feat: add coding tools (edit_file, write_file, bash)

New tools for code modification:
- EditFileTool: find-and-replace with safety checks (unique match required)
- WriteFileTool: create/overwrite files with path validation
- BashTool: full bash with controlled write access

Security controls on BashTool:
- Allowed: mkdir, touch, cp, mv, rm (single files), git, pip, pytest
- Forbidden: sudo, curl, wget, ssh, rm -rf, chmod 777

Includes 39 new tests (78 total now passing).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
2026-01-10 11:16:05 +01:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 4.5
parent 3b58fa4f8b
commit d0fa5b38a7
8 changed files with 1350 additions and 4 deletions
@@ -8,8 +8,11 @@ from pydantic_ai import Agent, RunContext
from src.domains.agents.base import AgentContext
from src.domains.tools.file.read import ReadFileTool
from src.domains.tools.file.glob import GlobFilesTool
from src.domains.tools.file.edit import EditFileTool
from src.domains.tools.file.write import WriteFileTool
from src.domains.tools.search.grep import GrepContentTool
from src.domains.tools.shell.bash import BashReadOnlyTool
from src.domains.tools.shell.bash_full import BashTool
def register_explore_tools(agent: Agent[AgentContext, str]) -> None:
@@ -161,3 +164,110 @@ def register_explore_tools(agent: Agent[AgentContext, str]) -> None:
timeout=min(timeout, ctx.deps.timeout_seconds)
)
return result.to_string()
# === Write-capable tools ===
@agent.tool
async def edit_file(
ctx: RunContext[AgentContext],
file_path: str,
old_string: str,
new_string: str,
replace_all: bool = False
) -> str:
"""Make targeted edits to a file using find-and-replace.
Args:
file_path: Absolute path to the file to edit
old_string: The exact text to find and replace (must exist in file)
new_string: The replacement text
replace_all: If True, replace all occurrences. If False (default),
old_string must be unique (appear exactly once).
Returns:
Success message with diff preview, or error.
IMPORTANT:
- old_string must exactly match file content (including whitespace)
- By default, old_string must appear exactly once (for safety)
- Always read the file first to verify exact content before editing
"""
tool = EditFileTool(allowed_paths=ctx.deps.allowed_paths)
result = await tool.execute(
file_path=file_path,
old_string=old_string,
new_string=new_string,
replace_all=replace_all
)
return result.to_string()
@agent.tool
async def write_file(
ctx: RunContext[AgentContext],
file_path: str,
content: str
) -> str:
"""Create a new file or overwrite an existing file.
Args:
file_path: Absolute path to the file to create/write
content: The content to write to the file
Returns:
Success message with file path and size.
IMPORTANT:
- Parent directory must exist (use mkdir first if needed)
- For editing existing files, prefer edit_file instead
- Will overwrite existing files without confirmation
"""
tool = WriteFileTool(allowed_paths=ctx.deps.allowed_paths)
result = await tool.execute(
file_path=file_path,
content=content
)
return result.to_string()
@agent.tool
async def bash(
ctx: RunContext[AgentContext],
command: str,
cwd: str | None = None,
timeout: int = 60
) -> str:
"""Execute a bash command with write capabilities.
ALLOWED:
- File operations: ls, find, mkdir, touch, cp, mv, rm (single files)
- Git (full): git add, git commit, git checkout, git merge, git pull
- Python: python, pip install, pytest, mypy, ruff
- Text processing: grep, awk, sed, sort
- Command chaining: && and || are allowed
FORBIDDEN:
- sudo, su (privilege escalation)
- Network: curl, wget, ssh, scp, rsync
- Dangerous: rm -rf, chmod 777, dd, mkfs
Args:
command: The bash command to execute
cwd: Working directory (default: agent working directory)
timeout: Timeout in seconds (default: 60)
Returns:
Command output or error message.
Examples:
- "mkdir -p src/utils" creates directory
- "git add . && git commit -m 'fix: bug'" commits changes
- "pytest tests/ -v" runs tests
- "rm old_file.py" removes single file
"""
tool = BashTool(allowed_paths=ctx.deps.allowed_paths)
working_dir = cwd or ctx.deps.working_dir
result = await tool.execute(
command=command,
cwd=working_dir,
timeout=min(timeout, ctx.deps.timeout_seconds)
)
return result.to_string()
+5 -2
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@@ -4,15 +4,18 @@ Tool implementations for agent use.
