* fix(security): keep agent file tools out of the app state directory
The agent's read tools (read_file, grep, glob, ls) resolved model-supplied
paths against a root list whose first entry was the whole data directory.
That directory holds the session store, the auth database, the app
encryption key and the settings file, so prompt-injected content could ask
for any of them. No approval prompt stood in the way: reads are classified
read_workspace and pass the untrusted-context gate untouched, which is
correct for reading a workspace and wrong for reading the app's own state.
The agent gets data/agent_workspace/ instead, and the subprocess cwd and
HOME move with it so bash and read_file agree on where scratch files live.
The deny itself is a property of the path, not of the root it arrived
through, because three routes reach the same bytes and closing only the
first leaves the other two working:
- the default root list
- a workspace bound at or above the data directory, which vet_workspace
accepted and chat_routes auto-binds from a path named in the message
- a tool_path_extra_roots setting covering the data directory
_resolve_search_root also returned the workspace root unchecked when the
path was empty, so a bare ls enumerated the directory whatever the deny
list said. It now resolves that case through the same guards.
A containment rule rather than a filename deny list, so state files added
later are covered without anyone remembering to list them, and so a user's
own settings.json or app.db inside a real workspace is not caught.
Four directories of user content stay readable, because the application
hands their paths to the model and tells it to open them: the chat upload
manifest, downloaded mail attachments, personal docs (which covers the
runbook) and personal uploads.
* fix: enforce state deny during recursive file search
* fix: bound protected filesystem searches
* fix(security): reject inode aliases and workspace redirects
* fix(security): harden partitioned agent searches
* fix(security): report fallback worker exits promptly
* fix(security): clean up search readers and retain relative data roots
---------
Co-authored-by: RaresKeY <158580472+RaresKeY@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(security): stop API tokens reaching privileged agent tools
A bearer API token resolves to the human who minted it, and minting is admin-only, so every owner-keyed privilege check in the agent path answers "admin". A token issued for a narrow integration therefore reached bash and python with the authority of the account that created it.
Three independent routes to that sink, each closed here.
The token could answer its own tool-approval prompt. An approval records that a person authorized one dangerous action, and a token cannot make that statement, so /api/chat_stream now refuses an approval resume from a bearer caller.
The chat-session grant was reconstructable from caller-supplied message metadata. Two routes persist a metadata blob on the caller's behalf, so the shape of a resolved approval card could be written straight into a transcript and was then read back as authority. The server now signs the grant when it resolves an approval and verifies that signature when reading it back, binding it to the chat and the approval it was issued for. Both routes also drop server-owned keys from an inbound blob.
A run driven by a token inherited its owner's tool set. Such a run is now capped at the non-admin policy regardless of who minted the credential, which holds even where no approval is raised at all.
The human path is unchanged: a browser session still receives the prompt, still approves, and a granted chat-session scope still carries to later turns in that chat.
Scope enforcement across the wider route surface is a separate gap and is not addressed here.
* fix scoped chat delegation boundaries
* fix(auth): reject malformed chat approval signatures
---------
Co-authored-by: RaresKeY <158580472+RaresKeY@users.noreply.github.com>
scripts/mlx_image_server.py resolved the model per request
(`req.model or _args.model`) on both /v1/images/generations and
/v1/images/edits, so the caller chose which model was served.
`_is_hidream()` is a substring test and `_snapshot_path()` accepts either a
local directory or a Hugging Face repo id, so a caller-supplied string
selected the HiDream branch and then supplied the directory it runs
`scripts/hidream_o1/generate_hidream_o1_mlx.py` from, under sys.executable.
The server has no auth, and the Cookbook binds it to 0.0.0.0 whenever it is
serving to a remote host, so one POST executed attacker code on the serving
host.
Both paths now use `_args.model`. The request field is still accepted for
OpenAI wire compatibility and ignored, matching scripts/diffusion_server.py,
and Odysseus already sends the served model's own id, so this is a no-op for
legitimate callers. /v1/images/harmonize already pinned.
Regression tests cover both endpoints, the local-directory and
Hugging-Face-repo halves, and that a server actually launched with a HiDream
model still serves it. Three of the four fail on the unfixed code.
