chore(release): align dev version with 1.0.3

Keep dev version metadata aligned with the current hotfix release while the rolling branch continues toward 1.1.0.

Evidence: the canonical APP_VERSION imports as 1.0.3 and the diff check is clean. This commit changes version metadata only; it does not tag or publish a release.

core/atomic_io.py

@@ -30,11 +30,20 @@ def atomic_write_json(path: str, data: Any, *, indent: Optional[int] = None) ->
     """
     os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(path) or ".", exist_ok=True)
     tmp = f"{path}.tmp.{uuid.uuid4().hex}"
-    with open(tmp, "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:
-        json.dump(data, f, indent=indent)
-        f.flush()
-        os.fsync(f.fileno())
-    os.replace(tmp, path)
+
+    try:
+        with open(tmp, "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:
+            json.dump(data, f, indent=indent)
+            f.flush()
+            os.fsync(f.fileno())
+        os.replace(tmp, path)
+    finally:
+        # Directly unlink to avoid a check-then-act race condition.
+        # Swallows FileNotFoundError (on success path) and other cleanup OSErrors.
+        try:
+            os.unlink(tmp)
+        except OSError:
+            pass
 
 
 def atomic_write_text(path: str, text: str) -> None:
@@ -42,8 +51,17 @@ def atomic_write_text(path: str, text: str) -> None:
         raise TypeError("atomic_write_text expects a string")
     os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(path) or ".", exist_ok=True)
     tmp = f"{path}.tmp.{uuid.uuid4().hex}"
-    with open(tmp, "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:
-        f.write(text)
-        f.flush()
-        os.fsync(f.fileno())
-    os.replace(tmp, path)
+
+    try:
+        with open(tmp, "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:
+            f.write(text)
+            f.flush()
+            os.fsync(f.fileno())
+        os.replace(tmp, path)
+    finally:
+        # Directly unlink to avoid a check-then-act race condition.
+        # Swallows FileNotFoundError (on success path) and other cleanup OSErrors.
+        try:
+            os.unlink(tmp)
+        except OSError:
+            pass

core/models.py

@@ -8,6 +8,11 @@ These are simple datacontainers. All persistence is handled by SessionManager.
 from dataclasses import dataclass
 from typing import Dict, List, Any, Optional, TYPE_CHECKING
 
+from src.tool_approval_scopes import (
+    CHAT_SESSION_APPROVAL_CONTEXT_MARKER,
+    CHAT_SESSION_APPROVAL_DECISION,
+)
+
 if TYPE_CHECKING:
     from .session_manager import SessionManager
 
@@ -31,6 +36,35 @@ set_session_manager = set_session_manager_instance
 get_session_manager = get_session_manager_instance
 
 
+def _history_grants_chat_session_approval(
+    history: List["ChatMessage"],
+    session_id: str,
+) -> bool:
+    """Return whether this exact chat has a resolved session-scope grant."""
+
+    expected_session = str(session_id or "")
+    if not expected_session:
+        return False
+    for message in reversed(history or []):
+        metadata = getattr(message, "metadata", None)
+        if not isinstance(metadata, dict):
+            continue
+        tool_events = metadata.get("tool_events")
+        if not isinstance(tool_events, list):
+            continue
+        for event in reversed(tool_events):
+            ask_user = event.get("ask_user") if isinstance(event, dict) else None
+            if not isinstance(ask_user, dict):
+                continue
+            if (
+                ask_user.get("kind") == "tool_approval"
+                and ask_user.get("resolved") == CHAT_SESSION_APPROVAL_DECISION
+                and str(ask_user.get("session_id") or "") == expected_session
+            ):
+                return True
+    return False
+
+
 @dataclass
 class ChatMessage:
     """A single chat message."""
@@ -116,11 +150,27 @@ class Session:
         the model. Display/history-load paths use the raw ``history`` and are
         unaffected.
         """
-        return [
+        messages = [
             msg.to_dict()
             for msg in self.history
             if (msg.metadata or {}).get("source") != "slash"
         ]
+        if not _history_grants_chat_session_approval(self.history, self.id):
+            return messages
+
+        # Keep the grant close to the latest user request so route-neutral
+        # compaction/trimming preserves it. Copy the metadata instead of
+        # mutating the durable transcript object.
+        for index in range(len(messages) - 1, -1, -1):
+            if messages[index].get("role") != "user":
+                continue
+            message = dict(messages[index])
+            metadata = dict(message.get("metadata") or {})
+            metadata[CHAT_SESSION_APPROVAL_CONTEXT_MARKER] = True
+            message["metadata"] = metadata
+            messages[index] = message
+            break
+        return messages
 
     def get(self, key: str, default=None):
         """Dict-like access for compatibility."""

routes/chat_helpers.py

@@ -624,6 +624,8 @@ async def build_chat_context(
     agent_mode: bool = False,
     allow_tool_preprocessing: bool = True,
     defer_context_shaping: bool = False,
+    continuation_context_message: str | None = None,
+    persist_user_message: bool = True,
 ) -> ChatContext:
     """Build the full context (preface + messages) for an LLM call.
 
@@ -647,14 +649,14 @@ async def build_chat_context(
     # Add user message to history. Nobody/incognito uses a request-local
     # transcript store instead of session history so stale saved chats cannot
     # bleed into context and the turn is not persisted.
-    if incognito:
+    if persist_user_message and incognito:
         user_meta = {"attachments": preprocessed.attachment_meta} if preprocessed.attachment_meta else None
         _append_incognito_message(session_id, "user", preprocessed.user_content, user_meta)
-    else:
+    elif persist_user_message:
         add_user_message(sess, chat_handler, preprocessed, incognito=False)
 
     # Fire events
-    if not incognito:
+    if persist_user_message and not incognito:
         fire_message_event(request, webhook_manager, session_id, sess, message, compare_mode)
 
     # Resolve owner-scoped prefs/context. Browser requests keep the cookie user;
@@ -666,7 +668,12 @@ async def build_chat_context(
         getattr(chat_handler, "upload_handler", None),
         getattr(sess, "owner", None),
     )
-    casual_low_signal = _is_casual_low_signal(message)
+    context_message = (
+        str(continuation_context_message).strip()
+        if continuation_context_message
+        else message
+    )
+    casual_low_signal = _is_casual_low_signal(context_message)
 
     # Memory enabled?
     mem_enabled = not incognito and not no_memory and uprefs.get("memory_enabled", True)
@@ -703,7 +710,15 @@ async def build_chat_context(
     # Build context preface
     # The stream path uses enhanced_message (with CoT/preprocessing applied),
     # the sync path uses text_for_context.
-    _ctx_msg = preprocessed.enhanced_message if use_enhanced_message else preprocessed.text_for_context
+    _ctx_msg = (
+        context_message
+        if continuation_context_message
+        else (
+            preprocessed.enhanced_message
+            if use_enhanced_message
+            else preprocessed.text_for_context
+        )
+    )
     _preface_kwargs = dict(
         message=_ctx_msg,
         session=sess,

routes/chat_routes.py

@@ -89,6 +89,65 @@ def _stream_failure_status(chunk: str) -> Optional[int]:
     return None
 
 
+def _mark_tool_approval_resolved(sess, approval_id: Any, decision: Any) -> bool:
+    """Persist a consumed approval decision on its existing tool event."""
+
+    approval_key = str(approval_id or "")
+    normalized_decision = str(decision or "").strip().lower()
+    if not approval_key or normalized_decision not in {"approve", "approve_task", "deny"}:
+        return False
+
+    message_id = None
+    resolved_metadata = None
+    for item in reversed(getattr(sess, "history", []) or []):
+        metadata = getattr(item, "metadata", None)
+        if not isinstance(metadata, dict):
+            continue
+        tool_events = metadata.get("tool_events")
+        if not isinstance(tool_events, list):
+            continue
+        for event in reversed(tool_events):
+            ask_user = event.get("ask_user") if isinstance(event, dict) else None
+            if not isinstance(ask_user, dict):
+                continue
+            if str(ask_user.get("approval_id") or "") != approval_key:
+                continue
+            ask_user["resolved"] = normalized_decision
+            message_id = metadata.get("_db_id")
+            resolved_metadata = {
+                key: value for key, value in metadata.items() if key != "_db_id"
+            }
+            break
+        if resolved_metadata is not None:
+            break
+
+    if resolved_metadata is None or not message_id:
+        return False
+
+    db = SessionLocal()
+    try:
+        db_message = db.query(DBChatMessage).filter(
+            DBChatMessage.id == message_id,
+            DBChatMessage.session_id == str(getattr(sess, "id", "")),
+        ).first()
+        if db_message is None:
+            return False
+        db_message.meta_data = json.dumps(resolved_metadata)
+        db.commit()
+        return True
+    except Exception:
+        db.rollback()
+        logger.exception("Failed to persist tool approval resolution")
+        return False
+    finally:
+        db.close()
+
+
+async def _tool_approval_resolution_stream(decision: str) -> AsyncGenerator[str, None]:
+    yield f"data: {json.dumps({'type': 'tool_approval_resolved', 'decision': decision})}\n\n"
+    yield "data: [DONE]\n\n"
+
+
 def _chat_candidate_request_factory(
     messages,
     fallback_context_length: int = 0,
@@ -917,6 +976,7 @@ def setup_chat_routes(
         exact_tool_approval = None
         pending_tool_approval = None
         retired_tool_approval_taint = False
+        external_untrusted_context_seen = False
         tool_approval_continuation = False
         # Workspace: confine the agent's file/shell tools to this folder.
         workspace, workspace_rejected = _resolve_request_workspace(
@@ -1050,14 +1110,14 @@ def setup_chat_routes(
             )
 
         try:
-            # Attachment-only sends: skip the message-required check when the
-            # user has attached one or more files (the attachment IS the action).
+            # Attachment-only sends and approval controls may omit message text.
             _has_atts = (
                 bool(body and isinstance(body.get("attachments"), list) and body["attachments"])
                 or bool(form_data.get("attachments"))
             )
             message, session = coerce_message_and_session(
-                body, message, session, session_manager, allow_empty=_has_atts,
+                body, message, session, session_manager,
+                allow_empty=(_has_atts or bool(tool_approval_id)),
             )
             # Verify ownership AFTER coerce (which may resolve a default session)
             # but BEFORE loading. Prevents cross-user session hijack.
@@ -1076,8 +1136,14 @@ def setup_chat_routes(
                         409,
                         "This tool approval is invalid, expired, or belongs to another thread.",
                     )
+                pending_taint = bool(
+                    pending_tool_approval.external_untrusted_context_seen
+                )
+                external_untrusted_context_seen = (
+                    external_untrusted_context_seen or pending_taint
+                )
                 decision = str(tool_approval_decision or "").strip().lower()
-                if decision not in {"approve", "deny"}:
+                if decision not in {"approve", "approve_task", "deny"}:
                     raise HTTPException(400, "Invalid tool approval decision.")
                 if plan_mode:
                     raise HTTPException(
@@ -1091,37 +1157,46 @@ def setup_chat_routes(
                     session_id=session,
                 )
                 tool_approval_continuation = True
-                if decision == "approve" and exact_tool_approval is None:
+                if (
+                    decision in {"approve", "approve_task"}
+                    and exact_tool_approval is None
+                ):
                     raise HTTPException(
                         409,
                         "This tool approval could not be consumed.",
                     )
-                if decision == "approve":
-                    message = (
-                        f"Approved the exact {pending_tool_approval.tool_name} action "
-                        "shown above once."
+                if not _mark_tool_approval_resolved(
+                    sess,
+                    tool_approval_id,
+                    decision,
+                ):
+                    logger.warning(
+                        "Tool approval %s was consumed but its persisted card could not be marked resolved",
+                        tool_approval_id,
                     )
-                    # The sealed server record, not mutable composer state,
-                    # restores the original action workspace.
-                    workspace = pending_tool_approval.workspace or None
-                    workspace_rejected = None
-                    if pending_tool_approval.document_id:
-                        active_doc_id = pending_tool_approval.document_id
-                    # The approval click is the per-turn opt-in for this exact
-                    # sealed action. Restore only the coarse request toggle
-                    # that would otherwise disable it because the synthetic
-                    # "Approved…" message no longer resembles the original
-                    # shell/web request. Current privilege, global-disable,
-                    # incognito, compare, and tool-policy gates still run.
-                    if pending_tool_approval.tool_name == "bash":
-                        allow_bash = "true"
-                    if pending_tool_approval.tool_name in WEB_TOOL_NAMES:
-                        allow_web_search = "true"
-                        _search_enabled = True
-                else:
-                    message = (
-                        f"Denied the {pending_tool_approval.tool_name} action shown above."
+                if decision == "deny":
+                    return StreamingResponse(
+                        _tool_approval_resolution_stream(decision),
+                        media_type="text/event-stream",
                     )
+                # Approval is a control-plane continuation, not a new user turn.
+                # Reuse the sealed interrupted request only for internal context,
+                # retrieval, and policy reconstruction; never persist or display it.
+                message = pending_tool_approval.continuation_query
+                # The sealed server record, not mutable composer state,
+                # restores the original action workspace.
+                workspace = pending_tool_approval.workspace or None
+                workspace_rejected = None
+                if pending_tool_approval.document_id:
+                    active_doc_id = pending_tool_approval.document_id
+                # Restore only the coarse request toggle needed by the exact
+                # sealed action. Current privilege, global-disable, incognito,
+                # compare, and tool-policy gates still run.
+                if pending_tool_approval.tool_name == "bash":
+                    allow_bash = "true"
+                if pending_tool_approval.tool_name in WEB_TOOL_NAMES:
+                    allow_web_search = "true"
+                    _search_enabled = True
                 chat_mode = "agent"
             else:
                 # A normal user message supersedes the card that was waiting
@@ -1132,6 +1207,9 @@ def setup_chat_routes(
                     owner=owner,
                     session_id=session,
                 )
+                external_untrusted_context_seen = (
+                    external_untrusted_context_seen or retired_tool_approval_taint
+                )
             _reconcile_selected_route_from_request(request, sess, session, form_data, owner=owner)
             if _clear_orphaned_session_endpoint(sess, owner=owner):
                 raise HTTPException(400, "Selected model endpoint was removed. Pick another model in Settings.")
@@ -1261,6 +1339,14 @@ def setup_chat_routes(
             agent_mode=(chat_mode == "agent"),
             allow_tool_preprocessing=allow_tool_preprocessing,
             defer_context_shaping=foreground_policy.enabled,
+            continuation_context_message=(
+                pending_tool_approval.continuation_query
+                if exact_tool_approval
+                and pending_tool_approval
+                and pending_tool_approval.continuation_query
+                else None
+            ),
+            persist_user_message=not tool_approval_continuation,
         )
 