All tools inherit from BaseTool and return ToolResult.
"""
from src.domains.tools.base import BaseTool, ToolResult
from src.domains.tools.file import ReadFileTool, GlobFilesTool
from src.domains.tools.file import ReadFileTool, GlobFilesTool, EditFileTool, WriteFileTool
from src.domains.tools.search import GrepContentTool
from src.domains.tools.shell import BashReadOnlyTool
from src.domains.tools.shell import BashReadOnlyTool, BashTool
__all__ = [
"BaseTool",
"ToolResult",
"ReadFileTool",
"GlobFilesTool",
"EditFileTool",
"WriteFileTool",
"GrepContentTool",
"BashReadOnlyTool",
"BashTool",
]
@@ -3,5 +3,7 @@ File operation tools.
"""
from src.domains.tools.file.read import ReadFileTool
from src.domains.tools.file.glob import GlobFilesTool
from src.domains.tools.file.edit import EditFileTool
from src.domains.tools.file.write import WriteFileTool
__all__ = ["ReadFileTool", "GlobFilesTool"]
__all__ = ["ReadFileTool", "GlobFilesTool", "EditFileTool", "WriteFileTool"]
+194
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
"""
File editing tool with find-and-replace functionality.
"""
import difflib
import aiofiles
from pathlib import Path
from src.domains.tools.base import BaseTool, ToolResult
from src.shared.logging import logged, get_logger
logger = get_logger(__name__)
# Binary file extensions to skip
BINARY_EXTENSIONS = {
'.pyc', '.pyo', '.so', '.o', '.a', '.lib', '.dll', '.exe',
'.bin', '.dat', '.db', '.sqlite', '.sqlite3',
'.png', '.jpg', '.jpeg', '.gif', '.ico', '.bmp', '.webp',
'.pdf', '.doc', '.docx', '.xls', '.xlsx',
'.zip', '.tar', '.gz', '.bz2', '.7z', '.rar',
'.mp3', '.mp4', '.avi', '.mov', '.wav',
'.woff', '.woff2', '.ttf', '.eot',
}
class EditFileTool(BaseTool):
"""
Edit files using find-and-replace.
Safely modifies files by finding exact text matches and replacing them.
Includes safety checks to prevent accidental edits.
"""
name = "edit_file"
description = """Make targeted edits to a file using find-and-replace.
Args:
file_path: Absolute path to the file to edit
old_string: The exact text to find and replace (must exist in file)
new_string: The replacement text
replace_all: If True, replace all occurrences. If False (default),
old_string must be unique in the file (appear exactly once).
Returns:
Success message with diff preview showing changes, or error.
IMPORTANT:
- The old_string must exactly match text in the file (including whitespace/indentation)
- By default, old_string must appear exactly once in the file (for safety)
- Use replace_all=True only when you intentionally want to replace all occurrences
- Always read the file first to verify exact content before editing
- Cannot edit binary files
Examples:
- Fix a bug: old_string="return x + y", new_string="return x * y"
- Rename function: old_string="def old_name(", new_string="def new_name("
- Add import: old_string="import os", new_string="import os\\nimport sys"
"""
def __init__(
self,
allowed_paths: list[str] | None = None,
max_file_size: int = 1_000_000, # 1MB
):
"""
Initialize EditFileTool.
Args:
allowed_paths: List of allowed directory prefixes (empty = no restrictions)
max_file_size: Maximum file size to edit in bytes
"""
self.allowed_paths = allowed_paths or []
self.max_file_size = max_file_size
def _is_binary_file(self, path: Path) -> bool:
"""Check if file is likely binary based on extension."""
return path.suffix.lower() in BINARY_EXTENSIONS
def _generate_diff(
self,
original: str,
modified: str,
file_path: str
) -> str:
"""Generate a unified diff between original and modified content."""
original_lines = original.splitlines(keepends=True)
modified_lines = modified.splitlines(keepends=True)
diff = difflib.unified_diff(
original_lines,
modified_lines,
fromfile=f"a/{Path(file_path).name}",
tofile=f"b/{Path(file_path).name}",
lineterm=""
)
return "".join(diff)
@logged()
async def execute(
self,
file_path: str,
old_string: str,
new_string: str,
replace_all: bool = False
) -> ToolResult:
"""
Edit a file by replacing old_string with new_string.
