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@@ -5,3 +5,10 @@ INSERT INTO ticket_history (ticket_record_id, field, old_value, new_value, chang
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Second finding 2026-09-13, from webber''s twin fix: an httpx event-hook on the client (the T-4 signal-reading approach) never fires under the openai SDK even when correctly wired — webber verified headers arriving while the hook stayed silent. When rewiring the client, read the signals from the parsed body''s model_extra in the sanitized create() instead (the wrapper injects balancing/compaction_due into non-streamed JSON bodies; openai pydantic models retain unknown fields). The steward''s raw-call body read is unaffected and already correct.', NULL, '2026-09-13 08:00:17', '2026-09-13 08:00:17.002', '2026-09-13 08:00:17.002', NULL, '6fb4cc1d7d7222e3d570cd8c7fed4fd9', 2) ON CONFLICT(hash) DO NOTHING;
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Second finding 2026-09-13, from webber''s twin fix: an httpx event-hook on the client (the T-4 signal-reading approach) never fires under the openai SDK even when correctly wired — webber verified headers arriving while the hook stayed silent. When rewiring the client, read the signals from the parsed body''s model_extra in the sanitized create() instead (the wrapper injects balancing/compaction_due into non-streamed JSON bodies; openai pydantic models retain unknown fields). The steward''s raw-call body read is unaffected and already correct.', NULL, '2026-09-13 08:00:17', '2026-09-13 08:00:17.002', '2026-09-13 08:00:17.002', NULL, '6fb4cc1d7d7222e3d570cd8c7fed4fd9', 2) ON CONFLICT(hash) DO NOTHING;
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INSERT INTO ticket_history (ticket_record_id, field, old_value, new_value, changed_by, changed_at, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G9KH87TRDGW45GMDWVDRPABR', 'status', 'backlog', 'in_progress', NULL, '2026-09-13 08:19:35', '2026-09-13 08:19:35.028', '2026-09-13 08:19:35.028', NULL, '5bcf19379361a2f766cd4787ff734611', 2) ON CONFLICT(hash) DO NOTHING;
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INSERT INTO ticket_history (ticket_record_id, field, old_value, new_value, changed_by, changed_at, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G9KH87TRDGW45GMDWVDRPABR', 'status', 'backlog', 'in_progress', NULL, '2026-09-13 08:19:35', '2026-09-13 08:19:35.028', '2026-09-13 08:19:35.028', NULL, '5bcf19379361a2f766cd4787ff734611', 2) ON CONFLICT(hash) DO NOTHING;
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INSERT INTO ticket_history (ticket_record_id, field, old_value, new_value, changed_by, changed_at, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G9KH87TRDGW45GMDWVDRPABR', 'status', 'in_progress', 'done', NULL, '2026-09-13 08:27:21', '2026-09-13 08:27:21.779', '2026-09-13 08:27:21.779', NULL, '1c59422336b88a76c6f1c3720916d7d5', 2) ON CONFLICT(hash) DO NOTHING;
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INSERT INTO ticket_history (ticket_record_id, field, old_value, new_value, changed_by, changed_at, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G9KH87TRDGW45GMDWVDRPABR', 'status', 'in_progress', 'done', NULL, '2026-09-13 08:27:21', '2026-09-13 08:27:21.779', '2026-09-13 08:27:21.779', NULL, '1c59422336b88a76c6f1c3720916d7d5', 2) ON CONFLICT(hash) DO NOTHING;
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INSERT INTO ticket_history (ticket_record_id, field, old_value, new_value, changed_by, changed_at, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G99D07Z3FZY8EBT9PJ1RCGHW', 'status', 'backlog', 'in_progress', NULL, '2026-09-13 08:48:55', '2026-09-13 08:48:55.587', '2026-09-13 08:48:55.587', NULL, 'ca4f8fb42c961b0002aa87bb7b1d5af5', 2) ON CONFLICT(hash) DO NOTHING;
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INSERT INTO ticket_history (ticket_record_id, field, old_value, new_value, changed_by, changed_at, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G99D07Z3FZY8EBT9PJ1RCGHW', 'status', 'in_progress', 'done', NULL, '2026-09-13 09:00:50', '2026-09-13 09:00:50.006', '2026-09-13 09:00:50.006', NULL, '5ea799ee4815e42ede80c3df4c81b28c', 2) ON CONFLICT(hash) DO NOTHING;
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INSERT INTO ticket_history (ticket_record_id, field, old_value, new_value, changed_by, changed_at, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G9KZSCFR79G4DFCT4E5W5CAM', 'description', 'Observed 2026-09-13 twice: before the v2.7.0 release audit and again during T-5 — make test exits 1 with a failure that does not reproduce on the immediate rerun, and both times the failing test''s name went uncaptured because the diagnostic rerun passed. Next occurrence: keep the FULL output of the failing run (make test 2>&1 | tee /tmp/flake.log) before rerunning, then pin the named test. Suspects worth checking when a name exists: order-dependent state in the session-scoped app init (conftest asyncio.run + cached health globals), port/redis contention with the live containers, and the coverage plugin''s tmp handling.', 'Observed 2026-09-13 twice: before the v2.7.0 release audit and again during T-5 — make test exits 1 with a failure that does not reproduce on the immediate rerun, and both times the failing test''s name went uncaptured because the diagnostic rerun passed. Next occurrence: keep the FULL output of the failing run (make test 2>&1 | tee /tmp/flake.log) before rerunning, then pin the named test. Suspects worth checking when a name exists: order-dependent state in the session-scoped app init (conftest asyncio.run + cached health globals), port/redis contention with the live containers, and the coverage plugin''s tmp handling.
