fix(personal): bound multi-file upload memory

/api/personal/upload and DELETE /api/personal/file mutated the same
vector and tracking state add/remove/reload serialize on, outside
_index_job_lock and inline on the event loop.

Both now stage async work on the loop, then run the complete transition
(vector writes, disk change, personal_docs_manager update) in one
offloaded critical section under the shared lock, acquired before the
offload so queued requests park on the loop rather than pinning a
threadpool worker.

Adds add-vs-upload and add-vs-file ordering regressions.

.env.example

@@ -76,24 +76,12 @@ SEARXNG_INSTANCE=http://localhost:8080
 # Change this if another local service already uses 7000 (macOS AirPlay often does).
 # APP_PORT=7000
 
-# Optional HTTP address advertised in companion/mobile pairing codes. Set this
-# when Docker would otherwise advertise a container address or loopback. Use a
-# LAN or Tailscale IPv4 address, a single-label hostname, or an mDNS *.local
-# name that the phone can reach. HTTPS and public hostnames are not supported
-# by the current companion client. Do not include credentials, a path, query,
-# or fragment.
-# COMPANION_BASE_URL=http://192.168.1.50:7000
-
 # Development-only auth bypass for loopback requests.
 # Keep false for Docker, LAN, reverse proxy, and any shared deployment.
 # LOCALHOST_BYPASS=false
 
-# Mark session cookies Secure. Left unset, this follows the request scheme:
+# Mark session cookies Secure. Set true when Odysseus is served through HTTPS
-# an HTTPS login gets a Secure cookie, a plain-HTTP one does not. Set true to
+# by a trusted reverse proxy or private access gateway.
-# force it on, or false to force it off while you still serve plain HTTP.
-# Upgrading: this used to default to false. Drop a leftover SECURE_COOKIES=false
-# from your .env unless you still need that escape hatch — it keeps HTTPS logins
-# on a non-Secure cookie.
 # SECURE_COOKIES=true
 
 # Optional: pre-seed the first admin password during setup.
@@ -163,21 +151,6 @@ SEARXNG_INSTANCE=http://localhost:8080
 # Local HTTP setups may use the callback URL inferred by the application.
 # GOOGLE_OAUTH_REDIRECT_URI=https://your-domain.com/api/email/oauth/google/callback
 
-# Origin the MCP OAuth callback is sent back to, for remote (Streamable HTTP)
-# MCP servers that register it dynamically. Defaults to http://localhost:$APP_PORT,
-# which is right only when you reach Odysseus directly on that port. Set it for
-# HTTPS, reverse-proxy, hosted, and Docker installs — inside the container the
-# app always listens on 7000 and cannot see the host port map, so the default is
-# wrong there whenever APP_PORT is not 7000.
-#
-# Not for Google MCP servers. Those use Desktop App credentials, and Google only
-# accepts loopback redirect URIs for that client type, so a public origin here is
-# rejected with redirect_uri_mismatch. Leave it unset for a Google-only install:
-# the loopback default is what Google wants, and remote users finish through the
-# paste-back page, which never has to load the redirect.
-# https://developers.google.com/identity/protocols/oauth2/native-app
-# OAUTH_REDIRECT_BASE_URL=https://your-domain.com
-
 # ============================================================
 # Misc
 # ============================================================

.gitattributes

@@ -15,13 +15,6 @@ docker/entrypoint.sh text eol=lf
 *.cmd text eol=crlf
 *.bat text eol=crlf
 
-# Vendored third-party bundles in static/lib/ are published minified artifacts
-# and must stay byte-identical to what npm ships — stripping trailing whitespace
-# to satisfy `git diff --check` would desync them from the upstream release. Turn
-# the whitespace check off for that tree instead, and keep the bundles out of
-# GitHub's language statistics.
-static/lib/** -whitespace linguist-vendored
-
 # Binary assets — never normalize.
 *.png  binary
 *.jpg  binary

.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/bug_report.yml

@@ -26,18 +26,6 @@ body:
         - label: I am running the latest code from the `dev` branch (the default branch you get on clone, where fixes land first) and the bug still reproduces there. Please `git pull` the latest `dev` before filing.
           required: true
 
-  - type: input
-    id: revision
-    attributes:
-      label: Odysseus Revision
-      description: |
-        From the repository root (on the host when using Docker), run
-        `git show -s --abbrev=12 --format='%h (%cs)' HEAD`
-        and paste the output exactly.
-      placeholder: "1fef4929cf1d (2026-08-11)"
-    validations:
-      required: true
-
   - type: dropdown
     id: install-method
     attributes:

.github/pull_request_template.md

@@ -28,7 +28,6 @@ Fixes #
 - [ ] This PR targets `dev`
 - [ ] My changes are limited to the scope described above — no unrelated refactors or whitespace changes mixed in.
 - [ ] I actually ran the app (`docker compose up` or `uvicorn app:app`) and verified the change works end-to-end. Type-checks and unit tests are not enough.
-- [ ] I did not run the app/runtime validation and stated that gap in **How to Test**. Leave this unchecked when the app-run box above is checked.
 
 ## How to Test
 

.github/scripts/check-issue-description.js

@@ -41,14 +41,6 @@ module.exports = async ({ github, context, core }) => {
       break;
 
     case 'bug': {
-      const revisionText = section('Odysseus Revision');
-      if (!/^[0-9a-f]{12} \(\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}\)$/i.test(revisionText)) {
-        failures.push(
-          '**Odysseus Revision** — paste the 12-character commit SHA and date, ' +
-          'for example `1fef4929cf1d (2026-08-11)`',
-        );
-      }
-
       if (!section('Install Method')) {
         failures.push('**Install Method** — select how you installed Odysseus');
       }

.github/scripts/check-pr-description.js

@@ -21,11 +21,11 @@ module.exports = async ({ github, context, core }) => {
     return strip(m?.[0].replace(new RegExp(`#+\\s+${heading}`, 'i'), '') ?? '');
   }
 
-  const descriptionProblems = [];
+  const problems = [];
 
   // 1. Summary must be filled in.
   if (section('Summary').length < 20) {
-    descriptionProblems.push('**Summary** is empty or too short — describe what changed and why.');
+    problems.push('**Summary** is empty or too short — describe what changed and why.');
   }
 
   // 2. Linked Issue must reference a real issue. Accept a bare #NNN, a closing
@@ -34,18 +34,18 @@ module.exports = async ({ github, context, core }) => {
   const linkedSection = section('Linked Issue');
   const hasIssueRef = /#\d+\b/.test(linkedSection) || /\/issues\/\d+/.test(linkedSection);
   if (!linkedSection || !hasIssueRef) {
-    descriptionProblems.push('**Linked Issue** — add a reference like `Fixes #NNN`, a bare `#NNN`, or a link to the issue.');
+    problems.push('**Linked Issue** — add a reference like `Fixes #NNN`, a bare `#NNN`, or a link to the issue.');
   }
 
   // 3. At least one Type of Change box must be checked.
   const typeBlock = body.match(/##\s+Type of Change[\s\S]*?(?=\n##\s|$)/i)?.[0] ?? '';
   if (!/- \[x\]/i.test(typeBlock)) {
-    descriptionProblems.push('**Type of Change** — check at least one box.');
+    problems.push('**Type of Change** — check at least one box.');
   }
 
   // 4. Duplicate-search checklist item must be checked.
   if (!/- \[x\] I searched/i.test(body)) {
-    descriptionProblems.push('**Checklist** — check the duplicate-search box to confirm you searched existing issues and PRs.');
+    problems.push('**Checklist** — check the duplicate-search box to confirm you searched existing issues and PRs.');
   }
 
