Commit Graph
11 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
tanmayraut45 4e440a9fd5 Hwfit: estimate params from config.json fallback
`add_hwfit_models.py` infers `parameter_count` and `parameters_raw` by
regexing the HF repo name for a `<num>B` token, optionally with an
`-A<num>B` MoE active-param suffix. Repos that don't encode a size in
their name at all (e.g. `zai-org/GLM-4.5`, where the "4.5" is a version
not a parameter count) fall through to the safetensors element-count
path. That path works for unquantized FP16 / BF16 repos but is brittle
in two cases the catalog hits often:

1. Author-bulk runs (`AUTHORS = ["cyankiwi"]`) pull pre-quantized AWQ /
   GPTQ / MLX repos. The safetensors metadata stores the packed I32
   tensors and a per-dtype `parameters` map, which the script unpacks
   via a per-quant pack factor. When the upload doesn't populate that
   map (older repos, custom shards), `st.total` is used raw and the
   parameter count is off by 4-8x.
2. Repos where the safetensors block is absent from `model_info()`
   entirely. The current code returns `None` and silently drops the
   model, which then has to be added to `EXTRA_REPOS` by hand with a
   literal `parameter_count` string.

Both are exactly what the issue calls out — the regex / safetensors
combo can't size GLM-4.5 by itself because the name has no `<num>B`
and the upstream repo's safetensors block doesn't carry a usable param
total either.

Add a config.json fallback in front of the safetensors path:

- `_fetch_config_json(repo_id)` downloads `config.json` via
  `hf_hub_download` (so the standard HF on-disk cache handles
  deduplication across runs, no extra cache layer needed). Network /
  404 / gated-repo errors return `None` and the caller proceeds to the
  safetensors fallback. An in-process `_CONFIG_CACHE` dedupes the
  base-model vs. source-repo lookups within a single run.
- `_params_from_config(cfg)` first honours explicit `num_parameters` /
  `n_params` / `total_params` fields when present. Otherwise it sums
  embeddings + attention (GQA-aware via `num_key_value_heads` and
  `head_dim`) + dense MLP (`3 * hidden_size * intermediate_size`,
  covering SwiGLU / GeGLU). For MoE configs it picks up both naming
  conventions in the wild — `num_experts` / `num_experts_per_tok`
  (Qwen3-MoE) and `n_routed_experts` / `n_shared_experts` (GLM-4-MoE,
  DeepSeek-V3) — uses `moe_intermediate_size`, and respects
  `first_k_dense_replace` so the first N layers stay dense. Active
  parameters come out as `num_experts_per_tok + n_shared_experts` of
  the routed experts, which matches how each architecture reports its
  active count.
- In `_entry_from_modelinfo`, try config.json on the source repo first
  (works for unquantized models) and then on the `base_model:` parent
  (covers AWQ / GPTQ children whose own config is just a quantization
  manifest). Both lookups run only when regex + override + base_model
  tag all failed, so the normal author-bulk run still resolves sizes
  from names without touching the Hub.

Spot-checks against the three architecture families this script
actually pulls — within ~5% of the documented param counts, which is
well inside the `parameter_count` rounding (one decimal of "B") and
the `min_vram_gb` downstream bucket:

  Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct      7.62B   (HF card: 7.6B)
  Qwen3-30B-A3B            30.5B / 3.34B active   (card: 30.5B / 3.3B)
  GLM-4.5                  352.7B / 33.6B active  (card: 355B / 32B)

The safetensors path is unchanged and remains the last resort, so
repos with neither a parsable name nor a fetchable config.json behave
exactly as before.

Closes #955.
2026-06-02 20:33:25 +09:00
tanmayraut45 b5747e3979 Sessions: ignore list keydown while typing
The list keyboard handler (_onSessionListKeydown) treats Backspace and
Delete as "delete the focused session". When the user double-clicks a
chat to rename it, an <input class="session-rename-input"> is mounted
inside the .list-item row. Backspace on the input bubbles up to the list
container, the handler walks closest('.list-item[data-session-id]') from
e.target, finds the parent row and DELETEs the session via the API —
so a single typo correction nukes the whole conversation.