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Third occurrence 2026-09-13, during the v2.7.2 release gate — and two process lessons captured the hard way: (1) the gate run was piped through grep, which swallowed make''s exit code, so the tag went out on a red run (release content was safe — version+changelog only on green-tested aace128 — but the gate did not gate); release runs must let make test''s exit code stand alone. (2) The failing name went uncaptured AGAIN because the tee capture only started on the rerun, which passed. The capture must wrap the FIRST gate run, every time, not begin after a failure.', NULL, '2026-09-13 09:14:10', '2026-09-13 09:14:10.345', '2026-09-13 09:14:10.345', NULL, '22909a81b656320b4a39405165f48612', 2) ON CONFLICT(hash) DO NOTHING;
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INSERT INTO ticket_history (ticket_record_id, field, old_value, new_value, changed_by, changed_at, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G9KZSCFR79G4DFCT4E5W5CAM', 'status', 'backlog', 'in_progress', NULL, '2026-09-13 09:16:08', '2026-09-13 09:16:08.928', '2026-09-13 09:16:08.928', NULL, '34276614ec535d50d5fa6ddf9f5e0da6', 2) ON CONFLICT(hash) DO NOTHING;
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INSERT INTO ticket_history (ticket_record_id, field, old_value, new_value, changed_by, changed_at, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G9KZSCFR79G4DFCT4E5W5CAM', 'status', 'in_progress', 'done', NULL, '2026-09-13 09:29:10', '2026-09-13 09:29:10.192', '2026-09-13 09:29:10.192', NULL, 'e040af9004e4510c4f8a9e9cacee9a8c', 2) ON CONFLICT(hash) DO NOTHING;
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@@ -2,3 +2,5 @@ INSERT INTO ticket_idmap (record_id, ticket_id, created_at, updated_at, deleted_
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INSERT INTO ticket_idmap (record_id, ticket_id, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G99D07EM5DZWTS0WD9V8PSKM', 'T-4', '2026-09-12 08:20:21.494', '2026-09-12 08:20:21.494', NULL, '5b28e07bdc3be1f9ed0ed71d2da60c72', 2) ON CONFLICT(record_id) DO UPDATE SET ticket_id=excluded.ticket_id, updated_at=excluded.updated_at, deleted_at=excluded.deleted_at, hash=excluded.hash, canonical_version=excluded.canonical_version WHERE excluded.updated_at >= ticket_idmap.updated_at;
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INSERT INTO ticket_idmap (record_id, ticket_id, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G99D07EM5DZWTS0WD9V8PSKM', 'T-4', '2026-09-12 08:20:21.494', '2026-09-12 08:20:21.494', NULL, '5b28e07bdc3be1f9ed0ed71d2da60c72', 2) ON CONFLICT(record_id) DO UPDATE SET ticket_id=excluded.ticket_id, updated_at=excluded.updated_at, deleted_at=excluded.deleted_at, hash=excluded.hash, canonical_version=excluded.canonical_version WHERE excluded.updated_at >= ticket_idmap.updated_at;
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INSERT INTO ticket_idmap (record_id, ticket_id, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G99D07Z3FZY8EBT9PJ1RCGHW', 'T-5', '2026-09-12 08:20:21.625', '2026-09-12 08:20:21.625', NULL, '0a417012779f612a4dad1a7dbd0787e3', 2) ON CONFLICT(record_id) DO UPDATE SET ticket_id=excluded.ticket_id, updated_at=excluded.updated_at, deleted_at=excluded.deleted_at, hash=excluded.hash, canonical_version=excluded.canonical_version WHERE excluded.updated_at >= ticket_idmap.updated_at;
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INSERT INTO ticket_idmap (record_id, ticket_id, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G99D07Z3FZY8EBT9PJ1RCGHW', 'T-5', '2026-09-12 08:20:21.625', '2026-09-12 08:20:21.625', NULL, '0a417012779f612a4dad1a7dbd0787e3', 2) ON CONFLICT(record_id) DO UPDATE SET ticket_id=excluded.ticket_id, updated_at=excluded.updated_at, deleted_at=excluded.deleted_at, hash=excluded.hash, canonical_version=excluded.canonical_version WHERE excluded.updated_at >= ticket_idmap.updated_at;
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INSERT INTO ticket_idmap (record_id, ticket_id, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G9KH87TRDGW45GMDWVDRPABR', 'T-6', '2026-09-13 07:57:01.782', '2026-09-13 07:57:01.782', NULL, 'd6c184ba6d24e03c0dc77064bf71fead', 2) ON CONFLICT(record_id) DO UPDATE SET ticket_id=excluded.ticket_id, updated_at=excluded.updated_at, deleted_at=excluded.deleted_at, hash=excluded.hash, canonical_version=excluded.canonical_version WHERE excluded.updated_at >= ticket_idmap.updated_at;