   // 5. How to Test must contain enough real detail for a reviewer to act on.
@@ -53,83 +53,7 @@ module.exports = async ({ github, context, core }) => {
   //    code block — so we only require non-trivial content, not a specific shape.
   const howTo = section('How to Test');
   if (howTo.length < 30) {
-    descriptionProblems.push('**How to Test** — explain how a reviewer can verify this change. Numbered steps, the commands you ran, or a short code block all work — give a sentence or two of real detail (not just "tested locally").');
+    problems.push('**How to Test** — explain how a reviewer can verify this change. Numbered steps, the commands you ran, or a short code block all work — give a sentence or two of real detail (not just "tested locally").');
-  }
-
-  // Classify paths from GitHub's API. This workflow runs in the privileged base
-  // context, so it must never check out or execute code from the PR branch.
-  const changedFiles = await github.paginate(github.rest.pulls.listFiles, {
-    owner, repo, pull_number: prNum, per_page: 100,
-  });
-  const changedPaths = changedFiles.map(file => file.filename);
-
-  function isUiSensitivePath(filename) {
-    const path = filename.toLowerCase();
-    return path.startsWith('static/')
-      || path.startsWith('templates/')
-      || /\.(?:html?|css|svg)$/.test(path);
-  }
-
-  function isDocsOnlyPath(filename) {
-    const path = filename.toLowerCase();
-    return /\.(?:md|mdx|rst|adoc|txt)$/.test(path)
-      || (path.startsWith('docs/') && !isUiSensitivePath(path));
-  }
-
-  function isRuntimeSensitivePath(filename) {
-    const path = filename.toLowerCase();
-    if (isUiSensitivePath(path)) return false;
-    if (path.startsWith('tests/') || path.startsWith('.github/')) return false;
-    return /^(?:app\.py|routes\/|services\/|src\/|core\/|mcp_servers\/|scripts\/|docker\/)/.test(path)
-      || /^(?:dockerfile|docker-compose.*\.ya?ml|requirements(?:-optional)?\.txt|pyproject\.toml|setup\.py)$/.test(path)
-      || /\.(?:py|sh|ps1|bat)$/.test(path);
-  }
-
-  let classification = 'tooling';
-  if (changedPaths.some(isUiSensitivePath)) {
-    classification = 'UI-sensitive';
-  } else if (changedPaths.some(isRuntimeSensitivePath)) {
-    classification = 'backend/runtime';
-  } else if (changedPaths.length > 0 && changedPaths.every(isDocsOnlyPath)) {
-    classification = 'docs-only';
-  }
-
-  const appRan = /- \[x\]\s+I actually ran the app\b/i.test(body);
-  const appNotRun = /- \[x\]\s+I did not run the app\/runtime validation\b/i.test(body);
-  // Anchor on the wording, not the template's emphasis: a ticked box the author
-  // retyped without the surrounding ** renders identically on the PR page, so
-  // treating it as unchecked is invisible from their side. Matches the two
-  // attestations above, which already ignore formatting.
-  const screenshotChecked = /- \[x\]\s+[*_]{0,2}Screenshot or short clip[*_]{0,2}/i.test(body);
-  const screenshotSection = section('Screenshots / clips');
-  const hasVisualEvidence = /!\[[^\]]*\]\([^)]+\)|<(?:img|video|source)\b[^>]*(?:src|href)=|https?:\/\/[^\s)]+/i.test(screenshotSection);
-  const evidenceGaps = [];
-  let needsRuntimeValidation = false;
-  let needsVisualEvidence = false;
-
-  if (classification === 'backend/runtime' || classification === 'UI-sensitive') {
-    if (appRan && appNotRun) {
-      needsRuntimeValidation = true;
-      evidenceGaps.push('The app-run and explicit not-run boxes are both checked. Select the one state that is true.');
-    } else if (!appRan) {
-      needsRuntimeValidation = true;
-      if (appNotRun) {
-        evidenceGaps.push('The author explicitly reports that app/runtime validation was not performed.');
-      } else {
-        evidenceGaps.push('App/runtime validation is not author-attested. Check the run box only after running it, or check the explicit not-run box and describe the gap.');
-      }
-    }
-  }
-
-  if (classification === 'UI-sensitive') {
-    if (!screenshotChecked) {
-      needsVisualEvidence = true;
-      evidenceGaps.push('The screenshot/clip checkbox is not checked for this UI-sensitive change.');
-    }
-    if (!hasVisualEvidence) {
-      needsVisualEvidence = true;
-      evidenceGaps.push('The Screenshots / clips section does not contain an actual attachment or link.');
-    }
   }
 
   // ── Comment ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -138,43 +62,22 @@ module.exports = async ({ github, context, core }) => {
   });
   const existing = comments.find(c => (c.body ?? '').includes(MARKER));
 
-  if (descriptionProblems.length === 0 && evidenceGaps.length === 0) {
+  if (problems.length === 0) {
     if (existing) {
       await github.rest.issues.deleteComment({ owner, repo, comment_id: existing.id });
     }
   } else {
-    const commentLines = [MARKER];
+    const commentBody = [
-    if (descriptionProblems.length > 0) {
+      MARKER,
-      commentLines.push(
+      '⚠️ **PR description — action needed**',
-        '⚠️ **PR description — action needed**',
+      '',
-        '',
+      'The following required sections are missing or incomplete. Please update the PR description to address them:',
-        'The following required sections are missing or incomplete. Please update the PR description to address them:',
+      '',
-        '',
+      problems.map(p => `- ${p}`).join('\n'),
-        descriptionProblems.map(problem => `- ${problem}`).join('\n'),
-      );
-    } else {
-      commentLines.push(
-        '⚠️ **PR description is complete; validation evidence is still outstanding**',
-        '',
-        `Changed-file classification: **${classification}**.`,
-      );
-    }
-    if (evidenceGaps.length > 0) {
-      commentLines.push(
-        '',
-        '**Author-reported runtime / visual state**',
-        '',
-        evidenceGaps.map(gap => `- ${gap}`).join('\n'),
-        '',
-        'Checkboxes are author attestations. GitHub Actions results remain the execution evidence for CI; this check does not prove that a local command ran.',
-      );
-    }
-    commentLines.push(
       '',
       '---',
-      '_This comment updates automatically when the description or changed files change._',
+      '_This comment is deleted automatically once all sections are complete._',
-    );
+    ].join('\n');
-    const commentBody = commentLines.join('\n');
 
     if (existing) {
       await github.rest.issues.updateComment({ owner, repo, comment_id: existing.id, body: commentBody });
@@ -194,47 +97,34 @@ module.exports = async ({ github, context, core }) => {
       return true;
     } catch (e) {
       if (e.status === 404) return false;
-      if (e.status === 403) {
-        core.warning(`Could not inspect label "${name}" — token lacks label read access; skipping.`);
-        return false;
-      }
       throw e;
     }
   }
 
-  async function setLabel(name, wanted) {
+  async function swapLabel(num, add, remove) {
-    if (wanted && await labelExists(name)) {
+    if (await labelExists(add)) {
       try {
-        await github.rest.issues.addLabels({ owner, repo, issue_number: prNum, labels: [name] });
+        await github.rest.issues.addLabels({ owner, repo, issue_number: num, labels: [add] });
       } catch (e) {
         // Fail soft on a token that can't write labels so a label permission
         // problem never masks the actual description verdict.
-        if (e.status !== 403 && e.status !== 404) throw e;
+        if (e.status !== 403) throw e;
-        core.warning(`Could not add "${name}" — label is unavailable or the token lacks label write access; skipping.`);
+        core.warning(`Could not add "${add}" — token lacks label write here; skipping.`);
       }
-    } else if (wanted) {
-      core.warning(`Label "${name}" does not exist in the repo — skipping. Create it once to enable labelling.`);
     } else {
-      try {
+      core.warning(`Label "${add}" does not exist in the repo — skipping. Create it once to enable labelling.`);
-        await github.rest.issues.removeLabel({ owner, repo, issue_number: prNum, name });
+    }
-      } catch (e) {
+    try {
-        if (e.status !== 404 && e.status !== 410 && e.status !== 403) throw e;
+      await github.rest.issues.removeLabel({ owner, repo, issue_number: num, name: remove });
-      }
+    } catch (e) {
+      if (e.status !== 404 && e.status !== 410 && e.status !== 403) throw e;
     }
   }
 
-  const descriptionComplete = descriptionProblems.length === 0;
+  if (problems.length === 0) {
-  const evidenceComplete = evidenceGaps.length === 0;
+    await swapLabel(prNum, 'ready for review', 'needs work');
-  const isDraft = Boolean(context.payload.pull_request.draft);
+  } else {
-  await setLabel(
+    await swapLabel(prNum, 'needs work', 'ready for review');
-    'ready for review',
+    core.setFailed(`PR description has ${problems.length} issue(s) — see bot comment for details.`);
-    descriptionComplete && evidenceComplete && !isDraft,
-  );
-  await setLabel('needs work', !descriptionComplete);
-  await setLabel('needs runtime validation', needsRuntimeValidation);
-  await setLabel('needs visual evidence', needsVisualEvidence);
-
-  if (!descriptionComplete) {
-    core.setFailed(`PR description has ${descriptionProblems.length} issue(s) — see bot comment for details.`);
   }
 };

.github/workflows/pr-description-check.yml

@@ -5,11 +5,7 @@ on:
   # works on fork PRs. Safe here: the checkout pins to the base branch (no fork
   # code runs) and the scripts only read context.payload and call the GitHub API.
   pull_request_target:  # zizmor: ignore[dangerous-triggers]
-    types: [opened, edited, synchronize, reopened, ready_for_review, converted_to_draft]
+    types: [opened, edited, synchronize, reopened, ready_for_review]
-
-concurrency:
-  group: pr-description-${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}
-  cancel-in-progress: true
 
 # Default-deny at the workflow level; each job opts into only the scopes it needs.
 # Note: modifying a PR's labels/comments needs pull-requests:write even though the
@@ -63,14 +59,12 @@ jobs:
 
   check-mergeable:
     name: Flag unmergeable PRs
-    needs: check-description
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     permissions:
       pull-requests: write
       issues: write
-    # Run after description validation failures, but never from an obsolete
+    # Skip bots: they open PRs programmatically and have their own process.
-    # workflow run canceled by a newer PR event.
+    if: github.event.pull_request.user.type != 'Bot'
-    if: ${{ !cancelled() && github.event.pull_request.user.type != 'Bot' }}
     steps:
       - uses: actions/github-script@3a2844b7e9c422d3c10d287c895573f7108da1b3  # v9.0.0
         with:

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.md

@@ -65,16 +65,6 @@ Vendored in `static/lib/` and served directly:
 | [jsPDF](https://github.com/parallax/jsPDF) (bundled in html2pdf) | PDF generation | MIT |
 | [html2canvas](https://github.com/niklasvh/html2canvas) (bundled in html2pdf) | DOM → canvas rasterization | MIT |
 | [node-qrcode](https://github.com/soldair/node-qrcode) (`qrcode.min.js`) | QR-code rendering (2FA setup) | MIT |
-| [KaTeX](https://github.com/KaTeX/KaTeX) v0.16.22 (`katex/katex.min.{js,css}` + `katex/fonts/*.woff2`) | Math typesetting | MIT ([`licenses/KaTeX-MIT-LICENSE.txt`](licenses/KaTeX-MIT-LICENSE.txt)) |
-| [Mermaid](https://github.com/mermaid-js/mermaid) v11.16.1 (`mermaid.min.js`) | Diagrams from text | MIT ([`licenses/Mermaid-MIT-LICENSE.txt`](licenses/Mermaid-MIT-LICENSE.txt)) |
-
-KaTeX and Mermaid are loaded on first use by `static/js/markdown.js` rather than
-from `index.html`, so a session that renders no math and no diagram never fetches
-either. Only the `.woff2` KaTeX fonts are shipped, matching `static/fonts/`; the
-`.woff` and `.ttf` variants its stylesheet also lists are never requested by a
-browser that supports `woff2`. The bundles are the published npm artifacts,
-unmodified — `.gitattributes` turns the whitespace check off for `static/lib/`
-so they can stay byte-identical to upstream.
 