Two py/polynomial-redos sinks ran regexes with two adjacent \s-matching
quantifiers over untrusted model text, backtracking O(n^2) when the tail failed
on a whitespace flood:
- routes/skills_routes.py: the last-resort verdict-from-prose extractor used
`["\'\s:]*\s*` — the class already matches \s, so the trailing \s* was a
redundant second quantifier. Dropped it (extracted to a documented module
constant _VERDICT_PROSE_RE); the matched text is identical, the scan linear.
- src/agent_loop.py _EXPLICIT_CONTINUATION_RE: `\s*[.!?]*\s*$` put two \s*
around `[.!?]*`. Rewrote as `\s*(?:[.!?]+\s*)?$` — same accepted tails (no
two \s* adjacent), linear. Portable form (no possessive quantifiers).
Both verified output-equivalent to the originals across a fuzz corpus. Adds
tests/test_redos_verdict_continuation.py pinning the unchanged match sets and
bounding the flood inputs (old patterns took seconds at 40k whitespace chars).
* fix(security): prevent ReDoS in XML and args tool-call parsers
Four py/polynomial-redos sinks in tool_parsing.py ran lazy/greedy regexes over
untrusted model output (tool-call markup is attacker-influenced via prompt
injection). When the closing delimiter was absent, each rescanned to
end-of-string from every opener -> O(n^2):
- args => { ... } in _parse_tool_call_block: greedy \{([\s\S]*)\} restarted
from every `args:{` opener. Now finds the opener once and takes through the
last `}` (rfind) — equivalent capture, O(n).
- _XML_INVOKE_RE: lazy <invoke ...>([\s\S]*?)</invoke>. Now _iter_xml_invoke
pairs each opener with the first reachable </invoke> and stops when none is.
- _XML_DIRECT_TOOL_RE and the <tag>([\s\S]*?)</\1> param scan in
_parse_tool_code_block: lazy backreference patterns. Now _iter_backref_blocks
pairs each opener with the nearest matching closer and memoizes tag names
with no remaining closer, so an opener flood stays O(n).
All four are output-equivalent to the originals on well-formed tool-call markup;
the lazy patterns remain defined (still re-exported via agent_tools) but no
longer drive a finditer over untrusted text. Adds tests/test_redos_xml_tool_parsers.py
pinning correctness and bounding the opener-flood inputs (old paths took 4-15s).
* fix(security): harden invoke-parameter and distinct-name tag scans
Forward-only the two residual ReDoS paths in the XML/tool parsers that the
outer-delimiter fix left quadratic:
- _parse_xml_invoke parsed <parameter> with _XML_PARAM_RE.finditer, so a
closed <invoke> body full of unclosed <parameter> openers rescanned the
body from every opener (O(n^2), ~11s at 8k openers). Now scans forward-only
via _iter_named_blocks, factored out of _iter_xml_invoke.
- _iter_backref_blocks only memoized repeated missing tag names; a flood of
distinct unclosed names searched the suffix once per name (O(n^2)). It now
indexes every closer by name in one linear pass and binary-searches per
opener (O(n log n)). Covers the direct and tool_code backref scans.
Output-equivalent to the prior scanners (200k randomized trials match the
memoized version for both the direct ci=True and tool_code ci=False configs).
Adds regressions for the closed-invoke parameter flood and the distinct-name
floods (45k openers now run in ~0.05s, were 5-6s).
* fix(security): prevent ReDoS in LLM-output tool/think parsers
The regexes that parse untrusted model output in text_helpers.py and
tool_parsing.py are delimiter-bounded with a lazy [\s\S]*? (or an
ambiguous (\s+[^>]*)?). Applied with re.sub/re.finditer over a whole
response, they degrade to O(n^2) when the closing delimiter is absent:
the engine rescans to end-of-string from every opener. Model output is
untrusted, so a prompt-injected or malicious model can stall the agent
loop with many unclosed openers (measured ~25s on a 60KB <thought flood).
- text_helpers.py: replace ambiguous <thought(\s+[^>]*)?> with
<thought([^>]*)> (identical capture, no \s+/[^>]* overlap); skip the
Gemma <|channel>...<channel|> subs when no <channel|> closer is present.