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INSERT INTO ticket_idmap (record_id, ticket_id, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G9KH87TRDGW45GMDWVDRPABR', 'T-6', '2026-09-13 07:57:01.782', '2026-09-13 07:57:01.782', NULL, 'd6c184ba6d24e03c0dc77064bf71fead', 2) ON CONFLICT(record_id) DO UPDATE SET ticket_id=excluded.ticket_id, updated_at=excluded.updated_at, deleted_at=excluded.deleted_at, hash=excluded.hash, canonical_version=excluded.canonical_version WHERE excluded.updated_at >= ticket_idmap.updated_at;
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INSERT INTO ticket_idmap (record_id, ticket_id, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G9KZSCFR79G4DFCT4E5W5CAM', 'T-7', '2026-09-13 09:00:32.255', '2026-09-13 09:00:32.255', NULL, 'b0b0a4c3ccaabeb58ad1958e7c2c2602', 2) ON CONFLICT(record_id) DO UPDATE SET ticket_id=excluded.ticket_id, updated_at=excluded.updated_at, deleted_at=excluded.deleted_at, hash=excluded.hash, canonical_version=excluded.canonical_version WHERE excluded.updated_at >= ticket_idmap.updated_at;
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INSERT INTO ticket_idmap (record_id, ticket_id, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G9M68FC27YHQSP1R9SQQ87P0', 'T-8', '2026-09-13 09:28:48.737', '2026-09-13 09:28:48.737', NULL, 'd3a29143f5496ea4b4ee8a9a834c5290', 2) ON CONFLICT(record_id) DO UPDATE SET ticket_id=excluded.ticket_id, updated_at=excluded.updated_at, deleted_at=excluded.deleted_at, hash=excluded.hash, canonical_version=excluded.canonical_version WHERE excluded.updated_at >= ticket_idmap.updated_at;
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@@ -13,3 +13,16 @@ Second finding 2026-09-13, from webber''s twin fix: an httpx event-hook on the c
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INSERT INTO tickets (record_id, type, parent_record_id, title, description, status, priority, assigned_to, team, decision_ref, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G9KH87TRDGW45GMDWVDRPABR', 'bug', NULL, 'The sanitized OpenAI client is never used: the override pokes an attribute nobody reads', 'src/ollama/provider.py sets self._openai_client after super().__init__, but OllamaProvider.client serves self._client (pydantic_ai 1.27''s official openai_client= constructor param is the right wiring — webber hit the identical bug and fixed it 2026-09-13, exposed by the wrapper 503ing a session-less request). Silently dead in production as a result: the content-null sanitizer (moot on llama-server, live hazard if Ollama ever returns), the T-4 x-boilerroom-* signal hook (never logs), and the OLLAMA_TIMEOUT=120 cap (SDK default ~600s applies). Sessions were unaffected — they ride ModelSettings extra_body. Fix like webber: pass _SanitizedAsyncOpenAI through openai_client=, add a wiring test asserting provider.client is the sanitized type, then verify balancing/compaction logs actually appear.
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INSERT INTO tickets (record_id, type, parent_record_id, title, description, status, priority, assigned_to, team, decision_ref, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G9KH87TRDGW45GMDWVDRPABR', 'bug', NULL, 'The sanitized OpenAI client is never used: the override pokes an attribute nobody reads', 'src/ollama/provider.py sets self._openai_client after super().__init__, but OllamaProvider.client serves self._client (pydantic_ai 1.27''s official openai_client= constructor param is the right wiring — webber hit the identical bug and fixed it 2026-09-13, exposed by the wrapper 503ing a session-less request). Silently dead in production as a result: the content-null sanitizer (moot on llama-server, live hazard if Ollama ever returns), the T-4 x-boilerroom-* signal hook (never logs), and the OLLAMA_TIMEOUT=120 cap (SDK default ~600s applies). Sessions were unaffected — they ride ModelSettings extra_body. Fix like webber: pass _SanitizedAsyncOpenAI through openai_client=, add a wiring test asserting provider.client is the sanitized type, then verify balancing/compaction logs actually appear.
