start-macos.sh is the single-instance launcher and adopts whatever is
already listening: an open ChromaDB port is a resource it reuses. With
one checkout that is right. With several, it means a scratch worktree
silently attaching to another checkout's vector store, and the script
reports it as a success.
odysseus-dev is the sibling that owns isolation instead. Ports are
derived from the worktree path, so two checkouts never collide and one
checkout always gets the same URL. A ChromaDB this worktree did not
start is refused, never adopted — we start our own or fall closed to
keyword mode and say which. The data dir, database and browser-MCP
cache live under .odysseus-dev/, leaving data/ to a normal launch. A
checkout wired into launchd or systemd will not boot at all, and the
ports the project already means something by (7000, 7011, 7860, 8100)
are refused even when asked for explicitly.
Readiness is /api/ready rather than a TCP accept: the port accepting
connections says nothing about the database or a writable data dir.
That endpoint is not auth-exempt, so the tool owns a dev admin account,
hands it to setup.py and prints it.
--from-pr N fetches pull/N/head into its own worktree and boots it,
borrowing a venv so a PR is a few seconds rather than a pip install.
start-macos.sh is untouched: it is what the LaunchAgent runs.
The R09 scholarly hardening routes every hop through check_outbound_url with
block_private=True. On a DNS64/NAT64 network, an IPv4-only host can resolve
through the RFC 6052 Well-Known Prefix. For example, export.arxiv.org resolved
to 64:ff9b::924b:5b2a in the reproduced environment.
CPython classifies that outer IPv6 prefix as reserved, so the URL guard rejected
the request before examining the effective IPv4 destination.
Decode addresses in exactly 64:ff9b::/96 to their embedded IPv4 destination and
evaluate that destination under the strict outbound policy.
The translated target is always checked with private-address blocking enabled.
This prevents the NAT64 prefix from becoming a path to loopback, private,
shared/CGNAT, link-local, multicast, unspecified, or other non-global IPv4
space.
Network-specific translation prefixes are not decoded. In particular,
64:ff9b:1::/48 remains subject to the existing IPv6 policy.
Coverage includes:
- public IPv4 destinations embedded through the RFC 6052 prefix
- loopback, link-local, private, CGNAT, multicast, unspecified, benchmark, and
TEST-NET rejection
- network-specific NAT64 prefixes remaining undecoded
- deterministic scholarly provider tests without live DNS dependence
- redirect query parameter isolation
- relative redirect resolution
- HTTP error fallback behavior
- editor draft GET and DELETE behavior remaining unaffected
R09, R11, and R01 were independently audited and otherwise left unchanged.
- Enforce outbound URL policy on all hops via bounded manual redirects in scholarly lookups
- Guard declared Content-Length in EditorDraftRoute before request body parsing
- Keep scholarly lookup timeouts and budgets as internal constants rather than surface env vars
- Narrow TUI threat-model description around demonstrable host shell bridge behavior
- Add behavioral regression tests for redirect security and pre-parsing body size guards
Covers both behaviours end to end: a refused outbound URL and an exhausted
budget must skip the request entirely rather than fall through to httpx, the
remaining budget caps each hop's timeout, and an over-ceiling Content-Length
returns 413 without the body being parsed.
Verified against the pre-fix tree: the User-Agent was hardcoded, the endpoints
were literals, check_outbound_url was absent, both hops carried independent
12.0s timeouts, and an oversized declared body returned 422 after parsing
rather than 413 before it.
Léo