Args:
file_path: Absolute path to the file
old_string: Text to find (must exist)
new_string: Replacement text
replace_all: Replace all occurrences (default: False)
Returns:
ToolResult with diff preview or error
"""
path = Path(file_path)
# Validate path is allowed
if not self._validate_path(path, self.allowed_paths):
return self._error(f"Path not in allowed paths: {file_path}")
# Check file exists
if not path.exists():
return self._error(f"File not found: {file_path}")
if not path.is_file():
return self._error(f"Not a file: {file_path}")
# Check for binary files
if self._is_binary_file(path):
return self._error(f"Cannot edit binary file: {file_path}")
# Check file size
file_size = path.stat().st_size
if file_size > self.max_file_size:
return self._error(
f"File too large ({file_size} bytes). Max: {self.max_file_size} bytes"
)
# Validate inputs
if not old_string:
return self._error("old_string cannot be empty")
if old_string == new_string:
return self._error("old_string and new_string are identical")
try:
# Read file content
async with aiofiles.open(path, 'r', encoding='utf-8', errors='replace') as f:
content = await f.read()
# Check if old_string exists
count = content.count(old_string)
if count == 0:
return self._error(
f"old_string not found in file. "
f"Make sure to match exact whitespace and indentation."
)
# Check uniqueness if replace_all is False
if not replace_all and count > 1:
return self._error(
f"old_string appears {count} times in file. "
f"Use replace_all=True to replace all, or provide a more specific string."
)
# Perform replacement
if replace_all:
modified = content.replace(old_string, new_string)
else:
modified = content.replace(old_string, new_string, 1)
# Generate diff for preview
diff = self._generate_diff(content, modified, file_path)
# Write modified content
async with aiofiles.open(path, 'w', encoding='utf-8') as f:
await f.write(modified)
replacements = count if replace_all else 1
return self._success(
data=f"Successfully edited {file_path}\n\n{diff}",
replacements=replacements,
file_path=str(path.resolve())
)
except PermissionError:
return self._error(f"Permission denied: {file_path}")
except UnicodeDecodeError as e:
return self._error(f"Unable to decode file (binary?): {e}")
except Exception as e:
logger.exception(f"Error editing file: {file_path}")
return self._error(f"Error editing file: {e}")
+125
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@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
"""
File writing tool for creating and overwriting files.
"""
import aiofiles
from pathlib import Path
from src.domains.tools.base import BaseTool, ToolResult
from src.shared.logging import logged, get_logger
logger = get_logger(__name__)
class WriteFileTool(BaseTool):
"""
Create new files or overwrite existing files.
Validates paths are within allowed directories and enforces size limits.
"""
name = "write_file"
description = """Create a new file or overwrite an existing file.
Args:
file_path: Absolute path to the file to create/write
content: The content to write to the file
Returns:
Success message with file path and size, or error.
Includes a warning if overwriting an existing file.
IMPORTANT:
- Use absolute paths only
- Parent directory must exist (will not create directories)
- Will overwrite existing files without confirmation
- For targeted edits to existing files, use edit_file instead
- Maximum content size: 1MB
Examples:
- Create new module: file_path="/project/src/utils.py", content="def helper(): pass"
- Create config: file_path="/project/config.json", content='{"key": "value"}'
- Create test: file_path="/project/tests/test_new.py", content="def test_example(): assert True"
"""
def __init__(
self,
allowed_paths: list[str] | None = None,
max_content_size: int = 1_000_000, # 1MB
):
"""
Initialize WriteFileTool.
Args:
allowed_paths: List of allowed directory prefixes (empty = no restrictions)
max_content_size: Maximum content size in bytes
"""
self.allowed_paths = allowed_paths or []
self.max_content_size = max_content_size
@logged()
async def execute(
self,
file_path: str,
content: str
) -> ToolResult:
"""
Write content to a file.
Args:
file_path: Absolute path to the file
content: Content to write
Returns:
ToolResult with success info or error
"""
path = Path(file_path).resolve()
# Validate path is allowed
if not self._validate_path(path, self.allowed_paths):
return self._error(f"Path not in allowed paths: {file_path}")
# Check content size
content_bytes = len(content.encode('utf-8'))
if content_bytes > self.max_content_size:
return self._error(
f"Content too large ({content_bytes} bytes). "
f"Max: {self.max_content_size} bytes"
)
# Check parent directory exists
if not path.parent.exists():
return self._error(
f"Parent directory does not exist: {path.parent}. "
f"Create it first with mkdir."