 ## Front-end libraries loaded at runtime (CDN)
 
@@ -82,6 +72,8 @@ Referenced from `cdn.jsdelivr.net` / `cdnjs.cloudflare.com` at runtime — not v
 
 | Library | Purpose | License |
 |---|---|---|
+| [KaTeX](https://github.com/KaTeX/KaTeX) 0.16.22 | Math typesetting | MIT |
+| [Mermaid](https://github.com/mermaid-js/mermaid) 11 | Diagrams from text | MIT |
 | [Pyodide](https://github.com/pyodide/pyodide) 0.27.5 | In-browser Python runtime | MPL-2.0 |
 | [PDFObject](https://github.com/pipwerks/PDFObject) 2.1.1 | Inline PDF embedding | MIT |
 

README.md

@@ -59,20 +59,15 @@ Help is welcome. The best entry points are fresh-install testing, provider setup
 
 ## Security
 
-Odysseus is a self-hosted workspace with powerful local tools. Keep auth enabled, keep private data out of Git, and do not expose raw model/service ports publicly.
+Odysseus is a self-hosted workspace with powerful local tools. Keep auth enabled, keep private data out of Git, and do not expose raw model/service ports publicly. Deployment details are in the [setup guide](docs/setup.md#security-notes).
-
-- Keep `AUTH_ENABLED=true` for any network-accessible deployment.
-- Keep `LOCALHOST_BYPASS=false` outside local development.
-
-Deployment details are in the [setup guide](docs/setup.md#security-notes).
 
 ## Star History
 
-<a href="https://star-history.dera.page/#odysseus-dev/odysseus&type=date&legend=top-left">
+<a href="https://www.star-history.com/?repos=odysseus-dev%2Fodysseus&type=date&legend=top-left">
  <picture>
-   <source media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" srcset="https://star-history.dera.page/svg?repos=odysseus-dev/odysseus&type=date&theme=dark&legend=top-left" />
+   <source media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" srcset="https://api.star-history.com/chart?repos=odysseus-dev/odysseus&type=date&theme=dark&legend=top-left" />
-   <source media="(prefers-color-scheme: light)" srcset="https://star-history.dera.page/svg?repos=odysseus-dev/odysseus&type=date&legend=top-left" />
+   <source media="(prefers-color-scheme: light)" srcset="https://api.star-history.com/chart?repos=odysseus-dev/odysseus&type=date&legend=top-left" />
-   <img alt="Star History Chart" src="https://star-history.dera.page/svg?repos=odysseus-dev/odysseus&type=date&legend=top-left" />
+   <img alt="Star History Chart" src="https://api.star-history.com/chart?repos=odysseus-dev/odysseus&type=date&legend=top-left" />
  </picture>
 </a>
 

SECURITY.md

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ Security fixes are handled on the default branch until formal releases are cut.
 
 - Keep `AUTH_ENABLED=true` for any network-accessible deployment.
 - Keep `LOCALHOST_BYPASS=false` outside local development.
-- Leave `SECURE_COOKIES` unset unless you need to override it: session cookies are marked `Secure` whenever the request arrives over HTTPS. Set `SECURE_COOKIES=true` to force it on (for a proxy Odysseus cannot see the scheme of), or `SECURE_COOKIES=false` to force it off while you still serve plain HTTP alongside HTTPS.
+- Set `SECURE_COOKIES=true` when Odysseus is served through HTTPS by a trusted reverse proxy or private access gateway.
 - Use HTTPS when exposing the app beyond localhost.
 - Put the authenticated Odysseus web/API entrypoint behind a trusted reverse proxy or private access layer such as Cloudflare Access, Tailscale, or a VPN.
 - Keep ChromaDB, SearXNG, ntfy, Ollama, vLLM, llama.cpp, databases, and raw model/provider APIs internal-only.

THREAT_MODEL.md

@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ Non-admin defaults are in `core/auth.py:DEFAULT_PRIVILEGES`. Tool enforcement is
 
 - **Sessions:** bcrypt passwords, 7-day session tokens stored atomically in `data/sessions.json` via `core/atomic_io.py`.
 - **2FA:** TOTP with 8 single-use backup codes. Verified after password check, before session issuance.
-- **Reserved usernames:** request sentinels and the Default/Local storage owner cannot be registered or renamed into. Defined in `core/auth.py:RESERVED_USERNAMES`.
+- **Reserved usernames:** `internal-tool`, `api`, `demo`, `system` cannot be registered or renamed into. Defined in `core/auth.py:RESERVED_USERNAMES`.
   - `internal-tool` is security-critical: `core/middleware.py:require_admin` treats any request where `request.state.current_user == "internal-tool"` as the in-process tool loopback and grants admin unconditionally. A real account with that name would silently pass every `require_admin` check.
 - **Orphan sessions:** `validate_token` re-checks that the user record still exists on every call. A deleted user's cookie is dropped on next request rather than continuing to authenticate.
 

app.py

@@ -67,13 +67,7 @@ from core.constants import (
     REQUEST_TIMEOUT, OPENAI_API_KEY, AUTH_FILE,
 )
 from core.database import SessionLocal, ApiToken
-from core.middleware import (
+from core.middleware import SecurityHeadersMiddleware, is_cors_preflight
-    SecurityHeadersMiddleware,
-    get_application_route_path,
-    is_cors_preflight,
-    path_is_route_or_child,
-    with_asgi_root_path,
-)
 from core.auth import AuthManager, normalize_known_username
 from core.exceptions import (
     SessionNotFoundError, InvalidFileUploadError,
@@ -84,7 +78,6 @@ import bcrypt as _bcrypt
 
 from src.app_helpers import abs_join, serve_html_with_nonce
 from src.generated_images import GENERATED_IMAGE_HEADERS, resolve_generated_image_path
-from src.owner_identity import auth_disabled
 from starlette.responses import RedirectResponse
 
 # ========= LOGGING =========
@@ -255,7 +248,7 @@ from routes.auth_routes import setup_auth_routes, SESSION_COOKIE
 
 auth_manager = AuthManager()
 app.state.auth_manager = auth_manager
-AUTH_ENABLED = not auth_disabled()
+AUTH_ENABLED = os.getenv("AUTH_ENABLED", "true").lower() != "false"
 LOCALHOST_BYPASS = os.getenv("LOCALHOST_BYPASS", "false").lower() == "true"
 if LOCALHOST_BYPASS:
     logger.warning("LOCALHOST_BYPASS is enabled, loopback requests bypass authentication. Do not expose this instance to a network.")
@@ -291,7 +284,7 @@ if AUTH_ENABLED:
     def _is_auth_exempt(path: str) -> bool:
         if path in AUTH_EXEMPT_EXACT:
             return True
-        if any(path_is_route_or_child(path, p) for p in AUTH_EXEMPT_PREFIXES):
+        if any(path.startswith(p) for p in AUTH_EXEMPT_PREFIXES):
             return True
         return any(p.match(path) for p in AUTH_EXEMPT_PATTERNS)
 
@@ -362,7 +355,7 @@ if AUTH_ENABLED:
 
     class AuthMiddleware(BaseHTTPMiddleware):
         async def dispatch(self, request: Request, call_next):
-            path = get_application_route_path(request.scope)
+            path = request.url.path
             # A genuine CORS preflight (OPTIONS + Access-Control-Request-Method)
             # carries no credentials by design and must reach CORSMiddleware to be
             # answered. AuthMiddleware is the outermost middleware, so gating the
@@ -406,10 +399,7 @@ if AUTH_ENABLED:
             if not auth_manager.is_configured:
                 # No users yet — redirect to login for first-time setup
                 if not path.startswith("/api/"):
-                    return RedirectResponse(
+                    return RedirectResponse(url="/login", status_code=302)
-                        url=with_asgi_root_path(request.scope, "/login"),
-                        status_code=302,
-                    )
                 return JSONResponse(status_code=401, content={"error": "Setup required"})
 
             # --- Bearer token auth (API tokens for external integrations) ---
@@ -471,10 +461,7 @@ if AUTH_ENABLED:
             if not auth_manager.validate_token(token):
                 if path.startswith("/api/"):
                     return JSONResponse(status_code=401, content={"error": "Not authenticated"})
-                return RedirectResponse(
+                return RedirectResponse(url="/login", status_code=302)
-                    url=with_asgi_root_path(request.scope, "/login"),
-                    status_code=302,
-                )
 
             # Attach current username to request state for downstream routes
             request.state.current_user = auth_manager.get_username_for_token(token)
@@ -643,24 +630,13 @@ app.include_router(auth_router)
 
 @app.post("/api/activity/heartbeat")
 async def activity_heartbeat():
-    from src.interactive_gate import (
+    from src.interactive_gate import mark_browser_activity
-        mark_browser_activity,
-        maybe_stop_background_tasks_for_heartbeat,
-    )
-
     await mark_browser_activity()
-
     async def _stop_background():
         try:
-            await maybe_stop_background_tasks_for_heartbeat(
+            await task_scheduler.stop_background_tasks_for_foreground(reason="browser heartbeat")
-                task_scheduler.stop_background_tasks_for_foreground
-            )
         except Exception:
-            logging.getLogger("app.foreground_gate").debug(
+            logging.getLogger("app.foreground_gate").debug("heartbeat task stop failed", exc_info=True)
-                "heartbeat task stop failed",
-                exc_info=True,
-            )
-
     asyncio.create_task(_stop_background())
     return {"ok": True}
 
