RaresKeYandStressTestor
7026cf40b5
* docs(specs): restore bootstrap after dev rewrite
* docs(specs): remove runtime inventory snapshot
* docs(specs): reconcile current dev truth
* docs(specs): document scheduled task actions as an owner-attribution source
Owner Attribution covered cookie, bearer-token and internal-loopback
requests. Scheduled task actions are a fourth source and behave
differently: _execute_action passes owner=task.owner off the stored
ScheduledTask row, so no request and no resolved principal are in
flight, and route-level require_user() never runs.
Webhook triggers are the sharp case. They are unauthenticated by
design with the token as the only credential and execute under the
stored task.owner.
Paths cite routes/task/task_routes.py, the canonical location after
the task subpackage move (#6081); routes/task_routes.py on current dev
is the backward-compat shim.
* docs(specs): add chained tasks to the trigger list, refresh dev stamp
Review feedback from RaresKeY on the previous commit.
"Every trigger path" was too broad: success-chained tasks are another
path into _execute_action. Added them with their own citation, and
noted that chaining additionally requires the target task to share
task.owner and rejects cycles, which is stricter than the trigger-side
checks. Softened the lead-in to "these trigger paths".
Line 56 still pointed at routes/task_routes.py for webhook credential
validation. That path is the backward-compat shim on current dev after
the task subpackage move (#6081); repointed to the canonical
routes/task/task_routes.py.
Stamp moved to dev@2a6b09b. Inspection backing that bump was scoped:
every file path cited in this spec was mechanically checked to resolve
on 2a6b09b, and every file:line in the Owner Attribution additions was
read against it. Behavioral claims elsewhere in the file were not
re-audited.
* docs(specs): correct SECURE_COOKIES description to match current behavior
Third of the stale details RaresKeY enumerated. The cookie section
described SECURE_COOKIES as purely opt-in, which stopped being true.
_secure_cookie() (routes/auth_routes.py:89) treats an explicit true or
false as authoritative and derives the Secure attribute from the
request otherwise, including when the variable is unset and when
docker-compose injects it present-but-empty. Either the connection
scheme or the first X-Forwarded-Proto hop being https is enough.
* docs(specs): refresh current dev truth
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Co-authored-by: StressTestor <212606152+StressTestor@users.noreply.github.com>
1.5 KiB
Other Local And Proxy Compatible Engines
Last updated: dev@28d27ee | 2026-07-17
Scope
Canonical explicit identities mlx_lm, text_generation_inference,
lmdeploy, and litellm, plus unknown OpenAI-compatible deployments not
covered by the native Ollama, LM Studio, llama.cpp, vLLM, or SGLang specs.
Shape
Use explicit endpoint kind when known; otherwise use only the general model list envelopes for inventory identity. Capability-looking structural fields remain raw. Local host and port do not distinguish these engines. MLX/Cookbook launch recipes, TGI task configuration, LMDeploy adapters, and LiteLLM upstream routing can all change capability independently of the model ID.
Proxy model aliases are endpoint scoped. A proxy may return richer fields, but unknown keys remain raw until a versioned shape is added. Provider-specific headers/extensions must not be applied based on a port or upstream model name.
Fallback And Safety
Discovery can probe cheap native identity endpoints when available, but capability probes execute only explicit bounded test contracts. Never read broad server/environment dumps as ordinary model metadata. Unknown compatible servers should still list identities and make conservative text calls where explicitly configured, without appearing on capability-gated surfaces.
Current Gaps
- These engines need individual safe metadata fixtures before they can graduate from general fallback.
- Gateway upstream identity and effective downstream model capability are not yet represented as a chain.