- tool_parsing.py: gate _TOOL_CALL_RE, _XML_TOOL_CALL_RE and _TOOL_CODE_RE
(in parse_tool_blocks and strip_tool_blocks) on a cheap presence check
for their closing delimiter. With no closer the regex cannot match, so
skipping is equivalent; only the wasted O(n^2) rescan is removed.
Resolves CodeQL py/polynomial-redos #230, #231, #232, #233, #235, #236,
#524. The _XML_OPEN_TOOL_CALL_RE alerts (#234, #477) are false positives
(its greedy [\s\S]*\Z is linear) and left untouched.
* fix(security): close ReDoS gaps in tool/think parsers from review
Addresses two review findings on the closer-guard approach:
- Whole-string "closer exists?" checks were bypassable: a stale closer
before an opener flood, or a closer with no reachable inner `}`, kept
the guard true while every opener still rescanned to end-of-string
(O(n^2)). Replace the substring guards with `_iter_delimited`, a
forward-only scan that pairs each opener with a *later* closer and
stops once none is reachable (O(n)). `parse_tool_blocks` and
`strip_tool_blocks` (via `_strip_delimited`) both use it for the
[TOOL_CALL], <tool_call>/<function_call>, and <tool_code> formats.
Verified equivalent to the original regexes on well-formed inputs.
- `<thought([^>]*)>` dropped the tag-name boundary and corrupted
unrelated tags (`<thoughtful>` -> `<thinkful>`). Use `<thought(\s[^>]*)?>`:
the single fixed `\s` keeps the pattern linear (no `\s+`/`[^>]*`
overlap) while restoring the boundary; capture is byte-for-byte
identical for real `<thought ...>` openers.
Adds regressions for stale-closer-before-opener, closer-present-without-
inner-brace, and the <thoughtful>/<thoughts> passthrough.
* fix(security): close Gemma channel ReDoS guard flagged in review
vdmkenny noted the same bypassable whole-string guard remained in
text_helpers.py: `if "<channel|>" in out.lower()` gating the Gemma
thought/response channel subs. A stale `<channel|>` before a
`<|channel>thought` opener flood keeps the guard true while every opener
still rescans to end-of-string (measured ~7.3s at 4k openers).
Replace it with `_sub_delimited`, the same forward-only scan used for the
tool-call parsers: pair each opener with a later closer, stop when none is
reachable (O(n)). Verified output-equivalent to the original capture regexes
on well-formed multi-channel inputs; the stale-closer case now runs in <2ms.
Adds a regression for stale-closer-before-opener on the Gemma path.
* fix(security): harden strip_think() think-tag ReDoS flagged in review
The earlier fixes hardened normalize_thinking_markup and the delimiter
scanners, but the production entrypoint strip_think() still ran
_THINK_CLOSED_RE / _THINK_ATTR_RE / _THINK_OPEN_RE (and the stray-tag
_THINK_TAG_RE) over untrusted model output. Those kept the same ReDoS
shapes: the lazy `<open>[\s\S]*?</close>` rescanned to end-of-string from
every opener, and `(?:\s+[^>]*)?` / `[^>]*` attribute scans ran to
end-of-string from every opener on a "many openers, no closer" flood. On
the prior head, malformed `<think` / `<thinking` / `<thought` floods took
6-14s through strip_think(). The shipped `<thought>` normalization had the
same residual: the single-opener case was linear but an opener flood was
still O(n^2) (~4.4s).
- Replace the lazy multi-pass _THINK_CLOSED_RE loop with the existing
forward-only _sub_delimited scan (pair each opener with the first
reachable closer, stop when none is reachable). One pass collapses
sequential and nested blocks as before.
- Bound every opener/stray-tag attribute scan at `<` (`[^<>]` not `[^>]`)
so a no-`>` opener flood can't drive a single match attempt to
end-of-string. Identical capture for well-formed think/thought tags.
- email_helpers._strip_think: compute had_think from the single linear
_THINK_TAG_RE instead of the lazy closed/open `.search()` calls, which
had the same O(n^2) on the email reply/summary/extraction paths.
All flood variants now finish in <10ms (were 6-14s). Output verified
byte-for-byte identical to the prior implementation over a 34-case corpus
(nested, mismatched, attr, uppercase, Gemma, prose, prompt-echo). Adds
strip_think() timing regressions for malformed openers, opener floods
(all three tag names), the closed-opener flood, and the malformed-closer
flood.