         _research_flags = {"do": do_research}  # Mutable container for generator scope
@@ -1663,7 +1749,11 @@ def setup_chat_routes(
                 if foreground_policy.enabled
                 else ctx.messages
             )
-            messages = _ensure_current_request_is_latest_user(context_source, message)
+            messages = (
+                list(context_source)
+                if tool_approval_continuation
+                else _ensure_current_request_is_latest_user(context_source, message)
+            )
 
             # Auto-compact notification
             if ctx.was_compacted:
@@ -2134,7 +2224,10 @@ def setup_chat_routes(
                                     incognito=incognito, compare_mode=compare_mode,
                                     character_name=ctx.preset.character_name,
                                     owner=_user,
-                                    allow_background_extraction=not tool_policy.block_all_tool_calls,
+                                    allow_background_extraction=(
+                                        not tool_policy.block_all_tool_calls
+                                        and not tool_approval_continuation
+                                    ),
                                 )
                             _stream_set(session, status="done")
                             yield chunk
@@ -2223,17 +2316,17 @@ def setup_chat_routes(
                         plan_mode=plan_mode,
                         approved_plan=approved_plan or None,
                         workspace=workspace or None,
+                        relevant_tools=(
+                            set(pending_tool_approval.selected_tools)
+                            if exact_tool_approval
+                            and pending_tool_approval
+                            and pending_tool_approval.selected_tools
+                            else None
+                        ),
                         forced_tools=_forced_tools,
                         uploaded_files=ctx.uploaded_files,
                         defer_context_shaping=_foreground_policy.enabled,
-                        external_untrusted_context_seen=bool(
-                            retired_tool_approval_taint
-                            or (
-                                tool_approval_continuation
-                                and pending_tool_approval
-                                and pending_tool_approval.external_untrusted_context_seen
-                            )
-                        ),
+                        external_untrusted_context_seen=external_untrusted_context_seen,
                         exact_approval=exact_tool_approval,
                     ):
                         if chunk.startswith("data: ") and not chunk.startswith("data: [DONE]"):
@@ -2401,8 +2494,14 @@ def setup_chat_routes(
                                     agent_tool_calls=_agent_tool_calls,
                                     skills_manager=skills_manager,
                                     owner=_user,
-                                    extract_skills=user_requested_agent,
-                                    allow_background_extraction=not tool_policy.block_all_tool_calls,
+                                    extract_skills=(
+                                        user_requested_agent
+                                        and not tool_approval_continuation
+                                    ),
+                                    allow_background_extraction=(
+                                        not tool_policy.block_all_tool_calls
+                                        and not tool_approval_continuation
+                                    ),
                                 )
                             _stream_set(session, status="done")
                             yield chunk

routes/skills_routes.py

@@ -1603,6 +1603,9 @@ def setup_skills_routes(skills_manager: SkillsManager) -> APIRouter:
             decision=decision,
             owner=user,
             session_id=None,
+            # The button here says "Allow once" and there is no chat to carry a
+            # scope into, so the gate must re-arm behind the sealed action.
+            allow_continuation=False,
         )
 
         if decision == "approve" and exact_approval is None:

scripts/mlx_image_server.py

@@ -327,7 +327,12 @@ def list_models():
 
 @app.post("/v1/images/generations")
 def generate(req: ImageRequest):
-    model = req.model or _args.model
+    # The served model is the one this process was launched with. `req.model`
+    # is accepted for OpenAI wire compatibility and ignored, matching
+    # scripts/diffusion_server.py: honouring it would let a caller point the
+    # generator at any local directory or Hugging Face repo, and the HiDream
+    # branch runs a python script from inside that directory.
+    model = _args.model
     width, height = _size(req.size)
     out_images = []
     count = max(1, min(int(req.n or 1), 4))
@@ -393,7 +398,7 @@ async def edit_image(
     size: str = Form("1024x1024"),
     response_format: str = Form("b64_json"),
 ):
-    active_model = model or _args.model
+    active_model = _args.model  # pinned; see generate()
     if _is_lama_inpaint(active_model) or _is_ddcolor(active_model):
         image_raw = await image.read()
         mask_raw = await mask.read() if mask is not None else None

src/agent_loop.py

@@ -3081,10 +3081,17 @@ def _append_tool_results(
             messages.append(result_message)
     else:
         tool_output_text = "\n\n".join(tool_results)
-        msg = {"role": "assistant", "content": round_response}
-        if round_reasoning:
-            msg["reasoning_content"] = round_reasoning
-        messages.append(msg)
+        # An approved-action replay injects the sealed tool result with no
+        # assistant prose for that round, which used to append an assistant turn
+        # whose content was "". Anthropic's Messages API rejects a non-final
+        # assistant message with empty content (HTTP 400), so the resumed turn
+        # died before the model saw the result. A turn carrying neither prose nor
+        # reasoning has nothing to say to any provider, so skip it entirely.
+        if round_response.strip() or round_reasoning:
+            msg = {"role": "assistant", "content": round_response}
+            if round_reasoning:
+                msg["reasoning_content"] = round_reasoning
+            messages.append(msg)
         # Tool output (shell/python stdout, file reads, fetched pages, email
         # bodies, MCP results) is sourced from outside the server. Wrap it as
         # untrusted data so prompt-injection inside a tool result is treated as
@@ -3460,7 +3467,10 @@ async def stream_agent_loop(
                 and exact_approval.pending.external_untrusted_context_seen
             )
             or messages_contain_external_untrusted_context(messages)
-        )
+        ),
+        approval_gate_bypassed=bool(
+            exact_approval and exact_approval.allow_remaining_actions
+        ),
     )
     mcp_mgr = get_mcp_manager()
     prep_timings: Dict[str, float] = {}
@@ -5698,6 +5708,16 @@ async def stream_agent_loop(
                         "policy": "exact_tool_approval_target",
                     }
                 else:
+                    # The approval click becomes a synthetic user turn. Seal the
+                    # actual server-selected candidates now so that continuation
+                    # does not lose memory, skills, MCP, documents, or other
+                    # ToolIndex/RAG-selected tools by classifying that synthetic text.
+                    approval_selected_tools = set(_relevant_tools or ())
+                    approval_selected_tools.update(
+                        name for name in _tool_names_sent if name
+                    )
+                    approval_selected_tools.add(block.tool_type)
+                    approval_selected_tools.difference_update(disabled_tools)
                     pending_approval = tool_approval_store.create(
                         owner=owner,
                         session_id=session_id,
@@ -5725,6 +5745,8 @@ async def stream_agent_loop(
                         external_untrusted_context_seen=(
                             run_security.external_untrusted_context_seen
                         ),
+                        selected_tools=approval_selected_tools,
+                        continuation_query=_retrieval_query or _last_user,
                         capabilities=capabilities_for_action(
                             block.tool_type,
                             block.content,

src/constants.py

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ import os
 
 from src.runtime_paths import get_app_root, get_default_data_dir
 
-APP_VERSION = "1.0.2"
+APP_VERSION = "1.0.3"
 
 # Base paths
 BASE_DIR = os.path.join(get_app_root(), "")

src/tool_approval_scopes.py

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+"""Shared wire values and scope markers for tool approval continuations."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from enum import Enum
+
+
+# Keep the existing wire values so the current route and no-build frontend do
+# not need a second protocol migration. ``approve`` no longer means one action;
+# it now selects chat-session scope.
+TASK_APPROVAL_DECISION = "approve_task"
+CHAT_SESSION_APPROVAL_DECISION = "approve"
+DENY_APPROVAL_DECISION = "deny"
+
+# Session.get_context_messages() adds this server-owned marker only when the
+# session history contains a matching, resolved chat-session approval.
+CHAT_SESSION_APPROVAL_CONTEXT_MARKER = "_tool_approval_chat_session_granted"
+
+
+class ToolApprovalScope(str, Enum):
+    # Surfaces without a resumable chat (the skill tester, unattended audits)
+    # keep the original one-use meaning: the sealed action runs and the gate
+    # re-arms immediately for anything after it.
+    SINGLE_ACTION = "single_action"
+    TASK = "task"
+    CHAT_SESSION = "chat_session"
+
+
+def scope_for_decision(decision: object) -> ToolApprovalScope | None:
+    normalized = str(decision or "").strip().lower()
+    if normalized == TASK_APPROVAL_DECISION:
+        return ToolApprovalScope.TASK
+    if normalized == CHAT_SESSION_APPROVAL_DECISION:
+        return ToolApprovalScope.CHAT_SESSION
+    return None

src/tool_approvals.py

@@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
-"""Opaque, exact, one-use approvals for tainted model-requested actions.
+"""Opaque exact-action approvals with explicit task and chat scopes.
 
-The model may propose an action after untrusted context, but only the server
-stores and later executes the exact approved tool input.  Browser-visible
-fields are display copies, never authority.
+The server still seals and claims the first displayed action exactly once. The
+selected scope then bypasses only the automatic post-external-context approval
+gate for the rest of the resumed task or chat session. Browser-visible fields
+are display copies, never authority.
 """
 
 from __future__ import annotations
@@ -16,6 +17,13 @@ import time
 from dataclasses import dataclass, field
 from typing import Any
 
+from src.tool_approval_scopes import (
+    CHAT_SESSION_APPROVAL_DECISION,
+    DENY_APPROVAL_DECISION,
+    TASK_APPROVAL_DECISION,
+    ToolApprovalScope,
+    scope_for_decision,
+)
 from src.tool_capabilities import ToolCapabilities, capabilities_for_action
 
 
@@ -33,6 +41,51 @@ def _normalized_workspace(workspace: Any) -> str:
     return os.path.realpath(os.path.expanduser(workspace))
 