@@ -784,7 +760,7 @@ from src.task_scheduler import TaskScheduler
 task_scheduler = TaskScheduler(session_manager)
 from src.event_bus import set_task_scheduler
 set_task_scheduler(task_scheduler)
-from routes.task.task_routes import setup_task_routes
+from routes.task_routes import setup_task_routes
 app.include_router(setup_task_routes(task_scheduler))
 
 from routes.assistant_routes import setup_assistant_routes

build-macos-app.sh

@@ -73,10 +73,6 @@ cat > "$APP/Contents/MacOS/$APP_NAME.tmpl" <<'LAUNCHER'
 INSTALL_DIR="__INSTALL_DIR__"
 PORT="__PORT__"
 URL="http://127.0.0.1:${PORT}"
-# uvicorn is started with --port below, but APP_PORT is what the app itself
-# reads when it needs to build a URL for this instance (internal_api_base(),
-# companion pairing, the MCP OAuth callback), so export it as well.
-export APP_PORT="$PORT"
 export PATH="/opt/homebrew/bin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin:/bin:$PATH"
 
 UVICORN="$INSTALL_DIR/venv/bin/uvicorn"

companion/pairing.py

@@ -6,14 +6,11 @@ units so the route layer stays thin and the logic is directly testable.
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
-import ipaddress
 import json
 import os
-import re
 import secrets
 import socket
 import uuid
-from urllib.parse import urlsplit
 
 import bcrypt
 
@@ -23,102 +20,6 @@ PAIRING_VERSION = 1
 COMPANION_SCOPE = "chat"
 
 
-_COMPANION_IPV4_NETWORKS = tuple(
-    ipaddress.ip_network(cidr)
-    for cidr in (
-        "10.0.0.0/8",
-        "100.64.0.0/10",
-        "127.0.0.0/8",
-        "169.254.0.0/16",
-        "172.16.0.0/12",
-        "192.168.0.0/16",
-    )
-)
-_DNS_LABEL_RE = re.compile(r"[a-z0-9](?:[a-z0-9-]{0,61}[a-z0-9])?\Z")
-
-
-def _valid_companion_client_host(host: str) -> bool:
-    """Match the host forms supported by the current v1 Expo client."""
-    if not host or len(host) > 253 or not host.isascii() or "%" in host:
-        return False
-
-    try:
-        address = ipaddress.ip_address(host)
-    except ValueError:
-        labels = host.split(".")
-        if any(not _DNS_LABEL_RE.fullmatch(label) for label in labels):
-            return False
-        if any(label.startswith("xn--") for label in labels):
-            return False
-        # WHATWG URL parsers treat a decimal or ``0x`` single-label hostname
-        # as an IPv4 number even though Python's strict ``ipaddress`` parser
-        # rejects that spelling.  The v1 client interpolates this host back
-        # into a URL, so accepting e.g. ``134744072`` would make the phone send
-        # its bearer token to public 8.8.8.8.  Keep DNS labels unambiguous.
-        if len(labels) == 1 and (
-            labels[0].isdigit()
-            or re.fullmatch(r"0x[0-9a-f]*", labels[0]) is not None
-        ):
-            return False
-        return len(labels) == 1 or (len(labels) >= 2 and labels[-1] == "local")
-
-    return isinstance(address, ipaddress.IPv4Address) and any(
-        address in network for network in _COMPANION_IPV4_NETWORKS
-    )
-
-
-def parse_companion_base_url(value: str) -> tuple[str, int]:
-    """Validate a v1 companion address and return its legacy (host, port).
-
-    The deployed client understands only HTTP plus a LAN-style host and port.
-    Reject anything outside that exact contract instead of advertising a URL
-    the client would reject, downgrade, or interpret differently.
-    """
-    if not isinstance(value, str) or not value:
-        raise ValueError("COMPANION_BASE_URL must be a canonical HTTP LAN origin")
-    if not value.isascii():
-        raise ValueError("COMPANION_BASE_URL must contain only ASCII characters")
-    if any(
-        ord(char) <= 32 or ord(char) == 127 or char in {"\\", "%"}
-        for char in value
-    ):
-        raise ValueError(
-            "COMPANION_BASE_URL contains a forbidden character"
-        )
-
-    try:
-        parsed = urlsplit(value)
-        port = parsed.port
-    except ValueError as exc:
-        raise ValueError("COMPANION_BASE_URL must be a valid HTTP LAN origin") from exc
-
-    host = parsed.hostname
-    if parsed.scheme.lower() != "http" or not parsed.netloc or not host:
-        raise ValueError("COMPANION_BASE_URL must be a canonical HTTP LAN origin")
-    if parsed.username is not None or parsed.password is not None:
-        raise ValueError("COMPANION_BASE_URL must not contain credentials")
-    if parsed.path or parsed.query or parsed.fragment:
-        raise ValueError("COMPANION_BASE_URL must not contain a path, query, or fragment")
-    if port is not None and not 1 <= port <= 65535:
-        raise ValueError("COMPANION_BASE_URL port must be between 1 and 65535")
-    if not _valid_companion_client_host(host):
-        raise ValueError("COMPANION_BASE_URL host is not supported by companion v1")
-
-    netloc = f"{host}:{port}" if port is not None else host
-    origin = f"http://{netloc}"
-    if value != origin:
-        raise ValueError("COMPANION_BASE_URL must be a canonical HTTP LAN origin")
-    return host, port or 80
-
-
-def configured_companion_origin() -> tuple[str, int] | None:
-    """Return the validated operator-configured v1 address, if any."""
-    value = os.environ.get("COMPANION_BASE_URL")
-    if value is None or value == "":
-        return None
-    return parse_companion_base_url(value)
-
-
 def default_port() -> int:
     """Best guess at the port the server is reachable on. Callers that know the
     real request port should pass it explicitly."""

companion/routes.py

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ from fastapi import APIRouter, HTTPException, Request
 from fastapi.responses import HTMLResponse
 
 from core.middleware import require_admin
-from src.auth_helpers import _auth_disabled, get_current_user
+from src.auth_helpers import get_current_user
 
 from companion import pairing as _pairing
 
@@ -113,9 +113,8 @@ def setup_companion_routes() -> APIRouter:
         The stock /api/models route scopes to get_current_user, which for a
         bearer token is the sandboxed pseudo-user "api" (owns nothing). Here we
         scope to the token's real owner instead, plus legacy null-owner shared
-        rows -- the same rule as owner_filter. Explicit auth-disabled mode keeps
+        rows -- the same rule as owner_filter. Read-only; never returns api_key
-        the stock route's single-user all-endpoints view. Read-only; never
+        material.
-        returns api_key material.
         """
         require_models_scope(request)
         import json as _json
@@ -124,11 +123,6 @@ def setup_companion_routes() -> APIRouter:
         from src.endpoint_resolver import build_chat_url
 
         owner = token_owner(request)
-        single_user_mode = (
-            owner is None
-            and not getattr(request.state, "api_token", False)
-            and _auth_disabled()
-        )
         out = []
         db = SessionLocal()
         try:
@@ -139,7 +133,7 @@ def setup_companion_routes() -> APIRouter:
             if owner:
                 q = q.filter((ModelEndpoint.owner == owner) | (ModelEndpoint.owner == None))  # noqa: E711
             for ep in q.all():
-                if not single_user_mode and not owner_can_see(ep.owner, owner):
+                if not owner_can_see(ep.owner, owner):
                     continue
                 try:
                     model_ids = _json.loads(ep.cached_models) if ep.cached_models else []
@@ -200,27 +194,19 @@ def setup_companion_routes() -> APIRouter:
         the code works immediately, no restart. `?format=json` returns the
         payload for an in-app pairing screen."""
         require_admin(request)
-        try:
-            configured_origin = _pairing.configured_companion_origin()
-        except ValueError as exc:
-            raise HTTPException(500, str(exc)) from None
         owner = get_current_user(request)
         invalidate = getattr(request.app.state, "invalidate_token_cache", None)
         token_id, raw_token = mint_pairing_token(owner, invalidate)
 
-        if configured_origin:
+        hosts = _pairing.lan_ip_candidates()
-            host, port = configured_origin
+        host = hosts[0] if hosts else "127.0.0.1"
-            hosts = [host]
+        port = request.url.port or _pairing.default_port()
-        else:
-            hosts = _pairing.lan_ip_candidates()
-            host = hosts[0] if hosts else "127.0.0.1"
-            port = request.url.port or _pairing.default_port()
         payload = _pairing.pairing_payload(host, port, raw_token)
         qr = _pairing.pairing_qr_png_data_uri(payload)
         qr_ok = bool(qr and qr.startswith("data:image/png;base64,"))
 
         if (request.query_params.get("format") or "").lower() == "json":
-            response = {
+            return {
                 "host": host,
                 "port": port,
                 "token": raw_token,
@@ -229,7 +215,6 @@ def setup_companion_routes() -> APIRouter:
                 "payload": payload,
                 "qr": qr if qr_ok else None,
             }
-            return response
 
         import json as _json
         payload_json = _json.dumps(payload, separators=(",", ":"))

core/atomic_io.py

@@ -30,20 +30,11 @@ def atomic_write_json(path: str, data: Any, *, indent: Optional[int] = None) ->
     """
     os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(path) or ".", exist_ok=True)
     tmp = f"{path}.tmp.{uuid.uuid4().hex}"
-
+    with open(tmp, "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:
-    try:
+        json.dump(data, f, indent=indent)
-        with open(tmp, "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:
+        f.flush()
-            json.dump(data, f, indent=indent)
+        os.fsync(f.fileno())
-            f.flush()
+    os.replace(tmp, path)
-            os.fsync(f.fileno())
-        os.replace(tmp, path)
-    finally:
-        # Directly unlink to avoid a check-then-act race condition.
-        # Swallows FileNotFoundError (on success path) and other cleanup OSErrors.
-        try:
-            os.unlink(tmp)
-        except OSError:
-            pass
 
 
 def atomic_write_text(path: str, text: str) -> None:
@@ -51,17 +42,8 @@ def atomic_write_text(path: str, text: str) -> None:
         raise TypeError("atomic_write_text expects a string")
     os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(path) or ".", exist_ok=True)
     tmp = f"{path}.tmp.{uuid.uuid4().hex}"
-
+    with open(tmp, "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:
-    try:
+        f.write(text)
-        with open(tmp, "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:
+        f.flush()
-            f.write(text)
+        os.fsync(f.fileno())
-            f.flush()
+    os.replace(tmp, path)
-            os.fsync(f.fileno())
-        os.replace(tmp, path)
-    finally:
-        # Directly unlink to avoid a check-then-act race condition.
-        # Swallows FileNotFoundError (on success path) and other cleanup OSErrors.
-        try:
-            os.unlink(tmp)
-        except OSError:
-            pass

core/auth.py

@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
 
 
 from core.atomic_io import atomic_write_json as _atomic_write_json  # noqa: E402
+from core.middleware import INTERNAL_TOOL_USER  # noqa: E402
 
