The session-scoped autouse fixture bound 127.0.0.1:7011 and raised when the
port was taken. Because it is autouse, that raise errored every collected
test rather than the browser ones: a second worktree running its own suite
produced 10,612 errors, none of them about the code under test. 7011 is also
the application's own default port, so the suite could not run while a local
instance was up.
Bind port 0 instead and publish the resulting origin as
ODYSSEUS_TEST_STATIC_ORIGIN. The browser tests shell out to node, which
inherits the environment, so the snippets read process.env rather than
hardcoding a port. ODYSSEUS_TEST_STATIC_PORT still pins one when something
outside pytest has to reach the server; that is the only path that can now
fail to bind, and it fails with a message that says so.
Two concurrent full runs from one checkout now both pass. Only the docx export
snippet is an rf-string, so it is the only one whose JS braces needed doubling.
The R09 scholarly hardening routes every hop through check_outbound_url with
block_private=True. On a DNS64/NAT64 network, an IPv4-only host can resolve
through the RFC 6052 Well-Known Prefix. For example, export.arxiv.org resolved
to 64:ff9b::924b:5b2a in the reproduced environment.
CPython classifies that outer IPv6 prefix as reserved, so the URL guard rejected
the request before examining the effective IPv4 destination.
Decode addresses in exactly 64:ff9b::/96 to their embedded IPv4 destination and
evaluate that destination under the strict outbound policy.
The translated target is always checked with private-address blocking enabled.
This prevents the NAT64 prefix from becoming a path to loopback, private,
shared/CGNAT, link-local, multicast, unspecified, or other non-global IPv4
space.
Network-specific translation prefixes are not decoded. In particular,
64:ff9b:1::/48 remains subject to the existing IPv6 policy.
Coverage includes:
- public IPv4 destinations embedded through the RFC 6052 prefix
- loopback, link-local, private, CGNAT, multicast, unspecified, benchmark, and
TEST-NET rejection
- network-specific NAT64 prefixes remaining undecoded
- deterministic scholarly provider tests without live DNS dependence
- redirect query parameter isolation
- relative redirect resolution
- HTTP error fallback behavior
- editor draft GET and DELETE behavior remaining unaffected
R09, R11, and R01 were independently audited and otherwise left unchanged.
- Enforce outbound URL policy on all hops via bounded manual redirects in scholarly lookups
- Guard declared Content-Length in EditorDraftRoute before request body parsing
- Keep scholarly lookup timeouts and budgets as internal constants rather than surface env vars
- Narrow TUI threat-model description around demonstrable host shell bridge behavior
- Add behavioral regression tests for redirect security and pre-parsing body size guards
Covers both behaviours end to end: a refused outbound URL and an exhausted
budget must skip the request entirely rather than fall through to httpx, the
remaining budget caps each hop's timeout, and an over-ceiling Content-Length
returns 413 without the body being parsed.
Verified against the pre-fix tree: the User-Agent was hardcoded, the endpoints
were literals, check_outbound_url was absent, both hops carried independent
12.0s timeouts, and an oversized declared body returned 422 after parsing
rather than 413 before it.
Léo