* docs: trim verbose comments in think-tag ReDoS fix
The lazy `<think>.*?</think>` pattern (one compiled `_THINK_RE`, one inline
copy) is applied with `re.sub` over whole model responses. With a `<think>`
opener and no closer, the engine rescans to end-of-string from every opener
-> O(n^2) on attacker-influenced output (prompt injection can echo thousands
of openers via tool output / retrieved content). CodeQL py/polynomial-redos.
Replace both with `_strip_think_blocks`, a forward-only linear scan that is
byte-for-byte equivalent to the original narrow regex: only literal
`<think>`/`</think>` (any case) match, a dangling opener with no closer is
left intact, and an orphan `</think>` is never stripped. Routing through the
broader `text_helpers.strip_think` was avoided on purpose -- it also strips
`<thinking>`, attributes and prompt echoes, which would change what the
loop's progress/circling heuristics see.
Adds tests/test_redos_think_blocks.py pinning regex-equivalence on a battery
of well-formed/edge inputs plus a linear-time bound on hostile input.
* fix(security): redact credential-bearing URLs and PII from logs
Several log statements emitted sensitive data in clear text:
- model_routes / chat_routes / contacts_routes logged endpoint URLs raw.
Admin-configured URLs can embed credentials in userinfo or query
(e.g. https://user:pass@host, ?api_key=...). Route them through a
shared core.log_safety.redact_url() that drops userinfo/query/fragment.
- note_routes / task_scheduler logged operator email addresses (smtp_user,
recipient). Replaced with presence booleans, which keeps the diagnostic
("why didn't this send") without writing PII to logs.
model_routes already had a local redactor on its HTTPStatusError branch;
the generic except branch was missed, so reuse the existing helper there.
Clears CodeQL py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data alerts 264, 317, 324,
325, 343, 344, 528.
* fix(security): re-bracket IPv6 hosts and single-source the URL redactor
Address review on #4750:
- redact_url now re-brackets IPv6 literals so host:port stays
unambiguous (https://[2001:db8::1]:8443/v1, not the bracket-less
ambiguous form).
- point model_routes._redact_url_for_log at the shared helper so the
two redactors are single-sourced (also picks up the IPv6 fix).
* fix(security): escape backslashes in calendar bg-image CSS url()
The calendar event-background CSS escaped ' -> \' for a bg: image URL but
not backslashes first. Inside a single-quoted url('...'), \ is the CSS
escape char, so a URL value ending in/containing a backslash escapes the
closing quote and breaks out of the string, injecting arbitrary CSS. The
bg:<url> value is per-event and CalDAV-syncable, hence untrusted (CodeQL
js/incomplete-sanitization).
Add a single canonical _cssUrlEscape() in calendar/utils.js that escapes
backslashes FIRST, then quotes, and route all four sinks through it:
calendar.js:416 / :1263 (the flagged #463/#464), the event-form preview
(:2931), and _calBgCss() in utils.js — the latter two share the identical
bug but were unflagged. Output is byte-identical to the old escaping for
legitimate URLs (which contain no backslashes); only malicious input differs.
Resolves CodeQL js/incomplete-sanitization #463, #464.
* fix(security): route remaining calendar bg url() sinks through _cssUrlEscape
Review (vdmkenny) flagged that the centralization missed an injectable
sibling sink: the edit-form color-picker swatch (calendar.js:2856) built
`url('${url}')` from `existing.color` (a CalDAV-syncable, untrusted `bg:`
value) raw, then interpolated it into `style="background:..."` via innerHTML
- the same `'`/`\` breakout class as the sinks already fixed. The custom-dot
preview (:2953) was likewise raw (non-exploitable - a CSSOM `.style`
assignment of a URL the current user just picked - but it broke the invariant).
Route both through `_cssUrlEscape`, and normalize the two pre-escaped-variable
sites (_calItemBgStyle, _renderWeek) to the same inline form so all five
url() interpolations in calendar.js follow one rule. Add a whole-file
invariant test asserting every `url('${...}')` calls `_cssUrlEscape` - this
catches a future missed sink, the exact failure mode here. Behavior-identical
for legitimate URLs (no visual change).