)
if not path.parent.is_dir():
return self._error(f"Parent path is not a directory: {path.parent}")
# Check if we're overwriting
overwritten = path.exists() and path.is_file()
try:
# Write the file
async with aiofiles.open(path, 'w', encoding='utf-8') as f:
await f.write(content)
# Count lines for metadata
lines = content.count('\n') + (1 if content and not content.endswith('\n') else 0)
status = "Overwrote" if overwritten else "Created"
return self._success(
data=f"{status} {path} ({content_bytes} bytes, {lines} lines)",
file_path=str(path),
file_size=content_bytes,
lines=lines,
overwritten=overwritten
)
except PermissionError:
return self._error(f"Permission denied: {file_path}")
except OSError as e:
return self._error(f"OS error writing file: {e}")
except Exception as e:
logger.exception(f"Error writing file: {file_path}")
return self._error(f"Error writing file: {e}")
@@ -2,5 +2,6 @@
Shell execution tools.
"""
from src.domains.tools.shell.bash import BashReadOnlyTool
from src.domains.tools.shell.bash_full import BashTool
__all__ = ["BashReadOnlyTool"]
__all__ = ["BashReadOnlyTool", "BashTool"]
@@ -0,0 +1,430 @@
"""
Full bash command execution tool with controlled write capabilities.
Allows more operations than BashReadOnlyTool but still with safety controls.
"""
import asyncio
import shlex
from pathlib import Path
from src.domains.tools.base import BaseTool, ToolResult
from src.shared.logging import logged, get_logger
logger = get_logger(__name__)
# Commands allowed (includes write operations)
ALLOWED_COMMANDS = {
# File inspection (read-only)
"ls", "find", "cat", "head", "tail", "wc", "file", "stat",
"tree", "du", "df",
# Text processing
"grep", "awk", "sed", "sort", "uniq", "cut", "tr",
# Git (full operations)
"git",
# System info
"pwd", "whoami", "hostname", "uname", "date", "env", "printenv",
"which", "type", "echo",
# Archive operations
"tar", "unzip", "zipinfo",
# Write operations (controlled)
"mkdir", "touch", "cp", "mv", "rm",
"chmod",
# Python ecosystem
"python", "python3", "pip", "pip3", "pytest", "mypy", "ruff",
# Other dev tools
"make", "cargo", "npm", "node", "tsc",
}
# Git subcommands (includes write operations)
ALLOWED_GIT_SUBCOMMANDS = {
# Read-only
"status", "log", "diff", "show", "branch", "tag",
"remote", "config", "ls-files", "ls-tree",
"rev-parse", "describe", "shortlog", "blame",
# Write operations
"add", "commit", "checkout", "switch", "restore",
"merge", "rebase", "cherry-pick",
"stash", "pull", "fetch", "init",
"reset", "clean", "rm", "mv",
}
# Absolutely forbidden - too dangerous regardless of context
ABSOLUTELY_FORBIDDEN = [
# Catastrophic deletes
"rm -rf /",
"rm -rf ~",
"rm -rf .",
"rm -rf *",
# Privilege escalation
"sudo ",
"su ",
"doas ",
# Dangerous permissions
"chmod 777",
"chmod -R 777",
"chown ",
"chgrp ",
# Disk operations
"dd if=",
"mkfs",
"fdisk",
"parted",
# System control
"shutdown",
"reboot",
"poweroff",
"init ",
"systemctl",
# Fork bomb pattern
":(){ :|:& };:",
]
# Network commands are forbidden
NETWORK_FORBIDDEN = [
"curl", "wget", "ssh", "scp", "rsync", "sftp", "ftp",
"nc", "netcat", "telnet", "nmap", "ping",
]
# Dangerous rm flags
DANGEROUS_RM_FLAGS = {"-rf", "-fr", "-r -f", "-f -r", "--recursive --force"}
class BashTool(BaseTool):
"""
Execute bash commands with controlled write capabilities.
More permissive than BashReadOnlyTool but still with safety controls.
"""
name = "bash"
description = """Execute a bash command with write capabilities.
ALLOWED commands:
- File operations: ls, find, cat, head, tail, mkdir, touch, cp, mv
- Git (full): git add, git commit, git checkout, git merge, git pull, etc.
