = token.start_mark.index - token.start_mark.column
if not text[line_start : token.start_mark.index].strip():
return line_start, token.start_mark.column
return root.end_mark.index, token.start_mark.column
except yaml.YAMLError:
pass
return root.end_mark.index, root.start_mark.column
def _add_block_default_inheritance(
contents: bytes, text: str, root: MappingNode | None
) -> bytes:
newline = _newline_for(contents)
character_offset, indent_width = _block_mapping_position(text, root)
bom_length = len(_UTF8_BOM) if contents.startswith(_UTF8_BOM) else 0
offset = bom_length + len(text[:character_offset].encode("utf-8"))
separator = b""
if offset not in (0, bom_length) and not contents[:offset].endswith((b"\n", b"\r")):
separator = newline
addition = (
separator
+ b" " * indent_width
+ b"use_default_settings: true"
+ newline
)
return contents[:offset] + addition + contents[offset:]
def migrate_settings(path: Path) -> bool:
"""Add the missing inheritance key atomically; return whether the file changed."""
source_stat = path.lstat()
if not stat.S_ISREG(source_stat.st_mode):
raise ValueError(f"settings path is not a regular file: {path}")
contents = path.read_bytes()
if not contents:
return False
text = contents.decode("utf-8-sig")
root, loaded = _parse_root_mapping(text)
if "use_default_settings" in loaded:
return False
if root is not None and root.flow_style:
start = _flow_mapping_start(text)
bom_length = len(_UTF8_BOM) if contents.startswith(_UTF8_BOM) else 0
offset = bom_length + len(text[: start + 1].encode("utf-8"))
separator = b", " if root.value else b""
updated = (
contents[:offset]
+ b"use_default_settings: true"
+ separator
+ contents[offset:]
)
else:
updated = _add_block_default_inheritance(contents, text, root)
fd, temporary_name = tempfile.mkstemp(
prefix=f".{path.name}.odysseus-", dir=path.parent
)
temporary = Path(temporary_name)
try:
# chmod before chown: the Compose cap set is `cap_drop: ALL` plus
# CHOWN/SETGID/SETUID/DAC_OVERRIDE, with no FOWNER. Once the temporary
# file belongs to searxng:searxng — which every retained settings file
# does, because searxng's entrypoint chowns /etc/searxng — root can no
# longer chmod it and the migration dies with EPERM.
os.fchmod(fd, stat.S_IMODE(source_stat.st_mode))
os.fchown(fd, source_stat.st_uid, source_stat.st_gid)
with os.fdopen(fd, "wb") as handle:
fd = -1
handle.write(updated)
handle.flush()
os.fsync(handle.fileno())
os.replace(temporary, path)
directory_fd = os.open(path.parent, os.O_RDONLY | os.O_DIRECTORY)
try:
os.fsync(directory_fd)
finally:
os.close(directory_fd)
finally:
if fd >= 0:
os.close(fd)
temporary.unlink(missing_ok=True)
return True
def main(argv: list[str]) -> int:
if len(argv) > 2:
print(f"usage: {Path(argv[0]).name} [settings.yml]", file=sys.stderr)
return 2
path = Path(argv[1]) if len(argv) == 2 else Path("/etc/searxng/settings.yml")
try:
changed = migrate_settings(path)
except (OSError, UnicodeError, ValueError) as exc:
print(f"SearXNG settings migration failed: {exc}", file=sys.stderr)
return 1
if changed:
print("Added use_default_settings inheritance to retained SearXNG settings")
return 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
raise SystemExit(main(sys.argv))
+1 -2
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
"""Memory service — persistent memory storage and retrieval."""
from .service import MemoryService, Memory, MemorySearchResult
from .memory import MemoryManager, MemoryStoreUnreadable
from .memory import MemoryManager
from .memory_vector import MemoryVectorStore
__all__ = [
@@ -10,6 +10,5 @@ __all__ = [
"Memory",
"MemorySearchResult",
"MemoryManager",
"MemoryStoreUnreadable",
"MemoryVectorStore",
]
+2 -12
View File
@@ -5,16 +5,6 @@ application runtime instantiates ``src.memory.MemoryManager``, so keeping a
parallel implementation here risks silent drift between import paths.
"""
from src.memory import (
MemoryManager,
MemoryStoreUnreadable,
get_text_similarity,
tokenize,
)
from src.memory import MemoryManager, get_text_similarity, tokenize
__all__ = [
"MemoryManager",
"MemoryStoreUnreadable",
"get_text_similarity",
"tokenize",
]
__all__ = ["MemoryManager", "get_text_similarity", "tokenize"]
+2 -21
View File
@@ -17,8 +17,6 @@ import os
import re
from typing import Optional
from src.memory import MemoryStoreUnreadable
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
@@ -389,13 +387,7 @@ async def extract_and_store(
# Get owner from session
_owner = getattr(session, 'owner', None)
# Strict load: this is a read-modify-write. Degrading to [] here would
# save only the newly extracted facts and drop the entire store.
try:
existing = memory_manager.load_all_for_update()
except MemoryStoreUnreadable as e:
logger.error("Skipping auto memory extraction, store unreadable: %s", e)
return
existing = memory_manager.load_all()
added = 0
for fact in facts:
@@ -634,18 +626,7 @@ async def audit_memories(
# Merge audited entries back with other users' entries
if owner:
# Strict load: the merge below reconstructs the whole file. If this
# degraded to [] we would save only this owner's audited slice and
# destroy every other tenant's memories.
try:
all_entries = memory_manager.load_all_for_update()
except MemoryStoreUnreadable as e:
logger.error("Aborting memory audit save, store unreadable: %s", e)
return {
"before": before_count,
"after": before_count,
"error": "store_unreadable",
}
all_entries = memory_manager.load_all()
audited_ids = {e["id"] for e in final_entries}
other_entries = [e for e in all_entries if e.get("owner") != owner and (e.get("owner") is not None)]
# Also keep legacy entries that weren't part of this audit
+4 -43
View File
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ import json
import logging
import re
from dataclasses import dataclass, field
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from datetime import datetime
from typing import Any, Dict, List, Optional
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
@@ -100,18 +100,6 @@ def _parse_scalar(raw: str) -> Any:
if raw.lower() in ("null", "none", "~"):
return None
if (raw[0] == raw[-1]) and raw[0] in ("'", '"'):
if raw[0] == '"':
# _emit_scalar writes double-quoted scalars with json.dumps, so
# decode the escapes instead of only stripping the quotes. Without
# this, `\"` / `\\` / `\uXXXX` stayed verbatim in the value and the
# next save escaped their backslashes again, doubling them on every
# load/save cycle (issue #5210).
try:
return json.loads(raw)
except ValueError:
# Hand-written file using escapes JSON rejects (e.g. a bare
# Windows path). Keep the previous literal reading.
pass
return raw[1:-1]
# Try number
try:
@@ -183,26 +171,6 @@ def parse_frontmatter(text: str) -> tuple[Dict[str, Any], str]:
return fm, body
# Characters that force a quoted scalar. The punctuation would otherwise change
# how the value reads back; the second row is every character str.splitlines()
# treats as a line break, and parse_frontmatter() reads one scalar per line, so
# emitting one of those bare would split the value across lines.
_FM_MUST_QUOTE = (
":", "#", "[", "]", "{", "}", ",", "&", "*", "!", "|", ">", "'", '"', "%", "@",
"\n", "\r", "\v", "\f", "\x1c", "\x1d", "\x1e", "\x85", "\u2028", "\u2029",
)
# json.dumps escapes every C0 control character, but with ensure_ascii=False it
# passes NEL / LINE SEPARATOR / PARAGRAPH SEPARATOR through literally, and
# str.splitlines() still breaks on all three. Re-escape exactly those, which
# json.loads decodes again on the way in, so the pair stays symmetric.
_FM_POST_DUMPS_ESCAPES = (
("\x85", "\\u0085"),
("\u2028", "\\u2028"),
("\u2029", "\\u2029"),
)
def _emit_scalar(v: Any) -> str:
if v is None:
return "null"
@@ -213,15 +181,8 @@ def _emit_scalar(v: Any) -> str:
if isinstance(v, list):
return "[" + ", ".join(_emit_scalar(x) for x in v) + "]"
s = str(v)
if any(c in s for c in _FM_MUST_QUOTE):
# ensure_ascii=False keeps non-ASCII text as itself. SKILL.md is UTF-8 at
# both ends (skills.py reads it, atomic_write_text writes it), so the
# \uXXXX form bought nothing and leaked into the parsed value (#5210).
out = json.dumps(s, ensure_ascii=False)
for ch, esc in _FM_POST_DUMPS_ESCAPES:
if ch in out:
out = out.replace(ch, esc)
return out
if any(c in s for c in (":", "#", "\n", "[", "]", "{", "}", ",", "&", "*", "!", "|", ">", "'", '"', "%", "@")):
return json.dumps(s)
return s
@@ -480,4 +441,4 @@ class Skill:
def _now_iso() -> str:
return datetime.now(timezone.utc).strftime("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ")
return datetime.utcnow().strftime("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ")
+43 -213
View File
@@ -1,18 +1,16 @@
"""Import SKILL.md bundles from public GitHub (or skills.sh → GitHub) URLs."""
from __future__ import annotations
import ipaddress
import logging
import os
import time
import re
from dataclasses import dataclass
from typing import Dict, Iterable, List, Optional, Tuple, cast
from typing import Dict, List, Optional, Tuple
from urllib.parse import quote, urljoin, urlparse
import httpcore
import httpx
from src.url_safety import _default_resolver, check_outbound_url
from src.url_safety import check_outbound_url
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
@@ -27,7 +25,6 @@ TEXT_NAMES = {"skill.md", "license", "license.md", "readme.md"}
_GITHUB_HOSTS = frozenset({
"github.com", "www.github.com", "api.github.com", "raw.githubusercontent.com",
})
_SKILLS_SH_HOSTS = frozenset({"skills.sh", "www.skills.sh"})
def _github_host(url: str) -> str:
@@ -75,158 +72,18 @@ def _is_text_file(name: str) -> bool:
_MAX_FETCH_REDIRECTS = 5
def _validated_ips(raw_ips: List[str]) -> List[ipaddress._BaseAddress]:
"""Parse and de-duplicate one resolver snapshot in resolver order."""
ips: List[ipaddress._BaseAddress] = []
seen = set()
for raw in raw_ips:
if not isinstance(raw, str):
continue
try:
ip = ipaddress.ip_address(raw.split("%", 1)[0])
except ValueError:
continue
if ip in seen:
continue
seen.add(ip)
ips.append(ip)
return ips
def _check_fetch_url(url: str) -> None:
"""SSRF guard for skill-import fetches (defense-in-depth).
def _resolve_and_check_url(url: str) -> List[ipaddress._BaseAddress]:
"""Return the exact address snapshot approved for one fetch hop."""
resolved_ips: List[str] = []
def _recording_resolver(host: str) -> List[str]:
answers = list(_default_resolver(host))
resolved_ips[:] = answers
return answers
ok, reason = check_outbound_url(
url,
block_private=True,
resolver=_recording_resolver,
)
Skill bundles only ever come from public GitHub, never an internal
address, so block private/loopback/link-local targets on every hop
matching the hardened web-fetch path in
``services/search/content.py:_get_public_url`` rather than the lenient
default used for admin-configured model endpoints.
"""
ok, reason = check_outbound_url(url, block_private=True)
if not ok:
raise SkillImportError(f"outbound URL blocked: {reason}")
pinned_ips = _validated_ips(resolved_ips)
if not pinned_ips:
raise SkillImportError("outbound URL blocked: host did not resolve to a usable address")
return pinned_ips
# Backward compatibility alias for tests importing _check_fetch_url directly
_check_fetch_url = _resolve_and_check_url
class _PinnedBackend(httpcore.NetworkBackend):
"""Connect only to addresses from one validated DNS snapshot."""
def __init__(self, ips: List[ipaddress._BaseAddress]):
self._ips = [str(ip) for ip in ips]
self._real = httpcore.SyncBackend()
def connect_tcp(
self,
host: str,
port: int,
timeout: float | None = None,
local_address: str | None = None,
socket_options=None,
):
deadline = None if timeout is None else time.monotonic() + timeout
last_exc: Optional[Exception] = None
for ip in self._ips:
remaining = None if deadline is None else max(0.0, deadline - time.monotonic())
try:
return self._real.connect_tcp(
ip,
port,
remaining,
local_address,
socket_options,
)
except (httpcore.ConnectError, httpcore.ConnectTimeout) as exc:
last_exc = exc
if deadline is not None and time.monotonic() >= deadline:
break
if last_exc is not None:
raise last_exc
raise httpcore.ConnectError("no validated address available")
def connect_unix_socket(self, path, timeout=None, socket_options=None):
return self._real.connect_unix_socket(path, timeout, socket_options)
def sleep(self, seconds: float) -> None:
return self._real.sleep(seconds)
_HTTPCORE_TO_HTTPX_EXC = {
httpcore.ConnectError: httpx.ConnectError,
httpcore.ConnectTimeout: httpx.ConnectTimeout,
httpcore.LocalProtocolError: httpx.LocalProtocolError,
httpcore.NetworkError: httpx.NetworkError,
httpcore.PoolTimeout: httpx.PoolTimeout,
httpcore.ProtocolError: httpx.ProtocolError,
httpcore.ProxyError: httpx.ProxyError,
httpcore.ReadError: httpx.ReadError,
httpcore.ReadTimeout: httpx.ReadTimeout,
httpcore.RemoteProtocolError: httpx.RemoteProtocolError,
httpcore.TimeoutException: httpx.TimeoutException,
httpcore.UnsupportedProtocol: httpx.UnsupportedProtocol,
httpcore.WriteError: httpx.WriteError,
httpcore.WriteTimeout: httpx.WriteTimeout,
}
class _PinnedTransport(httpx.BaseTransport):
"""Pin socket connects while preserving URL authority, Host, and TLS SNI."""
def __init__(self, ips: List[ipaddress._BaseAddress]):
self._pinned_ips = list(ips)
self._pool = httpcore.ConnectionPool(
ssl_context=httpx.create_ssl_context(),
http1=True,
http2=False,
network_backend=_PinnedBackend(ips),
)
def handle_request(self, request: httpx.Request) -> httpx.Response:
core_request = httpcore.Request(
method=request.method,
url=httpcore.URL(
scheme=request.url.raw_scheme,
host=request.url.raw_host,
port=request.url.port,
target=request.url.raw_path,
),
headers=request.headers.raw,
content=request.stream,
extensions=request.extensions,
)
core_response = None
try:
core_response = self._pool.handle_request(core_request)
content = b"".join(cast(Iterable[bytes], core_response.stream))
except Exception as exc:
mapped = _HTTPCORE_TO_HTTPX_EXC.get(type(exc))
if mapped is not None:
raise mapped(str(exc)) from exc
raise
finally:
if core_response is not None:
core_response.close()
return httpx.Response(
status_code=core_response.status,
headers=core_response.headers,
content=content,
extensions=core_response.extensions,
)
def close(self) -> None:
self._pool.close()
raise SkillImportError(reason)
def _get_checked(
@@ -243,76 +100,49 @@ def _get_checked(
hand lets us re-validate every hop, closing that blind-SSRF gap.
"""
current = url
for _ in range(_MAX_FETCH_REDIRECTS + 1):
pinned_ips = _resolve_and_check_url(current)
with httpx.Client(
transport=_PinnedTransport(pinned_ips),
follow_redirects=False,
timeout=timeout,
) as client:
with httpx.Client(follow_redirects=False, timeout=timeout) as client:
for _ in range(_MAX_FETCH_REDIRECTS + 1):
_check_fetch_url(current)
r = client.get(current, headers=headers)
if r.status_code in (301, 302, 303, 307, 308):
location = r.headers.get("location")
if not location:
return r
current = urljoin(str(r.url), location)
continue
return r
if r.status_code in (301, 302, 303, 307, 308):
location = r.headers.get("location")
if not location:
return r
current = urljoin(str(r.url), location)
continue
return r
raise SkillImportError("too many redirects while fetching skill bundle")
def parse_skill_source(url: str) -> ResolvedSource:
"""Normalize skills.sh / GitHub web URLs into owner/repo/ref/path."""
url = (url or "").strip()
if not url:
raw = (url or "").strip()
if not raw:
raise SkillImportError("URL is required")
# ``urlparse`` only reports an unambiguous scheme when the URL carries the
# ``scheme://`` form. Opaque schemes (``mailto:``, ``javascript:``) and a
# schemeless ``host:port`` both parse a "scheme" that is not one, so they
# fall through to the host check below and are rejected on the host instead.
scheme = urlparse(url).scheme.lower()
if scheme not in ("http", "https"):
if scheme and url.lower().startswith(f"{scheme}://"):
raise SkillImportError(f"unsupported URL scheme: {scheme}")
# Schemeless "github.com/owner/repo" — accept only a supported host.
rough_host = (urlparse("//" + url).hostname or "").lower()
if rough_host not in _GITHUB_HOSTS and rough_host not in _SKILLS_SH_HOSTS:
raise SkillImportError("Only GitHub or skills.sh URLs are supported")
url = "https://" + url
parsed = urlparse(url)
hostname = (parsed.hostname or "").lower()
if hostname not in _GITHUB_HOSTS and hostname not in _SKILLS_SH_HOSTS:
raise SkillImportError("Only GitHub or skills.sh URLs are supported")
# A skills.sh link is only usable if it redirects to an exact supported
# GitHub host. Scraping the page body for a github.com link cannot work:
# skill pages only ever link the repository root, never the skill's
# subdirectory, so the scrape resolves every skill in a repo to the same
# (wrong) bundle. Fail with an actionable message instead.
if hostname in _SKILLS_SH_HOSTS:
r = _get_checked(url, timeout=20.0)
# skills.sh often links to GitHub; try to unwrap ?url= or redirect target later.
if "skills.sh" in raw and "github.com" not in raw:
r = _get_checked(raw, timeout=20.0)
if r.status_code >= 400:
raise _github_response_error(r)
final = str(r.url)
if _github_host(final) not in _GITHUB_HOSTS:
raise SkillImportError(
"skills.sh did not redirect to GitHub — open the skill's "
"repository on GitHub, navigate to the exact skill folder or "
"SKILL.md file, and paste that URL; the repository-root link "
"alone is not sufficient"
)
url = final
_assert_github_url(final, context="redirect target")
# Page may embed a github link; prefer final URL if redirected.
if "github.com" in final:
raw = final
else:
m = re.search(r"https?://github\.com/[^\s\"')]+", r.text or "")
if m:
raw = m.group(0).rstrip(".,)")
# Update parsed and hostname to reflect the new GitHub URL
parsed = urlparse(url)
hostname = (parsed.hostname or "").lower()
parsed = urlparse(raw)
host = _github_host(raw)
if host not in _GITHUB_HOSTS:
raise SkillImportError(
"Only GitHub URLs are supported (https://github.com/... or raw.githubusercontent.com/...)"
)
_assert_github_url(url)
if hostname == "raw.githubusercontent.com":
if host == "raw.githubusercontent.com":
# /owner/repo/ref/path/to/file
bits = [p for p in parsed.path.split("/") if p]
if len(bits) < 4:
-53
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@
"""Multi-provider TTS service — dispatches to local Kokoro, OpenAI-compatible API, or browser."""
import io
import os
import wave
import logging
import hashlib
@@ -42,11 +41,6 @@ class TTSService:
self.cache_dir = Path(cache_dir)
self.cache_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
self._kokoro = None # lazy-init
try:
self.max_cache_bytes = int(os.getenv("ODYSSEUS_TTS_CACHE_MAX_BYTES", 500 * 1024 * 1024))
except ValueError:
self.max_cache_bytes = 500 * 1024 * 1024
# ── Settings ──
@@ -95,53 +89,6 @@ class TTSService:
ext = ".mp3" if (len(data) >= 3 and (data[:3] == b'ID3' or (data[0] == 0xff and (data[1] & 0xe0) == 0xe0))) else ".wav"
(self.cache_dir / f"{key}{ext}").write_bytes(data)
self._enforce_cache_limit()
def _enforce_cache_limit(self):
"""Evicts oldest files if the cache exceeds the configured byte limit."""
if self.max_cache_bytes <= 0:
return
try:
files = []
total_size = 0
# Safely scan files and sum sizes, ignoring files deleted mid-scan
for f in self.cache_dir.iterdir():
try:
if f.is_file() and f.suffix.lower() in (".mp3", ".wav"):
files.append(f)
total_size += f.stat().st_size
except OSError:
continue
if total_size > self.max_cache_bytes:
logger.info(
f"TTS cache ({total_size} bytes) exceeded limit ({self.max_cache_bytes} bytes). Evicting oldest files."
)
# Sort files by modification time (oldest first)
try:
files.sort(key=lambda f: f.stat().st_mtime)
except OSError as e:
logger.warning(f"Failed to sort cache files by mtime: {e}")
# Trim down to 80% of max capacity
target_size = self.max_cache_bytes * 0.8
while files and total_size > target_size:
f = files.pop(0)
try:
size = f.stat().st_size
f.unlink()
total_size -= size
except OSError as e:
logger.warning(f"Failed to evict cache file {f}: {e}")
continue
except Exception as e:
logger.warning(f"Error enforcing TTS cache limit: {e}", exc_info=True)
def clear_cache(self):
count = 0
for f in self.cache_dir.glob("*.*"):
+31 -412
View File
@@ -1,412 +1,31 @@
# Architecture Runtime Inventory
> **Purpose**: Phase 0 planning baseline for codebase readability improvements (#4071).
> **Parent issue**: [#4082](https://github.com/odysseus-dev/odysseus/issues/4082)
> **Last updated**: dev@b58af42 | 2026-06-16
> **Status**: Draft — to be reviewed before follow-up slices open.
> **Snapshot basis**: Importer / file / import-line counts are refreshed to `dev@b58af42` (2026-06-16) and are recomputable via the commands in §3.4. **Line counts** in §2.1 / §2.2 are a snapshot from an earlier baseline and drift as `dev` moves — recompute any of them with `wc -l <file>`. This inventory tracks structure and risk, not live metrics.
This document maps the current runtime module structure, identifies high-risk boundaries, and recommends safe first refactor slices. It does **not** move files, change imports, or alter runtime behavior.