 DEFAULT_PRIVILEGES = {
     "can_use_agent": True,
@@ -48,18 +49,24 @@ ADMIN_PRIVILEGES["allowed_models_restricted"] = False
 ADMIN_PRIVILEGES["block_all_models"] = False
 
 from src.constants import AUTH_FILE, PASSWORD_MIN_LENGTH
-from src.owner_identity import RESERVED_AUTH_USERNAMES
 DEFAULT_AUTH_PATH = AUTH_FILE
 TOKEN_TTL = 60 * 60 * 24 * 7  # 7 days
 
-# Usernames the auth + middleware layer reserves for request sentinels and
+# Usernames the auth + middleware layer reserve as internal "synthetic owner"
-# internal storage owners; they must never belong to a real login account.
+# sentinels; they must never belong to a real account. The most dangerous is
-# "internal-tool" is the most dangerous because `core.middleware.require_admin`
+# "internal-tool": `core.middleware.require_admin` treats any request whose
-# treats it as the in-process tool loopback. "api" collides with bearer-token
+# `current_user == "internal-tool"` as the in-process tool loopback and grants
-# attribution. "demo"/"system" are synthetic owners already special-cased by
+# admin, and because the cookie auth path sets `current_user` to the raw
-# scheduler/assistant/research paths. The Default/Local owner is a storage
+# username, an account literally named "internal-tool" would be silently
-# bucket for explicit auth-disabled no-login mode, not a login username.
+# treated as an admin by every `require_admin`-gated route. "api" collides with
-RESERVED_USERNAMES = frozenset(RESERVED_AUTH_USERNAMES)
+# the bearer-token owner-attribution sentinel. "demo"/"system" round out the
+# synthetic-owner set the rest of the codebase already special-cases (see
+# `_SYNTHETIC_OWNERS` in routes/assistant_routes.py and the matching guards in
+# src/task_scheduler.py / routes/research_routes.py) — a real account with one
+# of those names would be denied an assistant and inconsistently owner-scoped.
+# Refuse to create or rename into any of them so the sentinels can't be
+# impersonated. (Keep this in sync with that synthetic-owner set.)
+RESERVED_USERNAMES = frozenset({INTERNAL_TOOL_USER, "api", "demo", "system"})
 
 
 def normalize_known_username(users: Dict[str, Any], username: str | None) -> Optional[str]:

core/database.py

@@ -1491,25 +1491,8 @@ def _migrate_assign_legacy_owner():
             with open(prefs_path, "r", encoding="utf-8") as f:
                 prefs = _json.load(f)
             if "_users" not in prefs and prefs:
-                # Flat format → nest ordinary preferences under the admin
+                # Flat format → nest under admin user
-                # user. Foreground fallback is an explicit per-owner opt-in,
+                new_prefs = {"_users": {admin_user: prefs}}
-                # so auth-disabled consent must remain inert at the flat root
-                # rather than becoming consent for the first named owner.
-                foreground_keys = {
-                    "foreground_fallback_enabled",
-                    "foreground_model_fallbacks",
-                }
-                named_prefs = {
-                    key: value
-                    for key, value in prefs.items()
-                    if key not in foreground_keys
-                }
-                new_prefs = {
-                    key: prefs[key]
-                    for key in foreground_keys
-                    if key in prefs
-                }
-                new_prefs["_users"] = {admin_user: named_prefs}
                 with open(prefs_path, "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:
                     _json.dump(new_prefs, f, indent=2)
                 logger.info(f"Migrated user_prefs.json to per-user format under '{admin_user}'")

core/middleware.py

@@ -3,14 +3,10 @@
 
 import os
 import secrets
-from collections.abc import Mapping
 
 from fastapi import HTTPException, Request
 from starlette.middleware.base import BaseHTTPMiddleware
 from starlette.responses import Response
-from starlette.routing import get_route_path
-
-from src.owner_identity import INTERNAL_TOOL_USER, auth_disabled
 
 
 # Per-process token that lets the in-app tool layer hit admin-gated
@@ -19,30 +15,8 @@ from src.owner_identity import INTERNAL_TOOL_USER, auth_disabled
 # same value from this module. Never persisted or exposed externally.
 INTERNAL_TOOL_TOKEN = os.environ.get("ODYSSEUS_INTERNAL_TOKEN") or secrets.token_hex(32)
 INTERNAL_TOOL_HEADER = "X-Odysseus-Internal-Token"
-
+# Pseudo-username on in-process tool-loopback requests; require_admin trusts it and it is reserved.
-
+INTERNAL_TOOL_USER = "internal-tool"
-def get_application_route_path(scope: Mapping[str, object]) -> str:
-    """Return the application-relative path used by Starlette routing.
-
-    Uvicorn prefixes ``scope["path"]`` with a configured ASGI ``root_path``;
-    Starlette removes that prefix before matching routes. Middleware policy
-    must use the same path form or a deployment prefix can change which policy
-    applies to an otherwise unchanged application route.
-    """
-    return get_route_path(scope)
-
-
-def with_asgi_root_path(scope: Mapping[str, object], path: str) -> str:
-    """Prefix an application path for a client-facing redirect target."""
-    root_path = scope.get("root_path", "")
-    if not isinstance(root_path, str) or not root_path:
-        return path
-    return f"{root_path.rstrip('/')}{path}"
-
-
-def path_is_route_or_child(path: str, prefix: str) -> bool:
-    """Return whether ``path`` is exactly ``prefix`` or below that route."""
-    return path == prefix or path.startswith(prefix + "/")
 
 
 def is_cors_preflight(method: str, headers) -> bool:
@@ -73,7 +47,7 @@ def require_admin(request: Request):
         pass
 
     auth_mgr = getattr(request.app.state, "auth_manager", None)
-    if auth_disabled():
+    if os.getenv("AUTH_ENABLED", "true").lower() == "false":
         return
     if not auth_mgr or not auth_mgr.is_configured:
         raise HTTPException(403, "Admin only")

core/models.py

@@ -8,11 +8,6 @@ These are simple datacontainers. All persistence is handled by SessionManager.
 from dataclasses import dataclass
 from typing import Dict, List, Any, Optional, TYPE_CHECKING
 
-from src.tool_approval_scopes import (
-    CHAT_SESSION_APPROVAL_CONTEXT_MARKER,
-    CHAT_SESSION_APPROVAL_DECISION,
-)
-
 if TYPE_CHECKING:
     from .session_manager import SessionManager
 
@@ -36,35 +31,6 @@ set_session_manager = set_session_manager_instance
 get_session_manager = get_session_manager_instance
 
 
-def _history_grants_chat_session_approval(
-    history: List["ChatMessage"],
-    session_id: str,
-) -> bool:
-    """Return whether this exact chat has a resolved session-scope grant."""
-
-    expected_session = str(session_id or "")
-    if not expected_session:
-        return False
-    for message in reversed(history or []):
-        metadata = getattr(message, "metadata", None)
-        if not isinstance(metadata, dict):
-            continue
-        tool_events = metadata.get("tool_events")
-        if not isinstance(tool_events, list):
-            continue
-        for event in reversed(tool_events):
-            ask_user = event.get("ask_user") if isinstance(event, dict) else None
-            if not isinstance(ask_user, dict):
-                continue
-            if (
-                ask_user.get("kind") == "tool_approval"
-                and ask_user.get("resolved") == CHAT_SESSION_APPROVAL_DECISION
-                and str(ask_user.get("session_id") or "") == expected_session
-            ):
-                return True
-    return False
-
-
 @dataclass
 class ChatMessage:
     """A single chat message."""
@@ -150,27 +116,11 @@ class Session:
         the model. Display/history-load paths use the raw ``history`` and are
         unaffected.
         """
-        messages = [
+        return [
             msg.to_dict()
             for msg in self.history
             if (msg.metadata or {}).get("source") != "slash"
         ]
-        if not _history_grants_chat_session_approval(self.history, self.id):
-            return messages
-
-        # Keep the grant close to the latest user request so route-neutral
-        # compaction/trimming preserves it. Copy the metadata instead of
-        # mutating the durable transcript object.
-        for index in range(len(messages) - 1, -1, -1):
-            if messages[index].get("role") != "user":
-                continue
-            message = dict(messages[index])
-            metadata = dict(message.get("metadata") or {})
-            metadata[CHAT_SESSION_APPROVAL_CONTEXT_MARKER] = True
-            message["metadata"] = metadata
-            messages[index] = message
-            break
-        return messages
 
     def get(self, key: str, default=None):
         """Dict-like access for compatibility."""

core/session_manager.py

@@ -14,8 +14,6 @@ import logging
 from datetime import datetime, timezone, timedelta
 from typing import Dict, Optional
 
-from sqlalchemy import func
-
 from .database import Session as DbSession, ChatMessage as DbChatMessage, Document as DbDocument, SessionLocal, utcnow_naive
 from .models import Session, ChatMessage
 from src.attachment_refs import persistable_message_content
@@ -94,28 +92,14 @@ class SessionManager:
         try:
             db_sessions = db.query(DbSession).filter(
                 DbSession.archived == False,
-                DbSession.messages.any(),
+                DbSession.message_count > 0,
             ).order_by(DbSession.last_accessed.desc()).limit(100).all()
 