 
+_MAX_APPROVAL_SELECTED_TOOLS = 512
+_MAX_APPROVAL_TOOL_NAME_CHARS = 512
+_MAX_APPROVAL_CONTINUATION_QUERY_CHARS = 4000
+
+
+def _normalized_selected_tools(
+    selected_tools: Any,
+    *,
+    required_tool: Any = None,
+) -> tuple[str, ...]:
+    if isinstance(selected_tools, str):
+        selected_tools = (selected_tools,)
+    try:
+        values = selected_tools or ()
+        names = {
+            name.strip()
+            for name in values
+            if (
+                isinstance(name, str)
+                and name.strip()
+                and len(name.strip()) <= _MAX_APPROVAL_TOOL_NAME_CHARS
+            )
+        }
+        required_name = str(required_tool or "").strip()
+        if required_name and len(required_name) <= _MAX_APPROVAL_TOOL_NAME_CHARS:
+            names.add(required_name)
+        ordered = sorted(names)
+        if len(ordered) <= _MAX_APPROVAL_SELECTED_TOOLS:
+            return tuple(ordered)
+        kept = ordered[:_MAX_APPROVAL_SELECTED_TOOLS]
+        if required_name and required_name in names and required_name not in kept:
+            kept[-1] = required_name
+            kept.sort()
+        return tuple(kept)
+    except TypeError:
+        return ()
+
+
+def _normalized_continuation_query(value: Any) -> str:
+    # The query is server-derived from the interrupted run and already lives in
+    # session history. Keep the pending copy bounded because approvals are held
+    # in memory until consumed or expired.
+    return str(value or "").strip()[:_MAX_APPROVAL_CONTINUATION_QUERY_CHARS]
+
+
 def _canonical_digest(payload: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
     encoded = json.dumps(
         payload,
@@ -60,6 +113,8 @@ def _binding_payload(
     document_version: Any,
     document_digest: Any,
     external_untrusted_context_seen: bool,
+    selected_tools: Any,
+    continuation_query: Any,
     effects: tuple[str, ...],
     result_integrity: str,
 ) -> dict[str, Any]:
@@ -76,6 +131,10 @@ def _binding_payload(
         ),
         "document_digest": str(document_digest or "").strip().lower(),
         "external_untrusted_context_seen": bool(external_untrusted_context_seen),
+        "selected_tools": list(
+            _normalized_selected_tools(selected_tools, required_tool=tool_name)
+        ),
+        "continuation_query": _normalized_continuation_query(continuation_query),
         "effects": list(effects),
         "result_integrity": str(result_integrity),
     }
@@ -99,26 +158,47 @@ class PendingToolApproval:
     digest: str
     created_at: float
     expires_at: float
+    # Server-only continuation state. Both fields are digest-bound and never
+    # exposed in the browser payload.
+    selected_tools: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+    continuation_query: str = ""
 
     def public_payload(self, *, reason: str | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
         return {
             "kind": "tool_approval",
             "approval_id": self.approval_id,
-            "question": "Allow this exact action once?",
+            # The browser already owns this chat id. Persisting it with the
+            # resolved card lets history-derived session grants remain bound to
+            # this exact chat and prevents inheritance by a forked session.
+            "session_id": self.session_id,
+            "question": "Allow this task to continue?",
             "description": reason or (
-                "Untrusted context influenced this run, so this action needs "
-                "your explicit approval."
+                "Untrusted context influenced this run, so continuing with "
+                "otherwise-gated actions needs your explicit approval."
             ),
             "options": [
                 {
-                    "label": "Allow once",
-                    "value": "approve",
-                    "description": "Execute only the sealed action shown here.",
+                    "label": "Allow for this task",
+                    "value": TASK_APPROVAL_DECISION,
+                    "description": (
+                        "Execute the sealed action and allow every otherwise-gated "
+                        "action needed to finish this request. Current tool, account, "
+                        "workspace, and sandbox restrictions still apply."
+                    ),
+                },
+                {
+                    "label": "Allow for this chat session",
+                    "value": CHAT_SESSION_APPROVAL_DECISION,
+                    "description": (
+                        "Execute the sealed action and stop asking at this gate for "
+                        "later requests in this chat. Current tool, account, workspace, "
+                        "and sandbox restrictions still apply."
+                    ),
                 },
                 {
                     "label": "Deny",
-                    "value": "deny",
-                    "description": "Do not execute it.",
+                    "value": DENY_APPROVAL_DECISION,
+                    "description": "Do not execute the proposed action.",
                 },
             ],
             "action": {
@@ -137,12 +217,23 @@ class PendingToolApproval:
 
 @dataclass
 class ExactToolApproval:
-    """A consumed grant that the dispatcher can claim exactly once."""
+    """A consumed exact first action plus an explicit continuation scope."""
 
     pending: PendingToolApproval
+    scope: ToolApprovalScope = ToolApprovalScope.TASK
+    # The seam consumed by agent_loop. Both chat-card allow choices cover the
+    # complete resumed task, because one-action scope there immediately
+    # re-entered the same gate on the next round. Callers with no resumable
+    # chat still get SINGLE_ACTION, which leaves the gate armed behind the
+    # sealed action.
+    allow_remaining_actions: bool = True
     _claimed: bool = field(default=False, init=False, repr=False)
     _lock: threading.Lock = field(default_factory=threading.Lock, init=False, repr=False)
 
+    @property
+    def grants_chat_session(self) -> bool:
+        return self.scope is ToolApprovalScope.CHAT_SESSION
+
     def _matches_unlocked(
         self,
         *,
@@ -175,6 +266,8 @@ class ExactToolApproval:
             external_untrusted_context_seen=(
                 self.pending.external_untrusted_context_seen
             ),
+            selected_tools=self.pending.selected_tools,
+            continuation_query=self.pending.continuation_query,
             effects=effects,
             result_integrity=result_integrity,
         )
@@ -255,6 +348,8 @@ class ToolApprovalStore:
         document_id: Any = None,
         document_version: Any = None,
         document_digest: Any = None,
+        selected_tools: Any = None,
+        continuation_query: Any = None,
         external_untrusted_context_seen: bool,
         capabilities: ToolCapabilities,
     ) -> PendingToolApproval:
@@ -272,6 +367,8 @@ class ToolApprovalStore:
             document_version=document_version,
             document_digest=document_digest,
             external_untrusted_context_seen=external_untrusted_context_seen,
+            selected_tools=selected_tools,
+            continuation_query=continuation_query,
             effects=effects,
             result_integrity=result_integrity,
         )
@@ -294,6 +391,8 @@ class ToolApprovalStore:
             digest=_canonical_digest(payload),
             created_at=now,
             expires_at=now + self._ttl_seconds,
+            selected_tools=tuple(payload["selected_tools"]),
+            continuation_query=payload["continuation_query"],
         )
         with self._lock:
             self._purge_expired_locked(now)
@@ -331,7 +430,17 @@ class ToolApprovalStore:
         decision: Any,
         owner: Any,
         session_id: Any,
+        allow_continuation: bool = True,
     ) -> ExactToolApproval | None:
+        """Consume a pending approval.
+
+        ``allow_continuation`` is the caller's assertion that it owns a
+        resumable conversation the granted scope can apply to. Callers without
+        one (the skill tester, unattended audits) pass ``False`` and get the
+        original one-use grant, so a button labelled "Allow once" cannot widen
+        into a run-long bypass just because the chat card reuses the same wire
+        value.
+        """
         now = time.time()
         with self._lock:
             self._purge_expired_locked(now)
@@ -348,9 +457,21 @@ class ToolApprovalStore:
                 # another owner's pending action.
                 return None
             self._pending.pop(approval_key, None)
-        if str(decision or "").strip().lower() != "approve":
+        normalized_decision = str(decision or "").strip().lower()
+        scope = scope_for_decision(normalized_decision)
+        if scope is None:
             return None
-        return ExactToolApproval(pending)
+        if not allow_continuation:
+            return ExactToolApproval(
+                pending,
+                scope=ToolApprovalScope.SINGLE_ACTION,
+                allow_remaining_actions=False,
+            )
+        return ExactToolApproval(
+            pending,
+            scope=scope,
+            allow_remaining_actions=True,
+        )
 
     def peek(self, approval_id: Any) -> PendingToolApproval | None:
         now = time.time()

src/tool_capabilities.py

@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ from enum import Enum
 from types import MappingProxyType
 from typing import Any, Iterable, Mapping
 
+from src.tool_approval_scopes import CHAT_SESSION_APPROVAL_CONTEXT_MARKER
 from src.tool_security import BUILTIN_EMAIL_TOOLS
 
 
@@ -618,13 +619,30 @@ class ToolRunSecurityContext:
     external_untrusted_context_seen: bool = False
     external_sources: list[str] = field(default_factory=list)
     run_id: str = field(default_factory=lambda: uuid.uuid4().hex)
+    # Task-scope approval sets this for the resumed in-memory run. Chat-scope
+    # approval is projected from the server-owned session history marker below.
+    # The bypass affects only this automatic gate; current tool policy, ownership,
+    # workspace confinement, and execution/sandbox restrictions still apply.
+    approval_gate_bypassed: bool = False
 
     def observe_messages(self, messages: Iterable[dict]) -> None:
-        """Promote any server-labelled untrusted prompt context into the gate."""
-        if messages_contain_external_untrusted_context(messages):
+        """Apply server-owned chat scope and promote untrusted prompt context."""
+        message_list = list(messages or ())
+        if any(
+            isinstance(message, dict)
+            and isinstance(message.get("metadata"), dict)
+            and message["metadata"].get(
+                CHAT_SESSION_APPROVAL_CONTEXT_MARKER
+            ) is True
+            for message in message_list
+        ):
+            self.approval_gate_bypassed = True
+        if messages_contain_external_untrusted_context(message_list):
             self.external_untrusted_context_seen = True
 
     def decision_for(self, tool_name: Any, content: Any = None) -> ToolGateDecision:
+        if self.approval_gate_bypassed:
+            return ToolGateDecision(True)
         if not self.external_untrusted_context_seen:
             return ToolGateDecision(True)
         capabilities = capabilities_for_action(tool_name, content)

src/user_time.py

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ from __future__ import annotations
 
 import re
 from contextvars import ContextVar
-from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone, tzinfo
 from typing import Dict, Optional
 
 
@@ -65,19 +65,31 @@ def format_utc_offset(offset_min: Optional[int]) -> str:
     return f"{sign}{hours:02d}:{minutes:02d}"
 
 
-def user_timezone() -> timezone:
-    """Return the best known user timezone as a fixed-offset tzinfo."""
+def _zoneinfo_from_name():
+    """Return ZoneInfo for the request's IANA name, or None if missing/invalid."""
+    name = get_user_tz_name()
+    if not name:
+        return None
+    try:
+        from zoneinfo import ZoneInfo
+        return ZoneInfo(name)
+    except Exception:
+        return None
+
+
+def user_timezone() -> tzinfo:
+    """Return the best known user timezone.
+
+    A valid IANA name wins over x-tz-offset. The offset is a fixed number and
+    can disagree with the name (wrong sign, stale client); the name carries DST.
+    """
+    zone = _zoneinfo_from_name()
+    if zone is not None:
+        return zone
     offset = get_user_tz_offset()
-    if offset is None:
-        name = get_user_tz_name()
-        if name:
-            try:
-                from zoneinfo import ZoneInfo
-                return ZoneInfo(name)
-            except Exception:
-                pass
-        return datetime.now().astimezone().tzinfo or timezone.utc
-    return timezone(timedelta(minutes=offset))
+    if offset is not None:
+        return timezone(timedelta(minutes=offset))
+    return datetime.now().astimezone().tzinfo or timezone.utc
 
 
 def now_user_local(now_utc: Optional[datetime] = None) -> datetime:
@@ -100,14 +112,13 @@ def _clock_label(dt: datetime) -> str:
 
 def timezone_label(dt: Optional[datetime] = None) -> str:
     """Return a concise display label such as Australia/Brisbane, UTC+10:00."""
-    offset = get_user_tz_offset()
-    if offset is None:
-        if dt is None:
-            dt = datetime.now().astimezone()
-        offset = int((dt.utcoffset() or timedelta()).total_seconds() // 60)
+    if dt is None:
+        dt = now_user_local()
+    offset = int((dt.utcoffset() or timedelta()).total_seconds() // 60)
     offset_label = f"UTC{format_utc_offset(offset)}"
-    name = get_user_tz_name()
-    return f"{name}, {offset_label}" if name else offset_label
+    if _zoneinfo_from_name() is not None:
+        return f"{get_user_tz_name()}, {offset_label}"
+    return offset_label
 
 
 def current_datetime_prompt(now_utc: Optional[datetime] = None) -> str:

static/app.js

@@ -10,8 +10,8 @@ import modelsModule from './js/models.js?v=20260715startupcalm2';
 import ragModule from './js/rag.js';
 import presetsModule from './js/presets.js';
 import searchModule from './js/search.js';
-import chatModule from './js/chat.js?v=20260815toolapproval4';
-import compareModule from './js/compare/index.js?v=20260723compareicon2';
+import chatModule from './js/chat.js?v=20260819approvalcontrol1';
+import compareModule from './js/compare/index.js?v=20260819approvalcontrol1';
 import documentModule from './js/document.js?v=20260815approvalsave1';
 import searchChatModule from './js/search-chat.js';
 import { makeWindowDraggable } from './js/windowDrag.js';
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ import {
   settleSessionHydration
 } from './js/startupShell.js';
 import markdownModule from './js/markdown.js';
-import chatRenderer from './js/chatRenderer.js?v=20260815toolapproval4';
+import chatRenderer from './js/chatRenderer.js?v=20260819approvalcontrol1';
 import sessionModule from './js/sessions.js';
 import memoryModule from './js/memory.js?v=20260722memoryloading1';
 import voiceRecorderModule from './js/voiceRecorder.js';

static/index.html

@@ -2572,10 +2572,10 @@
 <script type="module" src="/static/js/tts-ai.js"></script>
 <script type="module" src="/static/js/document.js?v=20260815approvalsave1"></script>
 <script type="module" src="/static/js/gallery.js?v=20260708match1"></script>
-<script type="module" src="/static/js/chatRenderer.js?v=20260815toolapproval4"></script>
+<script type="module" src="/static/js/chatRenderer.js?v=20260819approvalcontrol1"></script>
 <script type="module" src="/static/js/codeRunner.js"></script>
-<script type="module" src="/static/js/chatStream.js?v=20260815approvalsave1"></script>
-  <script type="module" src="/static/js/chat.js?v=20260815toolapproval4"></script>
+<script type="module" src="/static/js/chatStream.js?v=20260819approvalcontrol1"></script>
+  <script type="module" src="/static/js/chat.js?v=20260819approvalcontrol1"></script>
 <script type="module" src="/static/js/cookbook.js"></script>
 <script src="/static/js/cookbookSchedule.js"></script>
 <script type="module" src="/static/js/search-chat.js"></script>

static/js/chat.js

@@ -8,8 +8,8 @@
 import Storage from './storage.js';
 import uiModule from './ui.js';
 import sessionModule from './sessions.js';
-import chatRenderer from './chatRenderer.js?v=20260815toolapproval4';
-import chatStream from './chatStream.js?v=20260815approvalsave1';
+import chatRenderer from './chatRenderer.js?v=20260819approvalcontrol1';
+import chatStream from './chatStream.js?v=20260819approvalcontrol1';
 import { addAITTSButton } from './tts-ai.js';
 import markdownModule from './markdown.js';
 import spinnerModule from './spinner.js';
@@ -62,20 +62,18 @@ import { loadPanel } from './panels.js';
   let _contextHeaderBound = false;
   let _pendingToolApproval = null;
 