---
## 1. Current Structure Overview
### 1.1 Top-Level Layout
```
odysseus/
├── app.py # FastAPI app entrypoint (1,145 lines)
├── conf/ # Configuration (config.py, settings.py, settings_scrub.py)
├── src/ # 95 flat .py files + 2 subdirectories
│ ├── agent_tools/ # Tool helpers: document, filesystem, subprocess, web
│ └── search/ # Search subsystem
├── routes/ # 54 flat .py files — HTTP route handlers
├── core/ # 10 files — database models, auth, middleware, session
├── mcp_servers/ # 5 files — MCP server implementations
├── scripts/ # CLI tools and one-shot scripts
├── static/ # Frontend HTML/CSS/JS
├── tests/ # 583 test files (~54,800 lines)
└── services/ # (exists as needed)
```
### 1.2 Directory Flatness Metric
| Directory | Flat `.py` Files | Subdirectories | Concern |
|-----------|-----------------|----------------|---------|
| `src/` | **95** | 2 (`agent_tools/`, `search/`) | No domain grouping; 95 files in one directory |
| `routes/` | **54** | 0 | All route handlers in one flat directory |
| `core/` | 10 | 0 | Manageable, but `database.py` is oversized |
---
## 2. Largest Runtime Modules
### 2.1 Python Backend
| Rank | File | Lines | Classes | Functions | Risk |
|------|------|-------|---------|-----------|------|
| 1 | `src/tool_implementations.py` | **4,032** | 0 | ~48 | **HIGH** |
| 2 | `routes/email_routes.py` | **3,245** | — | — | **MEDIUM** |
| 3 | `routes/cookbook_routes.py` | **2,969** | — | — | **MEDIUM** |
| 4 | `src/agent_loop.py` | **2,961** | 0 | ~24 | **HIGH** |
| 5 | `src/task_scheduler.py` | **2,330** | — | 5 | MEDIUM |
| 6 | `routes/model_routes.py` | **2,266** | — | — | MEDIUM |
| 7 | `core/database.py` | **2,265** | 28 | ~59 helpers | **HIGH** |
| 8 | `src/builtin_actions.py` | **2,262** | 2 | ~24 | MEDIUM |
| 9 | `src/llm_core.py` | **2,164** | — | — | MEDIUM |
| 10 | `mcp_servers/email_server.py` | 2,197 | — | — | LOW (separate process) |
| 11 | `src/visual_report.py` | 1,918 | — | — | LOW |
| 12 | `routes/gallery_routes.py` | 1,896 | — | — | LOW |
| 13 | `src/ai_interaction.py` | 1,846 | — | — | MEDIUM |
| 14 | `routes/document_routes.py` | 1,717 | — | — | LOW |
| 15 | `routes/skills_routes.py` | 1,648 | — | — | LOW |
**Heuristic**: Files > 2,000 lines with 20+ public symbols and many importers are the highest-risk splits. Files 1,0002,000 lines are medium-risk if tightly coupled.
### 2.2 Frontend
| File | Lines | Concern |
|------|-------|---------|
| `static/style.css` | **36,653** | Entire app CSS in one file (tracked separately in #2617) |
| `static/js/document.js` | **9,776** | Single JS file for document functionality |
| `static/js/slashCommands.js` | 6,498 | |
| `static/js/settings.js` | 5,266 | |
| `static/js/emailLibrary.js` | 5,217 | |
| `static/js/notes.js` | 5,124 | |
| `static/js/chat.js` | 4,985 | |
| `static/app.js` | 4,090 | |
**Note**: Frontend modularization is tracked separately in #2617 (CSS) and is not the focus of this Phase 0 inventory. Frontend is listed here for completeness but follow-up slices should target Python backend boundaries first.
---
## 3. Import Dependency Graph
### 3.1 Who Depends on `core/database.py`
**102 files** import from `core.database` — this is the most depended-upon module:
- All route handlers (`routes/*.py`)
- Most `src/*.py` files
- `core/session_manager.py`, `core/auth.py`
- Multiple test files
**Implication**: Any split of `core/database.py` is the highest-risk refactor. It should be tackled **last**, never first.
### 3.2 Who Depends on `src/tool_implementations.py`
**17 files** import from `src.tool_implementations`:
- `src/agent_loop.py`, `src/builtin_actions.py`, `src/tool_index.py`
- `src/task_scheduler.py`, `src/tool_policy.py`
- Various tests
### 3.3 Who Depends on `src/agent_loop.py`
**22 files** import from `src.agent_loop`:
- `src/tool_policy.py`, `src/teacher_escalation.py`, `src/bg_monitor.py`
- `src/task_scheduler.py`
- Multiple test files
### 3.4 Cross-Layer Import Violations
**`src/` importing from `routes/`** (backwards dependency — domain logic depending on HTTP layer):
```
src/tool_implementations.py ──→ routes/calendar_routes.py
src/tool_implementations.py ──→ routes/cookbook_helpers.py
src/tool_implementations.py ──→ routes/email_helpers.py
src/tool_implementations.py ──→ routes/email_pollers.py
src/tool_implementations.py ──→ routes/email_routes.py
src/tool_implementations.py ──→ routes/model_routes.py
src/tool_implementations.py ──→ routes/note_routes.py
src/tool_implementations.py ──→ routes/prefs_routes.py
```
> These are **runtime imports** (inside function bodies, not at module top), which mitigates circular import risk but indicates fuzzy layer boundaries. Function-level inline imports from the HTTP layer into business logic are a code smell.
**Import counts (top-level)**:
| Direction | Count | Notes |
|-----------|-------|-------|
| `routes/``src/` | **374** | Expected: HTTP handlers call domain logic |
| `routes/``core/` | **126** | Expected: handlers access DB models |
| `src/``routes/` | **31** | **Unexpected**: domain logic reaching into HTTP layer (direct grep of import lines referencing `routes/`) |
| `src/``core/` | **106** | Acceptable but could be reduced with a data-access layer |
> **How the metrics in this document are computed** — recompute against current `dev` before treating any count as authoritative (the tree drifts; these numbers are a snapshot, not a live value):
> - `src/` flat `.py` files: `find src -maxdepth 1 -name '*.py' | wc -l`
> - `tests/` test files: `find tests -name 'test_*.py' | wc -l`
> - `core.database` importers: `grep -rlE '(from|import) +core\.database' --include='*.py' . | grep -v core/database.py | wc -l`
> - `src.agent_loop` importers: `grep -rlE '(from|import) +src\.agent_loop' --include='*.py' . | grep -v src/agent_loop.py | wc -l`
> - Cross-layer import lines: `grep -rhE '(from|import) +<pkg>' --include='*.py' <dir>/ | wc -l` (e.g. `(from|import) +routes` over `src/`)
---
## 4. Route Ownership Map
Routes can be grouped into logical feature domains. Current flat structure obscures these boundaries:
| Domain | Route Files | Total Lines | Review Complexity |
|--------|-------------|-------------|-------------------|
| **Email** | `email_routes.py`, `email_helpers.py`, `email_pollers.py` | 5,936 | HIGH — most complex domain |
| **Chat / Agent** | `chat_routes.py`, `chat_helpers.py`, `shell_routes.py`, `codex_routes.py`, `skills_routes.py` | 6,365 | HIGH — core interaction surface |
| **Cookbook** | `cookbook_routes.py`, `cookbook_helpers.py`, `cookbook_output.py` | 4,110 | MEDIUM |
| **Model / LLM** | `model_routes.py`, `assistant_routes.py`, `copilot_routes.py` | 2,764 | MEDIUM |
| **Calendar / Contacts** | `calendar_routes.py`, `contacts_routes.py` | 2,336 | MEDIUM |
| **Documents** | `document_routes.py`, `document_helpers.py` | 1,954 | LOW |
| **Auth** | `auth_routes.py`, `api_token_routes.py`, `device_flow.py` | 1,171 | LOW |
| **Tasks** | `task_routes.py` (standalone) | 1,157 | LOW |
| **Session** | `session_routes.py` (standalone) | 1,287 | LOW |
| **Gallery** | `gallery_routes.py`, `gallery_helpers.py` | 1,896 | LOW |
| **Memory** | `memory_routes.py` | — | LOW |
| **Research** | `research_routes.py` | — | LOW |
| **MCP** | `mcp_routes.py` | — | LOW |
| **Notes** | `note_routes.py` | — | LOW |
| **Other** | `prefs_routes.py`, `upload_routes.py`, `vault_routes.py`, `webhook_routes.py`, `workspace_routes.py`, `search_routes.py`, `history_routes.py`, `hwfit_routes.py`, `preset_routes.py`, `signature_routes.py`, `backup_routes.py`, `cleanup_routes.py`, `diagnostics_routes.py`, `embedding_routes.py`, `emoji_routes.py`, `font_routes.py`, `stt_routes.py`, `tts_routes.py`, `compare_routes.py`, `personal_routes.py`, `editor_draft_routes.py`, `admin_wipe_routes.py`, `chatgpt_subscription_routes.py` | 2,000+ | LOW individual, HIGH cumulative |
---
## 5. Tool Registry & Implementation Boundaries
### 5.1 Current Tool Architecture
| Component | File | Lines | Role |
|-----------|------|-------|------|
| Tool schemas | `src/tool_schemas.py` | 1,392 | JSON Schema tool definitions (Duck-TypedDict) |
| Tool index | `src/tool_index.py` | 542 | RAG-based tool retrieval from ChromaDB |
| Tool implementations | `src/tool_implementations.py` | 4,032 | 33 `do_*` functions — all tool execution logic |
| Tool security | `src/tool_security.py` | — | Owner-scoped tool blocking |
| Tool policy | `src/tool_policy.py` | — | Guide-only directive, plan-mode disabled tools |
| Tool utils | `src/tool_utils.py` | — | Shared tool helpers |
### 5.2 Tool Implementation Categories
The 33 `do_*` functions in `tool_implementations.py` fall into natural domain groups — the basis for slice 1's split in §6.2:
| Category | `do_*` functions | Count |
|----------|------------------|-------|
| **System / config** | `do_manage_skills`, `do_manage_tasks`, `do_manage_endpoints`, `do_manage_mcp`, `do_manage_webhooks`, `do_manage_tokens`, `do_manage_settings`, `do_api_call`, `do_app_api` | 9 |
| **Cookbook / model serving** | `do_download_model`, `do_serve_model`, `do_list_served_models`, `do_stop_served_model`, `do_tail_serve_output`, `do_list_downloads`, `do_cancel_download`, `do_search_hf_models`, `do_adopt_served_model`, `do_list_cookbook_servers`, `do_list_serve_presets`, `do_serve_preset`, `do_list_cached_models` | 13 |
| **Notes** | `do_manage_notes` | 1 |
| **Calendar** | `do_manage_calendar` | 1 |
| **Search** | `do_search_chats` | 1 |
| **Research** | `do_manage_research`, `do_trigger_research` | 2 |
| **Contacts** | `do_resolve_contact`, `do_manage_contact` | 2 |
| **Vault** | `do_vault_search`, `do_vault_get`, `do_vault_unlock` | 3 |
| **Image** | `do_edit_image` | 1 |
| | **Total** | **33** |
> Low-level tools (filesystem, subprocess, web fetch, document parsing) live in `src/agent_tools/`, **not** in `tool_implementations.py` — out of scope for this split.
---
## 6. Risk Assessment & Candidate Slice Ranking
> **Candidate proposals, not a committed plan.** The rankings, package shapes (e.g. `src/pkg/`, `src/domain/`, `src/infra/`, `src/api/`), split ordering, and route-grouping strategy below are **options for maintainer discussion**. Per #4082/#4071, slice ownership and order are settled by maintainers before any follow-up PR. §1–§3 above are the factual current-state inventory.
### 6.1 Risk Scale
| Level | Criteria |
|-------|----------|
| **LOW** | File has ≤3 importers AND ≤500 lines, OR is a pure refactor with clear boundaries |
| **MEDIUM** | File has 415 importers OR 5001,500 lines |
| **HIGH** | File has 16+ importers OR >2,000 lines, OR has cross-layer import violations |
### 6.2 Ranked Split Candidates
| Priority | Target | Risk | Rationale |
|----------|--------|------|-----------|
| **1** | `src/tool_implementations.py``src/tools/*.py` | **MEDIUM** | 4,032 lines → ~10 files by tool category. Already has natural boundaries. 17 importers, tracked in #3629. Use `__init__.py` shim to keep existing imports working. |
| **2** | `routes/` → domain subdirectories (one domain per PR) | **MEDIUM** | 54 flat files. Done **one domain at a time** (e.g. a standalone PR for the email domain, then chat, …), not a broad reorganization — route modules carry helper imports, registration assumptions, and test import paths. |
| **3** | `src/agent_loop.py``src/agent/loop.py` + submodules | **MEDIUM-HIGH** | 2,961 lines, 24 functions. Can extract prompt building, classification, verification, and runaway detection. Tracked in #3266. |
| **4** | `src/``src/pkg/`, `src/domain/`, `src/infra/`, `src/api/` | **MEDIUM** | Structural reorganization. Split flat `src/` into layered packages. Must come after routes and tools are stable. |
| **5** | `routes/email_*.py` consolidation | **LOW** | Already grouped by filename prefix. Low-risk cleanup within the email domain. |
| **6** | `core/database.py``src/infra/database/models/*.py` | **HIGH** | 28 classes, 102 importers. Highest-risk split. Must be **last** in any sequence. Requires careful import shim strategy. |
| **7** | Frontend CSS modularization | **MEDIUM** | 36,653 lines. Tracked in #2617. Separate timeline from backend work. |
| **8** | Frontend JS modularization | **MEDIUM** | 9,776 lines in `document.js`. Introduce ES modules at minimum. |
### 6.3 Candidate First 3 Behavior-Preserving Slices
**Slice 1: Split `tool_implementations.py`** (Lowest-risk high-impact)
- Create `src/tools/` package with one file per tool category
- Add `src/tools/__init__.py` re-exporting all symbols with current names
- Update 17 importers to use new paths (can be deferred via shim)
- Validation: `python -m pytest tests/ -x -q` + manual smoke test of tool execution
- Reference: #3629
**Slice 2: Group `routes/` by domain** (one domain per PR, not a broad sweep)
Route modules carry helper imports, router registration assumptions, and test import paths, so this must be done **one domain at a time** rather than as a single reorganization PR. Example sequence (each its own PR):
- PR 2a: move the **email** domain (`email_routes.py`, `email_helpers.py`, `email_pollers.py`) → `routes/email/` + shim
- PR 2b: move the **chat/agent** domain → `routes/chat/` + shim
- PR 2c: move the **cookbook** domain → `routes/cookbook/` + shim
- …and so on per domain from §4
Each PR: add `__init__.py` re-exporting old names, update `app.py` router imports, validation `python app.py` starts clean. **No behavior change** — pure file reorganization.
**Slice 3: Extract `agent_loop.py` submodules** (Improve reviewability)
- Move prompt assembly → `src/agent/prompt.py`
- Move request classification → `src/agent/classifier.py`
- Move sub-agent verification → `src/agent/verifier.py`
- Move runaway detection → `src/agent/runaway.py`
- Move context management → `src/agent/context.py`
- Keep `src/agent/loop.py` as the main orchestration module
- Validation: `python -m pytest tests/test_agent_loop.py tests/test_loop_breaker_runaway.py -v`
---
## 7. Safety Guardrails for Follow-Up Work
Per maintainer guidance in #4082 and #4071:
- [ ] **One domain/slice per PR** — never mix multiple reorganizations
- [ ] **No behavior changes** mixed with file moves — pure reorganization only
- [ ] **Keep compatibility shims**`__init__.py` re-exports for all existing import paths
- [ ] **Add or identify focused tests** before risky splits
- [ ] **Do not start with `core/database.py`** or broad route movement unless this inventory shows a safe boundary
- [ ] **Prefer small, reviewable slices** over large restructures
- [ ] **No packaging/runtime/tooling migration** mixed into file moves
- [ ] **No frontend framework migration** inside this stabilization lane
- [ ] **Validate with `python -m compileall`** — every PR must pass CI checks
- [ ] **Validate with `pytest`** — run the full test suite before opening each PR
---
## 8. Validation Commands
Each follow-up PR should be verifiable with these commands before submission:
```bash
# Syntax check — must pass with zero errors
python -m compileall src/ routes/ core/ conf/
# Full test suite — must match baseline pass rate
python -m pytest tests/ -x -q
# Import shim verification — existing import paths must still work
python -c "from src.tool_implementations import do_search_chats; print('OK')"
# App startup smoke test (if backend touched)
timeout 5 python app.py 2>&1 | head -5 || true
```
---
## 9. Open Questions
1. Is `#2538` (specs ground truth) the canonical behavior map baseline, and should this inventory be kept in sync with those specs once merged?
2. Should route grouping follow the domain map proposed here, or is there a different taxonomy preferred by maintainers?
3. For the `tool_implementations.py` split (#3629), is the tool categorization in §5.2 acceptable, or should it follow a different grouping?
4. Should compatibility shims (`__init__.py`) be temporary (removed in a follow-up wave) or permanent?
5. Should an ADR (Architecture Decision Record) document be started to track decisions made during this process?
---
## 10. Future Direction (NOT current state)
The following are **future refactor targets** (candidate directions **pending maintainer agreement**, not committed), recorded here so this inventory does not imply they exist today. None of them are present in the current `dev` tree:
- `main.py` — proposed rename of the `app.py` entrypoint. Today the app boots via `app.py`.
- `src/agent/` — proposed package to hold `agent_loop.py` submodules (prompt/classifier/verifier/runaway/context). Today `agent_loop.py` is a single flat file in `src/`.
- `src/infra/`, `src/domain/`, `src/pkg/`, `src/api/` — proposed layered reorganization of the flat `src/` directory (slice 4 in §6).
These become real only when the corresponding slices land.
---
## Appendix A: File Listing
### `src/` (95 files — 61 shown; run `ls src/*.py` for the full list)
```
agent_loop.py tool_implementations.py tool_schemas.py
tool_index.py tool_security.py tool_policy.py
tool_utils.py builtin_actions.py task_scheduler.py
llm_core.py model_context.py model_discovery.py
session_search.py context_budget.py context_compactor.py
ai_interaction.py action_intents.py agent_runs.py
app_helpers.py app_initializer.py config.py
database.py memory.py memory_provider.py
secret_storage.py prompt_security.py url_security.py
url_safety.py rate_limiter.py cleanup_service.py
readiness.py service_health.py exceptions.py
request_models.py assistant_log.py bg_monitor.py
builtin_mcp.py chat_helpers.py chroma_client.py
document_processor.py embedding_lanes.py deep_research.py
research_handler.py research_utils.py personal_docs.py
rag_manager.py rag_singleton.py topic_analyzer.py
visual_report.py youtube_handler.py pdf_forms.py
pdf_form_doc.py pdf_runtime.py caldav_writeback.py
email_thread_parser.py text_helpers.py user_time.py
teacher_escalation.py cookbook_serve_lifecycle.py
chatgpt_subscription.py mcp_manager.py
```
### `routes/` (54 files)
```
__init__.py _validators.py
auth_routes.py api_token_routes.py device_flow.py
chat_routes.py chat_helpers.py shell_routes.py
codex_routes.py skills_routes.py
email_routes.py email_helpers.py email_pollers.py
cookbook_routes.py cookbook_helpers.py cookbook_output.py
model_routes.py assistant_routes.py copilot_routes.py
calendar_routes.py contacts_routes.py
document_routes.py document_helpers.py
gallery_routes.py gallery_helpers.py
task_routes.py session_routes.py
note_routes.py memory_routes.py research_routes.py
mcp_routes.py search_routes.py history_routes.py
webhook_routes.py workspace_routes.py upload_routes.py
vault_routes.py prefs_routes.py preset_routes.py
signature_routes.py personal_routes.py hwfit_routes.py
backup_routes.py cleanup_routes.py diagnostics_routes.py
embedding_routes.py emoji_routes.py font_routes.py
stt_routes.py tts_routes.py compare_routes.py
editor_draft_routes.py chatgpt_subscription_routes.py admin_wipe_routes.py
```
### `core/` (10 files)
```
__init__.py constants.py database.py models.py
auth.py middleware.py session_manager.py exceptions.py
atomic_io.py platform_compat.py
```
---
## Appendix B: Key Import Relationships
```
core/database.py ←── 102 importers (routes/*, src/*, core/*, tests/*)
├── routes/auth_routes.py
├── routes/email_routes.py
├── src/builtin_actions.py
├── src/task_scheduler.py
├── src/tool_implementations.py (inline)
└── ...97 more
src/tool_implementations.py ←── 17 importers
├── src/agent_loop.py
├── src/builtin_actions.py
├── src/tool_index.py
├── src/task_scheduler.py
├── src/tool_policy.py
└── ...12 more (mostly tests)
src/agent_loop.py ←── 22 importers
├── src/tool_policy.py
├── src/teacher_escalation.py
├── src/bg_monitor.py
├── src/task_scheduler.py
└── 18 more (incl. tests)
```
# Architecture runtime inventory disposition
> [!NOTE]
> The dated architecture runtime inventory has been classified and transferred
> to [`discovery/architecture-runtime-inventory.md`](../discovery/architecture-runtime-inventory.md)
> after verification of its stable facts.
>
> Stable runtime structure and subsystem boundaries were transferred to the
> proposed canonical destination,
> [`docs/ARCHITECTURE.md`](../docs/ARCHITECTURE.md), for maintainer review.
## Classification
| Content | Disposition |
|---|---|
| Stable runtime structure | Proposed canonical architecture document |
| Stable subsystem boundaries | Proposed canonical architecture document |
| Frontend module organization | `static/js/MODULE_SUMMARY.md` |
| Counts, rankings, and generated metrics | Non-canonical discovery inventory |
| Investigation context and unresolved questions | Non-canonical discovery material |
| Refactor options and prioritization | Issues, Plane, or discovery material |
No dated metrics, prioritization, or investigation findings remain in this
specification path.
## Review status
- Findings and scope have been validated.
- Transfer verification has completed.
- The final canonical status of `docs/ARCHITECTURE.md` requires maintainer review.
- No implementation behaviour, test taxonomy, or runtime files were changed.
+290 -1089
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+26 -84
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@@ -17,14 +17,13 @@ close / navigation / refresh). It does NOT survive a server restart.
import asyncio
import json
import logging
import uuid
from typing import AsyncGenerator, Dict, Optional
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
class _Run:
__slots__ = ("buffer", "subscribers", "status", "task", "evict_task", "run_id")
__slots__ = ("buffer", "subscribers", "status", "task", "evict_task")
def __init__(self) -> None:
self.buffer: list = [] # ordered SSE event strings (replay log)
@@ -32,9 +31,6 @@ class _Run:
self.status: str = "running" # running | done | error | stopped
self.task: Optional[asyncio.Task] = None
self.evict_task: Optional[asyncio.Task] = None
# Stable across every subscription/replay of this exact detached run.
# The browser uses it to make local cost accounting replay-idempotent.
self.run_id: str = uuid.uuid4().hex
_RUNS: Dict[str, _Run] = {}
@@ -57,24 +53,13 @@ def _publish(run: _Run, ev: str) -> None:
pass
def _wake_run_subscribers(run: _Run) -> None:
"""Close subscribers even when the drain task never reached its body."""
for q in list(run.subscribers):
try:
q.put_nowait((None, None))
except Exception:
pass
def _schedule_evict(session_id: str, expected_run: Optional[_Run] = None) -> None:
def _schedule_evict(session_id: str) -> None:
"""(Re)arm a grace-period eviction for a terminal run with no subscribers.