-            # message_count is derived metadata and can drift after interrupted
-            # or legacy writes. Count only the bounded discovery set so startup
-            # remains metadata-only while lazy hydration sees an authoritative
-            # positive count for every discovered non-empty session.
-            message_counts = {}
-            if db_sessions:
-                message_counts = dict(
-                    db.query(DbChatMessage.session_id, func.count(DbChatMessage.id))
-                    .filter(DbChatMessage.session_id.in_([row.id for row in db_sessions]))
-                    .group_by(DbChatMessage.session_id)
-                    .all()
-                )
-
             loaded_count = 0
             for db_session in db_sessions:
                 try:
                     session = self._db_to_session_meta(db_session)
                     if session is not None:
-                        session.message_count = message_counts[db_session.id]
                         self.sessions[db_session.id] = session
                         loaded_count += 1
                 except Exception as e:

docker-compose.gpu-amd.yml

@@ -46,11 +46,10 @@ services:
       - DATABASE_URL=${DATABASE_URL:-sqlite:///./data/app.db}
       - AUTH_ENABLED=${AUTH_ENABLED:-true}
       - LOCALHOST_BYPASS=${LOCALHOST_BYPASS:-false}
-      - COMPANION_BASE_URL=${COMPANION_BASE_URL:-}
       - ODYSSEUS_ADMIN_USER=${ODYSSEUS_ADMIN_USER:-admin}
       - ODYSSEUS_ADMIN_PASSWORD=${ODYSSEUS_ADMIN_PASSWORD:-}
       - ALLOWED_ORIGINS=${ALLOWED_ORIGINS:-http://localhost,http://127.0.0.1}
-      - SECURE_COOKIES=${SECURE_COOKIES:-}
+      - SECURE_COOKIES=${SECURE_COOKIES:-false}
       - EMBEDDING_URL=${EMBEDDING_URL:-}
       - EMBEDDING_MODEL=${EMBEDDING_MODEL:-}
       - EMBEDDING_API_KEY=${EMBEDDING_API_KEY:-}
@@ -75,11 +74,6 @@ services:
       - GOOGLE_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID=${GOOGLE_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID:-}
       - GOOGLE_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET=${GOOGLE_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET:-}
       - GOOGLE_OAUTH_REDIRECT_URI=${GOOGLE_OAUTH_REDIRECT_URI:-}
-      # Externally reachable origin for MCP OAuth callbacks. The container
-      # always listens on 7000 and cannot see the host port map above, so
-      # remote MCP OAuth needs this set whenever the browser reaches
-      # Odysseus on anything other than http://localhost:7000.
-      - OAUTH_REDIRECT_BASE_URL=${OAUTH_REDIRECT_BASE_URL:-}
       - TAVILY_API_KEY=${TAVILY_API_KEY:-}
       - SERPER_API_KEY=${SERPER_API_KEY:-}
       # PUID / PGID — the user/group the container drops to before
@@ -135,17 +129,12 @@ services:
           fi
           sed "s|__SEARXNG_SECRET__|$$secret|g" /tmp/searxng-settings.yml.template > /etc/searxng/settings.yml
         fi
-        # Advisory: a settings file the migration cannot parse or rewrite must
-        # not be what stops searxng from booting. It explains itself on stderr
-        # and we carry on, letting searxng report anything genuinely wrong.
-        /usr/local/searxng/.venv/bin/python /tmp/migrate-searxng-settings.py /etc/searxng/settings.yml || true
         exec /usr/local/searxng/entrypoint.sh
     ports:
       - "127.0.0.1:8080:8080"
     volumes:
       - searxng-data:/etc/searxng
       - ./config/searxng/settings.yml:/tmp/searxng-settings.yml.template:ro,z
-      - ./scripts/migrate_searxng_settings.py:/tmp/migrate-searxng-settings.py:ro,z
     environment:
       - SEARXNG_BASE_URL=http://localhost:8080/
       - SEARXNG_SECRET=${SEARXNG_SECRET:-}

docker-compose.gpu-nvidia.yml

@@ -45,11 +45,10 @@ services:
       - DATABASE_URL=${DATABASE_URL:-sqlite:///./data/app.db}
       - AUTH_ENABLED=${AUTH_ENABLED:-true}
       - LOCALHOST_BYPASS=${LOCALHOST_BYPASS:-false}
-      - COMPANION_BASE_URL=${COMPANION_BASE_URL:-}
       - ODYSSEUS_ADMIN_USER=${ODYSSEUS_ADMIN_USER:-admin}
       - ODYSSEUS_ADMIN_PASSWORD=${ODYSSEUS_ADMIN_PASSWORD:-}
       - ALLOWED_ORIGINS=${ALLOWED_ORIGINS:-http://localhost,http://127.0.0.1}
-      - SECURE_COOKIES=${SECURE_COOKIES:-}
+      - SECURE_COOKIES=${SECURE_COOKIES:-false}
       - EMBEDDING_URL=${EMBEDDING_URL:-}
       - EMBEDDING_MODEL=${EMBEDDING_MODEL:-}
       - EMBEDDING_API_KEY=${EMBEDDING_API_KEY:-}
@@ -74,11 +73,6 @@ services:
       - GOOGLE_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID=${GOOGLE_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID:-}
       - GOOGLE_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET=${GOOGLE_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET:-}
       - GOOGLE_OAUTH_REDIRECT_URI=${GOOGLE_OAUTH_REDIRECT_URI:-}
-      # Externally reachable origin for MCP OAuth callbacks. The container
-      # always listens on 7000 and cannot see the host port map above, so
-      # remote MCP OAuth needs this set whenever the browser reaches
-      # Odysseus on anything other than http://localhost:7000.
-      - OAUTH_REDIRECT_BASE_URL=${OAUTH_REDIRECT_BASE_URL:-}
       - TAVILY_API_KEY=${TAVILY_API_KEY:-}
       - SERPER_API_KEY=${SERPER_API_KEY:-}
       # PUID / PGID — the user/group the container drops to before
@@ -138,17 +132,12 @@ services:
           fi
           sed "s|__SEARXNG_SECRET__|$$secret|g" /tmp/searxng-settings.yml.template > /etc/searxng/settings.yml
         fi
-        # Advisory: a settings file the migration cannot parse or rewrite must
-        # not be what stops searxng from booting. It explains itself on stderr
-        # and we carry on, letting searxng report anything genuinely wrong.
-        /usr/local/searxng/.venv/bin/python /tmp/migrate-searxng-settings.py /etc/searxng/settings.yml || true
         exec /usr/local/searxng/entrypoint.sh
     ports:
       - "127.0.0.1:8080:8080"
     volumes:
       - searxng-data:/etc/searxng
       - ./config/searxng/settings.yml:/tmp/searxng-settings.yml.template:ro,z
-      - ./scripts/migrate_searxng_settings.py:/tmp/migrate-searxng-settings.py:ro,z
     environment:
       - SEARXNG_BASE_URL=http://localhost:8080/
       - SEARXNG_SECRET=${SEARXNG_SECRET:-}

docker-compose.yml

@@ -34,11 +34,10 @@ services:
       - DATABASE_URL=${DATABASE_URL:-sqlite:///./data/app.db}
       - AUTH_ENABLED=${AUTH_ENABLED:-true}
       - LOCALHOST_BYPASS=${LOCALHOST_BYPASS:-false}
-      - COMPANION_BASE_URL=${COMPANION_BASE_URL:-}
       - ODYSSEUS_ADMIN_USER=${ODYSSEUS_ADMIN_USER:-admin}
       - ODYSSEUS_ADMIN_PASSWORD=${ODYSSEUS_ADMIN_PASSWORD:-}
       - ALLOWED_ORIGINS=${ALLOWED_ORIGINS:-http://localhost,http://127.0.0.1}
-      - SECURE_COOKIES=${SECURE_COOKIES:-}
+      - SECURE_COOKIES=${SECURE_COOKIES:-false}
       - EMBEDDING_URL=${EMBEDDING_URL:-}
       - EMBEDDING_MODEL=${EMBEDDING_MODEL:-}
       - EMBEDDING_API_KEY=${EMBEDDING_API_KEY:-}
@@ -63,11 +62,6 @@ services:
       - GOOGLE_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID=${GOOGLE_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID:-}
       - GOOGLE_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET=${GOOGLE_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET:-}
       - GOOGLE_OAUTH_REDIRECT_URI=${GOOGLE_OAUTH_REDIRECT_URI:-}
-      # Externally reachable origin for MCP OAuth callbacks. The container
-      # always listens on 7000 and cannot see the host port map above, so
-      # remote MCP OAuth needs this set whenever the browser reaches
-      # Odysseus on anything other than http://localhost:7000.
-      - OAUTH_REDIRECT_BASE_URL=${OAUTH_REDIRECT_BASE_URL:-}
       - TAVILY_API_KEY=${TAVILY_API_KEY:-}
       - SERPER_API_KEY=${SERPER_API_KEY:-}
       # PUID / PGID — the user/group the container drops to before
@@ -116,17 +110,12 @@ services:
           fi
           sed "s|__SEARXNG_SECRET__|$$secret|g" /tmp/searxng-settings.yml.template > /etc/searxng/settings.yml
         fi
-        # Advisory: a settings file the migration cannot parse or rewrite must
-        # not be what stops searxng from booting. It explains itself on stderr
-        # and we carry on, letting searxng report anything genuinely wrong.
-        /usr/local/searxng/.venv/bin/python /tmp/migrate-searxng-settings.py /etc/searxng/settings.yml || true
         exec /usr/local/searxng/entrypoint.sh
     ports:
       - "127.0.0.1:8080:8080"
     volumes:
       - searxng-data:/etc/searxng
       - ./config/searxng/settings.yml:/tmp/searxng-settings.yml.template:ro,z
-      - ./scripts/migrate_searxng_settings.py:/tmp/migrate-searxng-settings.py:ro,z
     environment:
       - SEARXNG_BASE_URL=http://localhost:8080/
       - SEARXNG_SECRET=${SEARXNG_SECRET:-}

docs/setup.md

@@ -441,19 +441,10 @@ A grab-bag of small gotchas that otherwise turn into long debugging sessions.
 | Package | Feature unlocked |
 |---------|-----------------|
 | `faster-whisper` | Local speech-to-text (microphone -> text) via the "local" STT provider. |
-| `kokoro`, `soundfile` | Local Kokoro-82M text-to-speech on a CUDA GPU. The pinned Kokoro release supports Odysseus installs on Python 3.11-3.12; these packages are intentionally skipped on Python 3.13+ (including the Python 3.14 container image). |
 | `ddgs` | DuckDuckGo as a search provider option. |
 | `PyMuPDF` | PDF page rendering in the side viewer panel and form-filling. (Note: AGPL-3.0) |
 | `markitdown` | Office/EPUB document text extraction (converts .docx/.xlsx/.pptx/.xls/.epub to Markdown). |
 