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Second finding 2026-09-13, from webber''s twin fix: an httpx event-hook on the client (the T-4 signal-reading approach) never fires under the openai SDK even when correctly wired — webber verified headers arriving while the hook stayed silent. When rewiring the client, read the signals from the parsed body''s model_extra in the sanitized create() instead (the wrapper injects balancing/compaction_due into non-streamed JSON bodies; openai pydantic models retain unknown fields). The steward''s raw-call body read is unaffected and already correct.', 'done', 'high', NULL, NULL, NULL, '2026-09-13 07:57:01.782', '2026-09-13 08:27:21.778', NULL, 'ce3151ff27c70a1028ba7c03b07119a2', 2) ON CONFLICT(record_id) DO UPDATE SET type=excluded.type, parent_record_id=excluded.parent_record_id, title=excluded.title, description=excluded.description, status=excluded.status, priority=excluded.priority, assigned_to=excluded.assigned_to, team=excluded.team, decision_ref=excluded.decision_ref, updated_at=excluded.updated_at, deleted_at=excluded.deleted_at, hash=excluded.hash, canonical_version=excluded.canonical_version WHERE excluded.updated_at >= tickets.updated_at;
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Second finding 2026-09-13, from webber''s twin fix: an httpx event-hook on the client (the T-4 signal-reading approach) never fires under the openai SDK even when correctly wired — webber verified headers arriving while the hook stayed silent. When rewiring the client, read the signals from the parsed body''s model_extra in the sanitized create() instead (the wrapper injects balancing/compaction_due into non-streamed JSON bodies; openai pydantic models retain unknown fields). The steward''s raw-call body read is unaffected and already correct.', 'done', 'high', NULL, NULL, NULL, '2026-09-13 07:57:01.782', '2026-09-13 08:27:21.778', NULL, 'ce3151ff27c70a1028ba7c03b07119a2', 2) ON CONFLICT(record_id) DO UPDATE SET type=excluded.type, parent_record_id=excluded.parent_record_id, title=excluded.title, description=excluded.description, status=excluded.status, priority=excluded.priority, assigned_to=excluded.assigned_to, team=excluded.team, decision_ref=excluded.decision_ref, updated_at=excluded.updated_at, deleted_at=excluded.deleted_at, hash=excluded.hash, canonical_version=excluded.canonical_version WHERE excluded.updated_at >= tickets.updated_at;
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INSERT INTO tickets (record_id, type, parent_record_id, title, description, status, priority, assigned_to, team, decision_ref, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G99D07Z3FZY8EBT9PJ1RCGHW', 'bug', NULL, 'The container logs nowhere: stdout empty, /app/logs mount untouched', 'docker logs tatlock is 0 lines and the mounted ~/docker-data/tatlock/logs has been empty since 2025-12 — the running app writes logs to neither, which made the 2026-09-12 wrapper-cutover verification blind (flavor detection had to be proven behaviorally). Dev mode logs to build/logs/server.log via make run; production should log to stdout for docker logs at minimum.', 'in_progress', 'medium', NULL, NULL, NULL, '2026-09-12 08:20:21.624', '2026-09-13 08:48:55.586', NULL, '4770f6c6759cb82d825eb550dd4e42e2', 2) ON CONFLICT(record_id) DO UPDATE SET type=excluded.type, parent_record_id=excluded.parent_record_id, title=excluded.title, description=excluded.description, status=excluded.status, priority=excluded.priority, assigned_to=excluded.assigned_to, team=excluded.team, decision_ref=excluded.decision_ref, updated_at=excluded.updated_at, deleted_at=excluded.deleted_at, hash=excluded.hash, canonical_version=excluded.canonical_version WHERE excluded.updated_at >= tickets.updated_at;
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INSERT INTO tickets (record_id, type, parent_record_id, title, description, status, priority, assigned_to, team, decision_ref, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G9KZSCFR79G4DFCT4E5W5CAM', 'bug', NULL, 'The full suite flakes: one run fails, the rerun passes, twice now', 'Observed 2026-09-13 twice: before the v2.7.0 release audit and again during T-5 — make test exits 1 with a failure that does not reproduce on the immediate rerun, and both times the failing test''s name went uncaptured because the diagnostic rerun passed. Next occurrence: keep the FULL output of the failing run (make test 2>&1 | tee /tmp/flake.log) before rerunning, then pin the named test. Suspects worth checking when a name exists: order-dependent state in the session-scoped app init (conftest asyncio.run + cached health globals), port/redis contention with the live containers, and the coverage plugin''s tmp handling.', 'backlog', 'medium', NULL, NULL, NULL, '2026-09-13 09:00:32.255', '2026-09-13 09:00:32.255', NULL, '36c6f97b5a309e169b7acb35f7ca46d4', 2) ON CONFLICT(record_id) DO UPDATE SET type=excluded.type, parent_record_id=excluded.parent_record_id, title=excluded.title, description=excluded.description, status=excluded.status, priority=excluded.priority, assigned_to=excluded.assigned_to, team=excluded.team, decision_ref=excluded.decision_ref, updated_at=excluded.updated_at, deleted_at=excluded.deleted_at, hash=excluded.hash, canonical_version=excluded.canonical_version WHERE excluded.updated_at >= tickets.updated_at;