Identity-checked so a run that gets replaced/reused is never evicted by a
stale timer."""
run = _RUNS.get(session_id)
if run is None:
return
if expected_run is not None and run is not expected_run:
return
if run.evict_task and not run.evict_task.done():
run.evict_task.cancel()
@@ -100,38 +85,25 @@ def get_status(session_id: str) -> Optional[str]:
return r.status if r else None
def get_run_id(session_id: str) -> Optional[str]:
"""Return the opaque identity of the current detached run, if present."""
r = _RUNS.get(session_id)
return r.run_id if r else None
def get_active_run(session_id: str) -> Optional[_Run]:
"""Return the exact active run currently registered for a session."""
r = _RUNS.get(session_id)
return r if r and r.status == "running" else None
async def _drain(session_id: str, run: _Run, agen: AsyncGenerator[str, None],
async def _drain(session_id: str, agen: AsyncGenerator[str, None],
prev_task: Optional[asyncio.Task] = None) -> None:
"""Pull every event from the wrapped generator into the run buffer, fanning
each out to live subscribers. Runs to completion regardless of subscribers."""
subscribers_woken = False
def _wake_subscribers() -> None:
nonlocal subscribers_woken
if subscribers_woken:
return
subscribers_woken = True
_wake_run_subscribers(run)
run = _RUNS.get(session_id)
if run is None:
return
# If this run replaced an in-flight one (rapid double-send), wait for that
# one to fully finish first. Its CancelledError handler calls aclose(), which
# persists its partial response — letting it complete before we start writing
# keeps the two runs' session saves sequential instead of interleaved.
try:
if prev_task is not None and not prev_task.done():
if prev_task is not None and not prev_task.done():
try:
await asyncio.wait({prev_task})
except asyncio.CancelledError:
raise # our own cancellation — propagate
except Exception:
pass
try:
async for ev in agen:
_publish(run, ev)
if run.status == "running":
@@ -144,16 +116,6 @@ async def _drain(session_id: str, run: _Run, agen: AsyncGenerator[str, None],
await agen.aclose()
except Exception:
pass
# A rapid third replacement can cancel this task while it is still
# waiting for its predecessor. Close this run's subscribers promptly,
# but keep the task alive until the predecessor finishes so the next
# run still observes the transitive session-save ordering barrier.
_wake_subscribers()
if prev_task is not None and not prev_task.done():
try:
await asyncio.shield(prev_task)
except (asyncio.CancelledError, Exception):
pass
except Exception as e:
logger.error("[agent-run] %s failed: %s", session_id, e, exc_info=True)
run.status = "error"
@@ -165,11 +127,15 @@ async def _drain(session_id: str, run: _Run, agen: AsyncGenerator[str, None],
_publish(run, "data: [DONE]\n\n")
finally:
# Wake every subscriber with the end sentinel so their SSE closes.
_wake_subscribers()
for q in list(run.subscribers):
try:
q.put_nowait((None, None))
except Exception:
pass
# Run is terminal — arm the grace timer so it (and its buffer) is
# eventually freed even if nobody ever reconnects. subscribe() cancels
# this on connect and re-arms on disconnect.
_schedule_evict(session_id, run)
_schedule_evict(session_id)
def start(session_id: str, agen: AsyncGenerator[str, None]) -> _Run:
@@ -179,37 +145,20 @@ def start(session_id: str, agen: AsyncGenerator[str, None]) -> _Run:
prev_task: Optional[asyncio.Task] = None
if prev:
if prev.task and not prev.task.done():
# A task cancelled before its first instruction never enters
# _drain(), so its except/finally blocks cannot update status or
# wake a response already bound to this exact run. Terminalize it
# synchronously before cancelling; _drain's cleanup is idempotent
# when the task had already started.
if prev.status == "running":
prev.status = "stopped"
_wake_run_subscribers(prev)
prev.task.cancel()
prev_task = prev.task # new run awaits this before it starts writing
if prev.evict_task and not prev.evict_task.done():
prev.evict_task.cancel()
run = _Run()
_RUNS[session_id] = run
run.task = asyncio.create_task(_drain(session_id, run, agen, prev_task))
run.task = asyncio.create_task(_drain(session_id, agen, prev_task))
return run
async def subscribe(
session_id: str,
expected_run: Optional[_Run] = None,
) -> AsyncGenerator[str, None]:
async def subscribe(session_id: str) -> AsyncGenerator[str, None]:
"""Replay the run's buffer from the start, then stream live until it ends.
Safe to call repeatedly (reconnect) and from multiple clients at once.
``expected_run`` binds a lazy StreamingResponse body to the same run whose
identity was put in its response headers. Without that binding, a rapid
replacement between response construction and body iteration could replay
the replacement run under the prior run's identity.
"""
run = expected_run or _RUNS.get(session_id)
Safe to call repeatedly (reconnect) and from multiple clients at once."""
run = _RUNS.get(session_id)
if run is None:
return
q: asyncio.Queue = asyncio.Queue()
@@ -252,19 +201,12 @@ async def subscribe(
# Last subscriber gone on a finished run — (re)arm eviction so the
# buffer doesn't linger indefinitely.
if not run.subscribers and run.status != "running":
_schedule_evict(session_id, run)
_schedule_evict(session_id)
def stop(session_id: str, expected_run_id: Optional[str] = None) -> bool:
"""Cancel the matching in-flight run (which saves its partial output).
A stale browser may issue Stop after another tab has replaced the session's
run. Once the caller knows its opaque run identity, fail closed rather than
cancelling that newer run.
"""
def stop(session_id: str) -> bool:
"""Cancel an in-flight run (the wrapped generator saves its partial)."""
run = _RUNS.get(session_id)
if not expected_run_id or run is None or run.run_id != expected_run_id:
return False
if run and run.task and not run.task.done():
run.task.cancel()
return True
+6 -18
View File
@@ -510,12 +510,7 @@ async def do_manage_settings(content: str, owner: Optional[str] = None) -> Dict:
# set/get/list/delete operate on the REAL app settings (the same store
# the Settings panel writes), so changing a model / voice / search
# engine / reminder channel from chat actually takes effect.
from src.settings import (
DEFAULT_SETTINGS,
RETIRED_SETTING_KEYS,
load_settings,
save_settings,
)
from src.settings import load_settings, save_settings, DEFAULT_SETTINGS
# Secrets/credentials the agent must NOT write: kept read-only (masked)
# so API keys never flow through chat. User sets these in the panel.
@@ -567,9 +562,6 @@ async def do_manage_settings(content: str, owner: Optional[str] = None) -> Dict:
return k2
return _ALIASES_SET.get(k2, (k or "").strip())
def _is_managed_key(key):
return key in DEFAULT_SETTINGS and key not in RETIRED_SETTING_KEYS
_ENUMS = {
"image_quality": ["low", "medium", "high"],
"reminder_channel": ["browser", "email", "ntfy", "webhook"],
@@ -632,18 +624,14 @@ async def do_manage_settings(content: str, owner: Optional[str] = None) -> Dict:
if action == "list":
s = load_settings()
shown = {
k: _mask(k, v)
for k, v in s.items()
if _is_managed_key(k) and not isinstance(v, dict)
}
shown = {k: _mask(k, v) for k, v in s.items() if k in DEFAULT_SETTINGS and not isinstance(v, dict)}
return {"response": f"{len(shown)} settings (use get/set with a key)", "settings": shown, "exit_code": 0}
elif action == "get":
key = _resolve(args.get("key", ""))
if not key:
return {"error": "key is required", "exit_code": 1}
if not _is_managed_key(key):
if key not in DEFAULT_SETTINGS:
return {"error": f"Unknown setting '{args.get('key')}'. Use action='list' to see them.", "exit_code": 1}
val = load_settings().get(key, DEFAULT_SETTINGS.get(key))
return {"response": f"{key} = {_mask(key, val)}", "value": _mask(key, val), "exit_code": 0}
@@ -654,11 +642,11 @@ async def do_manage_settings(content: str, owner: Optional[str] = None) -> Dict:
if not raw:
return {"error": "key is required", "exit_code": 1}
key = _resolve(raw)
if not _is_managed_key(key):
if key not in DEFAULT_SETTINGS:
return {"error": f"Unknown setting '{raw}'. Use action='list' to see available settings.", "exit_code": 1}
if _is_secret(key):
return {"response": f"'{key}' is a credential/secret. For security I can't set it from chat. Open Settings and set it there.", "exit_code": 0}
# Structured settings (dicts/lists like keybinds or vision fallbacks)
# Structured settings (dicts/lists like keybinds, default_model_fallbacks)
# have no safe scalar coercion; _coerce would pass a bare string
# straight through and clobber the structure. Refuse them here; they're
# edited in their dedicated panels. (reset/delete still restore the
@@ -687,7 +675,7 @@ async def do_manage_settings(content: str, owner: Optional[str] = None) -> Dict:
elif action == "delete" or action == "reset":
key = _resolve(args.get("key", ""))
if not _is_managed_key(key):
if key not in DEFAULT_SETTINGS:
return {"error": f"Unknown setting '{args.get('key')}'.", "exit_code": 1}
if _is_secret(key):
return {"response": f"'{key}' is a credential. Reset it in the panel.", "exit_code": 0}
+8 -36
View File
@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ import sys
import time
import collections
from typing import Optional, Callable, Awaitable, Tuple, Dict
from core.platform_compat import IS_WINDOWS, find_bash
from src.constants import MAX_OUTPUT_CHARS
DEFAULT_BASH_TIMEOUT = 60 * 60 # 1 hour
@@ -17,27 +16,6 @@ PROGRESS_TAIL_LINES = 12
TMUX_CAPTURE_LINES = 2000
async def _create_bash_subprocess(command: str, **kwargs):
"""Start the agent shell with Bash semantics on every supported OS.
``asyncio.create_subprocess_shell`` delegates to ``cmd.exe`` on native
Windows. That contradicts the Bash tool contract and makes POSIX commands
such as ``pwd``, ``ls -la``, and ``cat`` unreliable even when the launcher
has found Git Bash. Pass the selected workspace as a structural ``cwd``
argument; Git Bash inherits that native Windows directory and exposes it
using its normal ``/c/...`` representation.
"""
if IS_WINDOWS:
bash = find_bash()
if not bash:
raise RuntimeError(
"Git Bash is required for the Bash tool on Windows; "
"install Git for Windows and restart Odysseus"
)
return await asyncio.create_subprocess_exec(bash, "-c", command, **kwargs)
return await asyncio.create_subprocess_shell(command, **kwargs)
def _tmux_session_name(session_id: Optional[str]) -> str:
raw = re.sub(r"[^A-Za-z0-9_.-]+", "-", str(session_id or "default")).strip("-")
return f"ody-agent-{raw[:80] or 'default'}"
@@ -302,10 +280,7 @@ class BashTool:
progress_cb = ctx.get("progress_cb")
_subproc_env = ctx.get("subproc_env")
session_id = ctx.get("session_id")
# tmux is a POSIX persistence path. A stray MSYS/Cygwin tmux.exe on
# native Windows must not bypass the Git Bash launcher below: the tmux
# setup hard-codes /bin/bash and cannot safely consume a native cwd.
if session_id and not IS_WINDOWS and shutil.which("tmux"):
if session_id and shutil.which("tmux"):
stdout, stderr, rc, timed_out = await _run_tmux_bash(
content,
session_id=str(session_id),
@@ -332,16 +307,13 @@ class BashTool:
"tmux_session": _tmux_session_name(str(session_id)),
}
try:
proc = await _create_bash_subprocess(
content,
stdout=asyncio.subprocess.PIPE,
stderr=asyncio.subprocess.PIPE,
env=_subproc_env,
cwd=agent_cwd(),
)
except RuntimeError as e:
return {"error": f"bash: {e}", "exit_code": 1}
proc = await asyncio.create_subprocess_shell(
content,
stdout=asyncio.subprocess.PIPE,
stderr=asyncio.subprocess.PIPE,
env=_subproc_env,
cwd=agent_cwd(),
)
stdout, stderr, rc, timed_out = await _run_subprocess_streaming(
proc,
timeout=DEFAULT_BASH_TIMEOUT,
+1 -10
View File
@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ import time
from typing import Any, Awaitable, Callable, Dict, Optional, Tuple
from src.constants import GENERATED_IMAGES_DIR
from src.memory import MemoryStoreUnreadable
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
@@ -385,15 +384,7 @@ async def do_manage_memory(content: str, session_id: Optional[str] = None, owner
return {"error": "Memory text cannot be empty"}
entry = _memory_manager.add_entry(text, source="ai_agent", category=category, owner=owner)
# Strict load: this is a read-modify-write, and it is the path an
# ordinary "remember that I prefer X" takes. Degrading to [] here would
# save just this one entry over a store we only failed to read,
# atomically destroying every memory in it (issue #5673).
try:
memories = _memory_manager.load_all_for_update()
except MemoryStoreUnreadable as e:
logger.error("Refusing to add memory, store unreadable: %s", e)
return {"error": "Memory store is temporarily unreadable — nothing was saved."}
memories = _memory_manager.load_all()
memories.append(entry)
_memory_manager.save(memories)
+105 -682
View File
@@ -20,395 +20,6 @@ from src.interactive_gate import wait_for_interactive_quiet
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
def _read_email_urgency_state(state_path):
"""Read one atomic urgency checkpoint, tolerating the legacy shape."""
from pathlib import Path
state_path = Path(state_path)
try:
state = (
json.loads(state_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
if state_path.exists()
else {}
)
except Exception:
return {}
return state if isinstance(state, dict) else {}
def _email_urgency_account_generations(state):
"""Return normalized per-account checkpoint/complete generations.
Checkpoint generations fence every accepted state mutation. Complete
generations advance only for a non-stale complete scan. Missing metadata
is the legacy generation zero.
"""
raw = state.get("account_generations", {}) if isinstance(state, dict) else {}
if not isinstance(raw, dict):
return {}
generations = {}
for account_id, value in raw.items():
if isinstance(value, dict):
checkpoint = value.get("checkpoint", 0)
complete = value.get("complete", 0)
else:
# Tolerate an intermediate scalar representation as one completed
# checkpoint generation instead of discarding its fence.
checkpoint = value
complete = value
try:
checkpoint = max(0, int(checkpoint))
except (TypeError, ValueError):
checkpoint = 0
try:
complete = max(0, int(complete))
except (TypeError, ValueError):
complete = 0
generations[str(account_id)] = {
"checkpoint": checkpoint,
"complete": complete,
}
return generations
def _email_urgency_string_set(value):
if not isinstance(value, (list, tuple, set, frozenset)):
return set()
return {str(item) for item in value if isinstance(item, (str, int))}
def _acquire_email_urgency_state_lock(
state_path,
lock_db_path,
cancel_event,
timeout_seconds=120,
):
"""Acquire the cross-process urgency lock without blocking the app loop."""
import sqlite3
import time
from pathlib import Path
state_path = Path(state_path)
state_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
deadline = time.monotonic() + timeout_seconds
while not cancel_event.is_set():
remaining = deadline - time.monotonic()
if remaining <= 0:
raise sqlite3.OperationalError("timed out waiting for urgency state lock")
conn = sqlite3.connect(
str(lock_db_path),
timeout=min(0.25, max(0.01, remaining)),
check_same_thread=False,
)
try:
conn.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
except sqlite3.OperationalError as exc:
conn.close()
if "locked" not in str(exc).lower():
raise
cancel_event.wait(min(0.05, max(0.0, remaining)))
continue
except BaseException:
conn.close()
raise
if cancel_event.is_set():
conn.rollback()
conn.close()
return None, None
return conn, _read_email_urgency_state(state_path)
return None, None
def _close_email_urgency_state_lock(conn):
if conn is None:
return
try:
try:
conn.rollback()
except Exception:
pass
finally:
conn.close()
def _commit_email_urgency_state(conn, state_path, next_state):
"""Atomically publish JSON before releasing the SQLite write lock."""
import uuid
from pathlib import Path
state_path = Path(state_path)
temp_path = state_path.with_name(
f".{state_path.name}.{uuid.uuid4().hex}.tmp"
)
try:
temp_path.write_text(json.dumps(next_state), encoding="utf-8")
temp_path.replace(state_path)
conn.commit()
except BaseException:
conn.rollback()
raise
finally:
temp_path.unlink(missing_ok=True)
conn.close()
async def _run_email_urgency_state_transaction(
state_path,
lock_db_path,
operation,
):
"""Serialize one urgency decision while keeping async work on this loop.
Only lock acquisition waits in a worker thread. ``operation`` is awaited
on the caller's long-lived event loop, where shared async clients, locks,
and the browser-notification queue belong. Cancellation rolls back the
SQLite transaction and never publishes a checkpoint.
"""
import asyncio
import threading
loop = asyncio.get_running_loop()
cancel_event = threading.Event()
acquire_future = loop.run_in_executor(
None,
_acquire_email_urgency_state_lock,
state_path,
lock_db_path,
cancel_event,
)
try:
conn, prior = await asyncio.shield(acquire_future)
except asyncio.CancelledError as cancelled:
cancel_event.set()
# The acquisition worker owns any connection until it returns. Wait
# for its short busy-poll to observe cancellation, then close a lock it
# may have won concurrently with the cancellation request.
while True:
try:
conn, _prior = await asyncio.shield(acquire_future)
break
except asyncio.CancelledError:
continue
except Exception:
conn = None
break
_close_email_urgency_state_lock(conn)
raise cancelled
if conn is None:
raise asyncio.CancelledError
try:
result, next_state = await operation(prior)
# Keep this small atomic publish synchronous. There is no await between
# the successful operation and commit, so cancellation cannot be
# observed and then followed by a checkpoint.
try:
_commit_email_urgency_state(conn, state_path, next_state)
finally:
conn = None
return result
except BaseException:
_close_email_urgency_state_lock(conn)
raise
def _email_urgency_account_key(message_key):
return str(message_key).split(":", 1)[0]
def _email_urgency_payload_account_ids(state):
"""Return account IDs that still own user-visible urgency payload."""
if not isinstance(state, dict):
return set()
per_uid = state.get("per_uid", {})
per_uid_keys = per_uid if isinstance(per_uid, dict) else {}
return {
_email_urgency_account_key(key) for key in per_uid_keys
} | {
_email_urgency_account_key(key)
for key in _email_urgency_string_set(state.get("notified_uids", []))
}
def _email_urgency_known_account_ids(state):
"""Return payload owners plus generation-only active/retired markers."""
return _email_urgency_payload_account_ids(state) | set(
_email_urgency_account_generations(state)
)
def _email_urgency_stale_accounts(
prior,
base_account_generations,
account_ids,
):
prior_generations = _email_urgency_account_generations(prior)
base_generations = _email_urgency_account_generations(
{"account_generations": base_account_generations}
)
return {
str(account_id)
for account_id in account_ids
if prior_generations.get(str(account_id), {}).get("checkpoint", 0)
!= base_generations.get(str(account_id), {}).get("checkpoint", 0)
}
def _merge_email_urgency_state(
prior,
*,
owner,
per_uid_scores,
notified_uids,
all_unread_keys,
fully_scanned_account_ids,
base_account_generations,
timestamp,
retired_account_ids=(),
base_payload_account_ids=(),
known_account_ids=(),
):
"""Merge a scan without letting an older snapshot erase newer facts."""
prior_per_uid = prior.get("per_uid", {})
if not isinstance(prior_per_uid, dict):
prior_per_uid = {}
complete = {str(account_id) for account_id in fully_scanned_account_ids}
prior_generations = _email_urgency_account_generations(prior)
retire_requested = {str(account_id) for account_id in retired_account_ids}
observed_accounts = {
_email_urgency_account_key(key) for key in per_uid_scores
} | complete | retire_requested
stale_accounts = _email_urgency_stale_accounts(
prior,
base_account_generations,
observed_accounts,
)
prior_payload_accounts = _email_urgency_payload_account_ids(prior)
base_payload_accounts = {
str(account_id) for account_id in base_payload_account_ids
}
# A selected account can be absent from the base snapshot. If another
# worker creates its first payload before this transaction wins the lock,
# membership itself is a fence even when both snapshots normalize to the
# legacy generation zero.
retired_accounts = {
account_id
for account_id in retire_requested - stale_accounts
if not (
account_id in prior_payload_accounts
and account_id not in base_payload_accounts
)
}
fresh_complete = complete - stale_accounts - retired_accounts
changed_accounts = set(fresh_complete)
merged_per_uid = {
key: value
for key, value in prior_per_uid.items()
if _email_urgency_account_key(key) not in retired_accounts
}
for key in list(merged_per_uid):
account_id = _email_urgency_account_key(key)
if account_id in fresh_complete:
merged_per_uid.pop(key, None)
changed_accounts.add(account_id)
# Partial scans may add or refresh facts, but absence from a partial scan
# is not evidence that another checkpoint or UI row is stale. When another
# worker committed after this scan captured its base generation, discard
# this account's whole stale snapshot. A key absent from the newer state
# may have been removed/read, so even a stale-only key is not safely
# additive without another fresh scan.
for key, value in per_uid_scores.items():
account_id = _email_urgency_account_key(key)
if account_id in stale_accounts or account_id in retired_accounts:
continue
if merged_per_uid.get(key) != value:
changed_accounts.add(account_id)
merged_per_uid[key] = value
prior_notified = _email_urgency_string_set(prior.get("notified_uids", []))
merged_notified = {
key
for key in prior_notified
if _email_urgency_account_key(key) not in retired_accounts
}
for key in _email_urgency_string_set(notified_uids) - prior_notified:
account_id = _email_urgency_account_key(key)
if account_id in stale_accounts or account_id in retired_accounts:
continue
merged_notified.add(key)
changed_accounts.add(account_id)
for key in list(merged_notified):
if (
_email_urgency_account_key(key) in fresh_complete
and key not in all_unread_keys
):
merged_notified.discard(key)
changed_accounts.add(_email_urgency_account_key(key))
next_generations = {
account_id: dict(value)
for account_id, value in prior_generations.items()
}
for account_id in changed_accounts:
generation = next_generations.setdefault(
account_id,
{"checkpoint": 0, "complete": 0},
)
generation["checkpoint"] += 1
if account_id in fresh_complete:
generation["complete"] += 1
for account_id in {str(value) for value in known_account_ids}:
next_generations.setdefault(
account_id,
{"checkpoint": 0, "complete": 0},
)
for account_id in retired_accounts:
# Every authoritative absence advances its generation, even when the
# prior state is already a payload-empty tombstone. A re-enabled scan
# may have captured that previous tombstone immediately before the
# account was disabled/deleted again; monotonic advancement is what
# makes that in-flight scan stale.
generation = next_generations.setdefault(
account_id,
{"checkpoint": 0, "complete": 0},
)
generation["checkpoint"] += 1
total_unread = 0
total_urgent = 0
max_score = 0
for value in merged_per_uid.values():
if not isinstance(value, dict):
continue
try:
score = max(0, min(3, int(value.get("score", 0))))
except (TypeError, ValueError):
score = 0
max_score = max(max_score, score)
if value.get("unread"):
total_unread += 1
if score >= 2:
total_urgent += 1
return {
"ts": timestamp,
"owner": owner or "",
"total_unread": total_unread,
"total_urgent": total_urgent,
"max_score": max_score,
"per_uid": merged_per_uid,
"notified_uids": sorted(merged_notified),
"account_generations": next_generations,
}
class TaskNoop(BaseException):
"""Raised by an action when it determined there's nothing to do.