-Install the optional set only when you need these features:
-
-```bash
-pip install -r requirements-optional.txt
-```
-
-The default Docker image currently uses Python 3.14, while Kokoro 0.9.4 declares Python `>=3.10,<3.13`. Odysseus itself continues to support Python 3.11+, but this pinned optional local-TTS feature requires a native Python 3.11 or 3.12 environment. Kokoro declares `torch`, but the local provider only activates when that torch build has CUDA and a GPU is visible; install the CUDA build appropriate for your host. Browser and configured endpoint TTS remain available on Python 3.13+ and in the container image.
-
 ### Faster, reproducible installs with uv (optional)
 [uv](https://docs.astral.sh/uv/) works as a drop-in replacement for the
 venv + pip steps in the native install guides, no project changes are needed but this change results in faster installs along with a lockfile for reproducible environments. After [installing `uv`](https://docs.astral.sh/uv/getting-started/installation/), use:
@@ -484,7 +475,7 @@ Odysseus is a self-hosted workspace with powerful local tools: shell access, fil
 
 - Keep `AUTH_ENABLED=true` for any network-accessible deployment.
 - Keep `LOCALHOST_BYPASS=false` outside local development.
-- Leave `SECURE_COOKIES` unset unless you need to override it: session cookies are marked `Secure` whenever the request arrives over HTTPS. Use `SECURE_COOKIES=true` to force it on for a proxy whose scheme Odysseus cannot see, or `SECURE_COOKIES=false` to force it off while you still serve plain HTTP alongside HTTPS.
+- Use `SECURE_COOKIES=true` when Odysseus is served through HTTPS by a trusted reverse proxy or private access gateway.
 - Do not expose it directly to the public internet without HTTPS and a trusted reverse proxy or private access layer.
 - Keep `.env`, `data/`, `logs/`, databases, uploads, generated media, backups, auth/session files, API keys, and model/provider tokens out of Git and private shares. They are ignored by default.
 - Review `data/auth.json` after first boot: disable open signup unless you intentionally want it, make only your own account admin, and keep demo/test accounts non-admin.
@@ -495,14 +486,6 @@ Odysseus is a self-hosted workspace with powerful local tools: shell access, fil
 - Keep ChromaDB, SearXNG, ntfy, Ollama, vLLM, llama.cpp, databases, and raw model/provider APIs internal-only. Expose only the authenticated Odysseus web/API entrypoint through your trusted proxy or private access layer.
 - Before publishing a fork, run `git status --short` and confirm no private files from `.env`, `data/`, `logs/`, uploads, backups, or local databases are staged.
 
-> **Upgrading an existing install:** `SECURE_COOKIES` used to default to
-> `false`, so an install set up before scheme derivation may still carry
-> `SECURE_COOKIES=false` in its own `.env`. That explicit value stays
-> authoritative, so HTTPS logins keep getting a non-`Secure` session cookie.
-> Pulling this change updates the tracked Compose files, but nothing rewrites
-> your `.env` — drop the line from it unless you deliberately serve plain HTTP
-> alongside HTTPS and want the escape hatch.
-
 ### Private or proxied deployments
 Odysseus serves plain HTTP on its app port. Docker Compose binds Odysseus and the bundled services to `127.0.0.1` by default, so a typical production/private setup is:
 
@@ -511,162 +494,9 @@ Odysseus serves plain HTTP on its app port. Docker Compose binds Odysseus and th
 3. Put the authenticated Odysseus web/API entrypoint behind that layer.
 4. Keep raw service and model ports internal-only.
 
-Cloudflare Access, Tailscale, Caddy, nginx, and Traefik can all fit this pattern; none are required by Odysseus. If your access layer reaches Odysseus on the same host, proxy to `http://127.0.0.1:7000` and keep `AUTH_ENABLED=true` and `LOCALHOST_BYPASS=false`. Any proxy that forwards `X-Forwarded-Proto: https` gets `Secure` session cookies without configuration, so `SECURE_COOKIES` only needs setting when you want to override that — force it on for a proxy that forwards no scheme at all, or off while you still serve plain HTTP.
+Cloudflare Access, Tailscale, Caddy, nginx, and Traefik can all fit this pattern; none are required by Odysseus. If your access layer reaches Odysseus on the same host, proxy to `http://127.0.0.1:7000` and keep `AUTH_ENABLED=true`, `LOCALHOST_BYPASS=false`, and `SECURE_COOKIES=true`.
 `ALLOWED_ORIGINS` lists exact permitted origins for cross-origin browser/API clients; ordinary same-origin reverse-proxy access usually does not need a special CORS entry.
 
-#### Faster over the network: HTTP/2
-
-The frontend is raw ES modules with no bundler, so a page load is a few hundred
-small same-origin requests. Over HTTP/1.1 browsers typically allow only a small
-number of concurrent connections per host (commonly around six), so many of
-those requests are serialized across multiple round trips. On localhost that
-costs almost nothing. Over a LAN, VPN, or remote link it can become a major
-part of load time, especially as latency increases.
-
-HTTP/2 multiplexes them onto one connection and the serialisation disappears.
-Odysseus needs no changes for this — uvicorn keeps speaking HTTP/1.1 on
-loopback and the proxy speaks HTTP/2 to the browser. Mainstream browsers
-negotiate HTTP/2 for normal web pages over TLS; they do not use the cleartext
-h2c mode here, so browser-facing HTTP/2 requires a certificate. The
-`--ssl-certfile` route in *HTTPS + LAN/Tailscale exposure* above gives you
-HTTPS but not HTTP/2 — uvicorn does not speak it.
-
-**1. Install Caddy.** See the [install docs](https://caddyserver.com/docs/install)
-for your platform; on macOS, `brew install caddy`.
-
-**2. Write a `Caddyfile`.** Pick the block that matches how you reach the
-machine. Replace `7000` if Odysseus listens elsewhere — the macOS start script
-uses `7860`.
-
-Public domain, Caddy obtains and renews the certificate itself:
-
-```
-odysseus.example.com {
-	reverse_proxy 127.0.0.1:7000
-}
-```
-
-Tailscale, no public DNS needed — `tailscale cert` issues a browser-trusted
-certificate for a tailnet name and writes `<domain>.crt` and `<domain>.key`:
-
-```bash
-tailscale cert myhost.tailnet-name.ts.net
-```
-
-```
-myhost.tailnet-name.ts.net {
-	tls /path/to/myhost.tailnet-name.ts.net.crt /path/to/myhost.tailnet-name.ts.net.key
-	reverse_proxy 127.0.0.1:7000
-}
-```
-
-LAN with your own certificate — same shape, your own files:
-
-```
-odysseus.lan {
-	tls /path/to/cert.pem /path/to/key.pem
-	reverse_proxy 127.0.0.1:7000
-}
-```
-
-Give `tls` absolute paths: a service starts in a working directory you did not
-choose. If port 443 is already taken, append a port to the site address
-(`odysseus.example.com:8443`) and use it in the URL. That alone does not free
-port 80 — Caddy still binds it for the HTTP-to-HTTPS redirect, and fails to
-start with `listen tcp :80: bind: address already in use` if something else
-holds it. Turn the redirect off with a global block at the top of the file:
-
-```
-{
-	auto_https disable_redirects
-}
-```
-
-**3. Run it in the foreground first:**
-
-```bash
-caddy run --config ./Caddyfile
-```
-
-Once that works, run it as a service:
-
-```bash
-brew services start caddy          # macOS — reads $(brew --prefix)/etc/Caddyfile, not ./Caddyfile
-sudo systemctl enable --now caddy  # Linux, if your package installed the unit
-```
-
-Odysseus's own service is unchanged; the proxy runs alongside it. Under Docker,
-run the proxy as another container, or on the host pointing at the published
-port.
-
-**4. Point Odysseus at the new origin** in `.env`, then restart it.
-
-A proxy that exposes the HTTPS request scheme to Odysseus needs no `SECURE_COOKIES` setting. Only force it on when the proxy cannot expose that scheme:
-
-```bash
-# only if the proxy cannot expose the external HTTPS scheme to Odysseus:
-SECURE_COOKIES=true
-# only if you use remote MCP servers with OAuth:
-OAUTH_REDIRECT_BASE_URL=https://odysseus.example.com
-```
-
-Gmail OAuth needs nothing here when the proxy runs on the same host: the
-redirect URI is built from the incoming request, and uvicorn rewrites the
-scheme from `X-Forwarded-Proto` for proxies it trusts — by default only
-`127.0.0.1`. A proxy in a separate container or on another machine is not
-trusted, so pin the URI there:
-
-```bash
-GOOGLE_OAUTH_REDIRECT_URI=https://odysseus.example.com/api/email/oauth/google/callback
-```
-
-(uvicorn's own `FORWARDED_ALLOW_IPS` widens that trust, but it has to be in the
-environment uvicorn starts with — `.env` is read by the app afterwards, too
-late for it to take effect.)
-
-**5. Confirm HTTP/2 is really on:**
-
-```bash
-curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_version}\n' https://odysseus.example.com/
-# 2
-```
-
-The status code is not the thing to check here — a logged-out request redirects
-to the login page, so `curl -I` shows `HTTP/2 302`, and the `HTTP/2` prefix is
-the part that matters. The browser reports the same in the Network panel's
-Protocol column (`h2`); in Chrome and Firefox that column is hidden until you
-enable it by right-clicking the column headers.
-
-Three things bite when moving an existing install behind TLS:
-
-- Leave `SECURE_COOKIES` unset when Odysseus can see the external HTTPS scheme;
-  the cookie then follows the request automatically. If your proxy cannot expose
-  that scheme, set `SECURE_COOKIES=true` **at the same time** you stop serving
-  plain HTTP, not before. An explicit `true` applies to every login, so while an
-  HTTP entrypoint is still reachable the browser will reject the `Secure` cookie
-  there and login will appear to loop.
-- `OAUTH_REDIRECT_BASE_URL` defaults to `http://localhost:7000`. Unlike the
-  Gmail redirect URI it cannot be derived from a request — it is registered
-  with each MCP authorization server up front — so set it to the external
-  origin if you use remote MCP servers over OAuth.
-- Odysseus sends `Strict-Transport-Security` once it sees `X-Forwarded-Proto:
-  https`. HSTS applies to the whole hostname and ignores the port, so any other
-  plain-HTTP service on that same hostname becomes unreachable in browsers that
-  have visited Odysseus. Give Odysseus its own hostname, or strip the header at
-  the proxy (`header_down -Strict-Transport-Security` in Caddy).
-
-Server-sent events are not buffered by this configuration, so chat streaming
-arrives token by token; add `flush_interval -1` inside the `reverse_proxy`
-block if you want that pinned explicitly. nginx needs `proxy_buffering off;`
-for the same reason.
-
-Changing the external origin also affects state scoped to it. Service workers
-and their caches are origin-scoped, so moving to a different origin starts with
-a cold load. Cookies follow their own domain/path/security rules rather than
-being port-scoped: changing the hostname normally requires a new login, while
-changing only the scheme or port does not by itself guarantee that existing
-cookies disappear.
-
 Common internal-only ports from the default docs/compose setup:
 