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INSERT INTO tickets (record_id, type, parent_record_id, title, description, status, priority, assigned_to, team, decision_ref, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G99D07Z3FZY8EBT9PJ1RCGHW', 'bug', NULL, 'The container logs nowhere: stdout empty, /app/logs mount untouched', 'docker logs tatlock is 0 lines and the mounted ~/docker-data/tatlock/logs has been empty since 2025-12 — the running app writes logs to neither, which made the 2026-09-12 wrapper-cutover verification blind (flavor detection had to be proven behaviorally). Dev mode logs to build/logs/server.log via make run; production should log to stdout for docker logs at minimum.', 'done', 'medium', NULL, NULL, NULL, '2026-09-12 08:20:21.624', '2026-09-13 09:00:50.006', NULL, 'd04562943a55527d6036ec38c2657308', 2) ON CONFLICT(record_id) DO UPDATE SET type=excluded.type, parent_record_id=excluded.parent_record_id, title=excluded.title, description=excluded.description, status=excluded.status, priority=excluded.priority, assigned_to=excluded.assigned_to, team=excluded.team, decision_ref=excluded.decision_ref, updated_at=excluded.updated_at, deleted_at=excluded.deleted_at, hash=excluded.hash, canonical_version=excluded.canonical_version WHERE excluded.updated_at >= tickets.updated_at;
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INSERT INTO tickets (record_id, type, parent_record_id, title, description, status, priority, assigned_to, team, decision_ref, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G9KZSCFR79G4DFCT4E5W5CAM', 'bug', NULL, 'The full suite flakes: one run fails, the rerun passes, twice now', 'Observed 2026-09-13 twice: before the v2.7.0 release audit and again during T-5 — make test exits 1 with a failure that does not reproduce on the immediate rerun, and both times the failing test''s name went uncaptured because the diagnostic rerun passed. Next occurrence: keep the FULL output of the failing run (make test 2>&1 | tee /tmp/flake.log) before rerunning, then pin the named test. Suspects worth checking when a name exists: order-dependent state in the session-scoped app init (conftest asyncio.run + cached health globals), port/redis contention with the live containers, and the coverage plugin''s tmp handling.
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Third occurrence 2026-09-13, during the v2.7.2 release gate — and two process lessons captured the hard way: (1) the gate run was piped through grep, which swallowed make''s exit code, so the tag went out on a red run (release content was safe — version+changelog only on green-tested aace128 — but the gate did not gate); release runs must let make test''s exit code stand alone. (2) The failing name went uncaptured AGAIN because the tee capture only started on the rerun, which passed. The capture must wrap the FIRST gate run, every time, not begin after a failure.', 'backlog', 'medium', NULL, NULL, NULL, '2026-09-13 09:00:32.255', '2026-09-13 09:14:10.345', NULL, 'ba4c6ab575af14f50acd3a29ff5e7ef8', 2) ON CONFLICT(record_id) DO UPDATE SET type=excluded.type, parent_record_id=excluded.parent_record_id, title=excluded.title, description=excluded.description, status=excluded.status, priority=excluded.priority, assigned_to=excluded.assigned_to, team=excluded.team, decision_ref=excluded.decision_ref, updated_at=excluded.updated_at, deleted_at=excluded.deleted_at, hash=excluded.hash, canonical_version=excluded.canonical_version WHERE excluded.updated_at >= tickets.updated_at;
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INSERT INTO tickets (record_id, type, parent_record_id, title, description, status, priority, assigned_to, team, decision_ref, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G9KZSCFR79G4DFCT4E5W5CAM', 'bug', NULL, 'The full suite flakes: one run fails, the rerun passes, twice now', 'Observed 2026-09-13 twice: before the v2.7.0 release audit and again during T-5 — make test exits 1 with a failure that does not reproduce on the immediate rerun, and both times the failing test''s name went uncaptured because the diagnostic rerun passed. Next occurrence: keep the FULL output of the failing run (make test 2>&1 | tee /tmp/flake.log) before rerunning, then pin the named test. Suspects worth checking when a name exists: order-dependent state in the session-scoped app init (conftest asyncio.run + cached health globals), port/redis contention with the live containers, and the coverage plugin''s tmp handling.