@@ -2267,7 +1878,6 @@ async def action_check_email_urgency(owner: str, **kwargs) -> Tuple[str, bool]:
# filename for single-user installs (matches prior behaviour).
_owner_slug = "".join(c if (c.isalnum() or c in "-_.@") else "_" for c in (owner or "default"))
STATE_PATH = _P(DATA_DIR) / f"email_urgency_state_{_owner_slug}.json"
STATE_LOCK_DB = STATE_PATH.with_suffix(".lock.sqlite3")
CACHE_DIR = _P(EMAIL_URGENCY_CACHE_DIR)
CACHE_DIR.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
STATE_PATH.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
@@ -2282,144 +1892,35 @@ async def action_check_email_urgency(owner: str, **kwargs) -> Tuple[str, bool]:
"shopping", "social", "work", "personal", "legal", "support", "promo",
}
# Resolve with the task owner as before, but defer the availability
# gate until after authoritative account cleanup. State retirement must
# still run when no model is configured.
# ── 1. Resolve LLM candidates (utility primary + utility fallbacks; fall
# through to default chat as a last resort).
from src.task_endpoint import resolve_task_candidates
candidates = resolve_task_candidates(owner=owner)
if not candidates:
return "No LLM endpoint available", False
target_account_id = _email_task_account_id(kwargs)
# ── 1. Enumerate enabled accounts. Match this task's owner AND fall
# ── 2. Enumerate enabled accounts. Match this task's owner AND fall
# back to the legacy "unowned account whose imap_user / from_address
# == this owner" pattern — same rule `_get_email_config` uses, so a
# pre-multi-user account row still gets picked up for the seeded task.
def _enumerate_enabled_accounts():
db = _SL()
try:
from sqlalchemy import and_ as _and, or_ as _or
q = db.query(_EA).filter(_EA.enabled == True) # noqa: E712
if owner:
unowned = _or(_EA.owner == None, _EA.owner == "") # noqa: E711
same_mailbox = _or(
_EA.imap_user == owner,
_EA.from_address == owner,
)
q = q.filter(
_or(_EA.owner == owner, _and(unowned, same_mailbox))
)
if target_account_id:
q = q.filter(_EA.id == target_account_id)
return q.all()
finally:
db.close()
initial_accounts = _enumerate_enabled_accounts()
initial_account_ids = {
str(account.id) for account in initial_accounts
}
# Register every account before IMAP work, including its first-ever
# scan. A concurrent zero-account cleanup can then advance this marker
# and fence delivery even before the scan has produced payload.
registered_state = None
if initial_account_ids:
async def _register_accounts(prior):
next_state = _merge_email_urgency_state(
prior,
owner=owner,
per_uid_scores={},
notified_uids=prior.get("notified_uids", []),
all_unread_keys=set(),
fully_scanned_account_ids=set(),
base_account_generations=(
_email_urgency_account_generations(prior)
),
timestamp=_time.time(),
known_account_ids=initial_account_ids,
)
# Return the exact state committed by registration. This is
# the scan's generation token: adopting a later checkpoint
# after account cleanup would let the stale scan appear fresh.
return next_state, next_state
registered_state = await _run_email_urgency_state_transaction(
STATE_PATH,
STATE_LOCK_DB,
_register_accounts,
)
# Revalidate after registration. If deletion/disable and its cleanup
# completed before the marker was published, this second enumeration
# observes the absence and this action retires its own marker instead
# of starting IMAP. Accounts newly appearing between the two reads are
# left for the next pass rather than scanned without prior registration.
verified_accounts = _enumerate_enabled_accounts()
enabled_account_ids = {
str(account.id) for account in verified_accounts
}
accounts = [
account
for account in verified_accounts
if str(account.id) in initial_account_ids
]
# Capture the checkpoint basis before cleanup or IMAP. A full
# owner-wide enumeration authoritatively retires all known state IDs
# absent from the current enabled/visible set. A scoped task may retire
# only its selected missing/disabled account. Existing accounts remain
# present even if their later network scan fails, so transient IMAP
# failure never erases their last known state.
base_state = (
registered_state
if registered_state is not None
else _read_email_urgency_state(STATE_PATH)
)
base_account_generations = _email_urgency_account_generations(
base_state
)
base_payload_account_ids = _email_urgency_payload_account_ids(base_state)
known_state_account_ids = _email_urgency_known_account_ids(base_state)
if target_account_id:
retired_account_ids = (
{str(target_account_id)}
if str(target_account_id) not in enabled_account_ids
else set()
)
else:
retired_account_ids = (
known_state_account_ids - enabled_account_ids
)
if retired_account_ids:
async def _retire_accounts(prior):
next_state = _merge_email_urgency_state(
prior,
owner=owner,
per_uid_scores={},
notified_uids=prior.get("notified_uids", []),
all_unread_keys=set(),
fully_scanned_account_ids=set(),
base_account_generations=base_account_generations,
timestamp=_time.time(),
retired_account_ids=retired_account_ids,
base_payload_account_ids=base_payload_account_ids,
)
return None, next_state
await _run_email_urgency_state_transaction(
STATE_PATH,
STATE_LOCK_DB,
_retire_accounts,
)
db = _SL()
try:
from sqlalchemy import and_ as _and, or_ as _or
q = db.query(_EA).filter(_EA.enabled == True) # noqa: E712
if owner:
unowned = _or(_EA.owner == None, _EA.owner == "") # noqa: E711
same_mailbox = _or(_EA.imap_user == owner, _EA.from_address == owner)
q = q.filter(_or(_EA.owner == owner, _and(unowned, same_mailbox)))
if target_account_id:
q = q.filter(_EA.id == target_account_id)
accounts = q.all()
finally:
db.close()
if not accounts:
raise TaskNoop("no email accounts configured")
# ── 2. Account retirement above is state maintenance and does not
# depend on model availability. Scanning still requires the utility
# primary/fallback candidates resolved for this task owner.
if not candidates:
return "No LLM endpoint available", False
urgency_prompt = settings.get("urgent_email_prompt", "")
per_uid_scores = {} # key = "<acc_id>:<uid>" → {"score": 0-3, "reason": "..."}
all_unread_keys = set()
@@ -2428,7 +1929,6 @@ async def action_check_email_urgency(owner: str, **kwargs) -> Tuple[str, bool]:
failed_classifications = []
tag_write_details = []
scanned = 0
fully_scanned_account_ids = set()
def _heuristic_email_verdict(item: dict) -> dict:
blob = (
@@ -2524,27 +2024,16 @@ async def action_check_email_urgency(owner: str, **kwargs) -> Tuple[str, bool]:
def _scan_one(account=acc, cache_uids=cache.get("uids", {})):
"""Sync IMAP work runs in a thread."""
results = []
scan_complete = True
conn = _imap_connect(account.id)
try:
select_status, _select_data = conn.select("INBOX", readonly=True)
if select_status != "OK":
return results, False
conn.select("INBOX", readonly=True)
# Tag recent inbox mail, not only unread mail. Urgency
# reminders below still only notify for unread messages.
since_str = AGE_CUTOFF.strftime("%d-%b-%Y")
status, data = conn.uid("SEARCH", None, f'(SINCE {since_str})')
if status != "OK":
return results, False
if not data or not data[0]:
return results, True
matching_uids = data[0].split()
if len(matching_uids) > 30:
# The scale guard deliberately processes only the most
# recent 30. That is a partial account snapshot, so it
# cannot justify pruning older checkpoint facts.
scan_complete = False
uids = matching_uids[-30:]
if status != "OK" or not data or not data[0]:
return results
uids = data[0].split()[-30:]
for uid_b in uids:
uid = uid_b.decode() if isinstance(uid_b, bytes) else str(uid_b)
key = f"{account.id}:{uid}"
@@ -2552,41 +2041,12 @@ async def action_check_email_urgency(owner: str, **kwargs) -> Tuple[str, bool]:
cached_ok = isinstance(cached, dict) and cached.get("triage_version") == TRIAGE_VERSION
results.append({"key": key, "uid": uid, "cached": cached if cached_ok else None})
if cached_ok:
# Cached verdicts still need a lightweight FLAGS
# refresh. Without it a cached unread message looks
# read and its successful notification checkpoint
# is pruned on the next pass.
try:
st, flag_data = conn.uid("FETCH", uid_b, "(UID FLAGS)")
if st != "OK" or not flag_data:
scan_complete = False
results.pop()
continue
flag_parts = []
for part in flag_data:
if isinstance(part, (bytes, bytearray)):
flag_parts.append(bytes(part))
elif (
isinstance(part, tuple)
and part
and isinstance(part[0], (bytes, bytearray))
):
flag_parts.append(bytes(part[0]))
flags_blob = b" ".join(flag_parts)
results[-1]["unread"] = b"\\Seen" not in flags_blob
except Exception as _fe:
scan_complete = False
results.pop()
logger.debug(
f"urgency: flag fetch for uid {uid} failed: {_fe}"
)
# Already classified — skip the fetch.
continue
# Pull headers + first ~800 chars of plaintext body.
try:
st, msg_data = conn.uid("FETCH", uid_b, "(UID FLAGS RFC822.HEADER BODY.PEEK[TEXT]<0.800>)")
if st != "OK" or not msg_data:
scan_complete = False
results.pop()
continue
flags_blob = b" ".join(
part[0] for part in msg_data
@@ -2600,8 +2060,6 @@ async def action_check_email_urgency(owner: str, **kwargs) -> Tuple[str, bool]:
if isinstance(part, tuple) and part[1]:
raw += part[1] + b"\n\n"
if not raw:
scan_complete = False
results.pop()
continue
msg = _email_mod.message_from_bytes(raw)
# Skip Odysseus-generated reminders so the scanner
@@ -2657,21 +2115,17 @@ async def action_check_email_urgency(owner: str, **kwargs) -> Tuple[str, bool]:
"unread": is_unread,
})
except Exception as _fe:
scan_complete = False
results.pop()
logger.debug(f"urgency: header fetch for uid {uid} failed: {_fe}")
finally:
try: conn.logout()
except Exception: pass
return results, scan_complete
return results
try:
items, scan_complete = await _aio.to_thread(_scan_one)
items = await _aio.to_thread(_scan_one)
except Exception as e:
logger.warning(f"urgency: IMAP scan failed for account {acc.id}: {e}")
continue
if scan_complete:
fully_scanned_account_ids.add(str(acc.id))
for item in items:
scanned += 1
@@ -2808,13 +2262,13 @@ async def action_check_email_urgency(owner: str, **kwargs) -> Tuple[str, bool]:
logger.debug(f"urgency: LLM classify failed for {key}: {e}")
continue
if scan_complete:
# Only a complete account scan proves a cached UID left the
# recent window. Partial/failing scans preserve prior facts.
seen_uids = {it["uid"] for it in items}
cache_uids = cache.get("uids", {})
for stale in [u for u in cache_uids if u not in seen_uids]:
cache_uids.pop(stale, None)
# ── Prune cache entries for UIDs that are no longer in the recent
# scan window. Read messages remain cached because tags are useful
# on read mail too; unread state is refreshed per scan above.
seen_uids = {it["uid"] for it in items}
cache_uids = cache.get("uids", {})
for stale in [u for u in cache_uids if u not in seen_uids]:
cache_uids.pop(stale, None)
try:
cache_file.write_text(_json.dumps(cache), encoding="utf-8")
@@ -2918,34 +2372,40 @@ async def action_check_email_urgency(owner: str, **kwargs) -> Tuple[str, bool]:
# ── 4. Aggregate state. urgent = score ≥ 2.
urgent_keys = [k for k, v in per_uid_scores.items() if v.get("score", 0) >= 2 and v.get("unread")]
max_score = max((v.get("score", 0) for v in per_uid_scores.values()), default=0)
total_urgent = len(urgent_keys)
# ── 5. Fire a reminder only when a previously-unnotified UID scores
# urgent. The read, decision, delivery, and checkpoint are serialized
# below so two scheduler workers cannot both act on the same stale
# state or overwrite each other's successful checkpoint.
# Load prior state to know which urgent UIDs we've already notified.
try:
prior = _json.loads(STATE_PATH.read_text(encoding="utf-8")) if STATE_PATH.exists() else {}
except Exception:
prior = {}
notified_uids = set(prior.get("notified_uids", []))
# ── 5. Fire reminder ONLY when a previously-unnotified UID scores urgent.
new_urgent = [k for k in urgent_keys if k not in notified_uids]
newly_notified = set()
notify_failed = set()
def _urgency_reminder_payload(reminder_keys):
total = len(reminder_keys)
title = "Urgent email" if total == 1 else f"{total} urgent emails"
if new_urgent:
title = "Urgent email" if total_urgent == 1 else f"{total_urgent} urgent emails"
# Build a real listing — subject · sender · reason for each urgent
# one — so the reminder email tells you which messages to act on,
# not just "4 needing reply". Optional deep-link when the user has
# `app_public_url` configured in Settings (so the email row links
# straight into the Odysseus Email tab).
# Sort: highest-scored UIDs first; cap at 10 to keep the email tidy.
sorted_urgent = sorted(
((key, per_uid_scores[key]) for key in reminder_keys),
key=lambda item: item[1].get("score", 0),
reverse=True,
((k, per_uid_scores[k]) for k in urgent_keys),
key=lambda kv: kv[1].get("score", 0), reverse=True,
)[:10]
_pub = (settings.get("app_public_url") or "").strip().rstrip("/")
from urllib.parse import quote as _quote
lines = [
f"{total} email" + ("" if total == 1 else "s")
+ " need an urgent reply:",
"",
]
for i, (key, value) in enumerate(sorted_urgent, 1):
subj = (value.get("subject") or "(no subject)")[:160]
frm = value.get("from") or ""
why = value.get("reason") or ""
uid_for_link = str(key).split(":", 1)[-1]
lines = [f"{total_urgent} email" + ("" if total_urgent == 1 else "s") + " need an urgent reply:", ""]
for i, (k, v) in enumerate(sorted_urgent, 1):
subj = (v.get("subject") or "(no subject)")[:160]
frm = v.get("from") or ""
why = v.get("reason") or ""
uid_for_link = str(k).split(":", 1)[-1]
hash_link = f"#email={_quote('INBOX', safe='')}:{uid_for_link}"
open_link = f"{_pub}/{hash_link}" if _pub else hash_link
line = f"{i}. {subj}"
@@ -2955,94 +2415,57 @@ async def action_check_email_urgency(owner: str, **kwargs) -> Tuple[str, bool]:
line += f" · {why}"
lines.append(line)
lines.append(f" Open email: {open_link}")
if total > len(sorted_urgent):
if total_urgent > len(sorted_urgent):
lines.append("")
lines.append(f"…and {total - len(sorted_urgent)} more.")
return title, "\n".join(lines)
async def _dispatch_urgency_reminder(reminder_keys):
# Call dispatch_reminder directly: a scheduler has no browser
# session cookie with which to call the HTTP endpoint.
from routes.note_routes import dispatch_reminder
title, body = _urgency_reminder_payload(reminder_keys)
return await dispatch_reminder(
title=title,
note_body=body,
note_id="urgent-email",
owner=owner or "",
)
async def _dispatch_and_checkpoint(prior):
notified_uids = _email_urgency_string_set(
prior.get("notified_uids", [])
)
observed_accounts = {
_email_urgency_account_key(key) for key in per_uid_scores
} | fully_scanned_account_ids
stale_accounts = _email_urgency_stale_accounts(
prior,
base_account_generations,
observed_accounts,
)
# Generation fencing must happen before delivery, not only during
# merge. A stale-only unread UID may have been removed, read, or
# downgraded by the newer completed scan.
deliverable_urgent = [
key
for key in urgent_keys
if _email_urgency_account_key(key) not in stale_accounts
]
new_urgent = [
key
for key in deliverable_urgent
if key not in notified_uids
]
if new_urgent:
try:
dispatch_result = await _dispatch_urgency_reminder(
deliverable_urgent
)
channel = (settings.get("reminder_channel") or "browser").strip().lower()
delivered = bool(dispatch_result.get("browser_sent"))
if channel == "email":
delivered = bool(dispatch_result.get("email_sent"))
elif channel == "ntfy":
delivered = bool(dispatch_result.get("ntfy_sent"))
elif channel == "webhook":
delivered = bool(dispatch_result.get("webhook_sent"))
if delivered:
newly_notified.update(new_urgent)
notified_uids.update(new_urgent)
else:
notify_failed.update(new_urgent)
logger.warning(
"urgency: reminder dispatch returned no successful "
f"delivery path: {dispatch_result}"
)
except Exception as e:
logger.warning(f"urgency: reminder dispatch failed: {e}")
lines.append(f"…and {total_urgent - len(sorted_urgent)} more.")
body = "\n".join(lines)
try:
# Call dispatch_reminder DIRECTLY (no HTTP/auth roundtrip — the
# endpoint version 401's the background scheduler because it
# has no session cookie).
from routes.note_routes import dispatch_reminder
dispatch_result = await dispatch_reminder(
title=title, note_body=body, note_id="urgent-email",
owner=owner or "",
)
channel = (settings.get("reminder_channel") or "browser").strip().lower()
delivered = bool(dispatch_result.get("browser_sent"))
if channel == "email":
delivered = bool(dispatch_result.get("email_sent"))
elif channel == "ntfy":
delivered = bool(dispatch_result.get("ntfy_sent"))
elif channel == "webhook":
delivered = bool(dispatch_result.get("webhook_sent"))
if delivered:
newly_notified.update(new_urgent)
else:
notify_failed.update(new_urgent)
logger.warning(f"urgency: reminder dispatch returned no successful delivery path: {dispatch_result}")
except Exception as e:
logger.warning(f"urgency: reminder dispatch failed: {e}")
notify_failed.update(new_urgent)
# Mark only successfully delivered UIDs as notified so a transient
# SMTP/ntfy/browser failure retries instead of lying forever.
notified_uids.update(newly_notified)
next_state = _merge_email_urgency_state(
prior,
owner=owner,
per_uid_scores=per_uid_scores,
notified_uids=notified_uids,
all_unread_keys=all_unread_keys,
fully_scanned_account_ids=fully_scanned_account_ids,
base_account_generations=base_account_generations,
timestamp=_time.time(),
)
return notified_uids, next_state
# Prune notified_uids that aren't unread anymore (so a future re-urgent
# message with the same UID — rare but possible after archive→unarchive
# — can re-notify). Keep only UIDs still in `all_unread_keys`.
notified_uids = {u for u in notified_uids if u in all_unread_keys}
state = {
"ts": _time.time(),
"owner": owner or "",
"total_unread": len(all_unread_keys),
"total_urgent": total_urgent,
"max_score": max_score,
"per_uid": per_uid_scores,
"notified_uids": sorted(notified_uids),
}
try:
await _run_email_urgency_state_transaction(
STATE_PATH,
STATE_LOCK_DB,
_dispatch_and_checkpoint,
)
STATE_PATH.write_text(_json.dumps(state), encoding="utf-8")
except Exception as e:
logger.warning(f"urgency: state transaction failed: {e}")
logger.warning(f"urgency: state write failed: {e}")
# ── 6. Activity-log summary — counts line on top, then per-tier
# bulleted breakdown so the user can see WHICH emails ranked where
+2 -62
View File
@@ -282,9 +282,7 @@ def trim_for_context(messages: List[Dict], context_length: int, reserve_tokens:
if essential_system:
sys_text = essential_system[0].get("content", "")
if len(sys_text) > 2000:
truncated_system = dict(essential_system[0])
truncated_system["content"] = sys_text[:2000] + "\n[System prompt truncated for context limits]"
essential_system[0] = truncated_system
essential_system[0] = {"role": "system", "content": sys_text[:2000] + "\n[System prompt truncated for context limits]"}
trimmed = essential_system + convo_msgs
if estimate_tokens(trimmed) <= budget:
return _sanitize_tool_messages(essential_system + protected_msgs + convo_msgs)
@@ -327,9 +325,6 @@ async def maybe_compact(
messages: List[Dict],
headers: Optional[Dict] = None,
owner: Optional[str] = None,
*,
persist: bool = True,
compaction_state: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = None,
) -> tuple:
"""Check context usage and compact if above threshold.
@@ -421,17 +416,7 @@ async def maybe_compact(
# offset — session.history INCLUDES the system messages, but
# split_point is indexed against convo_msgs which does NOT. Without
# this, the slice drops the leading system message(s).
if compaction_state is not None:
compaction_state.update({
"split_point": split_point,
"summary": summary,
"system_msg_count": len(system_msgs),
"applied": False,
})
if persist:
_update_session_history(session, split_point, summary, system_msg_count=len(system_msgs))
if compaction_state is not None:
compaction_state["applied"] = True
_update_session_history(session, split_point, summary, system_msg_count=len(system_msgs))
new_used = estimate_tokens(compacted)
logger.info(
@@ -442,51 +427,6 @@ async def maybe_compact(
return compacted, context_length, True
def apply_compaction_state(session, compaction_state: Optional[Dict[str, Any]]) -> bool:
"""Persist a route-specific compaction after that route commits output.
Candidate prompts may be compacted speculatively while an explicit
foreground fallback chain is being tried. Persisting at construction time
would let an unavailable route rewrite history before another route answers,
so callers hold this small plan and apply only the winning route's plan.
"""
state = compaction_state if isinstance(compaction_state, dict) else None
if not state or state.get("applied"):
return False
summary = state.get("summary")
split_point = state.get("split_point")
system_msg_count = state.get("system_msg_count", 0)
if not isinstance(summary, str) or not isinstance(split_point, int):
return False
_update_session_history(
session,
split_point,
summary,
system_msg_count=system_msg_count if isinstance(system_msg_count, int) else 0,
)
state["applied"] = True
return True
def apply_compaction_state_for_session(
session_id: Optional[str],
compaction_state: Optional[Dict[str, Any]],
) -> bool:
"""Resolve an in-memory session and apply a deferred compaction plan."""
if not session_id:
return False
try:
from core.models import get_session_manager_instance
manager = get_session_manager_instance()
session = manager.get_session(session_id) if manager else None
except Exception:
session = None
return apply_compaction_state(session, compaction_state) if session else False
def _update_session_history(session, split_point: int, summary: str,
system_msg_count: int = 0):
"""Update the in-memory session history after compaction.