-  function _submitToolApprovalWhenIdle(approvalId, label) {
+  function _submitToolApprovalWhenIdle(approvalId) {
     if (
       !_pendingToolApproval
       || _pendingToolApproval.approval_id !== approvalId
     ) return;
     if (isStreaming || _sendInFlight) {
-      setTimeout(() => _submitToolApprovalWhenIdle(approvalId, label), 120);
+      setTimeout(() => _submitToolApprovalWhenIdle(approvalId), 120);
       return;
     }
     const input = document.getElementById('message');
     if (input) {
       _pendingToolApproval.draft = input.value || '';
-      input.value = label;
-      input.dispatchEvent(new Event('input', { bubbles: true }));
     }
     const sendButton = document.querySelector('.send-btn');
     if (sendButton) sendButton.click();
@@ -84,16 +82,13 @@ import { loadPanel } from './panels.js';
   document.addEventListener('odysseus:tool-approval', (event) => {
     const detail = event && event.detail ? event.detail : {};
     const decision = String(detail.decision || '').toLowerCase();
-    if (!detail.approval_id || !['approve', 'deny'].includes(decision)) return;
+    if (!detail.approval_id || !['approve', 'approve_task', 'deny'].includes(decision)) return;
     _pendingToolApproval = {
       approval_id: String(detail.approval_id),
       decision,
       document_id: String(detail.document_id || ''),
     };
-    _submitToolApprovalWhenIdle(
-      _pendingToolApproval.approval_id,
-      detail.label || (decision === 'approve' ? 'Allow once' : 'Deny'),
-    );
+    _submitToolApprovalWhenIdle(_pendingToolApproval.approval_id);
   });
 
   function _fmtContextNumber(n) {
@@ -1309,10 +1304,10 @@ import { loadPanel } from './panels.js';
     }
 
     const el = uiModule.el;
-    const msg = el('message').value;
+    const msg = approvalForSend ? '' : el('message').value;
     // Allow empty text when a regen carries over the original message's
     // attachment ids — a photo-only message still has something to send.
-    if (!msg.trim() && !fileHandlerModule.getPendingCount() && !(_pendingRegenAttachments && _pendingRegenAttachments.length)) { _releaseSendFlag(); return; }
+    if (!msg.trim() && !approvalForSend && !fileHandlerModule.getPendingCount() && !(_pendingRegenAttachments && _pendingRegenAttachments.length)) { _releaseSendFlag(); return; }
 
     // --- Slash commands: execute directly without AI (no session needed) ---
     if (!approvalForSend && isCommand(msg.trim())) {
@@ -1590,7 +1585,7 @@ import { loadPanel } from './panels.js';
 
       const userDisplay = _displayOverride || msg;
       _displayOverride = null;
-      const skipBubble = _hideUserBubble;
+      const skipBubble = _hideUserBubble || !!approvalForSend;
       _hideUserBubble = false;
       // Auto-recovery counter: carries across a turn's auto-continues, but resets
       // when the user genuinely sends a new message (so each task gets a fresh cap).
@@ -1833,7 +1828,7 @@ import { loadPanel } from './panels.js';
       if (_inject.suffix) _finalMsgWithInject = _finalMsgWithInject + ' ' + _inject.suffix;
 
       const fd = new FormData();
-      fd.append('message', _finalMsgWithInject);
+      fd.append('message', approvalForSend ? '' : _finalMsgWithInject);
       fd.append('session', streamSessionId);
       if (approvalForSend) {
         fd.append('tool_approval_id', approvalForSend.approval_id);
@@ -2873,7 +2868,7 @@ import { loadPanel } from './panels.js';
                 if (spinner && spinner.element) spinner.destroy();
                 break;
               }
-              if (json.delta || json.type === 'agent_prep' || json.type === 'generated_image' || json.type === 'tool_start' || json.type === 'tool_output' || json.type === 'tool_progress' || json.type === 'agent_step' || json.type === 'loop_breaker_triggered' || json.type === 'intent_nudge_exhausted' || json.type === 'doc_stream_open' || json.type === 'doc_stream_delta' || json.type === 'research_progress') {
+              if (json.delta || json.type === 'agent_prep' || json.type === 'tool_approval_resolved' || json.type === 'generated_image' || json.type === 'tool_start' || json.type === 'tool_output' || json.type === 'tool_progress' || json.type === 'agent_step' || json.type === 'loop_breaker_triggered' || json.type === 'intent_nudge_exhausted' || json.type === 'doc_stream_open' || json.type === 'doc_stream_delta' || json.type === 'research_progress') {
                 clearResponseTimeout();
                 clearProcessingProbe();
                 clearFirstTokenWaitTimers();
@@ -2890,6 +2885,14 @@ import { loadPanel } from './panels.js';
                 }
                 continue;
               }
+              if (json.type === 'tool_approval_resolved') {
+                _cancelThinkingTimer();
+                _removeThinkingSpinner();
+                if (spinner && spinner.element) spinner.destroy();
+                if (!_isBg && roundHolder && roundHolder !== holder) roundHolder.remove();
+                if (!_isBg && holder) holder.remove();
+                continue;
+              }
               if (json.delta) {
                 _cancelThinkingTimer();
                 _removeThinkingSpinner();

static/js/chatRenderer.js

@@ -2327,6 +2327,42 @@ export function removeAskUserCards(root) {
   scope.querySelectorAll('.ask-user-card').forEach((node) => node.remove());
 }
 
+// While a choice card is visible, let plain 1–3 activate the corresponding
+// rendered option. Reuse the option's click path so the question keeps its
+// existing submission semantics. Tool approval cards are excluded: that card
+// exists to make consent deliberate after untrusted context influenced the
+// run, and its first option is the widest grant, so a stray digit must not
+// answer it.
+function _handleAskUserShortcut(event) {
+  if (
+    event.defaultPrevented
+    || event.repeat
+    || event.isComposing
+    || event.ctrlKey
+    || event.altKey
+    || event.metaKey
+    || event.shiftKey
+  ) return;
+  if (!/^[1-3]$/.test(event.key)) return;
+
+  const target = event.target;
+  if (target?.closest?.('input, textarea, select, [contenteditable="true"]')) return;
+
+  const focusedCard = document.activeElement?.closest?.('.ask-user-card') || null;
+  const mainCard = document.querySelector('#chat-history .ask-user-card');
+  const compareCards = document.querySelectorAll('.compare-pane .ask-user-card');
+  const card = focusedCard || mainCard || (compareCards.length === 1 ? compareCards[0] : null);
+  if (!card) return;
+  if (card.dataset.askUserKind === 'tool_approval') return;
+  const option = card.querySelectorAll('.ask-user-option')[Number(event.key) - 1];
+  if (!option || option.disabled) return;
+
+  event.preventDefault();
+  option.click();
+}
+
+document.addEventListener('keydown', _handleAskUserShortcut);
+
 /**
  * Render an ask_user payload as a durable choice card.
  *
@@ -2336,11 +2372,15 @@ export function removeAskUserCards(root) {
  */
 export function renderAskUserCard(payload, options) {
   const aq = payload || {};
+  if (aq.resolved) return null;
   const opts = Array.isArray(aq.options) ? aq.options : [];
-  const chatBox = document.getElementById('chat-history');
+  const renderOptions = options || {};
+  const chatBox = renderOptions.root || document.getElementById('chat-history');
+  const onSubmit = typeof renderOptions.onSubmit === 'function'
+    ? renderOptions.onSubmit
+    : null;
   if (!chatBox || !aq.question || opts.length < 2) return null;
 
-  const renderOptions = options || {};
   removeAskUserCards(chatBox);
 
   const card = document.createElement('div');
@@ -2349,6 +2389,7 @@ export function renderAskUserCard(payload, options) {
   card.tabIndex = -1;
   const multi = !!aq.multi;
   const isToolApproval = aq.kind === 'tool_approval' && !!aq.approval_id;
+  card.dataset.askUserKind = isToolApproval ? 'tool_approval' : 'question';
   const emojiText = (value) => svgifyEmoji(uiModule.esc(String(value)));
 
   const head = document.createElement('div');
@@ -2357,7 +2398,6 @@ export function renderAskUserCard(payload, options) {
   closeBtn.type = 'button';
   closeBtn.className = 'modal-close ask-user-close';
   closeBtn.setAttribute('aria-label', 'Dismiss question');
-  closeBtn.textContent = '×';
   closeBtn.addEventListener('click', () => {
     card.remove();
     const input = uiModule.el('message');
@@ -2400,6 +2440,17 @@ export function renderAskUserCard(payload, options) {
 
   const send = (text) => {
     if (!text) return;
+    if (onSubmit) {
+      const accepted = onSubmit({
+        kind: 'answer',
+        text,
+        label: text,
+        payload: aq,
+        card,
+      });
+      if (accepted !== false) card.remove();
+      return;
+    }
     card.remove();
     const input = uiModule.el('message');
     if (input) input.value = text;
@@ -2433,17 +2484,26 @@ export function renderAskUserCard(payload, options) {
       row.type = 'button';
       row.addEventListener('click', () => {
         if (isToolApproval) {
-          card.remove();
-          document.dispatchEvent(new CustomEvent('odysseus:tool-approval', {
-            detail: {
-              approval_id: aq.approval_id,
-              decision: String((opt && opt.value) || '').toLowerCase(),
-              label,
-              document_id: aq.action && aq.action.document_id
-                ? String(aq.action.document_id)
-                : '',
-            },
-          }));
+          const detail = {
+            approval_id: aq.approval_id,
+            decision: String((opt && opt.value) || '').toLowerCase(),
+            label,
+            document_id: aq.action && aq.action.document_id
+              ? String(aq.action.document_id)
+              : '',
+          };
+          if (onSubmit) {
+            const accepted = onSubmit({
+              kind: 'tool_approval',
+              ...detail,
+              payload: aq,
+              card,
+            });
+            if (accepted !== false) card.remove();
+          } else {
+            card.remove();
+            document.dispatchEvent(new CustomEvent('odysseus:tool-approval', { detail }));
+          }
         } else {
           send(label);
         }
@@ -2628,7 +2688,7 @@ export function addMessage(role, content, modelName, metadata) {
             box.appendChild(threadWrap);
           }
           for (const ev of roundTools) {
-            if (ev.ask_user) pendingAskUser = ev.ask_user;
+            if (ev.ask_user && !ev.ask_user.resolved) pendingAskUser = ev.ask_user;
             const ok = (ev.exit_code === 0 || ev.exit_code == null);
             let outHtml = '';
             if (ev.output && ev.output.trim()) {

static/js/chatStream.js

@@ -9,6 +9,35 @@ import markdownModule from './markdown.js';
 import sessionModule from './sessions.js';
 import documentModule from './document.js?v=20260815approvalsave1';
 
+// Tool approvals are control-plane submits for the current chat. chat.js
+// deliberately leaves the composer untouched, then programmatically clicks the
+// shared send button after it records the sealed approval id/decision. That
+// button is polymorphic: with an empty composer it can mean New chat or Record
+// voice instead of Send. Intercept only the programmatic approval click and
+// route it through the form submit path, which already reaches chat.js directly.
+document.addEventListener('odysseus:tool-approval', () => {
+  const sendButton = document.querySelector('.send-btn');
+  const chatForm = document.getElementById('chat-form');
+  if (!sendButton || !chatForm) return;
+
+  const interceptApprovalClick = (event) => {
+    // A real user click must retain the normal send/new-chat/STT behavior.
+    if (event.isTrusted) return;
+    sendButton.removeEventListener('click', interceptApprovalClick, true);
+    event.preventDefault();
+    event.stopImmediatePropagation();
+    if (chatForm.requestSubmit) chatForm.requestSubmit();
+    else chatForm.dispatchEvent(new Event('submit', { bubbles: true, cancelable: true }));
+  };
+
+  sendButton.addEventListener('click', interceptApprovalClick, true);
+  // Fail-safe cleanup if the approval continuation never reaches its deferred
+  // synthetic click (for example because the surrounding view is torn down).
+  setTimeout(() => {
+    sendButton.removeEventListener('click', interceptApprovalClick, true);
+  }, 60000);
+}, true);
+
 /**
  * Handle a ui_control SSE event — AI-driven UI manipulation.
  * Extracted from the duplicated ui_control + tool_output.ui_event handlers.