- Python: python, pip install, pytest, mypy, ruff
- Text processing: grep, awk, sed, sort, uniq
- System info: pwd, whoami, date, which
RESTRICTED:
- rm: Single files only, no -rf flag, must be in allowed paths
- mv/cp: Target must be in allowed paths
- chmod: Only safe modes (no 777)
FORBIDDEN (always blocked):
- sudo, su (privilege escalation)
- Network: curl, wget, ssh, scp, rsync
- Dangerous: chmod 777, rm -rf, dd, mkfs, shutdown
Args:
command: The bash command to execute
cwd: Working directory (default: current directory)
timeout: Timeout in seconds (default: 60)
Returns:
Command stdout on success, or error message.
Examples:
- "mkdir -p src/new_module" - Create directory
- "cp template.py src/new_file.py" - Copy file
- "git add . && git commit -m 'feat: add feature'" - Git commit
- "pip install requests" - Install package
- "pytest tests/ -v" - Run tests
- "rm src/old_file.py" - Remove single file
"""
def __init__(
self,
allowed_paths: list[str] | None = None,
default_timeout: int = 60,
max_output_size: int = 50000
):
"""
Initialize BashTool.
Args:
allowed_paths: Allowed working/target directories
default_timeout: Default command timeout in seconds
max_output_size: Maximum output size in characters
"""
self.allowed_paths = allowed_paths or []
self.default_timeout = default_timeout
self.max_output_size = max_output_size
@logged()
async def execute(
self,
command: str,
cwd: str | None = None,
timeout: int | None = None
) -> ToolResult:
"""
Execute a bash command.
Args:
command: Command to execute
cwd: Working directory
timeout: Timeout in seconds
Returns:
ToolResult with command output or error
"""
timeout = timeout or self.default_timeout
working_dir = Path(cwd) if cwd else Path.cwd()
# Validate working directory
if not self._validate_path(working_dir, self.allowed_paths):
return self._error(f"Working directory not allowed: {working_dir}")
if not working_dir.exists():
return self._error(f"Working directory not found: {working_dir}")
# Security validation
validation_error = self._validate_command(command, working_dir)
if validation_error:
return self._error(validation_error)
try:
proc = await asyncio.create_subprocess_shell(
command,
stdout=asyncio.subprocess.PIPE,
stderr=asyncio.subprocess.PIPE,
cwd=str(working_dir)
)
stdout, stderr = await asyncio.wait_for(
proc.communicate(),
timeout=timeout
)
stdout_str = stdout.decode('utf-8', errors='replace')
stderr_str = stderr.decode('utf-8', errors='replace')
# Truncate if necessary
truncated = False
if len(stdout_str) > self.max_output_size:
stdout_str = stdout_str[:self.max_output_size]
truncated = True
if proc.returncode != 0:
# Command failed, return stderr
error_msg = stderr_str or f"Command exited with code {proc.returncode}"
return ToolResult(
success=False,
data=stdout_str if stdout_str else None,
error=error_msg,
truncated=truncated
)
# Success - combine stdout and stderr if both present
output = stdout_str
if stderr_str and not output:
output = stderr_str
return self._success(
data=output,
truncated=truncated,
exit_code=proc.returncode
)
except asyncio.TimeoutError:
return self._error(f"Command timed out after {timeout} seconds")
except Exception as e:
logger.exception(f"Error executing command: {command}")
return self._error(f"Error executing command: {e}")
def _validate_command(self, command: str, working_dir: Path) -> str | None:
"""
Validate command is safe to execute.
Returns:
Error message if invalid, None if valid
"""
command_lower = command.lower()
# Check absolutely forbidden patterns first
for pattern in ABSOLUTELY_FORBIDDEN:
if pattern.lower() in command_lower:
return f"Command contains forbidden pattern: {pattern}"
# Check network commands
for net_cmd in NETWORK_FORBIDDEN:
# Check as standalone command or with path
if (f" {net_cmd} " in f" {command_lower} " or
command_lower.startswith(f"{net_cmd} ") or
command_lower == net_cmd or
f"/{net_cmd} " in command_lower or
f"/{net_cmd}" == command_lower[-len(net_cmd)-1:]):
return f"Network command not allowed: {net_cmd}"
# Split by command separators to validate each sub-command
# Handle &&, ||, ; but also pipe |
sub_commands = self._split_commands(command)
for sub_cmd in sub_commands:
sub_cmd = sub_cmd.strip()
if not sub_cmd:
continue
error = self._validate_single_command(sub_cmd, working_dir)
if error:
return error
return None
def _split_commands(self, command: str) -> list[str]:
"""Split command by separators (&&, ||, ;) but not pipes."""