Bail out at the top of the handler when e.target is an INPUT, TEXTAREA,
or contentEditable element. Arrow / Enter / Delete navigation still
works for rows themselves (the row is the focused element then, not the
input). Mirrors the guard pattern already used in ui.js, notes.js,
tasks.js, calendar.js, emailLibrary.js and galleryEditor.js.

Closes #1007.
2026-06-02 20:30:16 +09:00
tanmayraut45 6c654fb0ef Models: detect bare Ollama URLs as online
_ping_endpoint() is the reachability fallback the model-endpoint POST
handler invokes when _probe_endpoint() returns no model ids. It GETs
base + "/models" and, on any sub-500 response, returns immediately with
`reachable = (status < 400)`. That early return runs before the
Ollama-native /api/version / /api/tags fallback below it.

For an Ollama URL without /v1 (the quickstart accepts both
http://localhost:11434 and http://127.0.0.1:11434, and the reporter
on #1025 explicitly tried both), the OpenAI-style probe target is
http://127.0.0.1:11434/models. Ollama returns 404 there because /models
only lives under /v1. _ping_endpoint then returned reachable=False and
the picker showed "Added (offline — will retry on next load)" on an
install that was running fine. /api/version was never tried.

Same shape for http://127.0.0.1:11434/api (the native Ollama root):
/api/models is also 404, same premature offline verdict.

_probe_endpoint() does fall through to /api/tags on a 4xx (the response
raises via raise_for_status), so the endpoint quietly recovers once
cached_models becomes non-empty on the next background refresh —
matching the second commenter's "had to disconnect manually then
reconnect for it to be detected" note. The bug is most visible while
no models are pulled yet (cached_models stays empty, _ping_endpoint
keeps voting offline).

Fix:

- Hoist the Ollama-shaped-URL test (port == 11434 or "ollama" in
  hostname — the same condition _probe_endpoint already uses) to the
  top of the function so both code paths share it.
- Stop short-circuiting on 4xx when the URL looks like Ollama: fall
  through to the existing /api/version + /api/tags reachability loop
  so an alive Ollama gets recognised even when its OpenAI surface has
  the wrong prefix for the user's input.
- Fix the `root` computation in that loop to strip a trailing /api as
  well as /v1, so http://127.0.0.1:11434/api no longer gets probed at
  /api/api/version.
- 4xx on non-Ollama hosts keeps the current semantics: a 401 from
  api.openai.com/v1/models is still a definitive offline verdict, not
  a reason to GET /api/version on OpenAI.

Closes #1025.
2026-06-02 20:27:41 +09:00
tanmayraut45 1cc2e90ac0 Apply SafeSearch by default across search providers (#763)
#718 reported Deep Research drifting into adult / spam URLs several
rounds into a benign session ("research about https://bhagathgoud.com/
and what he doing currently"). The reporter's log showed Japanese
adult sites being crawled even though the model was emitting normal
queries like "Bhagath Goud LinkedIn" and "site:bhagathgoud.com".

The model wasn't generating those URLs. Every provider call site
constructed its params dict without a SafeSearch parameter, so the
underlying HTTP backend (the duckduckgo-search library / DDG's HTML
endpoint in this case) was free to surface "related search" /
trending / spam recommendations that have nothing to do with the
user's query. Per provider:

- SearXNG: instance-dependent; many self-hosted instances default
  to safesearch=0.
- Brave API: defaults to "off" for new API keys.
- duckduckgo-search lib: defaults to "moderate", which still lets
  related-search recommendations and HTTP-backend fallback URLs
  surface trending non-English spam topics.
- DDG HTML fallback (html.duckduckgo.com): no `kp` param, treated
  as off.
- Google PSE: omitted `safe` is equivalent to off.
- Serper: omitted `safe` proxies to Google with safe off.

