- Reconcile conflict resolution in routes/editor_agent_routes.py and src/editor_agent_model.py
- Enforce strict server-authorized endpoint resolution and reject client URL overrides
- Enforce bearer-token privilege separation: delegated API tokens are capped at non-admin scope per src/tool_security.py and cannot inspect private base URLs or probe metadata
- Preserve chat-scope authorization, missing-session 401 rejection, and owner-scoped browser bridge/SSE queues
- Preserve administrator-disabled-tool denylist enforcement introduced by PR #6357
- Fix mobile toolbar flyout hit-testing and stacking context trapping on viewports <= 700px via scoped elevation and mask suppression
- Stabilize project recovery test fixture by awaiting document draft quiescence prior to baseline capture
* fix(security): stop the agent from re-enabling tools an admin disabled
settings.json:disabled_tools is the only global tool-permission boundary
the Settings > Agent Tools panel offers, yet manage_settings exposed an
`enable_tool` action that removed entries from it. Any agent turn could
undo the admin's restriction, and because the agent reads untrusted web
pages, emails and documents, a planted instruction could re-enable bash,
email or any other tool that had been switched off.
The denylist can now only be narrowed from a turn: `disable_tool` and
`list_tools` keep working, `enable_tool` is refused with a message that
points the user to Settings > Agent Tools, and the action is dropped from
the function schema, the prompt rule and the tool index so models are not
steered into calling it. The free-form set/delete/reset actions were
already unable to reach `disabled_tools`; a test now pins that.
Fixes#5523
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UAB5sz5srMKR7rbeDFtdMH
* fix(settings): close internal API tool-policy bypass
Refuse global tool-policy replacement from internal-token requests even when an admin owner is impersonated, and block the same write in app_api. Route explicit image re-enable requests to list_tools with a Settings pointer. Keep disabled_tools outside general settings actions even if a default is added later. Remove the retired action from capability metadata. Validation: 573 focused tests passed; the running app rejected handler, generic API and encoded-path internal HTTP attempts while preserving human administrator controls.
* fix(mcp): block agent writes to per-server MCP tool policy
PATCH /api/mcp/servers/{id}/tools only checked require_admin, which accepts
the internal tool token, and app_api still forwarded it, so an agent turn
could re-enable MCP tools an admin had switched off. Refuse the internal
token on that route (same check as POST /api/tools) and add PATCH
/api/mcp/servers to the app_api blocklist, with regression tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BCbhLNC7mJsunxqfwwshqn
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Afonso Junior <chatgpt@yack.com.br>
* fix(email): guard user-supplied IMAP/SMTP hosts against SSRF
POST /api/email/accounts/test opened raw imaplib/smtplib connections to
whatever host:port the request body named, and POST/PUT /api/email/accounts
and PUT /api/email/config persisted arbitrary hosts for the background
pollers to contact. All of these sit behind require_user/require_owner with
no admin gate, so any authenticated user could make the server connect to
loopback, LAN and cloud-metadata targets (169.254.169.254) and read the
first 200 characters of the remote banner back out of the friendly error.
THREAT_MODEL.md lists email as admin-only; the tool layer honours that but
the HTTP routes did not.
Add check_outbound_host() to src/url_safety.py, a bare-host companion to
check_outbound_url() with the same classification (link-local, multicast,
reserved and unspecified always rejected; private/loopback only with
block_private) plus localhost-name handling and an explicit policy for names
that do not resolve. Wire it into the four email routes via
_check_mail_host(): non-admin owners (and everyone when
EMAIL_BLOCK_PRIVATE_IPS=true) also lose private/loopback targets, admins
keep the local-first LAN/Dovecot setups. Unresolvable names pass through
because the connect that follows fails with the same DNS error.
Regression tests cover the helper's policy table and each route: the test
route rejects before any socket opens, save routes reject before touching
the DB, admins keep loopback unless locked down, and an update that fails
validation leaves the stored row untouched.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TwcwfY2uQMxNRsK3y6xBAp
* fix(email): harden IMAP/SMTP SSRF protection against rebinding, TOCTOU, and unvetted hosts
- P0: Implement safe_create_connection() in src/url_safety.py to resolve hostnames once, validate every returned address against SSRF policy, and connect directly to the pinned IP. This eliminates DNS rebinding and TOCTOU while preserving TLS SNI and certificate hostname verification across IMAP, IMAPS, STARTTLS, SMTP, and SMTP_SSL.
- P1: Ensure unresolvable or deferred hostnames cannot become an unrestricted future connection capability by enforcing runtime SSRF validation fail-closed on every connection, while maintaining compatibility with offline configurations.
- P2: Extend SSRF enforcement to the core connection layer (_open_imap_connection, _send_smtp_message, _imap_connect) using ContextVar owner scoping, protecting pre-existing DB rows, restored configs, background pollers, and scheduled operations.
- P3: Allow admin and single-user access to IPv6 loopback (::1, [::1]) for local mail servers (e.g. Dovecot) by checking loopback before is_reserved, while keeping link-local, cloud metadata (169.254.169.254, 100.100.100.200), and non-admin restrictions strictly enforced.