# Simple split - could be improved with proper shell parsing
result = []
current = ""
i = 0
while i < len(command):
if command[i:i+2] in ("&&", "||"):
result.append(current)
current = ""
i += 2
elif command[i] == ";":
result.append(current)
current = ""
i += 1
else:
current += command[i]
i += 1
if current:
result.append(current)
return result
def _validate_single_command(self, command: str, working_dir: Path) -> str | None:
"""Validate a single command (no &&, ||, ;)."""
# Handle pipes - validate first command in pipe chain
if "|" in command:
command = command.split("|")[0].strip()
# Parse command
try:
tokens = shlex.split(command)
if not tokens:
return None # Empty is ok (could be whitespace)
except ValueError as e:
return f"Invalid command syntax: {e}"
# Get base command
base_cmd = Path(tokens[0]).name
# Check if command is allowed
if base_cmd not in ALLOWED_COMMANDS:
return f"Command not allowed: {base_cmd}"
# Special handling for specific commands
if base_cmd == "git":
return self._validate_git_command(tokens)
elif base_cmd == "rm":
return self._validate_rm_command(tokens, working_dir)
elif base_cmd in ("cp", "mv"):
return self._validate_copy_move_command(tokens, working_dir)
elif base_cmd == "chmod":
return self._validate_chmod_command(tokens)
elif base_cmd in ("pip", "pip3"):
return self._validate_pip_command(tokens)
return None
def _validate_git_command(self, tokens: list[str]) -> str | None:
"""Validate git command."""
if len(tokens) < 2:
return "Git command requires a subcommand"
git_subcommand = tokens[1]
# Handle git with flags before subcommand (e.g., git -C path status)
if git_subcommand.startswith("-"):
# Find the actual subcommand
for i, token in enumerate(tokens[2:], 2):
if not token.startswith("-"):
git_subcommand = token
break
else:
return "Git command requires a subcommand"
if git_subcommand not in ALLOWED_GIT_SUBCOMMANDS:
return f"Git subcommand not allowed: {git_subcommand}"
# Block git push (could push to remote)
if git_subcommand == "push":
return "git push is not allowed (use manually)"
return None
def _validate_rm_command(self, tokens: list[str], working_dir: Path) -> str | None:
"""Validate rm command - only single files, no -rf."""
# Check for dangerous flags
flags = [t for t in tokens[1:] if t.startswith("-")]
for flag in flags:
if "r" in flag and "f" in flag:
return "rm -rf is not allowed"
if flag in DANGEROUS_RM_FLAGS:
return f"rm flag not allowed: {flag}"
# Must have at least one non-flag argument
args = [t for t in tokens[1:] if not t.startswith("-")]
if not args:
return "rm requires a file argument"
# Validate each path
for arg in args:
path = Path(arg)
if not path.is_absolute():
path = working_dir / path
if not self._validate_path(path, self.allowed_paths):
return f"rm target not in allowed paths: {arg}"
return None
def _validate_copy_move_command(
self, tokens: list[str], working_dir: Path
) -> str | None:
"""Validate cp/mv command - target must be in allowed paths."""
# Get non-flag arguments
args = [t for t in tokens[1:] if not t.startswith("-")]
if len(args) < 2:
return None # Let the command fail naturally
# Last argument is typically the destination
dest = args[-1]
dest_path = Path(dest)
if not dest_path.is_absolute():
dest_path = working_dir / dest_path
if not self._validate_path(dest_path, self.allowed_paths):
return f"Copy/move destination not in allowed paths: {dest}"
return None
def _validate_chmod_command(self, tokens: list[str]) -> str | None:
"""Validate chmod command - block dangerous modes."""
for token in tokens[1:]:
if token.startswith("-"):
continue
# Block 777 and similar
if "777" in token or "666" in token:
return f"chmod mode not allowed: {token}"
return None
def _validate_pip_command(self, tokens: list[str]) -> str | None:
"""Validate pip command - allow install, block uninstall of system packages."""
if len(tokens) < 2:
return None
subcommand = tokens[1]
# Allow help, list, show, freeze, check
allowed_pip = {"install", "list", "show", "freeze", "check", "help", "--help", "-h"}
if subcommand not in allowed_pip:
return f"pip subcommand not allowed: {subcommand}"
return None