static/js/compare/index.js

@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ import { EVAL_PROMPTS, WAVE_FRAMES,
 import { fetchModels, _persistSelections, _modelDisplayNames, getExcludedModels, setExcludedModels } from './models.js';
 import { showModelSelector, disableToolToggles, restoreToolToggles, _syncToolbarIndicator } from './selector.js?v=20260723compareicon2';
 import { _checkUnprobed, _clearProbeWaves } from './probe.js';
-import { streamToPane, _renderSearchResults, _runSynthForPane, _formatMs, registerStreamActions } from './stream.js';
+import { streamToPane, _renderSearchResults, _runSynthForPane, _formatMs, registerStreamActions } from './stream.js?v=20260819approvalcontrol1';
 import {
   stopAll, stopPane, rerollPane, shufflePanePositions, resetCompare,
   _addPane, _removePane, toggleExpandPane, togglePanePreview, copyPaneResponse,
@@ -1006,11 +1006,16 @@ async function _executeCompare(message) {
     console.error('Compare error:', err);
     if (uiModule) uiModule.showError('Compare failed: ' + err.message);
   } finally {
-    state._streaming = false;
-    _setSendBtn('send');
-    // Re-enable header buttons
-    document.querySelectorAll('#compare-shuffle-btn, #compare-check-btn, #compare-add-btn').forEach(b => {
-      b.disabled = false; b.style.opacity = '0.7'; b.style.pointerEvents = '';
+    // A pane may have started its own ask_user/approval continuation while the
+    // original all-pane Promise was settling. Keep Compare busy until every
+    // pane-owned controller is gone instead of exposing a second broadcast send.
+    const compareStillStreaming = state._abortControllers.some(Boolean);
+    state._streaming = compareStillStreaming;
+    _setSendBtn(compareStillStreaming ? 'stop' : 'send');
+    document.querySelectorAll('#compare-shuffle-btn, #compare-check-btn, #compare-add-btn').forEach((button) => {
+      button.disabled = compareStillStreaming;
+      button.style.opacity = compareStillStreaming ? '0.25' : '0.7';
+      button.style.pointerEvents = compareStillStreaming ? 'none' : '';
     });
   }
 }
@@ -1514,7 +1519,7 @@ async function showShufflePoolEditor() {
 // ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
 registerCompareActions({ stopAll, resetCompare });
-registerStreamActions({ rerollPane, autoPreviewHtml: _autoPreviewHtml });
+registerStreamActions({ rerollPane, autoPreviewHtml: _autoPreviewHtml, setSendBtn: _setSendBtn });
 registerPaneActions({ setSendBtn: _setSendBtn, deactivate, streamToPane, renderSearchResults: _renderSearchResults, fetchModels });
 
 // ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

static/js/compare/stream.js

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 // compare/stream.js — SSE streaming to panes
 import state from './state.js';
 import { addFinishBadge } from './vote.js';
-import { getModelCost, safeDisplayImageSrc } from '../chatRenderer.js';
+import { getModelCost, renderAskUserCard, safeDisplayImageSrc } from '../chatRenderer.js?v=20260819approvalcontrol1';
 import markdownModule from '../markdown.js';
 import spinnerModule from '../spinner.js';
 import uiModule from '../ui.js';
@@ -24,11 +24,157 @@ function _safeHttpHref(raw) {
 // ── Lazy-registered functions from compare.js (avoids circular deps) ──
 let _rerollPane = null;
 let _autoPreviewHtml = null;
+let _setSendBtn = null;
 
 /** Register external functions that live in compare.js. */
-function registerStreamActions({ rerollPane, autoPreviewHtml }) {
+function registerStreamActions({ rerollPane, autoPreviewHtml, setSendBtn }) {
   _rerollPane = rerollPane;
   _autoPreviewHtml = autoPreviewHtml;
+  _setSendBtn = setSendBtn;
+}
+
+function _paneSessionIsCurrent(paneIdx, sessionId) {
+  return Boolean(
+    state.isActive
+    && state._paneSessionIds[paneIdx] === sessionId
+    && document.getElementById('cmp-history-' + paneIdx)
+  );
+}
+
+function _setCompareBusy(active) {
+  state._streaming = Boolean(active);
+  if (_setSendBtn) _setSendBtn(active ? 'stop' : 'send');
+  document.querySelectorAll('#compare-shuffle-btn, #compare-check-btn, #compare-add-btn').forEach((button) => {
+    button.disabled = Boolean(active);
+    button.style.opacity = active ? '0.25' : '0.7';
+    button.style.pointerEvents = active ? 'none' : '';
+  });
+}
+
+function _syncCompareBusyFromPanes() {
+  _setCompareBusy((state._abortControllers || []).some(Boolean));
+}
+
+function _appendPaneMessage(hist, role, text) {
+  const message = document.createElement('div');
+  message.className = 'msg ' + (role === 'user' ? 'msg-user' : 'msg-ai');
+  const roleEl = document.createElement('div');
+  roleEl.className = 'role';
+  roleEl.textContent = role === 'user' ? 'You' : 'AI';
+  const body = document.createElement('div');
+  body.className = 'body';
+  body.textContent = text || '';
+  message.appendChild(roleEl);
+  message.appendChild(body);
+  hist.appendChild(message);
+  return message;
+}
+
+function _createPaneContinuationMessage(hist) {
+  const message = _appendPaneMessage(hist, 'assistant', '');
+  const body = message.querySelector('.body');
+  if (spinnerModule) {
+    const spinner = spinnerModule.create('Continuing...', 'right');
+    body.appendChild(spinner.createElement());
+    spinner.start();
+    message._spinner = spinner;
+  }
+  return message;
+}
+
+function _restorePaneAskUserCard(paneIdx, sessionId, submission, originController) {
+  const hist = document.getElementById('cmp-history-' + paneIdx);
+  const restored = _renderPaneAskUserCard(
+    paneIdx,
+    sessionId,
+    submission.payload || {},
+    hist,
+    null,
+    originController,
+  );
+  if (uiModule) {
+    uiModule.showError(
+      restored
+        ? 'This pane is still streaming — choose again once it settles.'
+        : 'Compare pane is still streaming; the choice was not sent.',
+    );
+  }
+  return restored;
+}
+
+function _resumePaneChoiceWhenIdle(paneIdx, sessionId, originController, submission) {
+  if (!_paneSessionIsCurrent(paneIdx, sessionId)) return false;
+
+  const startedAt = Date.now();
+  const resume = () => {
+    if (!_paneSessionIsCurrent(paneIdx, sessionId)) return;
+    const activeController = state._abortControllers[paneIdx];
+    if (activeController === originController) {
+      if (Date.now() - startedAt < 10000) {
+        setTimeout(resume, 25);
+        return;
+      }
+      // The originating stream never released the pane. The card was already
+      // removed when the choice was accepted, so put it back rather than
+      // swallowing a decision the user made.
+      _restorePaneAskUserCard(paneIdx, sessionId, submission, originController);
+      return;
+    }
+    // A reroll/model replacement already owns this pane. Never send the stale
+    // choice into that replacement stream or session UI.
+    if (activeController) return;
+
+    const hist = document.getElementById('cmp-history-' + paneIdx);
+    if (!hist) return;
+    hist.querySelectorAll('.ask-user-card').forEach((card) => card.remove());
+
+    const isApproval = submission.kind === 'tool_approval';
+    const message = isApproval ? '' : String(submission.text || submission.label || '');
+    if (!isApproval) _appendPaneMessage(hist, 'user', message);
+    const aiMessage = _createPaneContinuationMessage(hist);
+    hist.scrollTop = hist.scrollHeight;
+
+    const resumeOptions = { skipBadge: true };
+    if (isApproval) {
+      resumeOptions.toolApproval = {
+        approval_id: String(submission.approval_id || ''),
+        decision: String(submission.decision || '').toLowerCase(),
+      };
+    }
+
+    _setCompareBusy(true);
+    streamToPane(paneIdx, sessionId, message, aiMessage, resumeOptions)
+      .catch((error) => {
+        console.error('Compare pane continuation failed:', error);
+        if (uiModule) uiModule.showError('Compare continuation failed: ' + error.message);
+      })
+      .finally(_syncCompareBusyFromPanes);
+  };
+
+  setTimeout(resume, 0);
+  return true;
+}
+
+function _renderPaneAskUserCard(paneIdx, sessionId, payload, hist, aiMsgEl, originController) {
+  if (!hist || !hist.isConnected || !_paneSessionIsCurrent(paneIdx, sessionId)) return null;
+  if (aiMsgEl && aiMsgEl._spinner) {
+    if (aiMsgEl._spinner.element) aiMsgEl._spinner.destroy();
+    aiMsgEl._spinner = null;
+  }
+  const card = renderAskUserCard(payload, {
+    root: hist,
+    onSubmit: (submission) => _resumePaneChoiceWhenIdle(
+      paneIdx,
+      sessionId,
+      originController,
+      submission,
+    ),
+  });
+  if (card) {
+    card.dataset.comparePane = String(paneIdx);
+    card.dataset.compareSession = String(sessionId);
+  }
+  return card;
 }
 
 /** Format milliseconds as human-readable duration (e.g. "120ms", "1.23s", "4.5s"). */
@@ -164,6 +310,7 @@ async function streamToPane(paneIdx, sessionId, message, aiMsgEl, opts) {
   let metrics = null;
   let timedOut = false;
   let streamOk = false;
+  let awaitingChoice = false;
   let currentToolBlock = null;  // track active agent tool block
   // Idle timeout — abort only if no data is received for this many seconds.
   // Long generations (SVG, big code) are fine as long as the stream stays
@@ -219,6 +366,10 @@ async function streamToPane(paneIdx, sessionId, message, aiMsgEl, opts) {
     const fd = new FormData();
     fd.append('message', message);
     fd.append('session', sessionId);
+    if (opts.toolApproval) {
+      fd.append('tool_approval_id', opts.toolApproval.approval_id || '');
+      fd.append('tool_approval_decision', opts.toolApproval.decision || '');
+    }
 
     // Compare mode determines what tools/features are enabled
     const isAgent = state._compareMode === 'agent';
@@ -322,6 +473,36 @@ async function streamToPane(paneIdx, sessionId, message, aiMsgEl, opts) {
               }
             }
 
+          // ── Pane-local question / approval selector ──
+          } else if (json.type === 'ask_user') {
+            awaitingChoice = true;
+            _renderPaneAskUserCard(
+              paneIdx,
+              sessionId,
+              json.data || {},
+              hist,
+              aiMsgEl,
+              ac,
+            );
+            if (hist) hist.scrollTop = hist.scrollHeight;
+
+          // Deny ends as a tiny resolution-only stream, so replace the
+          // continuation spinner with an explicit pane-local result.
+          } else if (json.type === 'tool_approval_resolved') {
+            if (aiMsgEl._spinner) {
+              if (aiMsgEl._spinner.element) aiMsgEl._spinner.destroy();
+              aiMsgEl._spinner = null;
+            }
+            accumulated = json.decision === 'deny' ? 'Denied.' : 'Approval recorded.';
+            let target = aiMsgEl._textEl;
+            if (!target) {
+              target = document.createElement('div');
+              target.className = 'compare-text-content';
+              aiBody.appendChild(target);
+              aiMsgEl._textEl = target;
+            }
+            target.textContent = accumulated;
+
           // ── Tool start (bash, web search agent tool) ──
           } else if (json.type === 'tool_start') {
             // Finalize any accumulated text before the tool block
@@ -640,19 +821,21 @@ async function streamToPane(paneIdx, sessionId, message, aiMsgEl, opts) {
       // TTFT removed from the header per user request — just show total time.
       _timerEl.textContent = _formatMs(_totalMs);
     }
-    state._abortControllers[paneIdx] = null;
+    if (state._abortControllers[paneIdx] === ac) {
+      state._abortControllers[paneIdx] = null;
+    }
     // Hide stop button, show response action buttons
     const _paneElFinal = document.querySelector(`.compare-pane[data-pane="${paneIdx}"]`);
     if (_paneElFinal) {
       const _stopBtnFinal = _paneElFinal.querySelector('.pane-stop-btn');
       if (_stopBtnFinal) _stopBtnFinal.style.display = 'none';
-      if (accumulated.trim()) {
+      if (!awaitingChoice && accumulated.trim()) {
         _paneElFinal.querySelectorAll('.pane-needs-response').forEach(b => b.style.display = '');
       }
     }
     state._paneMetrics[paneIdx] = metrics;
     state._paneElapsed[paneIdx] = _totalMs;
-    if (!opts.skipBadge) {
+    if (!opts.skipBadge && !awaitingChoice) {
       if (streamOk) {
         state._finishOrder++;
         if (state._parallel) {
@@ -682,7 +865,7 @@ async function streamToPane(paneIdx, sessionId, message, aiMsgEl, opts) {
       }
     }
     // Auto-grade against expected answer — stamps ✓ or ✗ on the pane header.
-    if (streamOk && state._expectedAnswer) {
+    if (streamOk && !awaitingChoice && state._expectedAnswer) {
       _stampGradeBadge(paneIdx, accumulated, state._expectedAnswer);
     }
     // Show copy/reroll buttons now that response exists

