jpmschweitzerandClaude Opus 4.8
7171a09fc2
A clide:// link is an untrusted external vector (any webpage can fire one), so it no longer translates to a command in parseArgv. It routes the raw URL to a new builtin.deeplink handler that is doubly defensive: a default-deny allowlist (kDeepLinkSafeActions — only the read-only 'open' verb; run/git/write/passthrough rejected) AND a mandatory 'an external link wants to: … allow?' confirmation before anything runs. Records the security boundary as D-90. The earlier silent editor.open passthrough is replaced; open still works, now behind the prompt. Tests cover the allowlist (the boundary) + the gating. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
62 lines
2.3 KiB
Dart
62 lines
2.3 KiB
Dart
/// Tests for the clide:// deep-link parser + paranoid allowlist (T-56, D-90).
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/// The allowlist is the security boundary, so it gets the bulk of the coverage.
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library;
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import 'package:clide/builtin/deeplink/src/deep_link.dart';
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import 'package:test/test.dart';
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void main() {
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group('parseDeepLink — open', () {
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test('parses path + optional line', () {
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final a = parseDeepLink('clide://open?path=/repo/x.dart')!;
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expect(a.name, 'open');
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expect(a.path, '/repo/x.dart');
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expect(a.line, isNull);
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final b = parseDeepLink('clide://open?path=/repo/x.dart&line=42')!;
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expect(b.line, 42);
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});
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test('decodes a percent-encoded path', () {
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expect(parseDeepLink('clide://open?path=/a%20b/c.dart')!.path, '/a b/c.dart');
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});
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test('describe reads naturally for the prompt', () {
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expect(parseDeepLink('clide://open?path=/x&line=9')!.describe, contains('/x'));
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expect(parseDeepLink('clide://open?path=/x&line=9')!.describe, contains('9'));
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});
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test('missing/empty path is rejected', () {
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expect(parseDeepLink('clide://open'), isNull);
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expect(parseDeepLink('clide://open?path='), isNull);
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});
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test('a non-positive or non-numeric line is rejected (no guessing)', () {
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expect(parseDeepLink('clide://open?path=/x&line=0'), isNull);
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expect(parseDeepLink('clide://open?path=/x&line=-3'), isNull);
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expect(parseDeepLink('clide://open?path=/x&line=abc'), isNull);
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});
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});
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group('paranoid allowlist (default-deny) — the security boundary', () {
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test('the allowlist is exactly the safe navigation set', () {
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expect(kDeepLinkSafeActions, {'open'});
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});
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test('a non-allowlisted action is rejected even if well-formed', () {
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// These are the kind of things a malicious page might try.
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expect(parseDeepLink('clide://run?cmd=rm'), isNull);
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expect(parseDeepLink('clide://git?verb=push'), isNull);
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expect(parseDeepLink('clide://write?path=/x&content=evil'), isNull);
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expect(parseDeepLink('clide://exec?path=/x'), isNull);
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});
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test('a non-clide scheme or garbage is rejected', () {
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expect(parseDeepLink('https://evil.com/open?path=/x'), isNull);
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expect(parseDeepLink('file:///etc/passwd'), isNull);
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expect(parseDeepLink('not a url at all'), isNull);
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expect(parseDeepLink(''), isNull);
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});
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});
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}
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