Since the bad URLs entered through the provider layer, not the
model, the provider params are the right place to gate this.

Changes:

- src/settings.py: new `search_safesearch` setting with default
  "strict". Documented values ("strict" | "moderate" | "off") plus
  a few aliases ("on", "high", "0/1/2", "disabled", ...) so a
  hand-edited config doesn't silently fall through to off.
- src/search/providers.py:
  - Add `_get_safesearch_level()` (canonical, normalizing) and
    `_safesearch_for(provider)` (per-provider param translation).
  - Thread the per-provider value into every params dict:
    SearXNG JSON, SearXNG language/engines fallbacks, SearXNG HTML,
    Brave, DDG library, DDG HTML fallback, Google PSE, Serper.
  - Tavily is left untouched — its API has no SafeSearch knob and
    its index already filters explicit content at ingest time.

Behavior change for existing installs: default is now "strict", so
explicit results get filtered across every supported provider
without any user action. Users who deliberately want unfiltered
results can set `search_safesearch` to "off" in Settings. No new
dependencies, no schema migrations.

Closes #718.
2026-06-02 11:34:32 +09:00
tanmayraut45 eff762cdd9 Expose manage_notes via native function calling (#759)
The agent's RAG tool selector retrieves manage_notes as relevant for
note / todo / reminder requests, but two gaps stopped it from actually
firing on local llama.cpp / vLLM endpoints:

1. FUNCTION_TOOL_SCHEMAS had no entry for manage_notes. Even when the
   tool was marked relevant, no JSON schema was sent on the function
   tools list, so native-function-calling models had nothing to call.
   In practice the model would describe creating the note in prose
   while the actual note stayed blank — the symptom reported in #713
   ("checklist hallucinated as blank").

2. _API_HOSTS only listed hosted providers (OpenAI, Anthropic, etc.).
   For local endpoints like http://localhost:8080 or
   http://host.docker.internal:8000, _is_api_model fell back to
   keyword-sniffing the model name, so any model whose slug didn't
   happen to match the keyword list silently lost native tool
   schemas entirely.

Fixes:

- src/tool_schemas.py: add a manage_notes function schema covering
  list/add/update/delete/toggle_item with the full Keep-style field
  set. note_type is exposed as an enum ("note" | "checklist") so the
  model picks the mode explicitly instead of inferring it from
  content shape. Items are named checklist_items in the schema —
  consistent with the description's wording and avoiding the
  Python-built-in name clash that #713 calls out.

- src/tool_implementations.py: do_manage_notes accepts both
  checklist_items (new, schema-exposed) and items (legacy /
  internal). Direct API callers and existing code paths keep
  working unchanged; native function calls following the new
  schema route through the same path.

- src/agent_loop.py: add localhost, 127.0.0.1, and
  host.docker.internal to _API_HOSTS so the function-tool path is
  not gated behind model-name guessing for local servers.

Closes #174.
Closes #713.
2026-06-02 11:33:32 +09:00
tanmayraut45 0e31c38be0 Support in-place endpoint updates and recover empty-model sessions (#786)
The "don't wipe endpoint_url/model on endpoint delete" half of #587 landed
in 6a78b02 (Fix endpoint model preservation for tasks). The three remaining
follow-up pieces from the original PR — flagged in the review on #786 —
are:

- routes/model_routes.py: toggle_model_endpoint (PATCH) now accepts
  api_key and base_url, so the admin UI can rotate a key or fix a typo'd
  URL without going through delete+recreate. base_url is normalized the
  same way the POST handler does (strip /models, /chat/completions,
  /completions, /v1/messages, then _normalize_base). Cache invalidation
  matches the POST/DELETE paths and the response includes base_url so the
  frontend can confirm what was saved.