+33 -215
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ Consolidates the 4+ copies of normalize_base / resolve_endpoint logic into one p
"""
import json
import ipaddress
import logging
import socket
import subprocess
@@ -28,43 +27,6 @@ _NON_CHAT_MODEL = (
)
def endpoint_cost_tracked(url: str, endpoint_kind: Optional[str] = None) -> bool:
"""Return whether token cost should be tracked for a concrete route.
This is intentionally a non-secret route classification. It mirrors the
frontend's local/subscription exclusions without exposing endpoint URLs to
message metadata.
"""
try:
parsed = urlparse(url or "")
host = (parsed.hostname or "").lower().rstrip(".")
path = (parsed.path or "").rstrip("/")
except Exception:
return False
if not host:
return False
if host == "chatgpt.com" and (
path == "/backend-api/codex" or path.startswith("/backend-api/codex/")
):
return False
kind = str(endpoint_kind or "auto").strip().lower()
if kind == "local":
return False
if kind in {"api", "proxy"}:
return True
if host in {"localhost", "0.0.0.0", "host.docker.internal"} or host.endswith(".local"):
return False
try:
ip = ipaddress.ip_address(host)
return ip.is_global
except ValueError:
pass
if "." not in host:
return False
return True
def _first_chat_model(models) -> Optional[str]:
"""First model that isn't an embedding/tts/etc.; falls back to models[0]."""
for m in (models or []):
@@ -434,14 +396,10 @@ def resolve_endpoint(
db.close()
def _resolve_endpoint_by_id_with_descriptor(
ep_id: str,
model: Optional[str] = None,
owner: Optional[str] = None,
*,
require_exact_model: bool = False,
) -> Optional[Tuple[Tuple[str, str, Dict], dict]]:
"""Resolve a concrete endpoint/model plus its non-secret descriptor.
def resolve_endpoint_by_id(
ep_id: str, model: Optional[str] = None, owner: Optional[str] = None
) -> Optional[Tuple[str, str, Dict]]:
"""Resolve a specific endpoint id (+ optional model) to (chat_url, model, headers).
Returns None if the endpoint doesn't exist or is disabled. Used to turn
a configured fallback entry ({endpoint_id, model}) into a dispatch target.
@@ -468,34 +426,15 @@ def _resolve_endpoint_by_id_with_descriptor(
chat_url = build_chat_url(base)
headers = build_headers(api_key, base)
m = (model or "").strip()
enabled_models = _endpoint_enabled_models(ep)
if require_exact_model:
# Explicit foreground fallback entries are concrete choices. A
# hidden or known-missing model must disable the entry instead of
# silently substituting another model from the endpoint.
if not m or m in _endpoint_hidden_models(ep):
return None
if enabled_models and m not in enabled_models:
return None
else:
# Legacy Utility/Vision chains retain their model-repair behavior.
if m and m in _endpoint_hidden_models(ep):
m = ""
if not m:
m = _first_chat_model(enabled_models) or ""
# Drop a model the user disabled on the endpoint, then pick the first
# enabled chat model rather than a hidden one.
if m and m in _endpoint_hidden_models(ep):
m = ""
if not m:
m = _first_chat_model(_endpoint_enabled_models(ep)) or ""
if not m:
return None
return (
(chat_url, m, headers),
{
"endpoint_id": ep.id,
"endpoint_label": getattr(ep, "name", None) or ep.id,
"endpoint_cost_tracked": endpoint_cost_tracked(
chat_url,
getattr(ep, "endpoint_kind", None),
),
},
)
return chat_url, m, headers
except Exception as e:
logger.debug(f"Could not resolve endpoint {ep_id}: {e}")
return None
@@ -503,105 +442,29 @@ def _resolve_endpoint_by_id_with_descriptor(
db.close()
def resolve_endpoint_by_id(
ep_id: str,
model: Optional[str] = None,
owner: Optional[str] = None,
*,
require_exact_model: bool = False,
) -> Optional[Tuple[str, str, Dict]]:
"""Resolve a specific endpoint id (+ optional model) to its runtime route."""
def resolve_chat_fallback_candidates(owner: Optional[str] = None) -> list:
"""Build the configured default-chat fallback chain as a list of
(chat_url, model, headers) tuples, skipping any that can't resolve.
resolved = _resolve_endpoint_by_id_with_descriptor(
ep_id,
model,
owner=owner,
require_exact_model=require_exact_model,
)
return resolved[0] if resolved else None
def resolve_route_descriptor(
endpoint_url: str,
model: str,
headers: Optional[Dict] = None,
owner: Optional[str] = None,
) -> dict:
"""Return the visible endpoint identity for an already-resolved route.
Headers are compared only inside the process so two endpoints using the
same provider URL/model but different credentials remain distinguishable.
No credential material is returned or logged.
The primary model is NOT included callers prepend their session's
current (url, model, headers) so per-session model overrides are honored.
"""
if not endpoint_url or not model:
return {
"endpoint_id": None,
"endpoint_label": "Selected route",
"endpoint_cost_tracked": endpoint_cost_tracked(endpoint_url),
}
db = SessionLocal()
try:
q = db.query(ModelEndpoint).filter(ModelEndpoint.is_enabled == True)
if owner:
from src.auth_helpers import owner_filter
q = owner_filter(q, ModelEndpoint, owner)
expected = (endpoint_url.rstrip("/"), model, headers or {})
for ep in q.all():
resolved = _resolve_endpoint_by_id_with_descriptor(
ep.id,
model,
owner=owner,
require_exact_model=True,
)
if not resolved:
continue
candidate, descriptor = resolved
actual = (candidate[0].rstrip("/"), candidate[1], candidate[2] or {})
if actual == expected:
return descriptor
except Exception as e:
logger.debug("Could not identify selected endpoint route: %s", e)
finally:
db.close()
return {
"endpoint_id": None,
"endpoint_label": "Selected route",
"endpoint_cost_tracked": endpoint_cost_tracked(endpoint_url),
}
def resolve_route_descriptor_by_id(
endpoint_id: str,
endpoint_url: str,
model: str,
headers: Optional[Dict] = None,
owner: Optional[str] = None,
) -> Optional[dict]:
"""Resolve a selected route's identity without relying on row order.
The explicit endpoint id is still verified against the resolved runtime
route. This prevents stale or mismatched request metadata from being used
for attribution while disambiguating endpoints whose routes are otherwise
identical.
"""
resolved = _resolve_endpoint_by_id_with_descriptor(
endpoint_id,
model,
owner=owner,
require_exact_model=True,
)
if not resolved:
return None
candidate, descriptor = resolved
expected = ((endpoint_url or "").rstrip("/"), model, headers or {})
actual = (candidate[0].rstrip("/"), candidate[1], candidate[2] or {})
return descriptor if actual == expected else None
return _resolve_fallback_candidates("default_model_fallbacks", owner=owner)
def resolve_utility_fallback_candidates(owner: Optional[str] = None) -> list:
"""Configured fallback chain for the Utility model (`utility_model_fallbacks`)."""
try:
from src.settings import get_user_setting, load_settings
settings = load_settings()
utility_ep = (get_user_setting("utility_endpoint_id", owner or "", settings.get("utility_endpoint_id", "")) or "").strip()
if not utility_ep:
utility_chain = get_user_setting("utility_model_fallbacks", owner or "", settings.get("utility_model_fallbacks") or []) or []
if utility_chain:
return _resolve_fallback_candidates("utility_model_fallbacks", owner=owner)
return _resolve_fallback_candidates("default_model_fallbacks", owner=owner)
except Exception:
pass
return _resolve_fallback_candidates("utility_model_fallbacks", owner=owner)
@@ -611,62 +474,17 @@ def resolve_vision_fallback_candidates(owner: Optional[str] = None) -> list:
def _resolve_fallback_candidates(setting_key: str, owner: Optional[str] = None) -> list:
out = []
try:
from src.settings import get_user_setting, load_settings
settings = load_settings()
chain = get_user_setting(setting_key, owner or "", settings.get(setting_key) or []) or []
except Exception:
return []
return resolve_fallback_entries(chain, owner=owner)
def resolve_fallback_entries(
entries,
owner: Optional[str] = None,
*,
require_exact_model: bool = False,
) -> list:
"""Resolve ordered endpoint/model entries within the caller's owner scope."""
out = []
for entry in entries or []:
return out
for entry in chain:
if not isinstance(entry, dict):
continue
resolved = resolve_endpoint_by_id(
entry.get("endpoint_id", ""),
entry.get("model", ""),
owner=owner,
require_exact_model=require_exact_model,
)
if resolved and resolved not in out:
resolved = resolve_endpoint_by_id(entry.get("endpoint_id", ""), entry.get("model", ""), owner=owner)
if resolved:
out.append(resolved)
return out
def resolve_fallback_entries_with_descriptors(
entries,
owner: Optional[str] = None,
*,
require_exact_model: bool = False,
) -> list:
"""Resolve ordered entries while retaining safe endpoint provenance."""
out = []
seen = []
for entry in entries or []:
if not isinstance(entry, dict):
continue
resolved = _resolve_endpoint_by_id_with_descriptor(
entry.get("endpoint_id", ""),
entry.get("model", ""),
owner=owner,
require_exact_model=require_exact_model,
)
if not resolved:
continue
candidate, descriptor = resolved
if any(candidate == prior for prior in seen):
continue
seen.append(candidate)
out.append((candidate, descriptor))
return out
-206
View File
@@ -1,206 +0,0 @@
"""Explicit foreground Chat and Agent model-routing policy."""
from dataclasses import dataclass
from typing import Any, Collection, Dict, FrozenSet, Optional, Tuple
from src.endpoint_resolver import (
endpoint_cost_tracked,
resolve_fallback_entries,
resolve_fallback_entries_with_descriptors,
resolve_route_descriptor,
resolve_route_descriptor_by_id,
)
_DEFAULT_FALLBACK_ENTRY_RESOLVER = resolve_fallback_entries
FOREGROUND_FALLBACK_ENABLED_KEY = "foreground_fallback_enabled"
FOREGROUND_FALLBACK_LIST_KEY = "foreground_model_fallbacks"
FOREGROUND_AVAILABILITY_STATUSES: FrozenSet[int] = frozenset({
408, 425, 429, 500, 502, 503, 504, 507, 508, 529,
})
MAX_FOREGROUND_FALLBACKS = 10
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class ForegroundModelPolicy:
"""Resolved per-user foreground fallback policy."""
enabled: bool = False
fallback_candidates: Tuple[tuple, ...] = ()
fallback_descriptors: Tuple[dict, ...] = ()
eligible_statuses: FrozenSet[int] = FOREGROUND_AVAILABILITY_STATUSES
fallback_on_empty: bool = False
def _load_policy_preferences(owner: Optional[str]) -> dict:
"""Load only preferences that explicitly belong to ``owner``.
The generic preferences loader intentionally treats a legacy flat store as
the single-user preferences object. That compatibility must not cross an
authentication transition: once a named owner is present, foreground
fallback consent exists only in an actual ``_users[owner]`` dictionary.
"""
from routes import prefs_routes
if owner is None:
prefs = prefs_routes._load_for_user(None)
return dict(prefs) if isinstance(prefs, dict) else {}
raw = prefs_routes._load()
users = raw.get("_users") if isinstance(raw, dict) else None
if not isinstance(users, dict):
return {}
prefs = users.get(owner)
return dict(prefs) if isinstance(prefs, dict) else {}
def resolve_foreground_model_policy(
owner: Optional[str] = None,
allowed_models: Optional[Collection[str]] = None,
) -> ForegroundModelPolicy:
"""Resolve an explicit owner-scoped policy, failing closed to strict mode.
The policy is stored in user preferences even when authentication is
disabled. Historical ``default_model_fallbacks`` values are deliberately
unrelated and are never read or migrated.
"""
try:
prefs = _load_policy_preferences(owner)
except Exception:
return ForegroundModelPolicy()
if prefs.get(FOREGROUND_FALLBACK_ENABLED_KEY) is not True:
return ForegroundModelPolicy()
entries = prefs.get(FOREGROUND_FALLBACK_LIST_KEY)
if not isinstance(entries, list) or not entries:
return ForegroundModelPolicy()
if allowed_models is not None:
allowed = frozenset(allowed_models)
entries = [
entry for entry in entries
if (
isinstance(entry, dict)
and isinstance(entry.get("model"), str)
and entry.get("model") in allowed
)
]
if not entries:
return ForegroundModelPolicy()
entries = entries[:MAX_FOREGROUND_FALLBACKS]
if resolve_fallback_entries is not _DEFAULT_FALLBACK_ENTRY_RESOLVER:
# Preserve the long-standing resolver seam used by downstream tests and
# integrations. Production uses the descriptor-aware resolver below.
compatibility_candidates = resolve_fallback_entries(
entries,
owner=owner,
require_exact_model=True,
)
# Known limitation of this test-only seam: alignment matches on model
# alone, so when two entries share a model and the resolver skips the
# first, the surviving candidate inherits the skipped entry's
# endpoint_id. Production uses the descriptor-aware branch below,
# which is unaffected.
resolved_routes = []
remaining_entries = list(entries)
for candidate in compatibility_candidates:
matching_index = next(
(
index for index, entry in enumerate(remaining_entries)
if isinstance(entry, dict)
and entry.get("model") == candidate[1]
),
None,
)
matching_entry = (
remaining_entries.pop(matching_index)
if matching_index is not None
else {}
)
descriptor = {
"endpoint_id": matching_entry.get("endpoint_id"),
"endpoint_label": matching_entry.get("endpoint_id") or "Fallback route",
"endpoint_cost_tracked": endpoint_cost_tracked(candidate[0]),
}
resolved_routes.append((candidate, descriptor))
else:
resolved_routes = resolve_fallback_entries_with_descriptors(
entries,
owner=owner,
require_exact_model=True,
)
candidates = [candidate for candidate, _descriptor in resolved_routes]
if not candidates:
return ForegroundModelPolicy()
return ForegroundModelPolicy(
enabled=True,
fallback_candidates=tuple(candidates),
fallback_descriptors=tuple(
dict(descriptor) for _candidate, descriptor in resolved_routes
),
)
def resolve_foreground_fallback_candidates(owner: Optional[str] = None) -> list:
"""Return only candidates explicitly enabled by the current user."""
return list(resolve_foreground_model_policy(owner).fallback_candidates)
def build_foreground_model_candidates(
endpoint_url: str,
model: str,
headers: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = None,
owner: Optional[str] = None,
policy: Optional[ForegroundModelPolicy] = None,
) -> list:
"""Build the ordered candidate list for a foreground request."""
policy = policy or resolve_foreground_model_policy(owner)
primary = (endpoint_url, model, headers or {})
candidates = [primary]
for candidate in policy.fallback_candidates:
if candidate not in candidates:
candidates.append(candidate)
return candidates
def build_foreground_route_descriptors(
endpoint_url: str,
model: str,
headers: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = None,
owner: Optional[str] = None,
policy: Optional[ForegroundModelPolicy] = None,
selected_endpoint_id: Optional[str] = None,
) -> list:
"""Build safe route metadata parallel to foreground candidates."""
policy = policy or resolve_foreground_model_policy(owner)
selected = None
if selected_endpoint_id:
selected = resolve_route_descriptor_by_id(
selected_endpoint_id,
endpoint_url,
model,
headers or {},
owner=owner,
)
if selected is None:
selected = resolve_route_descriptor(endpoint_url, model, headers or {}, owner=owner)
primary = (endpoint_url, model, headers or {})
candidates = [primary]
descriptors = [selected]
for candidate, descriptor in zip(
policy.fallback_candidates,
policy.fallback_descriptors,
):
if candidate in candidates:
continue
candidates.append(candidate)
descriptors.append(dict(descriptor))
return descriptors
+3 -172
View File
@@ -1,14 +1,11 @@
import ipaddress
import json
import os
import time
import uuid
import logging
import re
from typing import Dict, List, Optional, Any
from urllib.parse import urljoin, urlparse, urlunparse
import httpcore
import httpx
from fastapi import HTTPException
@@ -357,152 +354,6 @@ def _find_integration(identifier: str) -> Optional[Dict[str, Any]]:
return None
# httpcore raises its own exception hierarchy; map the ones a simple request can
# surface back to their httpx equivalents so the caller's `except httpx.*` blocks
# below behave exactly as they did with the default transport.
_HTTPCORE_TO_HTTPX_EXC = {
httpcore.ConnectError: httpx.ConnectError,
httpcore.ConnectTimeout: httpx.ConnectTimeout,
httpcore.NetworkError: httpx.NetworkError,
httpcore.PoolTimeout: httpx.PoolTimeout,
httpcore.ProtocolError: httpx.ProtocolError,
httpcore.ReadError: httpx.ReadError,
httpcore.ReadTimeout: httpx.ReadTimeout,
httpcore.RemoteProtocolError: httpx.RemoteProtocolError,
httpcore.TimeoutException: httpx.TimeoutException,
httpcore.WriteError: httpx.WriteError,
httpcore.WriteTimeout: httpx.WriteTimeout,
}
class _PinnedAsyncBackend(httpcore.AsyncNetworkBackend):
"""Network backend that connects only to the pre-validated IPs, in order.
Every address here came out of the single SSRF resolution, so moving to the
next one after a connect failure is not re-resolution it's ordinary
multi-address fallback restricted to the set the guard already approved.
httpcore takes TLS SNI and the ``Host`` header from the request URL rather
than the connect host, so pinning the socket destination leaves certificate
validation and vhost routing pointed at the original hostname.
"""
def __init__(self, ips: List[ipaddress._BaseAddress]):
self._ips = [str(ip) for ip in ips]
self._real = httpcore.AnyIOBackend()
async def connect_tcp(self, host, port, timeout=None, local_address=None,
socket_options=None):
# One shared connect budget: each attempt gets the time left until the
# original deadline, so N dead addresses can't stretch the connect
# phase to N * timeout.
deadline = None if timeout is None else time.monotonic() + timeout
last_exc: Optional[Exception] = None
for ip in self._ips:
remaining = None if deadline is None else max(0.0, deadline - time.monotonic())
try:
return await self._real.connect_tcp(
ip, port, remaining, local_address, socket_options
)
except (httpcore.ConnectError, httpcore.ConnectTimeout) as exc:
last_exc = exc
if deadline is not None and time.monotonic() >= deadline:
break
raise last_exc
async def connect_unix_socket(self, path, timeout=None, socket_options=None):
return await self._real.connect_unix_socket(path, timeout, socket_options)
async def sleep(self, seconds: float) -> None:
return await self._real.sleep(seconds)
class _PinnedAsyncTransport(httpx.AsyncBaseTransport):
"""httpx transport that pins the TCP connect to the pre-resolved IP(s).
Kept local, mirroring the per-module pinned transports web fetch and
webhook delivery already carry, rather than coupling api_call to the
webhook subsystem. The request URL passes through unchanged, so SNI and the
``Host`` header stay the original hostname; only the socket destination is
pinned, which is what closes the rebinding window.
"""
def __init__(self, ips: List[ipaddress._BaseAddress]):
self._pinned_ips = list(ips)
self._pool = httpcore.AsyncConnectionPool(
# Reuse the CA trust the default httpx client would build (certifi
# plus SSL_CERT_FILE / SSL_CERT_DIR when trust_env is set) so
# swapping in this transport doesn't quietly change which chains
# verify. ssl.create_default_context() would use system roots.
ssl_context=httpx.create_ssl_context(),
http1=True,
http2=False,
network_backend=_PinnedAsyncBackend(ips),
)
async def handle_async_request(self, request: httpx.Request) -> httpx.Response:
core_req = httpcore.Request(
method=request.method,
url=httpcore.URL(
scheme=request.url.raw_scheme,
host=request.url.raw_host,
port=request.url.port,
target=request.url.raw_path,
),
headers=request.headers.raw,
content=request.stream,
extensions=request.extensions,
)
try:
core_resp = await self._pool.handle_async_request(core_req)
content = b"".join([chunk async for chunk in core_resp.aiter_stream()])
await core_resp.aclose()
except Exception as exc:
mapped = _HTTPCORE_TO_HTTPX_EXC.get(type(exc))
if mapped is not None:
raise mapped(str(exc)) from exc
raise
return httpx.Response(
status_code=core_resp.status,
headers=core_resp.headers,
content=content,
extensions=core_resp.extensions,
)
async def aclose(self) -> None:
await self._pool.aclose()
def _validated_ips(raw_ips: List[str]) -> List[ipaddress._BaseAddress]:
"""Return every entry that parses as an IP address, de-duplicated, order
preserved.
check_outbound_url only reports ok when *all* of these classify as safe, so
the whole list is guard-approved and any of them is a legitimate connect
target. Skipping unparseable entries mirrors how the guard walks the same
resolver output.
De-duplication matters because the resolver is getaddrinfo(host, None) with
no socktype filter, so glibc reports the same address once per socktype
(SOCK_STREAM/SOCK_DGRAM/SOCK_RAW) a single-homed host comes back three
times. Without this, the connect fallback would spend the shared deadline
retrying one dead address instead of moving on to a genuinely different one.
"""
ips: List[ipaddress._BaseAddress] = []
seen = set()
for raw in raw_ips:
if not isinstance(raw, str):
continue
try:
ip = ipaddress.ip_address(raw.split("%")[0]) # strip IPv6 zone id
except ValueError:
continue
if ip in seen:
continue
seen.add(ip)
ips.append(ip)
return ips
async def execute_api_call(
integration_id: str,
method: str,
@@ -558,31 +409,13 @@ async def execute_api_call(
# loopback for locked-down deployments. Private stays allowed by default
# because LAN integrations (Home Assistant, Miniflux, ntfy) are the
# primary use case.
from src.url_safety import check_outbound_url, _default_resolver
from src.url_safety import check_outbound_url
block_private = os.getenv(
"INTEGRATION_API_BLOCK_PRIVATE_IPS", "false"
).lower() == "true"
# Resolve the host exactly once and remember the IPs the guard validated so
# the request below can be pinned to them. check_outbound_url only reports
# (ok, reason); a plain httpx client re-resolves the host at connect time,
# which reopens a DNS-rebinding TOCTOU — a base_url host that answers with a
# public IP for the guard and then flips to 169.254.169.254 for the connect
# would reach cloud metadata with the integration's auth headers attached.
resolved_ips: List[str] = []
def _recording_resolver(host: str) -> List[str]:
ips = _default_resolver(host)
resolved_ips[:] = ips
return ips
ok, reason = check_outbound_url(
url, block_private=block_private, resolver=_recording_resolver
)
ok, reason = check_outbound_url(url, block_private=block_private)
if not ok:
return {"error": f"URL rejected: {reason}", "exit_code": 1}
pinned_ips = _validated_ips(resolved_ips)
if not pinned_ips:
return {"error": "URL rejected: host did not resolve to a usable address", "exit_code": 1}
method = method.upper()
@@ -622,9 +455,7 @@ async def execute_api_call(
auth = httpx.BasicAuth(parts[0], parts[1])
try:
async with httpx.AsyncClient(
timeout=30.0, transport=_PinnedAsyncTransport(pinned_ips)
) as client:
async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=30.0) as client:
response = await client.request(
method,
url,
-16
View File
@@ -63,11 +63,8 @@ _PASSIVE_EXACT_PATHS = {
"/api/activity/heartbeat",
"/api/client-perf",
"/api/tasks/notifications",
"/api/tasks/runs/recent",
"/api/research/active",
"/api/email/urgency-state",
# UI idle poll sibling of urgency-state; must not pre-empt background tasks.
"/api/email/unread-state",
}
_PASSIVE_PREFIXES = (
@@ -77,19 +74,6 @@ _PASSIVE_PREFIXES = (
)
async def maybe_stop_background_tasks_for_heartbeat(stop_background) -> bool:
"""Stop background work for browser activity only when the gate is enabled.
