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odysseus/specs/context-building.md
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RaresKeYandStressTestor 7026cf40b5 docs: bootstrap specs ground truth (#5794)
* docs(specs): restore bootstrap after dev rewrite

* docs(specs): remove runtime inventory snapshot

* docs(specs): reconcile current dev truth

* docs(specs): document scheduled task actions as an owner-attribution source

Owner Attribution covered cookie, bearer-token and internal-loopback
requests. Scheduled task actions are a fourth source and behave
differently: _execute_action passes owner=task.owner off the stored
ScheduledTask row, so no request and no resolved principal are in
flight, and route-level require_user() never runs.

Webhook triggers are the sharp case. They are unauthenticated by
design with the token as the only credential and execute under the
stored task.owner.

Paths cite routes/task/task_routes.py, the canonical location after
the task subpackage move (#6081); routes/task_routes.py on current dev
is the backward-compat shim.

* docs(specs): add chained tasks to the trigger list, refresh dev stamp

Review feedback from RaresKeY on the previous commit.

"Every trigger path" was too broad: success-chained tasks are another
path into _execute_action. Added them with their own citation, and
noted that chaining additionally requires the target task to share
task.owner and rejects cycles, which is stricter than the trigger-side
checks. Softened the lead-in to "these trigger paths".

Line 56 still pointed at routes/task_routes.py for webhook credential
validation. That path is the backward-compat shim on current dev after
the task subpackage move (#6081); repointed to the canonical
routes/task/task_routes.py.

Stamp moved to dev@2a6b09b. Inspection backing that bump was scoped:
every file path cited in this spec was mechanically checked to resolve
on 2a6b09b, and every file:line in the Owner Attribution additions was
read against it. Behavioral claims elsewhere in the file were not
re-audited.

* docs(specs): correct SECURE_COOKIES description to match current behavior

Third of the stale details RaresKeY enumerated. The cookie section
described SECURE_COOKIES as purely opt-in, which stopped being true.

_secure_cookie() (routes/auth_routes.py:89) treats an explicit true or
false as authoritative and derives the Secure attribute from the
request otherwise, including when the variable is unset and when
docker-compose injects it present-but-empty. Either the connection
scheme or the first X-Forwarded-Proto hop being https is enough.

* docs(specs): refresh current dev truth

---------

Co-authored-by: StressTestor <212606152+StressTestor@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-25 14:18:44 +02:00

8.9 KiB

Context Building

Last updated: dev@e71f8ce | 2026-08-25

Scope

This spec covers model-context construction in:

  • src/chat_processor.py;
  • src/chat_handler.py and src/youtube_handler.py;
  • routes/chat_helpers.py and context injection in routes/chat_routes.py;
  • src/agent_loop.py;
  • src/tool_execution.py;
  • src/attachment_refs.py and uploaded-file manifest construction in routes/chat_helpers.py;
  • src/tool_policy.py;
  • src/prompt_security.py;
  • src/tool_capabilities.py, src/tool_approval_scopes.py, and src/tool_approvals.py;
  • transport primitives in src/outbound_fetch.py plus fetch/extraction adapters in src/search/content.py and services/search/content.py;
  • search orchestration in services/search/core.py and the compatibility wrapper in src/search/core.py;
  • RAG and personal docs in src/rag_singleton.py, src/rag_vector.py, src/rag_manager.py, and src/personal_docs.py;
  • research flows in src/deep_research.py, src/research_handler.py, and services/research/research_handler.py;
  • memory and skills in src/memory.py and services/memory/*;
  • related policy in THREAT_MODEL.md.

Contract

Context-building tools gather evidence. They do not own user-intent routing.

Runtime rules:

  • if external context is available, add it as compact untrusted source data;
  • if an attempted source is unavailable and relevant, represent the unavailable state explicitly with source and reason when known;
  • preserve the user's original message for the model;
  • do not use regex preprocessing to force literal-vs-fetch intent;
  • do not disable tools or force a reply style solely because preprocessing found a URL.

Untrusted Data

src.prompt_security owns the untrusted wrapper:

  • UNTRUSTED_CONTEXT_POLICY states global model policy;
  • untrusted_context_message(label, content) wraps source content as user-role data with metadata.trusted = False, provenance origin, and an arm_tool_gate/tool_gate_untrusted signal that defaults to arming the server-owned tool gate.

Current untrusted context sources include:

  • fetched URLs and web search results;
  • webpage content passed into deep-research extraction;
  • YouTube transcripts/comments;
  • RAG/personal document chunks;
  • memories and skills;
  • notes and active editor documents;
  • emails and attachments;
  • tool output from external/user-controlled data.

Live multimodal provider blocks can contain data URLs, but persisted and tool-facing context uses stable attachment references. Tool manifests carry an odysseus://attachment/<id> URI and owner-checked read policy; local paths are compatibility data added only after owner and root-confinement checks. Persisted chat context keeps readable text/reference lines rather than reinserting raw media bytes into later turns or search state.