tests/test_approved_replay_message_shape.py

@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+"""Regression coverage for the assistant turn an approved-action replay appends.
+
+Anthropic's Messages API rejects a non-final assistant message whose content is
+empty, so the resumed turn after a tool approval used to fail before the model
+ever saw the sealed result. The replay injects its result with no assistant
+prose for that round, which is the only path that produced such a turn.
+"""
+
+import src.llm_core as llm_core
+from src.agent_loop import _append_tool_results
+
+_RESULT = "bash: ok\nhello"
+_RECORD = {
+    "tool_name": "bash",
+    "content": "printf hello",
+    "result": {"output": "hello", "exit_code": 0},
+    "text": _RESULT,
+}
+
+
+def _replay_messages(round_response="", round_reasoning=""):
+    """Mirror the approved-action injection in stream_agent_loop."""
+    messages = [
+        {"role": "system", "content": "system preface"},
+        {"role": "user", "content": "run the command and summarise it"},
+    ]
+    _append_tool_results(
+        messages,
+        round_response,
+        [],
+        [_RESULT],
+        [_RESULT],
+        False,
+        0,
+        round_reasoning=round_reasoning,
+        tool_result_records=[_RECORD],
+    )
+    return messages
+
+
+def _empty_assistant_turns(messages):
+    return [
+        index
+        for index, message in enumerate(messages)
+        if message.get("role") == "assistant"
+        and not str(message.get("content") or "").strip()
+        and not message.get("tool_calls")
+    ]
+
+
+def test_replay_appends_no_empty_assistant_turn():
+    assert _empty_assistant_turns(_replay_messages()) == []
+
+
+def test_replay_payload_is_a_single_non_empty_user_turn_for_anthropic():
+    # Asserting the whole sequence rather than scanning a slice: once the empty
+    # spacer is gone the payload is one message, so a "no offenders in
+    # chat[:-1]" check would pass without inspecting anything.
+    sanitized = llm_core._sanitize_llm_messages(_replay_messages())
+    payload = llm_core._build_anthropic_payload(
+        "claude-sonnet-5", sanitized, 0.2, 512
+    )
+    chat = payload["messages"]
+    assert [message["role"] for message in chat] == ["user"]
+    assert all(str(message.get("content") or "").strip() for message in chat)
+
+
+def test_replay_merges_tool_output_after_the_request_with_its_fence_intact():
+    # Dropping the empty assistant turn leaves two adjacent user messages, which
+    # the sanitizer merges. Pin that shape: the tool output must still sit
+    # behind its untrusted fence and must not precede the operator's request.
+    sanitized = llm_core._sanitize_llm_messages(_replay_messages())
+    user_turns = [m for m in sanitized if m.get("role") == "user"]
+    assert len(user_turns) == 1
+    merged = user_turns[0]["content"]
+    assert merged.index("run the command") < merged.index("UNTRUSTED SOURCE DATA")
+    assert merged.index("UNTRUSTED SOURCE DATA") < merged.index("hello")
+
+
+def test_a_round_with_prose_still_appends_its_assistant_turn():
+    messages = _replay_messages(round_response="running that now")
+    assistants = [m for m in messages if m.get("role") == "assistant"]
+    assert [m["content"] for m in assistants] == ["running that now"]
+
+
+def test_reasoning_only_round_keeps_its_carrier_and_its_known_empty_content():
+    """Characterises the one empty-content turn this change deliberately leaves.
+
+    A round with reasoning and no prose still appends its carrier, and that
+    carrier's content is still "", which Anthropic would still reject. Dropping
+    it would lose the reasoning DeepSeek thinking mode requires on the next
+    request, and the approval replay never takes this path because it passes no
+    reasoning. Left alone on purpose; this test makes the gap visible instead of
+    silent, and should be updated by whoever closes it.
+    """
+    messages = _replay_messages(round_reasoning="thinking about it")
+    assistants = [m for m in messages if m.get("role") == "assistant"]
+    assert len(assistants) == 1
+    assert assistants[0].get("reasoning_content") == "thinking about it"
+    assert assistants[0]["content"] == ""

tests/test_atomic_io.py

@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ def test_atomic_write_json_concurrent_writers_do_not_collide(tmp_path):
 
 
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# atomic_write_json — failure path: target preserved on serialization error.
+# atomic_write_json — failure paths
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 def test_atomic_write_json_preserves_target_when_serialization_fails(tmp_path):
     target = tmp_path / "data.json"
@@ -136,6 +136,26 @@ def test_atomic_write_json_preserves_target_when_serialization_fails(tmp_path):
         atomic_write_json(str(target), {"bad": {1, 2, 3}})
 
     assert target.read_text(encoding="utf-8") == before
+    # Temp file should be cleaned up
+    assert _tmp_siblings(tmp_path, "data.json") == []
+
+
+def test_atomic_write_json_preserves_target_when_replace_fails(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    target = tmp_path / "data.json"
+    atomic_write_json(str(target), {"existing": "value"})
+    before = target.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+
+    def boom(src, dst):
+        raise PermissionError("replace failed")
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(atomic_io.os, "replace", boom)
+
+    with pytest.raises(PermissionError, match="replace failed"):
+        atomic_write_json(str(target), {"new": "content"})
+
+    assert target.read_text(encoding="utf-8") == before
+    # Temp file should be cleaned up
+    assert _tmp_siblings(tmp_path, "data.json") == []
 
 
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -187,7 +207,7 @@ def test_atomic_write_text_rejects_non_string_before_tmp_file(tmp_path):
 
 
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# atomic_write_text — failure path: target preserved when replace fails.
+# atomic_write_text — failure paths
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 def test_atomic_write_text_preserves_target_when_replace_fails(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
     target = tmp_path / "note.txt"
@@ -195,11 +215,32 @@ def test_atomic_write_text_preserves_target_when_replace_fails(tmp_path, monkeyp
     before = target.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
 
     def boom(src, dst):
-        raise OSError("replace failed")
+        raise PermissionError("replace failed")
 
     monkeypatch.setattr(atomic_io.os, "replace", boom)
 
-    with pytest.raises(OSError):
+    with pytest.raises(PermissionError, match="replace failed"):
         atomic_write_text(str(target), "new content that never lands")
 
     assert target.read_text(encoding="utf-8") == before
+    # Temp file should be cleaned up
+    assert _tmp_siblings(tmp_path, "note.txt") == []
+
+
+def test_cleanup_error_swallows_and_preserves_original_exception(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    target = tmp_path / "note.txt"
+    atomic_write_text(str(target), "original content")
+
+    def replace_boom(src, dst):
+        raise PermissionError("replace failed")
+
+    def unlink_boom(path):
+        raise OSError("unlink failed")
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(atomic_io.os, "replace", replace_boom)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(atomic_io.os, "unlink", unlink_boom)
+
+    # If BOTH the replace fails AND the cleanup unlink fails,
+    # the original replace error should surface, completely swallowing the unlink error.
+    with pytest.raises(PermissionError, match="replace failed"):
+        atomic_write_text(str(target), "new content")

tests/test_compare_ask_user_routing.py

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+from pathlib import Path
+
+
+def test_compare_renders_ask_user_in_the_originating_pane():
+    root = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
+    stream = (root / "static/js/compare/stream.js").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+
+    assert "renderAskUserCard" in stream
+    assert "} else if (json.type === 'ask_user') {" in stream
+    assert "root: hist" in stream
+    assert "state._paneSessionIds[paneIdx] === sessionId" in stream
+    assert "streamToPane(paneIdx, sessionId, message, aiMessage, resumeOptions)" in stream
+    assert "handleCompareSubmit" not in stream
+
+
+def test_compare_submits_approval_only_to_the_pane_session():
+    root = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
+    stream = (root / "static/js/compare/stream.js").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+
+    assert "fd.append('tool_approval_id', opts.toolApproval.approval_id || '');" in stream
+    assert "fd.append('tool_approval_decision', opts.toolApproval.decision || '');" in stream
+    assert "const isApproval = submission.kind === 'tool_approval';" in stream
+    assert "const message = isApproval ? ''" in stream
+    assert "if (!isApproval) _appendPaneMessage(hist, 'user', message);" in stream
+    assert "json.type === 'tool_approval_resolved'" in stream
+    assert "json.decision === 'deny' ? 'Denied.'" in stream
+
+
+def test_compare_continuation_does_not_lose_or_replace_pane_ownership():
+    root = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
+    stream = (root / "static/js/compare/stream.js").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    index = (root / "static/js/compare/index.js").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+
+    assert "if (state._abortControllers[paneIdx] === ac)" in stream
+    assert "if (activeController === originController)" in stream
+    assert "if (activeController) return;" in stream
+    assert "registerStreamActions({ rerollPane, autoPreviewHtml: _autoPreviewHtml, setSendBtn: _setSendBtn });" in index
+    assert "const compareStillStreaming = state._abortControllers.some(Boolean);" in index
+    assert "_setSendBtn(compareStillStreaming ? 'stop' : 'send');" in index
+
+
+def test_compare_restores_the_card_instead_of_dropping_a_timed_out_choice():
+    """The card is removed the moment a choice is accepted.
+
+    If the originating stream still owns the pane when the resume deadline
+    passes, the decision has nowhere to go — so the card has to come back
+    rather than the click vanishing silently.
+    """
+
+    root = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
+    stream = (root / "static/js/compare/stream.js").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+
+    assert "function _restorePaneAskUserCard(" in stream
+    assert "_restorePaneAskUserCard(paneIdx, sessionId, submission, originController);" in stream
+    assert "submission.payload || {}" in stream
+
+    start = stream.index("function _resumePaneChoiceWhenIdle(")
+    end = stream.index("function _renderPaneAskUserCard(", start)
+    resume = stream[start:end]
+    # The deadline must not fall through to a bare return any more.
+    assert "if (Date.now() - startedAt < 10000) setTimeout(resume, 25);" not in resume

tests/test_foreground_model_routing.py

@@ -344,7 +344,7 @@ async def test_chat_stream_approval_restores_exact_shell_turn_toggle(monkeypatch
 
 
 @pytest.mark.asyncio
-async def test_chat_stream_denial_keeps_originating_run_tainted(monkeypatch):
+async def test_chat_stream_denial_returns_control_resolution(monkeypatch):
     from src.tool_capabilities import capabilities_for_action
 
     captured = {}
@@ -368,11 +368,13 @@ async def test_chat_stream_denial_keeps_originating_run_tainted(monkeypatch):
     )
 
     response = await endpoint(request)
-    async for _ in response.body_iterator:
-        pass
+    chunks = [chunk async for chunk in response.body_iterator]
 
+    event = json.loads(chunks[0][len("data: "):])
+    assert event == {"type": "tool_approval_resolved", "decision": "deny"}
+    assert chunks[-1] == "data: [DONE]\n\n"
+    assert "agent" not in captured
     assert "exact_approval" not in captured
-    assert captured["agent_external_untrusted_context_seen"] is True
     assert chat_routes.tool_approval_store.peek(pending.approval_id) is None
 
 