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||||||
|
Third occurrence 2026-09-13, during the v2.7.2 release gate — and two process lessons captured the hard way: (1) the gate run was piped through grep, which swallowed make''s exit code, so the tag went out on a red run (release content was safe — version+changelog only on green-tested aace128 — but the gate did not gate); release runs must let make test''s exit code stand alone. (2) The failing name went uncaptured AGAIN because the tee capture only started on the rerun, which passed. The capture must wrap the FIRST gate run, every time, not begin after a failure.', 'in_progress', 'medium', NULL, NULL, NULL, '2026-09-13 09:00:32.255', '2026-09-13 09:16:08.928', NULL, '660f20aa80dccf32427c3c3e26c46c8c', 2) ON CONFLICT(record_id) DO UPDATE SET type=excluded.type, parent_record_id=excluded.parent_record_id, title=excluded.title, description=excluded.description, status=excluded.status, priority=excluded.priority, assigned_to=excluded.assigned_to, team=excluded.team, decision_ref=excluded.decision_ref, updated_at=excluded.updated_at, deleted_at=excluded.deleted_at, hash=excluded.hash, canonical_version=excluded.canonical_version WHERE excluded.updated_at >= tickets.updated_at;
|
||||||
|
INSERT INTO tickets (record_id, type, parent_record_id, title, description, status, priority, assigned_to, team, decision_ref, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G9M68FC27YHQSP1R9SQQ87P0', 'task', NULL, 'tests/integration/ runs under no make target', 'Surfaced during T-7: make test ignores tests/integration by directory, and make test-integration runs only tests/agents/test_tatlock_agent.py — so the marked streaming tests in tests/integration/test_tatlock_streaming.py execute under no target at all. Fold them into test-integration (and check they still pass against the current wrapper topology) or retire them deliberately.', 'backlog', 'medium', NULL, NULL, NULL, '2026-09-13 09:28:48.737', '2026-09-13 09:28:48.737', NULL, '50b6e6d25ab009bd17a23544b08e722a', 2) ON CONFLICT(record_id) DO UPDATE SET type=excluded.type, parent_record_id=excluded.parent_record_id, title=excluded.title, description=excluded.description, status=excluded.status, priority=excluded.priority, assigned_to=excluded.assigned_to, team=excluded.team, decision_ref=excluded.decision_ref, updated_at=excluded.updated_at, deleted_at=excluded.deleted_at, hash=excluded.hash, canonical_version=excluded.canonical_version WHERE excluded.updated_at >= tickets.updated_at;
|
||||||
|
INSERT INTO tickets (record_id, type, parent_record_id, title, description, status, priority, assigned_to, team, decision_ref, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('06G9KZSCFR79G4DFCT4E5W5CAM', 'bug', NULL, 'The full suite flakes: one run fails, the rerun passes, twice now', 'Observed 2026-09-13 twice: before the v2.7.0 release audit and again during T-5 — make test exits 1 with a failure that does not reproduce on the immediate rerun, and both times the failing test''s name went uncaptured because the diagnostic rerun passed. Next occurrence: keep the FULL output of the failing run (make test 2>&1 | tee /tmp/flake.log) before rerunning, then pin the named test. Suspects worth checking when a name exists: order-dependent state in the session-scoped app init (conftest asyncio.run + cached health globals), port/redis contention with the live containers, and the coverage plugin''s tmp handling.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Third occurrence 2026-09-13, during the v2.7.2 release gate — and two process lessons captured the hard way: (1) the gate run was piped through grep, which swallowed make''s exit code, so the tag went out on a red run (release content was safe — version+changelog only on green-tested aace128 — but the gate did not gate); release runs must let make test''s exit code stand alone. (2) The failing name went uncaptured AGAIN because the tee capture only started on the rerun, which passed. The capture must wrap the FIRST gate run, every time, not begin after a failure.', 'done', 'medium', NULL, NULL, NULL, '2026-09-13 09:00:32.255', '2026-09-13 09:29:10.191', NULL, 'b15a45c0eaa13b417afe5257236ed0ec', 2) ON CONFLICT(record_id) DO UPDATE SET type=excluded.type, parent_record_id=excluded.parent_record_id, title=excluded.title, description=excluded.description, status=excluded.status, priority=excluded.priority, assigned_to=excluded.assigned_to, team=excluded.team, decision_ref=excluded.decision_ref, updated_at=excluded.updated_at, deleted_at=excluded.deleted_at, hash=excluded.hash, canonical_version=excluded.canonical_version WHERE excluded.updated_at >= tickets.updated_at;
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -7,6 +7,36 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0
|
|||||||
|
|
||||||
## [Unreleased]
|
## [Unreleased]
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Fixed
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- The unit suite is hermetic and the flake class is gone (T-7). Two
|
||||||
|
live couplings hid inside `make test`: the session init ran the real
|
||||||
|
backend health probes (an HTTP round trip to OLLAMA_HOST and a real