URL, Search, And Tool-Derived Context

Chat URL prefetch and agent web_fetch are different paths. Chat prefetch happens before the model call; web_fetch is a tool the model may choose later. Both should converge on the same intent: enrich context when content is available, represent unavailable content when it is not, and let the model interpret the user request.

Search results and fetched pages are evidence. web_search should not force a page fetch unless its explicit contract says it does. Failed fetches should not crash chat or silently imply content was read. Canonical search content fetchers can extract readable text from HTML, text/*, Markdown, .txt, .json, and .jsonl responses and should return shaped error results for HTTP status failures. URL fetches validate every redirect hop and pin the outbound connection to a public IP resolved during validation, so context-building callers do not need a second DNS-rebinding guard.

Current behavior is not yet unified:

  • successful chat URL prefetch is wrapped as untrusted context; failed prefetch now adds a compact untrusted statement that the page was not read, recognizes only transport-owned HTTP/size/rate-limit categories, and suppresses raw exception/response text;
  • agent web_fetch returns explicit URL-specific tool errors for timeout, unsupported scheme, fetch failure, or no readable text;
  • comprehensive search reports provider-chain failures, but individual page-fetch failures can be logged and omitted;
  • YouTube fetching is owned by ChatHandler/youtube_handler, while routes.chat_helpers only wraps the resulting transcript/comment strings.

src.outbound_fetch owns reusable synchronous public-URL classification, per-hop DNS resolution/pinning, redirect handling, and body budgets. services/search/core.py owns comprehensive_web_search() orchestration. services.search.content owns content extraction and adapts the shared transport; src/search/core.py and src/search/content.py preserve compatibility imports without a second implementation.

Tool Result Envelope

src.tool_execution executes and formats tools. Tool output caps live in src.constants and are re-exported through older facades; shared native-tool truncation lives in src.tool_utils. src.agent_loop._append_tool_results() owns model re-entry: native tool calls return as provider-style role: "tool" messages with untrusted metadata, while fenced-tool results use the untrusted wrapper. Classification considers both the requested tool and the result payload, so remote or stored model-visible content can arm the session gate even on a failed tool status.

Taint is server-owned continuation state, not a model instruction. After untrusted external/workspace context, low-impact reads can continue, but high-impact, unknown, and arbitrary MCP actions become proposals that produce an exact approval card. The server seals the exact first action plus private continuation tool/query state; document actions also bind the current document version and digest. A chat decision can allow the resumed task or persist a grant for later turns in that exact chat, while non-chat callers remain single-action. Blocked/approval placeholders and content-free failures do not recursively arm the gate.

Context budgeting uses known model context windows when available. src.context_budget treats the default 6000-token value as an automatic sentinel, scales to a capped fraction of known context length for non-explicit budgets, and leaves unknown windows on conservative defaults.

Side-effect enforcement lives outside context building. Chat route disabled-tool policy, src.tool_security, src.tool_execution, and do_app_api() block unsafe tool execution; prompt wording alone is not the authority.

Guide-only/no-tools policy can suppress context acquisition before the model call. src.tool_policy feeds chat route preprocessing and agent-loop assembly so tool-backed search/research/memory/RAG/skills/local-context paths are skipped when the latest user turn explicitly forbids tools.

Degraded And Optional Dependencies

  • ChromaDB, HTTP embeddings, and FastEmbed are installed/expected in normal setups but must degrade cleanly when a service, package, or embedding backend is unavailable.
  • src.rag_singleton.get_rag_manager() owns RAG startup retry throttling; src.rag_vector.VectorRAG is the live owner-filtered path; src.rag_manager.RAGManager is compatibility/backward-compat behavior.
  • Memory-vector and tool-index retrieval can fall back to keyword/text behavior when vector stores or embeddings fail.
  • Docker compose and native installs use different Chroma host defaults; model endpoint loopback rewriting is owned by model/runtime specs.

Current Call Sites Include

  • ChatProcessor.build_context_preface() for memory, RAG, web search, URL content, and skills index;
  • ChatHandler.preprocess_message() and the canonical services.youtube.youtube_handler import path for YouTube fetch/format, then routes/chat_helpers.py for wrapping prefetched search/Youtube context;
  • routes/chat_routes.py research context injection;
  • src.agent_loop for active editor document, skill context, and tool-result reinsertion;
  • uploaded-file manifest/reference context for agent tools and later chat turns;
  • src.tool_execution for web_search, web_fetch, file, shell, MCP, and other tool outputs;
  • src.deep_research and research handlers for search/fetch/extract flows used by research jobs, with fetched webpage text wrapped before extraction and analyzed URLs tracked separately from source snippets.

Current Gaps

  • URL/search context result shape is not unified across chat prefetch, agent tools, and research.
  • Failed fetch representation remains inconsistent outside direct chat URL prefetch, especially in comprehensive search and research aggregation.
  • Tool/context wording is spread across schema, prompt, and retrieval surfaces.
  • Source-specific wrapping and unavailable-state behavior still needs broader focused coverage for literal URL intent, research, RAG/memory/skills, and YouTube; external tool results and approval continuation now have dedicated gate/taint regressions.
  • Compare pre-search context is computed but may not be submitted through the current compare stream form.