- Add comprehensive regression and adversarial test coverage in tests/test_email_account_host_ssrf.py.
* fix(email): reject unresolved saved hosts without stdlib monkeypatches
Use the existing explicit policy IMAP/SMTP classes and canonical connect_outbound_tcp helper. Remove process-wide stdlib assignments, context-variable plumbing, redundant aliases and resolver-signature retries. Reject unsafe or unresolved hosts before account/config persistence, keep DNS work off the event loop, return fixed client errors, identify Alibaba metadata accurately and reject invalid TCP ports. Validation: 654 relevant email, URL-safety and CodeQL regression tests passed, 3 skipped. Three unrelated browser checks were excluded after environment failures (missing Playwright browser and Chromium timeout). Running-app checks verified rejected create/update/config requests leave stored data unchanged, administrator LAN configuration still works, and metadata/non-admin loopback are blocked.
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: PR #6029 Reviewer <reviewer@odysseus-review.local>
Co-authored-by: Afonso Junior <chatgpt@yack.com.br>
* fix(security): block read-only cookbook tools for non-admin owners
list_cached_models, list_served_models, tail_serve_output, list_downloads,
search_hf_models, list_serve_presets and list_cookbook_servers were in the
plan-mode read-only allowlist but in neither NON_ADMIN_BLOCKED_TOOLS nor the
dispatcher's _ADMIN_TOOLS. Each implementation calls a require_admin route
over the internal loopback with the process-wide INTERNAL_TOOL_TOKEN and
never checks the owner, so a non-admin user's agent inherited admin reach
through them. list_cached_models is the worst case: a caller-chosen `host`
is forwarded to /api/model/cached, which SSHes to that host with the app
user's keys and walks caller-chosen model_dirs. THREAT_MODEL.md lists model
serving as admin-only, so gate the read side the same way as serve/download.
Adding the names to NON_ADMIN_BLOCKED_TOOLS also hides them from non-admin
tool schemas and caps bearer-token agent runs; _ADMIN_TOOLS blocks them at
dispatch. Regression test covers both lists, schema hiding, and that the
loopback is never reached for a non-admin owner.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TwcwfY2uQMxNRsK3y6xBAp
* fix(cookbook): bind request authority in admin gate regressions
Keep all seven read-only Cookbook tools in the admin prompt inventory. Grant request authority in dispatch tests so the admin gate itself is exercised, and verify administrators still reach each handler. Validation: 359 focused authorization, tool-policy and schema tests passed. Against the running app with real auth accounts, all seven tools reject a non-admin and an admin reaches the authenticated Cookbook HTTP API.
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Afonso Junior <chatgpt@yack.com.br>
* fix(agent): give file tools the agent workspace as root when no workspace is set (#6679)
With no workspace bound, bash/python run in data/agent_workspace, but
RequestAuthority sealed no filesystem root, so every native file tool
failed with "requires a sealed resource root", and an approved
write_file failed with "no sealed resource identity". Seal the agent
workspace instead, and resolve relative paths in _resolve_tool_path
against it rather than the server's cwd.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test: re-seal resource roots when a test swaps the authority owner (#6679)
A no-workspace authority now seals the agent workspace for its owner, so
replace(authority, owner="bob") copied alice's root and was rejected
before the approval-binding check the tests are about.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(agent): only seal a vetted agent workspace as the file-tool root (#6679)
Apply the agent_cwd() check before sealing data/agent_workspace: it must
be a real directory in the readable data subdirs, otherwise no root is
sealed. A symlinked workspace no longer redirects the file tools or the
bash/python launch scope. Tighten the dispatch test assertions to the
exact 'outside the sealed roots' message.
* refactor(agent): vet the no-workspace file root with default_agent_workspace (#6679)
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
When the window widens after an auto-collapse, the restore check removes
.hidden and measures the chat width to decide whether the sidebar fits.
html.ody-sidebar-mini also forces the sidebar to width 0 and was only
cleared by syncRailSide() after the measurement, so the check always saw
a 0-width sidebar and restored it even when the chat ended up narrower
than MIN_CHAT_WIDTH. Sync the mode classes before measuring.
The global .hidden utility (display: none) also matches #sidebar.hidden,
so the collapsed sidebar was removed from layout before its width/opacity
transition could run, and opening and closing both snapped in one frame.
Keep the collapsed sidebar rendered and take it out of interaction once
closed: .sidebar.hidden stays display: flex, gains pointer-events: none,
and visibility: hidden that is transitioned so it only flips after the
collapse finishes (keeping the closed sidebar out of the tab order).
On desktop the icon rail now tucks under the sidebar and slides out as it
collapses, so the combined width eases instead of jumping by 48px when
the two swap. On mobile the drawer keeps its width while off so it slides
out as well as in, and switching it to the right edge before opening no
longer animates it across the screen. Transitions are disabled under
prefers-reduced-motion, and the auto-collapse restore measures the chat
width with the transition suppressed.
Re-record the computed-style snapshot baseline for the sidebar and icon
rail.
Alexandre Teixeira