The DELETE /api/personal/file disk-delete containment check used the
shared PERSONAL_UPLOADS_DIR root, so one admin could delete another
user's personal upload by passing its path (uploads are partitioned per
owner under <root>/<owner>/). Confine the check to the caller's own
per-owner subdir via _personal_upload_dir_for_owner(owner). RAG removal
and listing exclusion are unchanged (they still serve non-upload indexed
sources). Adds a regression test for the cross-owner case.
chatRenderer.js built the model-info popup HTML by concatenating the
model name (from the LLM response's model/answered_by field) into
popup.innerHTML without escaping, so a model advertised as an HTML/script
payload executed when the user clicked the role label. Wrap both
insertions with the uiModule.esc() helper the same function already uses.
Also apply existing escape helpers at two latent sinks flagged by CodeQL,
fed only by self-authored/server values today: document-tab title via
_esc(), and the calendar event background URL (escape the double quote
that would otherwise break out of the style="..." attribute).
* ci: add security scanning suite and governance
Consolidates the security CI work into one reviewable change. Adds, as
separate workflow files under .github/workflows/:
- secret-scan.yml gitleaks (pinned + checksum-verified), full history
- workflow-security.yml actionlint + zizmor, audits the workflows themselves
- dependency-review.yml PR dependency gate + advisory pip-audit
- container-scan.yml hadolint (blocking) + Trivy image scan (advisory)
- codeql.yml CodeQL for Python and JS, main + weekly
Plus .github/dependabot.yml (pip/npm/actions/docker), .github/CODEOWNERS,
and docs/security-ci.md explaining each check and the one-time settings.
All additive: no existing files are modified. Actions are pinned to commit
SHAs, tokens default-deny (permissions: {}), advisory scans never block,
and SARIF upload is gated to push so fork PRs do not fail on a read-only
token. Composes with the correctness CI in #1015.
* ci(security): isolate Trivy from the Dockerfile lint gate
Address review on #1314 (points 2 and 3).
container-scan.yml now runs only hadolint (the blocking Dockerfile lint)
and keeps the broad pull_request + push:[main] trigger so the required
check always reports and never hangs a PR.
The advisory image scan moves to container-trivy.yml, split by event:
- pull_request / workflow_dispatch: build and scan under contents:read
only, no SARIF upload. The image build runs PR-supplied Dockerfile
instructions, so this path holds no write scope.
- push to main: build, scan, and upload SARIF with security-events:write.
Only this trusted path is granted write.
This stops PR jobs from requesting security-events:write they never use,
and a paths-ignore (matching docker-publish.yml) skips the image rebuild
on docs-only changes.
docs/security-ci.md: correct the trigger description to "every pull
request and every push to main", matching the workflows and the existing
ci.yml convention.
Verified locally: zizmor --offline --min-severity=low and actionlint are
clean on the changed and new workflow files.
---------
Co-authored-by: Alexandre Teixeira <111787685+alteixeira20@users.noreply.github.com>
Pin actions to commit SHAs, set persist-credentials: false on every
checkout, and scope token permissions to the jobs that use them. Suppress
the two findings that are safe by design: the description bot's
pull_request_target trigger (no fork code runs) and an intentional
word-split in the docker manifest step.
Clears actionlint and zizmor against dev so the blocking gate from #1314
can pass once both land.
nopoz