- routes/chat_routes.py: new _recover_empty_session_model picks
  cached_models[0] from the endpoint that matches sess.endpoint_url and
  persists it onto the Session row before the LLM call goes out. Wired
  into both /api/chat and /api/chat_stream after the existing
  _clear_orphaned_session_endpoint guard, so the order is: drop
  truly-orphaned sessions first, then heal the "picker showed it, session
  never knew" case.

- routes/chat_routes.py: when recovery fails (no endpoint, no cached
  models) raise HTTP 400 with a clear message instead of letting
  model="" reach the upstream as 401/503.

Closes #587.
2026-06-02 11:26:38 +09:00
tanmayraut45 c1df31fda5 Honor AUTH_ENABLED=false in route-level auth gate (#785)
#622 reported "I cant even paste that hash pw and granted So auth_en
=false & localbypass= true But then the host still is showing login
page?" — the operator turned auth off in .env and still gets bounced
to /login on every page load. The flow:

The auth middleware in app.py is correctly gated on AUTH_ENABLED, so
the middleware itself does not install when AUTH_ENABLED=false. The
SPA front-end at static/app.js wraps window.fetch and redirects to
/login on ANY 401 response from any API call. So all it takes for the
operator to see a login page is one route-level 401.

src/auth_helpers.require_user — the shared FastAPI dependency mounted
on ~50 routes (email, contacts, personal, …) — was the source. It is
documented as defense-in-depth in case the middleware was bypassed
unexpectedly (SSRF from a sibling service), but the implementation
treated AUTH_ENABLED=false as one of those unexpected bypasses and
401'd anyway. The loopback fall-through that would have admitted the
operator does not fire under docker compose / a reverse proxy because
the container sees the request arriving from the bridge gateway
(172.x.x.x), not 127.0.0.1.

require_user now short-circuits to "" when AUTH_ENABLED=false so the
explicit operator opt-out reaches the route layer too. While in the
file, also mirror LOCALHOST_BYPASS=true the same way for loopback
callers — the middleware already lets them through, and routes 401'ing
the same caller would produce the same /login bounce. Non-loopback
callers under LOCALHOST_BYPASS are still rejected, matching the
middleware's _is_trusted_loopback check.

Add three focused regression tests in tests/test_security_regressions.py:
docker-bridge caller is admitted under AUTH_ENABLED=false, loopback
caller is admitted under LOCALHOST_BYPASS=true, LAN caller under
LOCALHOST_BYPASS=true is still rejected. The existing
test_require_user_rejects_unauthenticated and
test_require_user_accepts_loopback_when_unconfigured tests continue to
pass because neither sets AUTH_ENABLED, so the AUTH_ENABLED=true
default path is unchanged.

Closes #622.
2026-06-02 11:23:47 +09:00
tanmayraut45 55fa223e4d Exempt task webhook trigger from session auth (#784)
POSTing to the per-task webhook URL shown in the Tasks UI returned 401
Unauthorized even though the URL is labelled "no auth needed". The
trigger handler at routes/task_routes.py:873 (`POST
/api/tasks/{task_id}/webhook/{token}`) was written as an
unauthenticated endpoint — the 32-byte path-embedded `webhook_token`
generated by `secrets.token_urlsafe(32)` is the credential, and the
handler validates it against the row before doing anything. But
AuthMiddleware in app.py runs first and only knows about
AUTH_EXEMPT_EXACT (static path set) and AUTH_EXEMPT_PREFIXES (only
`/static`), so every external POST (curl, Zapier, n8n, Make,
Activepieces) got rejected before the route ever saw the request.
External callers can't supply a session cookie, which is precisely
why the per-task token exists.