tests/test_mlx_image_server_security.py

@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
+"""Pin the mlx_image_server caller-chosen-model + DNS-rebinding regressions.
+
+Background: scripts/mlx_image_server.py used to resolve the model per request
+(``req.model or _args.model``) instead of serving the model the process was
+launched with. ``_is_hidream`` is a substring test and ``_snapshot_path``
+accepts either a local directory or a Hugging Face repo id, so a caller could
+name any directory / repo and the HiDream branch would then run
+``<model>/scripts/hidream_o1/generate_hidream_o1_mlx.py`` under
+``sys.executable``. The server has no auth, and the cookbook binds it to
+``0.0.0.0`` whenever it is serving to a remote host, so that was reachable
+code execution.
+
+The fix pins both request paths to ``_args.model``, matching
+scripts/diffusion_server.py.
+"""
+
+import argparse
+import importlib.util
+import sys
+import types
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import pytest
+
+_SCRIPT = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent / "scripts" / "mlx_image_server.py"
+
+_BASE_URL = "http://127.0.0.1"
+
+
+def _load_module():
+    """Fresh import of the server module. Unlike diffusion_server it pulls in no
+    heavy runtime (mlx / torch imports all live inside the request handlers), so
+    the real module is imported rather than AST-extracted."""
+    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("mlx_image_server_under_test", _SCRIPT)
+    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
+    spec.loader.exec_module(module)
+    return module
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def server(monkeypatch):
+    """Server module launched with a pinned, non-HiDream model."""
+    module = _load_module()
+    module._args = argparse.Namespace(
+        model="mlx-community/pinned-model",
+        host="127.0.0.1",
+        port=8100,
+        steps=0,
+        width=512,
+        height=512,
+        base_model="",
+        lora_style="",
+        lora_paths=[],
+        lora_scales=[],
+        vlm_model="",
+    )
+    return module
+
+
+def _client(module):
+    from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
+
+    return TestClient(module.app, base_url=_BASE_URL)
+
+
+def _plant_hidream_model_dir(tmp_path: Path) -> tuple[Path, Path]:
+    """A directory that satisfies _is_hidream() and carries the script the
+    HiDream branch executes. The script writes a marker so the test can tell
+    whether it ran."""
+    model_dir = tmp_path / "hidream-planted"
+    generator = model_dir / "scripts" / "hidream_o1"
+    generator.mkdir(parents=True)
+    marker = model_dir / "executed.txt"
+    (generator / "generate_hidream_o1_mlx.py").write_text(
+        f"open({str(marker)!r}, 'w').write('ran')\n", encoding="utf-8"
+    )
+    return model_dir, marker
+
+
+def test_generate_does_not_run_code_from_a_caller_named_model_dir(server, tmp_path):
+    """The regression: naming a local directory as the model must not execute
+    the generator script inside it."""
+    model_dir, marker = _plant_hidream_model_dir(tmp_path)
+
+    _client(server).post(
+        "/v1/images/generations",
+        json={"model": str(model_dir), "prompt": "x", "size": "64x64"},
+    )
+
+    assert not marker.exists(), (
+        "code inside the caller-named model directory ran; the request model "
+        "must not select the generator"
+    )
+
+
+def test_generate_does_not_fetch_a_caller_named_repo(server, monkeypatch):
+    """The remote half of the same defect: the caller's string must never reach
+    the Hugging Face downloader."""
+    downloaded = []
+    stub = types.ModuleType("huggingface_hub")
+    stub.snapshot_download = lambda repo: downloaded.append(repo)
+    monkeypatch.setitem(sys.modules, "huggingface_hub", stub)
+
+    _client(server).post(
+        "/v1/images/generations",
+        json={"model": "attacker-account/hidream-anything", "prompt": "x"},
+    )
+
+    assert "attacker-account/hidream-anything" not in downloaded
+
+
+def test_edits_does_not_run_code_from_a_caller_named_model_dir(server, tmp_path):
+    """/v1/images/edits resolved the model the same way and must be pinned too.
+    A "lama" name reaches the inpaint bridge, so the caller's model string is
+    what picks the branch here."""
+    model_dir = tmp_path / "lama-planted"
+    model_dir.mkdir()
+    called = []
+    server._run_inpaint_bridge = lambda *a, **kw: called.append(a)
+    server._run_ddcolor_bridge = lambda *a, **kw: called.append(a)
+
+    resp = _client(server).post(
+        "/v1/images/edits",
+        data={"model": str(model_dir), "prompt": "x"},
+        files={"image": ("i.png", b"not-a-real-png", "image/png")},
+    )
+
+    assert not called, "caller-supplied model selected the edit branch"
+    assert resp.status_code == 422, "pinned non-edit model should be refused"
+
+
+def test_pinned_hidream_model_is_still_served(server, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    """Behaviour preservation: pinning must not break a server that was actually
+    launched with a HiDream model."""
+    model_dir, marker = _plant_hidream_model_dir(tmp_path)
+    server._args.model = str(model_dir)
+
+    _client(server).post("/v1/images/generations", json={"model": "", "prompt": "x"})
+
+    assert marker.exists(), "the model this server was launched with must still run"

tests/test_tool_approval_frontend_routing.py

@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+from pathlib import Path
+
+
+def test_tool_approval_bypasses_polymorphic_send_button_actions():
+    root = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
+    chat = (root / "static/js/chat.js").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    stream = (root / "static/js/chatStream.js").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+
+    # chat.js still defers the sealed approval through a synthetic button click.
+    assert "if (sendButton) sendButton.click();" in chat
+
+    # The capture listener must intercept only that synthetic click and route it
+    # through the chat form submit path, before app.js can reinterpret an empty
+    # composer as New chat or Record voice.
+    assert "if (event.isTrusted) return;" in stream
+    assert "event.stopImmediatePropagation();" in stream
+    assert "chatForm.requestSubmit()" in stream
+    assert "sendButton.dataset.mode = ''" not in stream
+
+
+def test_ask_user_close_button_uses_one_css_glyph():
+    root = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
+    renderer = (root / "static/js/chatRenderer.js").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    styles = (root / "static/style.css").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+
+    assert "closeBtn.className = 'modal-close ask-user-close';" in renderer
+    assert "closeBtn.setAttribute('aria-label', 'Dismiss question');" in renderer
+    assert "closeBtn.textContent = '×';" not in renderer
+    assert ".modal-close::before" in styles
+
+
+def test_ask_user_number_shortcuts_reuse_option_click_path():
+    root = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
+    renderer = (root / "static/js/chatRenderer.js").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    start = renderer.index("function _handleAskUserShortcut(event)")
+    end = renderer.index("document.addEventListener('keydown', _handleAskUserShortcut);", start)
+    shortcut = renderer[start:end]
+
+    assert "if (!/^[1-3]$/.test(event.key)) return;" in shortcut
+    assert "event.repeat" in shortcut
+    assert "event.ctrlKey" in shortcut
+    assert "event.altKey" in shortcut
+    assert "event.metaKey" in shortcut
+    assert "event.shiftKey" in shortcut
+    assert "input, textarea, select, [contenteditable=\"true\"]" in shortcut
+    assert "card.querySelectorAll('.ask-user-option')[Number(event.key) - 1]" in shortcut
+    assert "event.preventDefault();" in shortcut
+    assert "option.click();" in shortcut
+
+
+def test_digit_shortcuts_never_answer_a_tool_approval_card():
+    """A stray digit must not grant a scope the user did not deliberately pick."""
+
+    root = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
+    renderer = (root / "static/js/chatRenderer.js").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    start = renderer.index("function _handleAskUserShortcut(event)")
+    end = renderer.index("document.addEventListener('keydown', _handleAskUserShortcut);", start)
+    shortcut = renderer[start:end]
+
+    assert "if (card.dataset.askUserKind === 'tool_approval') return;" in shortcut
+    # The renderer has to label the card for that guard to ever fire.
+    assert (
+        "card.dataset.askUserKind = isToolApproval ? 'tool_approval' : 'question';"
+        in renderer
+    )
+
+
+def test_ask_user_renderer_accepts_scoped_root_and_submit_callback():
+    root = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
+    renderer = (root / "static/js/chatRenderer.js").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+
+    assert "const chatBox = renderOptions.root || document.getElementById('chat-history');" in renderer
+    assert "const onSubmit = typeof renderOptions.onSubmit === 'function'" in renderer
+    assert "kind: 'answer'" in renderer
+    assert "kind: 'tool_approval'" in renderer
+    assert "if (accepted !== false) card.remove();" in renderer
+    assert "document.dispatchEvent(new CustomEvent('odysseus:tool-approval', { detail }))" in renderer
+
+
+def test_every_changed_approval_module_is_cache_busted_together():
+    """A stale module here silently reinterprets the approval click.
+
+    chat.js leaves the composer empty and clicks the polymorphic send button,
+    so a browser that pairs the new chat.js with a cached chatStream.js has no
+    interceptor and lands on the New chat branch instead. The same holds for
+    the compare pane modules, which chatRenderer now shares a keydown listener
+    with.
+    """
+
+    root = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
+    version = "20260819approvalcontrol1"
+    index = (root / "static/index.html").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    app = (root / "static/app.js").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    chat = (root / "static/js/chat.js").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    compare_index = (root / "static/js/compare/index.js").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    compare_stream = (root / "static/js/compare/stream.js").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+
+    assert f"chatStream.js?v={version}" in index
+    assert f"chatStream.js?v={version}" in chat
+    assert f"compare/index.js?v={version}" in app
+    assert f"stream.js?v={version}" in compare_index
+    # One chatRenderer instance, so the ask_user keydown listener binds once.
+    assert f"chatRenderer.js?v={version}" in compare_stream

tests/test_tool_approval_single_action_scope.py

@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+"""Callers with no resumable chat keep the original one-use approval scope.
+
+The chat card reuses the wire value ``approve`` for chat-session scope, so any
+caller that still sends ``approve`` meaning "once" has to say so explicitly or
+it silently inherits a run-long gate bypass.
+"""
+
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from src.tool_approval_scopes import ToolApprovalScope
+from src.tool_approvals import ToolApprovalStore
+from src.tool_capabilities import ToolRunSecurityContext, capabilities_for_action
+
+
+def _pending(store: ToolApprovalStore, *, session_id=""):
+    content = "printf exact"
+    return store.create(
+        owner="Alice",
+        session_id=session_id,
+        origin_run_id="run-1",
+        tool_name="bash",
+        content=content,
+        workspace=None,
+        external_untrusted_context_seen=True,
+        capabilities=capabilities_for_action("bash", content),
+    )
+
+
+def test_single_action_grant_leaves_the_gate_armed_behind_the_sealed_action():
+    store = ToolApprovalStore()
+    pending = _pending(store)
+
+    grant = store.consume(
+        pending.approval_id,
+        decision="approve",
+        owner="alice",
+        session_id=None,
+        allow_continuation=False,
+    )
+
+    assert grant is not None
+    assert grant.scope is ToolApprovalScope.SINGLE_ACTION
+    assert grant.allow_remaining_actions is False
+    assert grant.grants_chat_session is False
+
+    resumed = ToolRunSecurityContext(
+        external_untrusted_context_seen=True,
+        approval_gate_bypassed=grant.allow_remaining_actions,
+    )
+    assert resumed.decision_for("bash").allowed is False
+
+
+def test_chat_callers_still_get_the_continuation_scope_they_asked_for():
+    store = ToolApprovalStore()
+    pending = _pending(store, session_id="session-1")
+
+    grant = store.consume(
+        pending.approval_id,
+        decision="approve_task",
+        owner="alice",
+        session_id="session-1",
+    )
+
+    assert grant is not None
+    assert grant.scope is ToolApprovalScope.TASK
+    assert grant.allow_remaining_actions is True
+
+
+def test_deny_is_unaffected_by_the_single_action_flag():
+    store = ToolApprovalStore()
+    pending = _pending(store)
+
+    assert store.consume(
+        pending.approval_id,
+        decision="deny",
+        owner="alice",
+        session_id=None,
+        allow_continuation=False,
+    ) is None
+    assert store.peek(pending.approval_id) is None
+
+
+def test_skill_test_approval_route_opts_out_of_continuation():
+    root = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
+    skills = (root / "routes/skills_routes.py").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+
+    approve_call = skills.index("exact_approval = tool_approval_store.consume(")
+    end = skills.index(")", skills.index("allow_continuation", approve_call))
+    assert "allow_continuation=False" in skills[approve_call:end]