|
||||||
|
Anthropic API call whenever the dev .env carries a key), and the
|
||||||
|
eight integration-marked tests in `tests/agents/test_tatlock_agent.py`
|
||||||
|
ran in the unit gate because it excluded by directory while they
|
||||||
|
live outside the ignored directories — ~110 seconds of real LLM
|
||||||
|
inference per "unit" run, failing whenever the backend was
|
||||||
|
mid-deploy. The probes are now stubbed to the deterministic
|
||||||
|
local-first state (a session test pins it), the gate enforces
|
||||||
|
`-m "not integration"`, and the suite runs in ~12 s with identical
|
||||||
|
results against a dead backend. T-8 files the orphaned
|
||||||
|
`tests/integration/` directory that no make target runs.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## [2.7.2] - 2026-09-13
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Fixed
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- Production logs exist now (T-5): the production default log level
|
||||||
|
was WARNING ("minimal noise"), and a healthy service warns roughly
|
||||||
|
never — so `docker logs tatlock` was empty for months, startup,
|
||||||
|
backend flavor detection and the wrapper's balancing/compaction
|
||||||
|
signals all suppressed, and the serving cutover could not be
|
||||||
|
verified from logs. The production default is INFO on stdout;
|
||||||
|
`LOG_LEVEL` remains the override for when noise is ever the real
|
||||||
|
problem. (The `/app/logs` mount was always decorative — no file
|
||||||
|
handler exists; `docker logs` is the log.)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
## [2.7.1] - 2026-09-13
|
## [2.7.1] - 2026-09-13
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
### Fixed
|
### Fixed
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ run: ## Start the development server on port 8777
|
|||||||
$(UVICORN) src.main:app --reload --host $(HOST) --port $(PORT) 2>&1 | tee build/logs/server.log
|
$(UVICORN) src.main:app --reload --host $(HOST) --port $(PORT) 2>&1 | tee build/logs/server.log
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
test: ## Run unit tests (no external services needed)
|
test: ## Run unit tests (no external services needed)
|
||||||
$(PYTEST) --ignore=tests/e2e --ignore=tests/integration --ignore=tests/contracts
|
$(PYTEST) --ignore=tests/e2e --ignore=tests/integration --ignore=tests/contracts -m "not integration"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
test-unit: test ## Alias for test
|
test-unit: test ## Alias for test
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|||||||
+1
-1
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ build-backend = "setuptools.build_meta"
|
|||||||
|
|
||||||
[project]
|
[project]
|
||||||
name = "tatlock"
|
name = "tatlock"
|
||||||
version = "2.7.1"
|
version = "2.7.2"
|
||||||
description = "OpenAI-compatible API with Ollama backend"
|
description = "OpenAI-compatible API with Ollama backend"
|
||||||
requires-python = ">=3.12"
|
requires-python = ">=3.12"
|
||||||
dependencies = [
|
dependencies = [
|
||||||
|
|||||||
+9
-3
@@ -230,15 +230,21 @@ class Config(BaseSettings):
|
|||||||
Get effective log level, auto-determining from environment if not set.
|
Get effective log level, auto-determining from environment if not set.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
- development: DEBUG (maximum verbosity)
|
- development: DEBUG (maximum verbosity)
|
||||||
- production: WARNING (minimal noise)
|
- production: INFO
|
||||||
- testing: INFO
|
- testing: INFO
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Production ran at WARNING ("minimal noise") until T-5: a healthy
|
||||||
|
service warns roughly never, so `docker logs` was empty for
|
||||||
|
months — startup, backend flavor detection and the wrapper's
|
||||||
|
balancing/compaction signals all suppressed, which made the
|
||||||
|
2026-09-12 serving cutover unverifiable from logs. INFO on
|
||||||
|
stdout is the operational floor; LOG_LEVEL quiets it when noise
|
||||||
|
ever becomes the real problem.
|
||||||
"""
|
"""
|
||||||
if self.LOG_LEVEL is not None:
|
if self.LOG_LEVEL is not None:
|
||||||
return self.LOG_LEVEL
|
return self.LOG_LEVEL
|
||||||
if self.ENVIRONMENT == Environment.DEVELOPMENT:
|
if self.ENVIRONMENT == Environment.DEVELOPMENT:
|
||||||
return "DEBUG"
|
return "DEBUG"
|
||||||
if self.ENVIRONMENT == Environment.PRODUCTION:
|
|
||||||
return "WARNING"
|
|
||||||
return "INFO"
|
return "INFO"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@property
|
@property
|
||||||
|
|||||||
+31
-3
@@ -49,16 +49,44 @@ def _tenant_guard():
|
|||||||
@pytest.fixture(scope="session", autouse=True)
|
@pytest.fixture(scope="session", autouse=True)
|
||||||
def _initialize_app(_tenant_guard):
|
def _initialize_app(_tenant_guard):
|
||||||
"""
|
"""
|
||||||
Run application lifespan (Claude health check, household registration, etc.)
|
Run application lifespan (household registration, backend globals)
|
||||||
once per test session. ASGITransport doesn't trigger lifespan events,
|
once per test session. ASGITransport doesn't trigger lifespan events,
|
||||||
so we call it explicitly.