``stop_background`` is injected by the application boundary so this policy
remains independently testable without importing the full FastAPI app.
"""
if not _enabled():
return False
await stop_background(reason="browser heartbeat")
return True
def should_track_interactive_request(path: str, method: str = "GET") -> bool:
if not _enabled():
return False
+145 -980
View File
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+9 -79
View File
@@ -10,18 +10,6 @@ from datetime import datetime
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
class MemoryStoreUnreadable(RuntimeError):
"""memory.json exists on disk but could not be read or parsed.
"The contents are unknown" is categorically different from "there are no
memories". A read-modify-write caller that conflates the two appends to an
empty view and then persists it, destroying the whole store the writes
are atomic, so the loss is durable. Raised by
:meth:`MemoryManager.load_all_for_update` so those callers fail closed.
"""
def tokenize(text: str) -> List[str]:
"""Simple tokenizer that splits on whitespace and removes punctuation."""
return [word.strip('.,!?";') for word in text.split()]
@@ -122,69 +110,21 @@ class MemoryManager:
with open(self.memory_file, 'w', encoding='utf-8') as f:
json.dump([], f, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2)
def _read_entries(self) -> List[Dict]:
"""Parse the store, or raise :class:`MemoryStoreUnreadable`.
Returns ``[]`` only when the file genuinely does not exist. Every other
failure mode raises, so callers can tell "no memories" apart from
"couldn't read the memories".
"""
def load_all(self) -> List[Dict]:
"""Load all memory entries from JSON file (unfiltered)."""
if not os.path.exists(self.memory_file):
return []
try:
with open(self.memory_file, "r", encoding="utf-8") as f:
data = json.load(f)
except OSError as e:
# PermissionError is an OSError (a scanner holding the file, a
# permissions problem, bad media).
raise MemoryStoreUnreadable(
f"cannot read {self.memory_file}: {e}"
) from e
except json.JSONDecodeError as e:
# This is the branch that actually destroyed stores: the file reads
# back fine, so nothing stops the save that follows. A truncated
# memory.json is reachable because core/database.py rewrites it with
# a plain open(..,"w") + json.dump during migration.
#
# Preserved behaviour: a corrupt store still gets one shot at the
# pre-JSON memory.txt migration. Only raise when that finds nothing,
# so we never report "empty" for a store we simply failed to parse.
legacy = self._migrate_from_legacy()
if legacy:
return legacy
raise MemoryStoreUnreadable(
f"{self.memory_file} is not valid JSON: {e}"
) from e
if not isinstance(data, list):
raise MemoryStoreUnreadable(
f"{self.memory_file} is not a JSON array (got {type(data).__name__})"
)
return self._validate_entries(data)
def load_all(self) -> List[Dict]:
"""Load all memory entries from JSON file (unfiltered).
Lenient by design: this feeds display, search, and context-injection
paths, so an unreadable store degrades to an empty list rather than
breaking chat. Never build a value from this that you intend to save
back use :meth:`load_all_for_update` for that.
"""
try:
return self._read_entries()
except MemoryStoreUnreadable as e:
if isinstance(data, list):
return self._validate_entries(data)
except (json.JSONDecodeError, PermissionError) as e:
logger.error("Error loading memory.json: %s", e)
return []
return self._migrate_from_legacy()
def load_all_for_update(self) -> List[Dict]:
"""Load for a read-modify-write cycle.
Propagates :class:`MemoryStoreUnreadable` instead of degrading to ``[]``
so a caller can never append to an empty view and persist it over a
store that was only temporarily unreadable (issue #5673).
"""
return self._read_entries()
return []
def load(self, owner: str = None) -> List[Dict]:
"""Load memory entries, optionally filtered by owner."""
@@ -195,12 +135,7 @@ class MemoryManager:
def claim_ownerless(self, owner: str):
"""Assign all ownerless memory entries to the given owner."""
try:
entries = self.load_all_for_update()
except MemoryStoreUnreadable as e:
# Skip the sweep rather than rewrite the store from an unknown view.
logger.error("Skipping ownerless claim, memory store unreadable: %s", e)
return
entries = self.load_all()
changed = False
claimed = 0
for entry in entries:
@@ -300,12 +235,7 @@ class MemoryManager:
if not ids:
return
id_set = set(ids)
try:
entries = self.load_all_for_update()
except MemoryStoreUnreadable as e:
# Best-effort counter; never worth rewriting the store blind.
logger.error("Skipping uses bump, memory store unreadable: %s", e)
return
entries = self.load_all()
changed = False
for e in entries:
if e.get("id") in id_set:
+2 -9
View File
@@ -157,11 +157,7 @@ class NativeMemoryProvider(MemoryProvider):
if metadata:
entry["metadata"] = dict(metadata)
# Strict load: read-modify-write. `load_all` degrades an unreadable
# store to [], which would save this single entry over everything
# already stored (issue #5673). The provider API has no error channel,
# so MemoryStoreUnreadable propagates to the caller.
memories = self.memory_manager.load_all_for_update()
memories = self.memory_manager.load_all()
memories.append(entry)
self.memory_manager.save(memories)
@@ -227,10 +223,7 @@ class NativeMemoryProvider(MemoryProvider):
]
async def delete(self, memory_id: str, *, owner: Optional[str] = None) -> bool:
# Strict load for the same reason: `remaining` is derived from this
# list and saved back, so it must never be built from a store we
# failed to read.
memories = self.memory_manager.load_all_for_update()
memories = self.memory_manager.load_all()
remaining = []
deleted_id = None
-1
View File
@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ class ChatRequest(BaseModel):
use_research: Optional[bool] = Field(default=False, description="Enable deep research")
time_filter: Optional[str] = Field(default=None, description="Time filter for search")
preset_id: Optional[str] = Field(default=None, description="Preset identifier")
selected_endpoint_id: Optional[str] = Field(default=None, description="Selected model endpoint ID")
@field_validator('message')
@classmethod
+8 -25
View File
@@ -14,13 +14,6 @@ from src.constants import SETTINGS_FILE, FEATURES_FILE
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
# Keys retained in the raw settings store for compatibility and rollback, but
# deliberately unavailable through generic settings APIs or agent tools. They
# must stay in ``DEFAULT_SETTINGS`` so old files continue to load without data
# loss; callers that present or mutate settings should use this set as a
# tombstone boundary.
RETIRED_SETTING_KEYS = frozenset({"default_model_fallbacks"})
# Tiny TTL cache for settings/features. get_setting() is called on hot paths
# (every chat, every preprocess); without this it re-parses the JSON each call.
# Picks up edits within _CACHE_TTL seconds, which is fine for human-edited config.
@@ -145,13 +138,14 @@ DEFAULT_SETTINGS = {
# Email replies use email_writing_style instead because greetings,
# signatures, and mailbox identity rules are medium-specific.
"document_writing_style": "",
# Legacy ordered fallback chain for the default chat model. Values remain
# stored for compatibility and rollback reference, but model routing no
# longer reads this key.
# Ordered fallback chain for the default chat model. Each entry is
# {"endpoint_id": "...", "model": "..."}. If the primary model fails
# before producing output (endpoint offline / errors), the chat
# dispatch retries the next entry in order.
"default_model_fallbacks": [],
# When True, non-admin users inherit the global default model/endpoint when
# they have no personal defaults. When False, users only use their personal
# defaults. Default is False.
# When True, non-admin users inherit global default model/endpoint/fallbacks
# when they have no personal defaults. When False, users only use their
# personal defaults (no global fallback). Default is False.
"share_defaults_with_users": False,
"utility_endpoint_id": "",
"utility_model": "",
@@ -204,17 +198,6 @@ DEFAULT_SETTINGS = {
},
}
def without_retired_settings(settings: dict) -> dict:
"""Return a shallow copy suitable for generic settings interfaces."""
if not isinstance(settings, dict):
return {}
return {
key: value
for key, value in settings.items()
if key not in RETIRED_SETTING_KEYS
}
DEFAULT_FEATURES = {
"web_search": True,
"web_fetch": True,
@@ -287,7 +270,7 @@ _PER_USER_KEYS = {
# Default chat endpoint / model — without per-user resolution every new
# account inherited whatever the most-recent admin picked, which then
# got injected into the chat composer on first open.
"default_endpoint_id", "default_model",
"default_endpoint_id", "default_model", "default_model_fallbacks",
"utility_endpoint_id", "utility_model", "utility_model_fallbacks",
"research_endpoint_id", "research_model",
}
+5
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
"""Shared resolver for background-task AI endpoints."""
from src.endpoint_resolver import (
resolve_chat_fallback_candidates,
resolve_endpoint,
resolve_utility_fallback_candidates,
)
@@ -31,6 +32,7 @@ def resolve_task_candidates(
2. Utility endpoint/model
3. Default endpoint/model
4. Utility fallback chain
5. Default fallback chain
"""
candidates = []
@@ -47,6 +49,9 @@ def resolve_task_candidates(
_append(*resolve_endpoint("default", owner=owner))
for url, model, headers in resolve_utility_fallback_candidates(owner=owner):
_append(url, model, headers)
for url, model, headers in resolve_chat_fallback_candidates(owner=owner):
_append(url, model, headers)
return candidates
+1 -2
View File
@@ -233,8 +233,7 @@ async def _call_teacher(teacher_model_spec: str, prompt: str,
owner: Optional[str] = None) -> Optional[str]:
"""Call the configured teacher endpoint with the escalation prompt."""
from src.llm_core import llm_call_async
from src.ai_interaction import _resolve_model
from src.agent_tools.model_interaction_tools import _TEACHER_SYSTEM_PROMPT
from src.ai_interaction import _resolve_model, _TEACHER_SYSTEM_PROMPT
try:
url, model, headers = await asyncio.to_thread(_resolve_model, teacher_model_spec, owner=owner)
except Exception as e:
+4 -69
View File
@@ -187,13 +187,9 @@ _FUNCTION_MODEL_NAME_RE = re.compile(
_FUNCTION_MODEL_PARAMS_OPEN_RE = re.compile(r"<parameters>\s*", re.IGNORECASE)
_FUNCTION_MODEL_PARAMS_CLOSE_RE = re.compile(r"</parameters>", re.IGNORECASE)
_QWEN_ROLE_MARKER_RE = re.compile(r"</?\|(?:assistant|assistan|user|system|tool)\|>?|</\|end\|>?", re.IGNORECASE)
# At least one pipe is required around `end`. Both pipes used to be optional
# (`\|?end\|?`), which also matched a bare `end` on its own line and deleted it
# from ordinary prose and from Ruby/Lua/shell snippets that close blocks with
# one; see #5547. `|end`, `end|`, `|end|` and `/|end|` still strip as before.
_QWEN_BARE_MARKER_RE = re.compile(
r"(?:^|[\t\r\n ])(?:/?\|end\||\|end|end\|)(?=[\t\r\n ]|$)|"
r"(?:^|[\r\n])[ \t]*assistan(?:t)?[ \t]*(?=[\r\n]|$)",
r"(?:^|[\t\r\n ])(?:\|?end\|?|/?\|end\|)(?=[\t\r\n ]|$)|"
r"(?:^|[\t\r\n ])assistan(?:t)?(?=[\t\r\n ]|$)",
re.IGNORECASE,
)
@@ -929,46 +925,6 @@ def _parse_xml_direct_tool(name, body) -> Optional[ToolBlock]:
return function_call_to_tool_block(mapped, json.dumps(params))
def _looks_like_json_body(body: str) -> bool:
"""True when a <tool_call> wrapper body is JSON, not XML markup."""
return body.lstrip()[:1] in ("{", "[")
def _parse_json_tool_call_body(body: str) -> Optional[ToolBlock]:
"""Parse a Qwen/Hermes text-mode wrapper body: bare JSON inside <tool_call>.
<tool_call>
{"name": "bash", "arguments": {"command": "mkdir -p agent-test"}}
</tool_call>
Strict by design (issue #5187 / tracker #5333): the body must decode to an
object with a string "name", and "arguments" when present must itself
be an object. Anything else returns None rather than being coerced, so a
malformed call is dropped instead of dispatching with mangled arguments.
raw_decode tolerates trailing chatter after the JSON object; the trailing
text is never scanned for tool markup. Conversion goes through
function_call_to_tool_block so aliases and per-tool argument formatting
stay identical to the XML invoke path.
"""
stripped = body.strip()
if not stripped.startswith("{"):
return None
try:
parsed, _end = json.JSONDecoder().raw_decode(stripped)
except json.JSONDecodeError:
return None
if not isinstance(parsed, dict):
return None
name = parsed.get("name")
if not isinstance(name, str) or not name.strip():
return None
if "arguments" in parsed and not isinstance(parsed["arguments"], dict):
return None
args = parsed.get("arguments", {})
from src.tool_schemas import function_call_to_tool_block
return function_call_to_tool_block(name.strip().lower(), json.dumps(args))
def _iter_stepfun_tool_calls(text: str):
"""Yield StepFun native tool-call token bodies without regex backtracking."""
pos = 0
@@ -1370,21 +1326,10 @@ def parse_tool_blocks(text: str, skip_fenced: bool = False) -> List[ToolBlock]:
if blocks:
return blocks
# Try wrapped: <tool_call><invoke ...>...</invoke></tool_call>
# A wrapper body that is JSON (Qwen/Hermes text mode, issue #5187) is
# parsed as JSON or dropped — never scanned by the XML iterators, so
# XML-like text inside JSON argument values stays data instead of
# selecting a different tool.
json_body_seen = False
for _ms, inner_start, inner_end, _me in _iter_delimited(
text, _XML_TOOL_CALL_OPEN_RE, _XML_TOOL_CALL_CLOSE_RE
):
body = text[inner_start:inner_end]
if _looks_like_json_body(body):
json_body_seen = True
block = _parse_json_tool_call_body(body)
if block:
blocks.append(block)
continue
for inv_name, inv_body in _iter_xml_invoke(body):
block = _parse_xml_invoke(inv_name, inv_body)
if block:
@@ -1399,13 +1344,6 @@ def parse_tool_blocks(text: str, skip_fenced: bool = False) -> List[ToolBlock]:
if not blocks:
for m in _XML_OPEN_TOOL_CALL_RE.finditer(text):
body = m.group(1)
if _looks_like_json_body(body):
# Same fail-closed rule as above for an unclosed wrapper.
json_body_seen = True
block = _parse_json_tool_call_body(body)
if block:
blocks.append(block)
break
for inv_name, inv_body in _iter_xml_invoke(body):
block = _parse_xml_invoke(inv_name, inv_body)
if block:
@@ -1416,11 +1354,8 @@ def parse_tool_blocks(text: str, skip_fenced: bool = False) -> List[ToolBlock]:
block = _parse_xml_direct_tool(d_name, d_body)
if block:
blocks.append(block)
# Try bare <invoke> without wrapper. Skipped when a JSON wrapper body
# was seen but produced no block: this rescan covers the full text,
# wrapper bodies included, and <invoke> markup inside a (possibly
# malformed) JSON payload must stay data rather than dispatch.
if not blocks and not json_body_seen:
# Try bare <invoke> without wrapper
if not blocks:
for inv_name, inv_body in _iter_xml_invoke(text):
block = _parse_xml_invoke(inv_name, inv_body)
if block:
-3
View File
@@ -196,9 +196,6 @@ async def do_manage_calendar(content: str, owner: Optional[str] = None) -> Dict:
try:
if action == "list_calendars":
_ensure_default_calendar(db, owner)
# This read path intentionally persists the lazily-created default;
# event creation commits it in the event's transaction instead.
db.commit()
cals = _calendar_query().all()
result = [{"name": c.name, "href": c.id} for c in cals]
if result:
+2 -4
View File
@@ -46,9 +46,7 @@ async def do_manage_skills(content: str, owner: Optional[str] = None) -> Dict:
except ValueError:
return {"error": "Invalid JSON arguments", "exit_code": 1}
action = (args.get("action") or "").strip().lower()
if not action:
return {"error": "action is required (list|view|view_ref|add|edit|patch|publish|delete|search)", "exit_code": 1}
action = (args.get("action") or "").lower()
from services.memory.skills import SkillsManager
from services.memory.skill_format import Skill, slugify
from src.constants import DATA_DIR
@@ -57,7 +55,7 @@ async def do_manage_skills(content: str, owner: Optional[str] = None) -> Dict:
# Accept legacy `skill_id` as an alias for `name`.
name = (args.get("name") or args.get("skill_id") or "").strip()
if action in ("list", "index"):
if action in ("list", "index", ""):
all_skills = sm.load(owner=owner)
if not all_skills:
return {"results": "No skills yet. Create one with action='add'."}
+38 -105
View File
@@ -35,16 +35,6 @@ import logging
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
UploadIndexFileSignature = tuple[
str,
Optional[int],
Optional[int],
Optional[int],
Optional[int],
Optional[int],
]
UploadIndexSignature = tuple[UploadIndexFileSignature, ...]
class UploadCleanupSafetyError(RuntimeError):
"""Raised when cleanup cannot prove that destructive work is safe."""
@@ -252,7 +242,7 @@ class UploadHandler:
# In-memory index cache to avoid O(N) disk I/O on every request
self._index_cache: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = None
self._index_signature: Optional[UploadIndexSignature] = None
self._index_mtime: float = 0.0
def inside_base_dir(self, path: str) -> bool:
"""Check if path is inside base directory"""
@@ -737,119 +727,62 @@ class UploadHandler:
# Update cache if this is the main index
if path.endswith("uploads.json"):
self._index_cache = data
self._index_signature = self._upload_index_signature(
(path, path + ".bak")
)
@staticmethod
def _upload_index_signature(
paths: tuple[str, ...],
) -> Optional[UploadIndexSignature]:
"""Return file identities strong enough to validate the index cache.
Modification time alone is insufficient: a torn write can change a
file without receiving a strictly newer timestamp on some filesystems.
Size, inode, and nanosecond change times make those mutations visible
while preserving the cache fast path for unchanged files.
"""
signature: list[UploadIndexFileSignature] = []
for candidate in paths:
try:
stat_result = os.stat(candidate)
except FileNotFoundError:
signature.append((candidate, None, None, None, None, None))
continue
self._index_mtime = os.path.getmtime(path)
except OSError:
return None
signature.append(
(
candidate,
stat_result.st_dev,
stat_result.st_ino,
stat_result.st_size,
stat_result.st_mtime_ns,
stat_result.st_ctime_ns,
)
)
return tuple(signature)
self._index_mtime = time.time()
def _load_upload_index(self, *, fail_on_error: bool = False) -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""Load the upload index from disk/cache. Uses file-identity validation
to avoid redundant parsing on hot paths without missing same-timestamp
mutations. When ``fail_on_error`` is true, a missing, malformed, or
unreadable live index raises so destructive callers cannot mistake
corruption for an empty store.
"""Load the upload index from disk/cache. Uses mtime-based validation
to avoid redundant parsing on hot paths. When ``fail_on_error`` is
true, a missing, malformed, or unreadable live index raises so
destructive callers cannot mistake corruption for an empty store.