The fallback regex in email_pollers.py that recovers a
[{"action": ...}, ...] JSON array from raw model output used lazy
[^[\]]*? runs inside a (?:,\s*\{...\}\s*)* repetition, which backtracks
exponentially (CodeQL py/redos) on inputs like [{"action"},{ + }},{{ * N.
It runs on the LLM reply to an email→calendar prompt embedding the
untrusted email body, so a crafted email can stall the background poller.
Extract the pattern to a module-level _CAL_ACTION_ARRAY_RE and rewrite the
object-content class from the lazy [^[\]]*? to a greedy brace-delimited
[^{}], which removes the quantifier ambiguity. The match is linear (a 500KB
adversarial input now resolves in <1ms) and equivalent on well-formed
arrays; it is also strictly more robust for values containing '[' or ']'
(the old class bailed on those and extracted nothing).
Resolves CodeQL py/redos #198.
The DELETE /api/personal/file disk-delete containment check used the
shared PERSONAL_UPLOADS_DIR root, so one admin could delete another
user's personal upload by passing its path (uploads are partitioned per
owner under <root>/<owner>/). Confine the check to the caller's own
per-owner subdir via _personal_upload_dir_for_owner(owner). RAG removal
and listing exclusion are unchanged (they still serve non-upload indexed
sources). Adds a regression test for the cross-owner case.
chatRenderer.js built the model-info popup HTML by concatenating the
model name (from the LLM response's model/answered_by field) into
popup.innerHTML without escaping, so a model advertised as an HTML/script
payload executed when the user clicked the role label. Wrap both
insertions with the uiModule.esc() helper the same function already uses.
Also apply existing escape helpers at two latent sinks flagged by CodeQL,
fed only by self-authored/server values today: document-tab title via
_esc(), and the calendar event background URL (escape the double quote
that would otherwise break out of the style="..." attribute).
* ci: add security scanning suite and governance
Consolidates the security CI work into one reviewable change. Adds, as
separate workflow files under .github/workflows/:
- secret-scan.yml gitleaks (pinned + checksum-verified), full history
- workflow-security.yml actionlint + zizmor, audits the workflows themselves
- dependency-review.yml PR dependency gate + advisory pip-audit
- container-scan.yml hadolint (blocking) + Trivy image scan (advisory)
- codeql.yml CodeQL for Python and JS, main + weekly
Plus .github/dependabot.yml (pip/npm/actions/docker), .github/CODEOWNERS,
and docs/security-ci.md explaining each check and the one-time settings.
All additive: no existing files are modified. Actions are pinned to commit
SHAs, tokens default-deny (permissions: {}), advisory scans never block,
and SARIF upload is gated to push so fork PRs do not fail on a read-only
token. Composes with the correctness CI in #1015.
* ci(security): isolate Trivy from the Dockerfile lint gate
Address review on #1314 (points 2 and 3).
container-scan.yml now runs only hadolint (the blocking Dockerfile lint)
and keeps the broad pull_request + push:[main] trigger so the required
check always reports and never hangs a PR.
The advisory image scan moves to container-trivy.yml, split by event:
- pull_request / workflow_dispatch: build and scan under contents:read
only, no SARIF upload. The image build runs PR-supplied Dockerfile
instructions, so this path holds no write scope.
- push to main: build, scan, and upload SARIF with security-events:write.
Only this trusted path is granted write.
This stops PR jobs from requesting security-events:write they never use,
and a paths-ignore (matching docker-publish.yml) skips the image rebuild
on docs-only changes.
docs/security-ci.md: correct the trigger description to "every pull
request and every push to main", matching the workflows and the existing
ci.yml convention.
Verified locally: zizmor --offline --min-severity=low and actionlint are
clean on the changed and new workflow files.
---------
Co-authored-by: Alexandre Teixeira <111787685+alteixeira20@users.noreply.github.com>
Pin actions to commit SHAs, set persist-credentials: false on every
checkout, and scope token permissions to the jobs that use them. Suppress
the two findings that are safe by design: the description bot's
pull_request_target trigger (no fork code runs) and an intentional
word-split in the docker manifest step.
Clears actionlint and zizmor against dev so the blocking gate from #1314
can pass once both land.