tests/test_tool_approval_task_scope.py

@@ -0,0 +1,351 @@
+"""Task- and chat-scoped approval continuation coverage for issue #6112."""
+
+import asyncio
+import json
+from dataclasses import replace
+from pathlib import Path
+from types import SimpleNamespace
+
+from core.models import ChatMessage, Session
+from src.tool_approval_scopes import (
+    CHAT_SESSION_APPROVAL_CONTEXT_MARKER,
+    ToolApprovalScope,
+)
+from src.tool_approvals import ExactToolApproval, ToolApprovalStore
+from src.tool_capabilities import ToolRunSecurityContext, capabilities_for_action
+
+
+def _pending(
+    store: ToolApprovalStore,
+    *,
+    selected_tools=None,
+    continuation_query="inspect the project using memory and skills",
+):
+    content = "printf exact"
+    return store.create(
+        owner="Alice",
+        session_id="session-1",
+        origin_run_id="run-1",
+        tool_name="bash",
+        content=content,
+        workspace=None,
+        external_untrusted_context_seen=True,
+        selected_tools=selected_tools,
+        continuation_query=continuation_query,
+        capabilities=capabilities_for_action("bash", content),
+    )
+
+
+def test_card_offers_task_chat_session_and_deny_without_leaking_private_state():
+    pending = _pending(
+        ToolApprovalStore(),
+        selected_tools=["manage_skills", "bash", "manage_skills"],
+    )
+
+    payload = pending.public_payload()
+
+    assert payload["session_id"] == "session-1"
+    assert [option["value"] for option in payload["options"]] == [
+        "approve_task",
+        "approve",
+        "deny",
+    ]
+    assert [option["label"] for option in payload["options"]] == [
+        "Allow for this task",
+        "Allow for this chat session",
+        "Deny",
+    ]
+    serialized = json.dumps(payload, sort_keys=True)
+    assert "Allow once" not in serialized
+    assert "selected_tools" not in serialized
+    assert "continuation_query" not in serialized
+    assert "manage_skills" not in serialized
+    assert "inspect the project" not in serialized
+
+
+def test_allow_for_task_bypasses_only_the_resumed_run_gate():
+    store = ToolApprovalStore()
+    pending = _pending(store, selected_tools=["bash", "manage_skills"])
+    grant = store.consume(
+        pending.approval_id,
+        decision="approve_task",
+        owner="alice",
+        session_id="session-1",
+    )
+
+    assert grant is not None
+    assert grant.scope is ToolApprovalScope.TASK
+    assert grant.allow_remaining_actions is True
+    assert grant.grants_chat_session is False
+    assert grant.pending.continuation_query == (
+        "inspect the project using memory and skills"
+    )
+
+    resumed = ToolRunSecurityContext(
+        external_untrusted_context_seen=True,
+        approval_gate_bypassed=grant.allow_remaining_actions,
+    )
+    assert resumed.decision_for("bash").allowed is True
+
+    # A new ordinary user turn constructs a fresh context and asks again.
+    fresh = ToolRunSecurityContext(external_untrusted_context_seen=True)
+    assert fresh.decision_for("bash").allowed is False
+
+
+def test_allow_for_chat_session_applies_to_later_turns_in_only_that_chat():
+    store = ToolApprovalStore()
+    pending = _pending(store, selected_tools=["bash", "manage_skills"])
+    grant = store.consume(
+        pending.approval_id,
+        decision="approve",
+        owner="alice",
+        session_id="session-1",
+    )
+
+    assert grant is not None
+    assert grant.scope is ToolApprovalScope.CHAT_SESSION
+    assert grant.allow_remaining_actions is True
+    assert grant.grants_chat_session is True
+    assert grant.pending.selected_tools == ("bash", "manage_skills")
+    assert grant.pending.continuation_query.startswith("inspect the project")
+
+    resolved_card = pending.public_payload()
+    resolved_card["resolved"] = "approve"
+    history = [
+        ChatMessage(
+            "assistant",
+            "approval requested",
+            {"tool_events": [{"ask_user": resolved_card}]},
+        ),
+        ChatMessage("user", "continue the work"),
+    ]
+    session = Session(
+        id="session-1",
+        name="Chat",
+        endpoint_url="http://example.invalid",
+        model="test",
+        history=history,
+    )
+
+    messages = session.get_context_messages()
+    assert messages[-1]["metadata"][CHAT_SESSION_APPROVAL_CONTEXT_MARKER] is True
+    assert history[-1].metadata is None
+
+    future_turn = ToolRunSecurityContext(external_untrusted_context_seen=True)
+    future_turn.observe_messages(messages)
+    assert future_turn.approval_gate_bypassed is True
+    assert future_turn.decision_for("bash").allowed is True
+
+    # The persisted card is bound to its original chat id, so a fork/copy does
+    # not inherit the grant merely by copying transcript metadata.
+    other_session = Session(
+        id="session-2",
+        name="Fork",
+        endpoint_url="http://example.invalid",
+        model="test",
+        history=history,
+    )
+    other_messages = other_session.get_context_messages()
+    assert CHAT_SESSION_APPROVAL_CONTEXT_MARKER not in (
+        other_messages[-1].get("metadata") or {}
+    )
+    other_turn = ToolRunSecurityContext(external_untrusted_context_seen=True)
+    other_turn.observe_messages(other_messages)
+    assert other_turn.decision_for("bash").allowed is False
+
+
+def test_deny_executes_nothing_and_grants_no_task_or_chat_scope():
+    store = ToolApprovalStore()
+    pending = _pending(store)
+
+    assert store.consume(
+        pending.approval_id,
+        decision="deny",
+        owner="alice",
+        session_id="session-1",
+    ) is None
+    assert store.peek(pending.approval_id) is None
+
+    denied_card = pending.public_payload()
+    denied_card["resolved"] = "deny"
+    session = Session(
+        id="session-1",
+        name="Chat",
+        endpoint_url="http://example.invalid",
+        model="test",
+        history=[
+            ChatMessage(
+                "assistant",
+                "approval requested",
+                {"tool_events": [{"ask_user": denied_card}]},
+            ),
+            ChatMessage("user", "another request"),
+        ],
+    )
+    messages = session.get_context_messages()
+    assert CHAT_SESSION_APPROVAL_CONTEXT_MARKER not in (
+        messages[-1].get("metadata") or {}
+    )
+
+
+def test_private_continuation_state_is_canonical_bounded_and_digest_bound():
+    selected_tools = ["manage_skills", "bash", "manage_skills", "", 7]
+    selected_tools.extend(f"tool_{index:04d}" for index in range(600))
+    selected_tools.append("x" * 513)
+    pending = _pending(
+        ToolApprovalStore(),
+        selected_tools=selected_tools,
+        continuation_query="  " + ("original request " * 500),
+    )
+    assert pending.selected_tools[:2] == ("bash", "manage_skills")
+    assert len(pending.selected_tools) == 512
+    assert all(len(name) <= 512 for name in pending.selected_tools)
+    assert "x" * 513 not in pending.selected_tools
+    assert pending.continuation_query.startswith("original request")
+    assert len(pending.continuation_query) == 4000
+
+    tampered = replace(
+        pending,
+        selected_tools=("bash", "manage_skills", "send_email"),
+        continuation_query="different request",
+    )
+    grant = ExactToolApproval(tampered)
+    assert grant.matches(
+        owner="alice",
+        session_id="session-1",
+        tool_name="bash",
+        content="printf exact",
+        workspace=None,
+    ) is False
+
+
+def test_consumed_card_resolution_updates_memory_and_persisted_metadata(monkeypatch):
+    from routes import chat_routes
+
+    ask_user = {
+        "kind": "tool_approval",
+        "approval_id": "approval-1",
+        "session_id": "session-1",
+    }
+    metadata = {
+        "_db_id": "message-1",
+        "tool_events": [{"ask_user": ask_user}],
+    }
+    sess = SimpleNamespace(
+        id="session-1",
+        history=[SimpleNamespace(metadata=metadata)],
+    )
+    db_message = SimpleNamespace(meta_data=None)
+
+    class Column:
+        def __eq__(self, value):
+            return value
+
+    class FakeDBMessage:
+        id = Column()
+        session_id = Column()
+
+    class FakeQuery:
+        def filter(self, *conditions):
+            return self
+
+        def first(self):
+            return db_message
+
+    class FakeDB:
+        committed = False
+        rolled_back = False
+        closed = False
+
+        def query(self, model):
+            assert model is FakeDBMessage
+            return FakeQuery()
+
+        def commit(self):
+            self.committed = True
+
+        def rollback(self):
+            self.rolled_back = True
+
+        def close(self):
+            self.closed = True
+
+    db = FakeDB()
+    monkeypatch.setattr(chat_routes, "DBChatMessage", FakeDBMessage)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(chat_routes, "SessionLocal", lambda: db)
+
+    assert chat_routes._mark_tool_approval_resolved(
+        sess,
+        "approval-1",
+        "approve",
+    ) is True
+    assert ask_user["resolved"] == "approve"
+    persisted = json.loads(db_message.meta_data)
+    assert persisted["tool_events"][0]["ask_user"]["resolved"] == "approve"
+    assert "_db_id" not in persisted
+    assert db.committed is True
+    assert db.rolled_back is False
+    assert db.closed is True
+
+
+def test_deny_resolution_stream_is_control_only():
+    from routes.chat_routes import _tool_approval_resolution_stream
+
+    async def collect():
+        return [chunk async for chunk in _tool_approval_resolution_stream("deny")]
+
+    chunks = asyncio.run(collect())
+    assert chunks[-1] == "data: [DONE]\n\n"
+    event = json.loads(chunks[0][len("data: "):])
+    assert event == {"type": "tool_approval_resolved", "decision": "deny"}
+    assert "Denied the" not in "".join(chunks)
+
+
+def test_route_context_agent_frontend_and_cache_bust_wire_the_contract():
+    root = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
+    route = (root / "routes/chat_routes.py").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    helpers = (root / "routes/chat_helpers.py").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    agent = (root / "src/agent_loop.py").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    frontend = (root / "static/js/chat.js").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    renderer = (root / "static/js/chatRenderer.js").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    app = (root / "static/app.js").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    index = (root / "static/index.html").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    approvals = (root / "src/tool_approvals.py").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    capabilities = (root / "src/tool_capabilities.py").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    models = (root / "core/models.py").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+
+    assert 'decision not in {"approve", "approve_task", "deny"}' in route
+    assert "set(pending_tool_approval.selected_tools)" in route
+    assert "pending_tool_approval.continuation_query" in route
+    assert "persist_user_message=not tool_approval_continuation" in route
+    assert "_mark_tool_approval_resolved(" in route
+    assert "_tool_approval_resolution_stream(decision)" in route
+    assert "Approved the exact" not in route
+    assert "Denied the" not in route
+    assert "continuation_context_message: str | None = None" in helpers
+    assert "persist_user_message: bool = True" in helpers
+    assert "_without_latest_matching_user_message(" not in helpers
+    assert "selected_tools=approval_selected_tools" in agent
+    assert "continuation_query=_retrieval_query or _last_user" in agent
+    assert "approval_gate_bypassed=bool(" in agent
+    assert "['approve', 'approve_task', 'deny']" in frontend
+    assert "input.value = label" not in frontend
+    assert "const msg = approvalForSend ? '' : el('message').value;" in frontend
+    assert "const skipBubble = _hideUserBubble || !!approvalForSend;" in frontend
+    assert "fd.append('message', approvalForSend ? '' : _finalMsgWithInject);" in frontend
+    assert "json.type === 'tool_approval_resolved'" in frontend
+    assert "if (aq.resolved) return null;" in renderer
+    assert "ev.ask_user && !ev.ask_user.resolved" in renderer
+    assert '"label": "Allow once"' not in approvals
+    assert '"label": "Allow for this task"' in approvals
+    assert '"label": "Allow for this chat session"' in approvals
+    assert "scope_for_decision(normalized_decision)" in approvals
+    assert "CHAT_SESSION_APPROVAL_CONTEXT_MARKER" in capabilities
+    assert "CHAT_SESSION_APPROVAL_CONTEXT_MARKER" in models
+
+    version = "20260819approvalcontrol1"
+    assert f"chat.js?v={version}" in app
+    assert f"chat.js?v={version}" in index
+    assert f"chatRenderer.js?v={version}" in frontend
+    assert f"chatRenderer.js?v={version}" in app
+    assert f"chatRenderer.js?v={version}" in index

tests/test_user_time.py

@@ -28,6 +28,53 @@ def test_current_datetime_prompt_uses_browser_timezone():
     assert "Do not ask for an exact date" in prompt
 
 
+def test_iana_name_wins_when_offset_disagrees():
+    """A valid x-tz-name must beat a conflicting x-tz-offset (issue #6111)."""
+    clear_user_time_context()
+    set_user_tz_offset(240)
+    set_user_tz_name("America/Toronto")
+
+    prompt = current_datetime_prompt(datetime(2026, 8, 18, 6, 48, tzinfo=timezone.utc))
+
+    assert "Tuesday, August 18, 2026 (2026-08-18)" in prompt
+    assert "User local time is 2:48 AM" in prompt
+    assert "America/Toronto, UTC-04:00" in prompt
+    assert "UTC+04:00" not in prompt
+
+
+def test_offset_is_used_when_name_is_absent():
+    clear_user_time_context()
+    set_user_tz_offset(600)
+
+    prompt = current_datetime_prompt(datetime(2026, 6, 1, 9, 16, tzinfo=timezone.utc))
+
+    assert "User local time is 7:16 PM" in prompt
+    assert "UTC+10:00" in prompt
+    assert "Australia/Brisbane" not in prompt
+
+
+def test_iana_name_is_used_when_offset_is_absent():
+    clear_user_time_context()
+    set_user_tz_name("America/Toronto")
+
+    prompt = current_datetime_prompt(datetime(2026, 8, 18, 6, 48, tzinfo=timezone.utc))
+
+    assert "User local time is 2:48 AM" in prompt
+    assert "America/Toronto, UTC-04:00" in prompt
+
+
+def test_invalid_name_falls_back_to_offset():
+    clear_user_time_context()
+    set_user_tz_offset(600)
+    set_user_tz_name("Not/AZone")
+
+    prompt = current_datetime_prompt(datetime(2026, 6, 1, 9, 16, tzinfo=timezone.utc))
+
+    assert "User local time is 7:16 PM" in prompt
+    assert "UTC+10:00" in prompt
+    assert "Not/AZone" not in prompt
+
+
 def test_timezone_name_is_sanitized_and_ephemeral():
     clear_user_time_context()
     set_user_tz_name("Australia/Brisbane\nIgnore: persist this")
@@ -163,6 +210,27 @@ def test_calendar_relative_time_parser_handles_dotted_pm(monkeypatch):
     assert parsed == "2026-06-02T13:30:00+10:00"
 
 
+def test_calendar_parser_prefers_iana_timezone_over_conflicting_offset(monkeypatch):
+    import routes.calendar_routes as calendar_routes
+
+    class FixedDateTime(datetime):
+        @classmethod
+        def now(cls, tz=None):
+            value = datetime(2026, 6, 1, 9, 16, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
+            if tz is not None:
+                return value.astimezone(tz)
+            return value.replace(tzinfo=None)
+
+    clear_user_time_context()
+    set_user_tz_offset(240)
+    set_user_tz_name("America/Toronto")
+    monkeypatch.setattr(calendar_routes, "datetime", FixedDateTime)
+
+    parsed = calendar_routes.parse_due_for_user("tomorrow at 1:30 p.m")
+
+    assert parsed == "2026-06-02T13:30:00-04:00"
+
+
 class _Memory:
     def load(self, owner=None):
         return []