"""
uploads_db_path = os.path.join(self.upload_dir, "uploads.json")
candidates = (uploads_db_path, uploads_db_path + ".bak")
for _attempt in range(3):
signature = self._upload_index_signature(candidates)
if fail_on_error:
# A backup is intentionally the previous snapshot. It is useful for
# non-destructive reads, but cannot authorize deletion when the live
# index is missing or corrupt.
if not os.path.exists(uploads_db_path):
raise ValueError("live uploads database is missing")
existing_candidates = [uploads_db_path]
else:
existing_candidates = [
path for path in candidates if os.path.exists(path)
]
if not existing_candidates:
self._index_cache = {}
self._index_signature = signature
return {}
if fail_on_error:
# A backup is intentionally the previous snapshot. It is useful for
# non-destructive reads, but cannot authorize deletion when the live
# index is missing or corrupt.
if not os.path.exists(uploads_db_path):
raise ValueError("live uploads database is missing")
existing_candidates = [uploads_db_path]
else:
existing_candidates = [path for path in candidates if os.path.exists(path)]
if not existing_candidates:
self._index_cache = {}
self._index_mtime = 0.0
return {}
# Check cache validity
# Check cache validity
try:
mtime = max(os.path.getmtime(path) for path in existing_candidates)
if (
not fail_on_error
and signature is not None
and self._index_cache is not None
and signature == self._index_signature
and mtime <= self._index_mtime
):
return self._index_cache
except OSError:
mtime = 0.0
# Try the live file first, fall back to the .bak sibling if the
# live file is truncated/corrupted. A candidate parsed from an old
# inode is accepted only when the whole index signature stays
# stable through the read; otherwise retry so the cache cannot pair
# stale data with a fresh replacement signature.
index_changed_during_read = False
for candidate in existing_candidates:
try:
with open(candidate, "r", encoding="utf-8") as f:
data = json.load(f)
verified_signature = self._upload_index_signature(candidates)
if (
signature is not None
and verified_signature is not None
and verified_signature != signature
):
index_changed_during_read = True
break
if isinstance(data, dict):
self._index_cache = data
self._index_signature = verified_signature
return data
except Exception as e:
logger.warning(f"Failed to read uploads database ({candidate}): {e}")
verified_signature = self._upload_index_signature(candidates)
if (
signature is not None
and verified_signature is not None
and verified_signature != signature
):
index_changed_during_read = True
break
continue
if index_changed_during_read:
# Try the live file first, fall back to the .bak sibling if the
# live file is truncated/corrupted.
for candidate in existing_candidates:
try:
with open(candidate, "r", encoding="utf-8") as f:
data = json.load(f)
if isinstance(data, dict):
self._index_cache = data
self._index_mtime = mtime
return data
except Exception as e:
logger.warning(f"Failed to read uploads database ({candidate}): {e}")
continue
break
if fail_on_error:
raise ValueError("live uploads database is unreadable")
self._index_cache = {}
self._index_signature = self._upload_index_signature(candidates)
return {}
def get_upload_info(self, upload_id: str) -> Optional[Dict[str, Any]]:
+147 -50
View File
@@ -10,25 +10,18 @@ import modelsModule from './js/models.js?v=20260715startupcalm2';
import ragModule from './js/rag.js';
import presetsModule from './js/presets.js';
import searchModule from './js/search.js';
import chatModule from './js/chat.js?v=20260801fix1';
import chatModule from './js/chat.js?v=20260722ctxheader4';
import compareModule from './js/compare/index.js?v=20260723compareicon2';
import documentModule from './js/document.js?v=20260722emailfastindex1';
import searchChatModule from './js/search-chat.js';
import { makeWindowDraggable } from './js/windowDrag.js';
import {
revealApplicationShellAfterPaint,
runDeferredRouteOpener,
deferRouteOpener,
settleSessionHydration
} from './js/startupShell.js';
import markdownModule from './js/markdown.js';
import chatRenderer from './js/chatRenderer.js?v=20260722emailfastindex1';
import sessionModule from './js/sessions.js';
import sessionModule from './js/sessions.js?v=20260722ctxheader4';
import memoryModule from './js/memory.js?v=20260722memoryloading1';
import voiceRecorderModule from './js/voiceRecorder.js';
import censorModule from './js/censor.js';
import galleryModule from './js/gallery.js';
import { UI_VIS_DEFAULT_OFF, resolveVisibility } from './js/ui_visibility.js';
import tasksModule from './js/tasks.js?v=20260723tasksbulkfeedback1';
import calendarModule from './js/calendar.js';
import notesModule from './js/notes.js';
@@ -1224,13 +1217,12 @@ function initializeEventListeners() {
'/library': () => sessionModule && sessionModule.openLibrary && sessionModule.openLibrary(),
};
const _opener = _routeOpen[urlPath];
// Defer the opener — at this point in init, the modules whose handlers we
// trigger (#rail-new-session click handler, the email-section header click
// handler in emailInbox, sessionModule) are still being wired up further
// down in this same function. startupShell decides when it can run: as soon
// as wiring completes, or — for the routes that read the session list —
// once /api/sessions has settled.
deferRouteOpener(urlPath, _opener);
// Defer the opener — at this point in init, the modules whose handlers
// we trigger (#rail-new-session click handler, the email-section header
// click handler in emailInbox, sessionModule's loaded session list) are
// still being wired up further down in this same function. Stash the
// opener so it runs from sessionModule.loadSessions().finally() below.
if (_opener) window._odysseusRouteOpener = _opener;
// Archive browser tool button
const toolLibraryBtn = el('tool-library-btn');
@@ -1697,20 +1689,12 @@ function initializeEventListeners() {
const newMemoryInput = el('new-memory-input');
if (newMemoryInput) {
// keydown, not the deprecated keypress: keypress is not guaranteed to
// fire for Enter everywhere, which left the Add Memory form with no
// working submit path (#5828).
newMemoryInput.addEventListener('keydown', (e) => {
if (e.key === 'Enter' && !e.isComposing) {
e.preventDefault();
newMemoryInput.addEventListener('keypress', (e) => {
if (e.key === 'Enter') {
memoryModule.addNewMemory();
}
});
}
const newMemoryAddBtn = el('new-memory-add-btn');
if (newMemoryAddBtn) {
newMemoryAddBtn.addEventListener('click', () => memoryModule.addNewMemory());
}
// Voice recording is handled by the dual-purpose send/mic button (see below)
@@ -2726,6 +2710,46 @@ function initializeEventListeners() {
// ── UI Visibility (Customize UI modal) ──
const UI_VIS_KEY = 'odysseus-ui-visibility';
// Selector map: key → CSS selector(s) for targets
const UI_VIS_MAP = {
'sidebar-brand': '.sidebar-brand-title',
'sidebar-new-chat': '#sidebar-new-chat-btn',
'sidebar-search': '#sidebar-search-btn',
'sessions-section': '#sessions-section',
'email-section': '#email-section',
'tools-section': '#tools-section',
// Per-tool visibility — fine-grained control over which entries show
// inside the Tools section in the sidebar.
'tool-calendar': '#tool-calendar-btn',
'tool-compare': '#tool-compare-btn',
'tool-cookbook': '#tool-cookbook-btn',
'tool-research': '#tool-research-btn',
'tool-gallery': '#tool-gallery-btn',
'tool-library': '#tool-library-btn',
'tool-memory': '#tool-memory-btn',
'tool-notes': '#tool-notes-btn',
'tool-tasks': '#tool-tasks-btn',
'tool-theme': '#tool-theme-btn',
'user-bar': '#user-bar-profile',
'sidebar-settings-btn':'#user-bar-settings',
'chat-meta': '.chat-meta-overlay',
'welcome-text': '.welcome-name, .welcome-sub, #welcome-tip',
'incognito-btn': '.incognito-btn',
'web-toggle-btn': '#web-toggle-btn',
'doc-toggle-btn': '#overflow-doc-btn',
'rag-toggle-btn': '#overflow-rag-btn',
'bash-toggle-btn': '#bash-toggle-btn',
'overflow-plus-btn': '.overflow-wrapper',
'mode-toggle': '.mode-toggle',
'preset-mini-btn': '#overflow-preset-btn',
'attach-btn': '#overflow-attach-btn',
'research-btn': '#overflow-research-btn',
'rail-new-chat': '#rail-new-session',
};
// Keys hidden by default on first run (no localStorage yet)
const UI_VIS_DEFAULT_OFF = new Set(['rag-toggle-btn', 'text-emojis', 'chat-fullwidth']);
// Keys that need admin to toggle off (reserved for future use)
const UI_VIS_ADMIN_ONLY = new Set([]);
@@ -2738,14 +2762,14 @@ function initializeEventListeners() {
}
function applyUIVis(state) {
// resolveVisibility computes selector→visible (pure; ui_visibility.js),
// including the tools-section parent rule that hides every tool rail
// launcher when Tools is off. Apply the result to the DOM here.
for (const [selector, visible] of Object.entries(resolveVisibility(state))) {
Object.entries(UI_VIS_MAP).forEach(([key, selector]) => {
// section-drag-reorder uses a body class instead of inline styles
if (key === 'section-drag-reorder') return;
const visible = key in state ? state[key] !== false : !UI_VIS_DEFAULT_OFF.has(key);
document.querySelectorAll(selector).forEach(el => {
el.style.display = visible ? '' : 'none';
});
}
});
// Drag reorder: use body class so dynamically created handles are covered
const dragEnabled = state['section-drag-reorder'] === true;
document.body.classList.toggle('rearrange-mode', dragEnabled);
@@ -3884,10 +3908,85 @@ function startOdysseusApp() {
const messageInput = el('message');
const modelPickerWrap = document.getElementById('model-picker-wrap');
// ArrowUp/ArrowDown prompt recall on #message lives in
// static/js/composerArrowUpRecall.js (wired from chat.js). Do not re-add a
// copy here: two capture-phase listeners on the same textarea meant the one
// without the draft guard won and ate unsent multi-line prompts (#5862).
function _readComposerPromptHistory() {
const chatBox = document.getElementById('chat-history');
if (!chatBox) return [];
return Array.from(chatBox.querySelectorAll('.msg-user'))
.reverse()
.map(msg => {
const body = msg.querySelector('.body');
return msg.dataset?.raw || (body ? body.textContent : '') || '';
})
.filter(Boolean);
}
if (messageInput && !messageInput._odysseusPromptRecallCapture) {
messageInput._odysseusPromptRecallCapture = true;
let recallHistory = [];
let recallIndex = -1;
let lastRecalled = '';
const norm = (v) => String(v || '').replace(/\r\n/g, '\n').trimEnd();
messageInput.addEventListener('input', () => {
if (norm(messageInput.value) === norm(lastRecalled)) return;
recallHistory = [];
recallIndex = -1;
lastRecalled = '';
try { delete messageInput.dataset.odysseusRecallIndex; } catch {}
}, true);
messageInput.addEventListener('keydown', (e) => {
if (e.key !== 'ArrowUp' && e.key !== 'ArrowDown') return;
if (e.shiftKey || e.altKey || e.ctrlKey || e.metaKey || e.isComposing) return;
if (window._ghostAutocomplete?.isActive?.()) return;
const fresh = _readComposerPromptHistory();
const history = fresh.length ? fresh : recallHistory;
if (!history.length) return;
const current = norm(messageInput.value);
let currentIndex = current ? history.findIndex(item => norm(item) === current) : -1;
if (current && currentIndex < 0 && current === norm(lastRecalled)) currentIndex = recallIndex;
if (current && currentIndex < 0) {
const markedIndex = Number(messageInput.dataset.odysseusRecallIndex);
if (Number.isInteger(markedIndex) && markedIndex >= 0 && markedIndex < history.length) {
currentIndex = markedIndex;
}
}
e.preventDefault();
e.stopPropagation();
e.stopImmediatePropagation();
if (e.key === 'ArrowDown') {
if (currentIndex < 0) return;
const nextIndex = currentIndex - 1;
if (nextIndex < 0) {
recallHistory = history;
recallIndex = -1;
lastRecalled = '';
try { delete messageInput.dataset.odysseusRecallIndex; } catch {}
messageInput.value = '';
try { messageInput.selectionStart = messageInput.selectionEnd = 0; } catch {}
try { uiModule.autoResize(messageInput); } catch {}
return;
}
const recalled = history[nextIndex];
recallHistory = history;
recallIndex = nextIndex;
lastRecalled = recalled;
try { messageInput.dataset.odysseusRecallIndex = String(nextIndex); } catch {}
messageInput.value = recalled;
try { messageInput.selectionStart = messageInput.selectionEnd = recalled.length; } catch {}
try { uiModule.autoResize(messageInput); } catch {}
return;
}
const nextIndex = currentIndex >= 0 ? Math.min(currentIndex + 1, history.length - 1) : 0;
const recalled = history[nextIndex];
if (!recalled) return;
recallHistory = history;
recallIndex = nextIndex;
lastRecalled = recalled;
try { messageInput.dataset.odysseusRecallIndex = String(nextIndex); } catch {}
messageInput.value = recalled;
try { messageInput.selectionStart = messageInput.selectionEnd = recalled.length; } catch {}
try { uiModule.autoResize(messageInput); } catch {}
}, true);
}
const _sendIcon = '<svg width="16" height="16" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2.5" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round"><path d="M12 19V5M5 12l7-7 7 7"/></svg>';
const _micIcon = '<svg width="16" height="16" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round"><path d="M12 1a3 3 0 0 0-3 3v8a3 3 0 0 0 6 0V4a3 3 0 0 0-3-3z"/><path d="M19 10v2a7 7 0 0 1-14 0v-2"/><line x1="12" y1="19" x2="12" y2="23"/><line x1="8" y1="23" x2="16" y2="23"/></svg>';
@@ -4283,10 +4382,6 @@ function startOdysseusApp() {
// Load initial data
presetsModule.loadPresets(uiModule.showError);
// Core wiring is complete for this turn — reveal the shell independently of
// the session-list request.
revealApplicationShellAfterPaint();
if (sessionModule) {
sessionModule.initDependencies({
API_BASE: API_BASE,
@@ -4298,19 +4393,21 @@ function startOdysseusApp() {
scrollHistory: uiModule.scrollHistoryInstant
});
// sessionModule is now wired, so every route opener has the modules it
// drives. The ones that read no session data open here rather than
// queueing behind /api/sessions.
runDeferredRouteOpener();
// The shell is already usable at this point; session hydration is
// sidebar-local and settles on its own schedule.
settleSessionHydration(() => sessionModule.loadSessions());
// Load sessions first (critical path) — remove loader when done
sessionModule.loadSessions()
.catch(e => console.warn('loadSessions error:', e))
.finally(() => {
const loader = document.getElementById('app-loader');
if (loader) { loader.style.opacity = '0'; setTimeout(() => loader.remove(), 300); }
// Fire any URL route opener now that sessions + module wiring are
// ready. Deferred from up top of init for exactly this reason.
if (window._odysseusRouteOpener) {
try { window._odysseusRouteOpener(); } catch (_) {}
window._odysseusRouteOpener = null;
}
});
} else {
console.error('Session module not loaded!');
// Nothing will hydrate. Settle immediately so the sidebar exposes the
// failure; session-dependent routes must remain unopened without data.
settleSessionHydration(null);
}
const runNonCriticalStartup = (fn, delay = 4000) => {
+17 -32
View File
@@ -248,20 +248,11 @@
}, { once: true });
})();
</script>
<!-- Preload the two faces first paint actually uses: Fira Code 400 and 600,
the app font and the weight the sidebar and header text render at. They
are declared in style.css, so without a hint they are only discovered
after the stylesheet parses and then queue behind the module graph.
crossorigin is required even though these are same-origin: fonts are
always fetched in CORS mode, and a preload whose mode does not match the
real request is discarded and the font fetched a second time. -->
<link rel="preload" as="font" type="font/woff2" crossorigin href="/static/fonts/FiraCode-Regular.woff2">
<link rel="preload" as="font" type="font/woff2" crossorigin href="/static/fonts/FiraCode-SemiBold.woff2">
<link rel="stylesheet" href="/static/style.css?v=20260808startupshell1">
<link rel="modulepreload" href="/static/app.js?v=20260808startupshell1">
<link rel="modulepreload" href="/static/js/chat.js?v=20260801fix1">
<link rel="stylesheet" href="/static/style.css?v=20260723tasksbulkfeedback1">
<link rel="modulepreload" href="/static/app.js?v=20260723tasksbulkfeedback1">
<link rel="modulepreload" href="/static/js/chat.js?v=20260722ctxheader4">
<link rel="modulepreload" href="/static/js/ui.js">
<link rel="modulepreload" href="/static/js/sessions.js">
<link rel="modulepreload" href="/static/js/sessions.js?v=20260722ctxheader4">
<link rel="modulepreload" href="/static/js/markdown.js">
</head>
<body>
@@ -295,13 +286,7 @@
if(!document.getElementById('app-loader')){clearInterval(iv);return}
render();
},150);
// startupShell.js hides the loader as soon as the shell is wired; it calls
// back here to stop the wave because this interval is owned by this script.
window.__odysseusLoaderWaveStop=function(){clearInterval(iv)};
// Last-resort fallback for a boot that never reaches app.js at all. Must
// still REMOVE the node: sessions.js reads its presence as "startup in
// progress" and stops clearing the composer while it is around.
setTimeout(function(){var l=document.getElementById('app-loader');if(l){clearInterval(iv);l.style.opacity='0';setTimeout(function(){l.remove()},300)}},5000);
setTimeout(function(){var l=document.getElementById('app-loader');if(l){l.style.opacity='0';setTimeout(function(){l.remove()},300)}},5000);
})();
</script>
<!-- Memory Management Modal -->
@@ -380,7 +365,6 @@
<span class="skill-rich-ph"><span class="k">Add a memory</span> &mdash; e.g. 'I prefer concise replies' <svg class="k" width="12" height="12" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" style="vertical-align:-2px;margin-left:4px;" aria-hidden="true"><polyline points="9 10 4 15 9 20"/><path d="M20 4v7a4 4 0 0 1-4 4H4"/></svg></span>
</div>
<select id="new-memory-category" class="memory-edit-cat-select" aria-label="Memory category"></select>
<button type="button" id="new-memory-add-btn" class="theme-io-btn" title="Save this memory" style="flex:none;height:28px;font-size:12px;"><svg width="13" height="13" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" style="vertical-align:-2px;margin-right:4px;" aria-hidden="true"><line x1="12" y1="5" x2="12" y2="19"/><line x1="5" y1="12" x2="19" y2="12"/></svg>Add</button>
</div>
</div>
<div class="admin-card">
@@ -828,13 +812,7 @@
<button class="session-bulk-btn" id="session-bulk-cancel" title="Cancel"><svg width="14" height="14" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2.5" stroke-linecap="round"><line x1="18" y1="6" x2="6" y2="18"/><line x1="6" y1="6" x2="18" y2="18"/></svg></button>
</div>
</div>
<div id="session-list" role="listbox">
<!-- Sidebar-local bootstrap state. renderSessionList() replaces the
whole list on first hydration, so this row is transient. -->
<div id="session-list-loading" class="list-item session-list-bootstrap" role="option" aria-disabled="true" aria-live="polite" aria-atomic="true">
<span class="grow muted" data-session-list-status>Loading chats…</span>
</div>
</div>
<div id="session-list" role="listbox"></div>
</div>
<!-- Hidden dropdown for session actions -->
<div id="session-actions-dropdown" class="dropdown hidden">
@@ -1027,7 +1005,7 @@
var tips = mobile ? phone : desktop;
var el = document.getElementById('welcome-tip');
if (el) {
el.textContent = tips[Math.floor(Math.random() * tips.length)];
el.textContent = 'Pick a model if you want, or just type.';
}
fetch('/api/version').then(function(r){return r.json()}).then(function(d){
if (d.version) window._appVersion = d.version;
@@ -1504,6 +1482,13 @@
<span class="adm-model-logo" id="set-defaultModelSelect-logo" style="display:inline-flex;align-items:center;justify-content:center;width:18px;height:18px;flex-shrink:0;opacity:0.9;color:var(--fg);"></span>
<select id="set-defaultModelSelect" class="settings-select"></select>
</div>
<div class="settings-row" style="align-items:flex-start;">
<label class="settings-label" style="margin-top:6px;">Fallbacks</label>
<div style="flex:1;display:flex;flex-direction:column;gap:6px;">
<div id="set-defaultFallbacks" class="settings-fallbacks"></div>
<button type="button" class="settings-fallback-add" id="set-defaultAddFallback" title="Add a model to try if the one above fails">+ Add fallback</button>
</div>
</div>
<div id="set-defaultChatMsg" style="font-size:11px;color:color-mix(in srgb, var(--fg) 45%, transparent);"></div>
</div>
</div>
@@ -2519,7 +2504,7 @@
<script type="module" src="/static/js/ui.js"></script>
<script type="module" src="/static/js/markdown.js"></script>
<script type="module" src="/static/js/dragSort.js"></script>
<script type="module" src="/static/js/sessions.js"></script>
<script type="module" src="/static/js/sessions.js?v=20260722ctxheader4"></script>
<script type="module" src="/static/js/memory.js?v=20260722memoryloading1"></script>
<script type="module" src="/static/js/skills.js"></script>
<script type="module" src="/static/js/tourHints.js"></script>
@@ -2537,7 +2522,7 @@
<script type="module" src="/static/js/chatRenderer.js?v=20260722emailfastindex1"></script>
<script type="module" src="/static/js/codeRunner.js"></script>
<script type="module" src="/static/js/chatStream.js?v=20260722emailfastindex1"></script>
<script type="module" src="/static/js/chat.js?v=20260801fix1"></script>
<script type="module" src="/static/js/chat.js?v=20260722ctxheader4"></script>
<script type="module" src="/static/js/cookbook.js"></script>
<script src="/static/js/cookbookSchedule.js"></script>
<script type="module" src="/static/js/search-chat.js"></script>
@@ -2545,7 +2530,7 @@
<script type="module" src="/static/js/censor.js"></script>
<script type="module" src="/static/js/settings.js?v=20260723compareicon1"></script>
<script type="module" src="/static/js/assistant.js"></script>
<script type="module" src="/static/app.js?v=20260808startupshell1"></script> <!-- app.js must be LAST -->
<script type="module" src="/static/app.js?v=20260723tasksbulkfeedback1"></script> <!-- app.js must be LAST -->
<script type="module" src="/static/js/init.js?v=20260715freshroot3"></script>
<script type="module" src="/static/js/a11y.js"></script>
<script nonce="{{CSP_NONCE}}">if('serviceWorker' in navigator){navigator.serviceWorker.register('/static/sw.js').catch(()=>{});}</script>
-1
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@@ -61,7 +61,6 @@ The largest and most central subsystem. Chat submission → backend SSE → prog
| **`chatRenderer.js`** | Message DOM construction: `addMessage`, role labels, model route labels, color coding, footers, metrics, code blocks, sources boxes (`web`/`research`/`RAG`), findings box, images, report links, ask-user cards, welcome screen, and transcript utilities. |
| **`streamingRenderer.js`** | Incremental streaming renderer used by `chat.js`. Freezes finalized DOM blocks and only re-renders the growing tail to avoid flicker and O(N²) re-parsing. |
| **`streamingSegmenter.js`** | Splits a token stream into display units (text vs code fences) for `streamingRenderer.js`. |
| **`liveThinkingThrottle.js`** | Trailing-edge coalescer for the live thinking block in `chat.js`: one DOM commit per 100 ms carrying the latest reasoning text, with `flush`/`cancel` for terminal and session-switch paths. |
| **`slashCommands.js`** | Slash-command registry (`/help`, `/setup`, etc.), parsing, and dispatch handlers. Exported functions are consumed by `chat.js` and `slashAutocomplete.js`. |
| **`slashAutocomplete.js`** | Composer autocomplete popup for `/` commands. |
| **`composerArrowUpRecall.js`** | Recall last user message with `↑` on an empty composer. |
+352 -1035
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-104
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@@ -1,104 +0,0 @@
/** Select and update the response holder for a route-provenance event. */
export function applyModelRouteEventState(event, holder, roundHolder, defaultModel = '') {
const target = event && event.round && roundHolder ? roundHolder : holder;
if (!target) return null;
target._requestedModel = (
event.requested_model
|| event.selected_model
|| target._requestedModel
|| defaultModel
);
target._actualModel = (
event.model
|| event.answered_by
|| target._actualModel
|| target._requestedModel
);
const hasEndpointRoute = Boolean(
event.requested_endpoint_id
|| event.selected_endpoint_id
|| event.endpoint_id
|| event.answered_by_endpoint_id
|| event.requested_endpoint_label
|| event.selected_endpoint_label
|| event.endpoint_label
|| event.answered_by_endpoint_label
|| target._requestedEndpointLabel
);
if (hasEndpointRoute) {
target._requestedEndpointId = (
event.requested_endpoint_id
|| event.selected_endpoint_id
|| target._requestedEndpointId
|| null
);
target._requestedEndpointLabel = (
event.requested_endpoint_label
|| event.selected_endpoint_label
|| target._requestedEndpointLabel
|| 'Selected route'
);
target._actualEndpointId = (
event.endpoint_id
|| event.answered_by_endpoint_id
|| target._actualEndpointId
|| target._requestedEndpointId
|| null
);
target._actualEndpointLabel = (
event.endpoint_label
|| event.answered_by_endpoint_label
|| target._actualEndpointLabel
|| target._requestedEndpointLabel
);
}
return target;
}
/** Copy the active route into the bubble created for the next Agent round. */
export function inheritModelRouteState(holder, roundHolder, target, defaultModel = '') {
if (!target) return null;
const source = roundHolder || holder;
target._requestedModel = source?._requestedModel || defaultModel;
target._actualModel = source?._actualModel || target._requestedModel;
if (source?._requestedEndpointLabel || source?._actualEndpointLabel) {
target._requestedEndpointId = source?._requestedEndpointId || null;
target._requestedEndpointLabel = source?._requestedEndpointLabel || 'Selected route';
target._actualEndpointId = source?._actualEndpointId || target._requestedEndpointId;
target._actualEndpointLabel = source?._actualEndpointLabel || target._requestedEndpointLabel;
}
return target;
}
/** Apply final/metrics provenance to the active round, not the first bubble. */
export function applyModelMetricsState(metrics, holder, roundHolder, defaultModel = '') {
const target = roundHolder || holder;
if (!target || !metrics) return target || null;
const roundModels = Array.isArray(metrics.round_models) ? metrics.round_models : [];
const roundModel = roundHolder && roundModels.length
? roundModels[roundModels.length - 1]
: null;
target._requestedModel = metrics.requested_model || target._requestedModel || defaultModel;
target._actualModel = roundModel || metrics.model || target._actualModel || target._requestedModel;
const roundEndpointIds = Array.isArray(metrics.round_endpoint_ids) ? metrics.round_endpoint_ids : [];
const roundEndpointLabels = Array.isArray(metrics.round_endpoint_labels) ? metrics.round_endpoint_labels : [];
if (
metrics.requested_endpoint_label
|| metrics.endpoint_label
|| roundEndpointLabels.length
|| target._requestedEndpointLabel
) {
target._requestedEndpointId = metrics.requested_endpoint_id || target._requestedEndpointId || null;
target._requestedEndpointLabel = metrics.requested_endpoint_label || target._requestedEndpointLabel || 'Selected route';
const hasRoundEndpointId = Boolean(roundHolder && roundEndpointIds.length);
const hasRoundEndpointLabel = Boolean(roundHolder && roundEndpointLabels.length);
target._actualEndpointId = hasRoundEndpointId
? roundEndpointIds[roundEndpointIds.length - 1]
: (metrics.endpoint_id || target._actualEndpointId || target._requestedEndpointId);
target._actualEndpointLabel = hasRoundEndpointLabel
? roundEndpointLabels[roundEndpointLabels.length - 1]
: (metrics.endpoint_label || target._actualEndpointLabel || target._requestedEndpointLabel);
}
return target;
}
+47 -258
View File
@@ -478,10 +478,7 @@ const DSML_STRAY_RE = /<\s*\/?\s*[|]+\s*DSML\s*[|]+[^>]*>/gi;
const DSML_INVOKE_RE = /<\s*[|]+\s*DSML\s*[|]+\s*invoke\b[^>]*>[\s\S]*?(?:<\s*\/\s*[|]+\s*DSML\s*[|]+\s*invoke\s*>|$)/gi;
const RAW_OPENAI_TOOL_JSON_RE = /(?:\[\s*)?\{\s*"function"\s*:\s*\{[\s\S]*?\}\s*,\s*"id"\s*:\s*"[^"]*"\s*,\s*"type"\s*:\s*"function"\s*\}\s*\]?/gi;
const QWEN_ROLE_MARKER_RE = /<\/?\|(?:assistant|assistan|user|system|tool)\|>?|<\/\|end\|>?/gi;
// Keep in sync with _QWEN_BARE_MARKER_RE in src/tool_parsing.py. At least one
// pipe is required around `end`: with both optional (`\|?end\|?`) this also ate
// a bare `end` on its own line, breaking Ruby/Lua/shell snippets (#5547).