|
so we call it explicitly.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
The backend health probes are stubbed (T-7): `make test` promises
|
||||||
|
"no external services", but the real probes coupled every unit run
|
||||||
|
to live infrastructure — an HTTP round trip to whatever answers
|
||||||
|
behind OLLAMA_HOST, and a real Anthropic API call whenever the dev
|
||||||
|
.env carries a key. The suite flaked whenever the local backend was
|
||||||
|
mid-deploy: the ollama probe failed, the cached globals flipped,
|
||||||
|
and any test that consults them unpatched changed behavior. The
|
||||||
|
stubs land the globals in the deterministic local-first state a
|
||||||
|
healthy startup produces; tests needing other states patch the
|
||||||
|
globals themselves, and `make test-integration` runs real probes.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Depends on _tenant_guard so the suite refuses to start under the
|
Depends on _tenant_guard so the suite refuses to start under the
|
||||||
production tenant before any initialization happens.
|
production tenant before any initialization happens.
|
||||||
"""
|
"""
|
||||||
from src.core.startup import initialize_application
|
from unittest.mock import patch
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
asyncio.run(initialize_application())
|
from src.anthropic import model_selector
|
||||||
|
from src.core import startup
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
async def _healthy_local_backend() -> bool:
|
||||||
|
model_selector._ollama_available = True
|
||||||
|
model_selector._local_flavor = "boilerroom"
|
||||||
|
return True
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
async def _no_cloud_fallback() -> bool:
|
||||||
|
model_selector._claude_available = False
|
||||||
|
return False
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
# Patch the names startup actually calls (imported into its module).
|
||||||
|
with (
|
||||||
|
patch.object(startup, "check_ollama_health", _healthy_local_backend),
|
||||||
|
patch.object(startup, "check_claude_health", _no_cloud_fallback),
|
||||||
|
):
|
||||||
|
asyncio.run(startup.initialize_application())
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@pytest.fixture
|
@pytest.fixture
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -241,6 +241,41 @@ class TestLoggingConfiguration:
|
|||||||
with patch.object(config, "ENVIRONMENT", Environment.PRODUCTION):
|
with patch.object(config, "ENVIRONMENT", Environment.PRODUCTION):
|
||||||
assert config.log_format == "json"
|
assert config.log_format == "json"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_production_default_level_is_info(self):
|
||||||
|
"""Production logs INFO to stdout (T-5).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
The old WARNING default made `docker logs` empty for months — a
|
||||||
|
healthy service warns roughly never, so startup, flavor
|
||||||
|
detection and the wrapper signals were all suppressed and the
|
||||||
|
serving cutover could not be verified from logs.
|
||||||
|
"""
|
||||||
|
from src.core.config import Environment, config
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
with (
|
||||||
|
patch.object(config, "ENVIRONMENT", Environment.PRODUCTION),
|
||||||
|
patch.object(config, "LOG_LEVEL", None),
|
||||||
|
):
|
||||||
|
assert config.effective_log_level == "INFO"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_log_level_env_still_quiets_production(self):
|
||||||
|
"""LOG_LEVEL stays the override for when noise is the problem."""
|
||||||
|
from src.core.config import Environment, config
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
with (
|
||||||
|
patch.object(config, "ENVIRONMENT", Environment.PRODUCTION),
|
||||||
|
patch.object(config, "LOG_LEVEL", "WARNING"),
|
||||||
|
):
|
||||||
|
assert config.effective_log_level == "WARNING"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_development_default_stays_debug(self):
|
||||||
|
from src.core.config import Environment, config
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
with (
|
||||||
|
patch.object(config, "ENVIRONMENT", Environment.DEVELOPMENT),
|
||||||
|
patch.object(config, "LOG_LEVEL", None),
|
||||||
|
):
|
||||||
|
assert config.effective_log_level == "DEBUG"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
def test_multiple_loggers_independent(self):
|
def test_multiple_loggers_independent(self):
|
||||||
"""Test multiple loggers are independent."""
|
"""Test multiple loggers are independent."""
|
||||||
logger1 = get_logger("test.logger1")
|
logger1 = get_logger("test.logger1")
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
|
|||||||
|
"""
|
||||||
|
The suite's backend globals are stubbed, not probed (T-7).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
`make test` promises "no external services". The session init used to
|
||||||
|
run the real health probes — an HTTP round trip to whatever answers
|
||||||
|
behind OLLAMA_HOST and a real Anthropic API call whenever the dev .env
|
||||||
|
carries a key — so the cached globals depended on live infrastructure,
|
||||||
|
and the suite flaked whenever the backend was mid-deploy. This test
|
||||||
|
discriminates: under the stub the globals are always the local-first
|
||||||
|
healthy state; under real probes they follow the network of the moment.
|
||||||
|
"""
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
from src.anthropic import model_selector
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_session_globals_are_deterministic():
|
||||||
|
assert model_selector._ollama_available is True
|
||||||
|
assert model_selector._local_flavor == "boilerroom"
|
||||||
|
assert model_selector._claude_available is False
|
||||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user