Fix: add an AUTH_EXEMPT_PATTERNS list of compiled regexes for dynamic
public paths and route `^/api/tasks/[^/]+/webhook/[^/]+/?$` through
it. The route handler still enforces `ScheduledTask.webhook_token ==
token` and 404s on mismatch, so an attacker without the token gets a
404 (indistinguishable from a non-existent task), and a holder of the
token gets the documented "POST and a task fires" behaviour. The
sibling endpoint `/{task_id}/webhook-regenerate` is admin-gated and
deliberately does NOT match the pattern — it requires `_owner(request)`
and a session.

Tests: tests/test_webhook_trigger_auth_exempt.py extracts the regex
list out of app.py, applies it to a representative trigger path
(positive) and the four neighbouring task paths that must stay
authenticated (negative — `/api/tasks`, `/api/tasks/{id}`,
`/api/tasks/{id}/webhook-regenerate`, `/api/tasks/{id}/run`), and
pins the handler-side token check so a refactor of the route doesn't
quietly turn the endpoint into a truly anonymous one.

Closes #621.
2026-06-02 11:23:40 +09:00
tanmayraut45 cc40a3263e Lift deep-research hard timeout into a setting (#783)
The 600s wall-clock cap in research_handler.start_research was too short
for local / edge LLMs to finish a deep-research synthesis — long
extraction passes plus a slow final report routinely blew past 10
minutes and the run was killed with partial results.

Introduce research_run_timeout_seconds (default 1800s = 30 min) in
DEFAULT_SETTINGS and resolve it at start_research entry when the caller
hasn't pinned hard_timeout. Bound the resolved value at [60, 86400] so a
misconfigured settings.json can't either disable the safety net or
explode into a multi-day hang. Existing call sites in research_routes.py
and chat_routes.py keep working unchanged — they don't pass hard_timeout
and now pick up the new default.

Closes #595.
2026-06-02 11:23:32 +09:00
tanmayraut45 2d7d7b2412 Fix TOCTOU race in chat stream status endpoint
The /api/chat/stream_status handler did a membership test against
_active_streams followed by an indexed read of the same key. Between
those two ops, a sibling stream's finally block (or a stop / cleanup
path) can pop the entry, turning the indexed read into a KeyError that
bubbles up as a 500. The race is the exact one _stream_set was already
written to avoid; the comment on the helper at the top of the module
spells out why a single .get() is the right pattern here too.

Collapse the two-step into a single .get() call so the lookup either
returns the live record or None, and report 'detached' / 404 based on
that single read. No behavior change on the happy path; the failure
mode under concurrent stream cleanup is now handled deterministically.

Closes #658.
2026-06-02 03:02:30 +05:30
tanmayraut45 d2bad10781 Fix searxng container permission errors during setup
A fresh `docker compose up -d` shows the searxng container failing its
healthcheck with permission errors at setup (reported in #721 — the
service comes up under names like `odysseus_searxng_1` and never goes
ready, which then blocks the main odysseus container because of the
`depends_on: searxng: condition: service_healthy` gate).

Root cause: the official `searxng/searxng:latest` image runs as the
non-root `searxng` user but its entrypoint still needs to

1. chown /etc/searxng on first boot so the persisted named volume is
   owned by the searxng user inside the container,
2. su-exec to drop / re-assert privileges before launching uwsgi, and
3. let our wrapper entrypoint (which seeds settings.yml into the named
   volume on first boot) write the file through the volume mount.

Without explicit `cap_add`, the container has neither CHOWN nor
DAC_OVERRIDE nor SETUID/SETGID, so the entrypoint aborts at the first
chown / su-exec / redirection with EACCES. The upstream searxng-docker
compose file solves this with the standard "drop everything, grant only
what's needed" capability pattern.

Fix: mirror the upstream cap_drop ALL / cap_add CHOWN, SETGID, SETUID,
DAC_OVERRIDE on the searxng service. This grants only the four caps the
entrypoint actually needs, matches what searxng-docker ships with, and
leaves ports, volumes, env, healthcheck, and the wrapper entrypoint
unchanged.

Closes #721.
2026-06-02 02:47:30 +05:30