const QWEN_BARE_MARKER_RE = /(?:^|[\t\r\n ])(?:\/?\|end\||\|end|end\|)(?=[\t\r\n ]|$)|(?:^|[\r\n])[ \t]*assistan(?:t)?[ \t]*(?=[\r\n]|$)/gi;
const QWEN_BARE_MARKER_RE = /(?:^|[\t\r\n ])(?:\|?end\|?|\/?\|end\|)(?=[\t\r\n ]|$)|(?:^|[\t\r\n ])assistan(?:t)?(?=[\t\r\n ]|$)/gi;
// Self-narration about tool results (model echoing stdout/exit_code)
const TOOL_NARRATION_RE = /(?:The (?:result|output) shows?:?\s*)?-?\s*(?:stdout|stderr|exit_code):\s*.+/gi;
@@ -615,36 +612,10 @@ export function sameModelName(left, right) {
|| shortModel(a).toLowerCase() === shortModel(b).toLowerCase();
}
function shortEndpointLabel(label) {
const value = modelValue(label);
if (!value) return '';
return value.length > 18 ? value.slice(0, 17) + '…' : value;
}
export function modelRouteLabel(
requestedModel,
actualModel,
requestedEndpointLabel = '',
actualEndpointLabel = '',
requestedEndpointId = '',
actualEndpointId = '',
) {
export function modelRouteLabel(requestedModel, actualModel) {
const requested = modelValue(requestedModel);
const actual = modelValue(actualModel) || requested;
const requestedRoute = modelValue(requestedEndpointId || requestedEndpointLabel);
const actualRoute = modelValue(actualEndpointId || actualEndpointLabel);
const routeChanged = Boolean(
actualRoute
&& requestedRoute
&& actualRoute !== requestedRoute
);
if (!requested || sameModelName(requested, actual)) {
const model = shortModel(actual || requested);
if (!routeChanged) return model;
const from = shortEndpointLabel(requestedEndpointLabel || 'Selected route');
const to = shortEndpointLabel(actualEndpointLabel || actualEndpointId);
return model + ' (' + from + ' -> ' + to + ')';
}
if (!requested || sameModelName(requested, actual)) return shortModel(actual || requested);
return shortModel(requested) + ' -> ' + shortModel(actual);
}
@@ -655,24 +626,10 @@ export function replyModelPair(modelName, metadata) {
if (actualFromMeta || requestedFromMeta) {
const actual = actualFromMeta || requestedFromMeta || modelValue(modelName);
const requested = requestedFromMeta || actual;
return {
requestedModel: requested,
actualModel: actual,
requestedEndpointId: meta.requested_endpoint_id || null,
requestedEndpointLabel: meta.requested_endpoint_label || 'Selected route',
actualEndpointId: meta.endpoint_id || null,
actualEndpointLabel: meta.endpoint_label || meta.requested_endpoint_label || 'Selected route',
};
return { requestedModel: requested, actualModel: actual };
}
const fallback = modelValue(modelName);
return {
requestedModel: fallback,
actualModel: fallback,
requestedEndpointId: null,
requestedEndpointLabel: 'Selected route',
actualEndpointId: null,
actualEndpointLabel: 'Selected route',
};
return { requestedModel: fallback, actualModel: fallback };
}
/**
@@ -864,50 +821,12 @@ export function isCostTrackedEndpoint(url) {
}
/** Cost for the current turn, returning null for non-billable endpoints. */
function _billableCost(model, inputTokens, outputTokens, endpointCostTracked, selectedEndpointUrl) {
// Foreground fallback can answer on a different endpoint than the session's
// selected route. Prefer the backend's non-secret actual-route
// classification; retain the selected-endpoint check for older history.
if (endpointCostTracked === false) return null;
const selectedUrl = selectedEndpointUrl === undefined
? _currentEndpointUrl()
: selectedEndpointUrl;
if (endpointCostTracked !== true && !isCostTrackedEndpoint(selectedUrl)) {
return null;
}
function _billableCost(model, inputTokens, outputTokens) {
const url = _currentEndpointUrl();
if (!isCostTrackedEndpoint(url)) return null;
return getModelCost(model, inputTokens, outputTokens);
}
/** Sum cost using the route/model that produced each Agent round. */
function _metricsBillableCost(metrics, model, inputTokens, outputTokens, selectedEndpointUrl) {
const buckets = Array.isArray(metrics.usage_buckets) ? metrics.usage_buckets : [];
if (!buckets.length) {
return _billableCost(
model,
inputTokens,
outputTokens,
metrics.endpoint_cost_tracked,
selectedEndpointUrl,
);
}
let total = 0;
let hasPricedUsage = false;
for (const bucket of buckets) {
if (!bucket || typeof bucket !== 'object') continue;
const bucketCost = _billableCost(
bucket.model || model,
Number(bucket.input_tokens) || 0,
Number(bucket.output_tokens) || 0,
bucket.endpoint_cost_tracked,
selectedEndpointUrl,
);
if (bucketCost === null) continue;
total += bucketCost;
hasPricedUsage = true;
}
return hasPricedUsage ? total : null;
}
export function getImageCost(model, quality, size) {
if (!model) return null;
const m = model.toLowerCase();
@@ -922,9 +841,6 @@ export function getImageCost(model, quality, size) {
/* ── Session cost helpers ─────────────────────────────────────────── */
const _COST_KEY = 'ody-session-cost';
const _COST_RUNS_KEY = 'ody-session-cost-runs';
const _MAX_COST_RUNS_PER_SESSION = 256;
const _COST_LEDGER_LOCK = 'odysseus-session-cost-ledger';
/** Return the accumulated cost for the current (or given) session. */
export function getSessionCost(sessionId) {
@@ -932,14 +848,7 @@ export function getSessionCost(sessionId) {
if (!sid) return 0;
try {
const costs = JSON.parse(localStorage.getItem(_COST_KEY) || '{}');
const runCosts = JSON.parse(localStorage.getItem(_COST_RUNS_KEY) || '{}');
const recordedRuns = runCosts[sid] && typeof runCosts[sid] === 'object'
? Object.values(runCosts[sid])
: [];
return (costs[sid] || 0) + recordedRuns.reduce(
(total, value) => total + (Number(value) || 0),
0,
);
return costs[sid] || 0;
} catch (_e) { return 0; }
}
@@ -951,9 +860,6 @@ export function resetSessionCost(sessionId) {
const costs = JSON.parse(localStorage.getItem(_COST_KEY) || '{}');
delete costs[sid];
localStorage.setItem(_COST_KEY, JSON.stringify(costs));
const runCosts = JSON.parse(localStorage.getItem(_COST_RUNS_KEY) || '{}');
delete runCosts[sid];
localStorage.setItem(_COST_RUNS_KEY, JSON.stringify(runCosts));
} catch (_e) { /* ignore */ }
updateSessionCostUI();
}
@@ -962,8 +868,21 @@ export function resetSessionCost(sessionId) {
export function updateSessionCostUI() {
const el = document.getElementById('session-cost-display');
if (!el) return;
// The ledger records billable work already performed in this session. A
// selected local endpoint does not erase cost from a paid fallback route.
// Non-billable endpoint? Hide the badge and clear stale cost that a previous
// cloud-rate calculation may have left in localStorage for this session.
const _url = _currentEndpointUrl();
if (!isCostTrackedEndpoint(_url)) {
const sid = window.sessionModule && window.sessionModule.getCurrentSessionId();
if (sid && getSessionCost(sid) > 0) {
try {
const costs = JSON.parse(localStorage.getItem(_COST_KEY) || '{}');
delete costs[sid];
localStorage.setItem(_COST_KEY, JSON.stringify(costs));
} catch (_e) { /* ignore */ }
}
el.style.display = 'none';
return;
}
const cost = getSessionCost();
if (cost > 0) {
el.textContent = '$' + (cost < 0.01 ? cost.toFixed(4) : cost < 1 ? cost.toFixed(3) : cost.toFixed(2));
@@ -973,94 +892,6 @@ export function updateSessionCostUI() {
}
}
/** Record one metrics payload in a session ledger at most once. */
export function recordSessionMetricsCost(metrics, sessionId, selectedEndpointUrl) {
if (!metrics || typeof metrics !== 'object') return null;
const cost = _metricsBillableCost(
metrics,
metrics.model || 'Unknown',
metrics.input_tokens || 0,
metrics.output_tokens || 0,
selectedEndpointUrl,
);
if (metrics._fromHistory) return cost;
const sid = sessionId || (
window.sessionModule && window.sessionModule.getCurrentSessionId()
);
if (!sid || cost === null) return cost;
const runId = typeof metrics._costRecordId === 'string'
? metrics._costRecordId.trim()
: '';
if ((metrics._costRecorded || metrics._costRecordPending) && !runId) return cost;
// Recorded is only set once the write actually runs; pending covers the
// window while the write waits on the cross-tab lock, so a replay in that
// window cannot double-add and a tab closed mid-queue never claims recorded.
metrics._costRecordPending = true;
const writeCost = () => {
if (runId) {
try {
const runCosts = JSON.parse(localStorage.getItem(_COST_RUNS_KEY) || '{}');
const sessionRuns = runCosts[sid] && typeof runCosts[sid] === 'object'
? runCosts[sid]
: {};
// Assigning by detached-run identity is replay-idempotent even when a
// refresh produces a fresh metrics object. The Web Lock around this
// read/modify/write also keeps distinct runs from two tabs from
// overwriting one another's stale snapshot.
sessionRuns[runId] = cost;
const entries = Object.entries(sessionRuns);
if (entries.length > _MAX_COST_RUNS_PER_SESSION) {
const overflow = entries.slice(0, entries.length - _MAX_COST_RUNS_PER_SESSION);
const costs = JSON.parse(localStorage.getItem(_COST_KEY) || '{}');
costs[sid] = (costs[sid] || 0) + overflow.reduce(
(total, entry) => total + (Number(entry[1]) || 0),
0,
);
overflow.forEach(([oldRunId]) => delete sessionRuns[oldRunId]);
localStorage.setItem(_COST_KEY, JSON.stringify(costs));
}
runCosts[sid] = sessionRuns;
localStorage.setItem(_COST_RUNS_KEY, JSON.stringify(runCosts));
} catch (_e) { /* ignore */ }
} else {
try {
const costs = JSON.parse(localStorage.getItem(_COST_KEY) || '{}');
costs[sid] = (costs[sid] || 0) + cost;
localStorage.setItem(_COST_KEY, JSON.stringify(costs));
} catch (_e) { /* ignore */ }
}
metrics._costRecorded = true;
metrics._costRecordPending = false;
const currentSid = window.sessionModule && window.sessionModule.getCurrentSessionId();
if (currentSid === sid) updateSessionCostUI();
};
let writeStarted = false;
const guardedWrite = () => {
writeStarted = true;
writeCost();
};
try {
if (
typeof navigator !== 'undefined'
&& navigator.locks
&& typeof navigator.locks.request === 'function'
) {
const pendingWrite = navigator.locks.request(_COST_LEDGER_LOCK, guardedWrite);
if (pendingWrite && typeof pendingWrite.catch === 'function') {
pendingWrite.catch(() => {
if (!writeStarted) guardedWrite();
});
}
} else {
guardedWrite();
}
} catch (_e) {
if (!writeStarted) guardedWrite();
}
return cost;
}
/** Create a timestamp span for role labels.
* Pass an ISO string / Date / epoch-ms to render the message's own time
* (used when replaying history). Falls back to "now" when no value is given. */
@@ -2040,19 +1871,23 @@ export function displayMetrics(messageElement, metrics) {
const isReal = metrics.usage_source === 'real';
const ctxPct = metrics.context_percent;
const model = metrics.model || 'Unknown';
const cost = _metricsBillableCost(
metrics,
model,
inputTokens,
outputTokens,
);
const cost = _billableCost(model, inputTokens, outputTokens);
// Nothing useful to show — bail out (only if ALL metrics are missing)
if (!responseTime && !inputTokens && !outputTokens && tps == null && !ctxPct) return;
// Rendering can occur when metrics arrive and again after [DONE]. The
// ledger mutation is idempotent for that shared payload.
recordSessionMetricsCost(metrics);
// Accumulate session cost (only on fresh metrics, not history reload)
if (!metrics._fromHistory) {
const _sid = window.sessionModule && window.sessionModule.getCurrentSessionId();
if (_sid && cost !== null) {
try {
const _costs = JSON.parse(localStorage.getItem(_COST_KEY) || '{}');
_costs[_sid] = (_costs[_sid] || 0) + cost;
localStorage.setItem(_COST_KEY, JSON.stringify(_costs));
} catch (_e) { /* ignore */ }
updateSessionCostUI();
}
}
// Keep token counts in the Message Stats popup; the footer should stay slim.
const costStr0 = cost !== null ? `$${cost < 0.01 ? cost.toFixed(4) : cost.toFixed(3)}` : null;
@@ -2469,19 +2304,9 @@ export function addMessage(role, content, modelName, metadata) {
const textRaw = Array.isArray(content) ? markdownModule.renderContent(content) : content;
// --- Agent multi-bubble reconstruction from saved metadata ---
if (
role === 'assistant'
&& metadata
&& (
(Array.isArray(metadata.tool_events) && metadata.tool_events.length > 0)
|| (Array.isArray(metadata.round_texts) && metadata.round_texts.length > 1)
)
) {
if (role === 'assistant' && metadata && metadata.tool_events && metadata.tool_events.length > 0) {
const roundTexts = metadata.round_texts || [];
const roundModels = metadata.round_models || [];
const roundEndpointIds = metadata.round_endpoint_ids || [];
const roundEndpointLabels = metadata.round_endpoint_labels || [];
const toolEvents = metadata.tool_events || [];
const toolEvents = metadata.tool_events;
let pendingAskUser = null;
let lastWrap = null;
let firstMsgAi = null;
@@ -2494,8 +2319,7 @@ export function addMessage(role, content, modelName, metadata) {
toolsByRound[r].push(ev);
}
const toolRounds = Object.keys(toolsByRound).map(Number);
const maxRound = Math.max(toolRounds.length ? Math.max(...toolRounds) : 0, roundTexts.length);
const maxRound = Math.max(...Object.keys(toolsByRound).map(Number), roundTexts.length);
for (let r = 0; r < maxRound; r++) {
const roundNum = r + 1;
@@ -2507,31 +2331,10 @@ export function addMessage(role, content, modelName, metadata) {
const roleEl = document.createElement('div');
roleEl.className = 'role';
const pair = replyModelPair(modelName, metadata);
const contModel = roundModels[r] || pair.actualModel || pair.requestedModel;
const contEndpointId = r < roundEndpointIds.length
? roundEndpointIds[r]
: pair.actualEndpointId;
const contEndpointLabel = r < roundEndpointLabels.length
? roundEndpointLabels[r]
: pair.actualEndpointLabel;
roleEl.textContent = modelRouteLabel(
pair.requestedModel,
contModel,
pair.requestedEndpointLabel,
contEndpointLabel,
pair.requestedEndpointId,
contEndpointId,
);
if (
pair.requestedModel
&& contModel
&& (
!sameModelName(pair.requestedModel, contModel)
|| (pair.requestedEndpointId && contEndpointId && pair.requestedEndpointId !== contEndpointId)
)
) {
roleEl.title = pair.requestedModel + ' -> ' + contModel
+ ' (' + pair.requestedEndpointLabel + ' -> ' + contEndpointLabel + ')';
const contModel = pair.actualModel || pair.requestedModel;
roleEl.textContent = modelRouteLabel(pair.requestedModel, contModel);
if (pair.requestedModel && contModel && !sameModelName(pair.requestedModel, contModel)) {
roleEl.title = pair.requestedModel + ' -> ' + contModel;
}
applyModelColor(roleEl, contModel);
if (r === 0) roleEl.appendChild(roleTimestamp(metadata?.timestamp));
@@ -2686,14 +2489,7 @@ export function addMessage(role, content, modelName, metadata) {
const isCompacted = metadata?.compacted;
const replyModels = replyModelPair(modelName, metadata);
const resolvedModel = replyModels.actualModel || replyModels.requestedModel;
var _roleText = role === 'user' ? 'You' : (isSlash || isCompacted) ? 'Odysseus' : modelRouteLabel(
replyModels.requestedModel,
resolvedModel,
replyModels.requestedEndpointLabel,
replyModels.actualEndpointLabel,
replyModels.requestedEndpointId,
replyModels.actualEndpointId,
);
var _roleText = role === 'user' ? 'You' : (isSlash || isCompacted) ? 'Odysseus' : modelRouteLabel(replyModels.requestedModel, resolvedModel);
if (role === 'assistant' && (metadata?.research || metadata?.research_clarification)) {
_roleText += ' (Research)';
}
@@ -2704,14 +2500,8 @@ export function addMessage(role, content, modelName, metadata) {
}
r.textContent = _roleText;
if (role !== 'user') {
const endpointChanged = Boolean(
replyModels.requestedEndpointId
&& replyModels.actualEndpointId
&& replyModels.requestedEndpointId !== replyModels.actualEndpointId
);
if (!isSlash && !isCompacted && replyModels.requestedModel && resolvedModel && (!sameModelName(replyModels.requestedModel, resolvedModel) || endpointChanged)) {
r.title = replyModels.requestedModel + ' -> ' + resolvedModel
+ ' (' + replyModels.requestedEndpointLabel + ' -> ' + replyModels.actualEndpointLabel + ')';
if (!isSlash && !isCompacted && replyModels.requestedModel && resolvedModel && !sameModelName(replyModels.requestedModel, resolvedModel)) {
r.title = replyModels.requestedModel + ' -> ' + resolvedModel;
}
if (!isSlash && !isCompacted) applyModelColor(r, resolvedModel);
r.appendChild(roleTimestamp(metadata?.timestamp));
@@ -2995,7 +2785,6 @@ const chatRenderer = {
getSessionCost,
resetSessionCost,
updateSessionCostUI,
recordSessionMetricsCost,
roleTimestamp,
stripToolBlocks,
copyMessageText,
-23
View File
@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
/** Build a terminal stream error while preserving provider-supplied text. */
export function createTerminalStreamError(payload = {}) {
const rawError = payload.error;
const message = (
payload.text
|| (typeof rawError === 'string' ? rawError : rawError?.message)
|| `Error ${payload.status || 'unknown'}`
);
const error = new Error(message);
error.name = 'TerminalStreamError';
error.terminalStreamError = true;
error.status = payload.status;
return error;
}
/** Only connection-class stream failures are safe to resubmit automatically. */
export function isRecoverableStreamError(error) {
if (!error || error.terminalStreamError || error.name === 'TerminalStreamError') return false;
if (error.name === 'TypeError') return true;
const message = (error.message || '').toLowerCase();
if (/\btool\b|unsupported|json|parse|\b4\d\d\b|\b5\d\d\b/.test(message)) return false;
return /network|fetch|connection|reset|closed|aborted|stream|tim(?:e|ed)\s?out|econn|eof/.test(message);
}

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