 | Port | Service |
@@ -697,7 +527,7 @@ Key settings:
 | `AUTH_ENABLED` | `true` | Enable/disable login |
 | `LOCALHOST_BYPASS` | `false` | Development-only auth bypass for loopback requests. Keep false for shared/network deployments. |
 | `ALLOWED_ORIGINS` | `http://localhost,http://127.0.0.1` | Comma-separated exact permitted origins for cross-origin browser/API clients. |
-| `SECURE_COOKIES` | derived from the request scheme | Marks session cookies `Secure` on HTTPS requests. Set true to force it on, false to force it off. |
+| `SECURE_COOKIES` | `false` | Set true when serving Odysseus through HTTPS at a trusted proxy or private access gateway. |
 | `DATABASE_URL` | `sqlite:///./data/app.db` | Database connection string |
 | `CHROMADB_HOST` | `localhost` | ChromaDB host for vector memory. Docker overrides this to `chromadb`. |
 | `CHROMADB_PORT` | `8100` | ChromaDB port for manual host runs. Docker overrides this to `8000`. |

launch-windows.ps1

@@ -163,10 +163,6 @@ if (Test-Path $cudaBase) {
 }
 
 # 7. Start the server (use `python -m uvicorn` - bare `uvicorn` may not be on PATH)
-# -Port only reaches uvicorn as a flag. Everything that builds a URL for this
-# instance - internal_api_base(), companion pairing, the MCP OAuth callback -
-# reads APP_PORT, so set it too or they all assume 7000.
-$env:APP_PORT = $Port
 Write-Step ("Starting Odysseus at http://{0}:{1}" -f $BindHost, $Port)
 Write-Host "Press Ctrl+C to stop."
 Write-Host ""

licenses/KaTeX-MIT-LICENSE.txt

@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-The MIT License (MIT)
-
-Copyright (c) 2013-2020 Khan Academy and other contributors
-
-Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
-of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
-in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
-to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
-copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
-furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
-
-The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
-copies or substantial portions of the Software.
-
-THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
-IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
-FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
-AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
-LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
-OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
-SOFTWARE.

licenses/Mermaid-MIT-LICENSE.txt

@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-The MIT License (MIT)
-
-Copyright (c) 2014 - 2022 Knut Sveidqvist
-
-Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
-of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
-in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
-to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
-copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
-furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
-
-The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
-copies or substantial portions of the Software.
-
-THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
-IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
-FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
-AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
-LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
-OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
-SOFTWARE.

mcp_servers/email_server.py

@@ -1802,6 +1802,7 @@ async def _ai_draft_reply_to_email(uid, folder="INBOX", reply_all=False, account
         from src.endpoint_resolver import (
             resolve_endpoint,
             resolve_utility_fallback_candidates,
+            resolve_chat_fallback_candidates,
         )
         from src.llm_core import llm_call_async_with_fallback
     except Exception as exc:
@@ -1842,6 +1843,13 @@ async def _ai_draft_reply_to_email(uid, folder="INBOX", reply_all=False, account
         utility_fallbacks = resolve_utility_fallback_candidates() or []
     for cand in utility_fallbacks:
         _add(*cand)
+    try:
+        chat_fallbacks = resolve_chat_fallback_candidates(owner=None) or []
+    except TypeError:
+        chat_fallbacks = resolve_chat_fallback_candidates() or []
+    for cand in chat_fallbacks:
+        _add(*cand)
+
     if not candidates:
         return {"error": "No LLM endpoint configured for AI reply"}
 

requirements-optional.txt

@@ -12,16 +12,6 @@
 # GPU-accelerated transcription — it's auto-detected, CPU is used otherwise.
 faster-whisper
 
-# Local text-to-speech via Kokoro-82M for the "local" TTS provider.
-# Kokoro 0.9.4 declares Python >=3.10,<3.13; Odysseus itself requires 3.11+,
-# so pip installs these extras on 3.11-3.12 and deliberately skips them on
-# Python 3.13+ (including the Python 3.14 container image). Kokoro declares
-# torch; the local provider still
-# requires a CUDA-enabled torch build and GPU at runtime. SoundFile is separate
-# in Kokoro's official install instructions and is not a transitive dependency.
-kokoro==0.9.4; python_version >= "3.11" and python_version < "3.13"
-soundfile; python_version >= "3.11" and python_version < "3.13"
-
 # DuckDuckGo as a search provider option.
 # Install if you want DDG in the search-provider dropdown.
 # Alternatives: SearXNG, Brave, Tavily, Serper, Google PSE.

routes/assistant_routes.py

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ from pydantic import BaseModel
 
 from core.database import SessionLocal, CrewMember, ScheduledTask
 from src.auth_helpers import get_current_user
-from src.owner_identity import REQUEST_SENTINEL_OWNERS
+from core.auth import RESERVED_USERNAMES
 from src.task_scheduler import compute_next_run
 
 
@@ -90,12 +90,11 @@ def setup_assistant_routes(task_scheduler) -> APIRouter:
     # check-in tasks seeded. Hitting any /assistant route under one of these
     # used to seed a full CrewMember + Morning/Midday/Evening tasks under that
     # owner, which then double-fired alongside the real user's check-ins.
-    # REQUEST_SENTINEL_OWNERS covers request-only identities; Default/Local is a
+    # RESERVED_USERNAMES covers the same set; the `not owner` guard handles "".
-    # reserved login name but remains a valid storage owner.
 
     async def _get_or_create(owner: str) -> CrewMember:
         """Return the per-owner assistant CrewMember, creating it on demand."""
-        if not owner or owner in REQUEST_SENTINEL_OWNERS:
+        if not owner or owner in RESERVED_USERNAMES:
             raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=f"Cannot seed assistant for {owner!r}")
         db = SessionLocal()
         try:

routes/auth_routes.py

@@ -22,8 +22,6 @@ from src.settings import (
     load_features as _load_features,
     save_features as _save_features,
     DEFAULT_SETTINGS,
-    RETIRED_SETTING_KEYS,
-    without_retired_settings,
 )
 from src.integrations import (
     load_integrations,
@@ -86,33 +84,6 @@ class SetOpenRegistrationRequest(BaseModel):
 SESSION_COOKIE = "odysseus_session"
 
 
-def _secure_cookie(request: Request) -> bool:
-    """Decide the ``Secure`` attribute of the session cookie.
-
-    ``SECURE_COOKIES`` stays authoritative when it holds an explicit value:
-    ``true`` always marks the cookie Secure (the documented knob for a TLS
-    proxy), ``false`` never does, which is the escape hatch for an install
-    that still answers on plain HTTP alongside HTTPS. Anything else —
-    unset, or the present-but-empty value docker-compose injects for a
-    variable the host has not defined — derives it from the request, so an
-    HTTPS login gets a Secure cookie without any configuration.
-
-    Either the connection scheme or ``X-Forwarded-Proto`` saying https is
-    enough, which is the same test ``core/middleware.py`` applies before it
-    sends HSTS. Uvicorn's proxy-headers middleware already folds that header
-    into the scheme for the proxies it trusts, so reading it here only adds
-    the case of a terminator that is not on a trusted address; the cost is
-    that a client talking to the app directly can set the header and lock
-    its own session out over plain HTTP.
-    """
-    configured = os.getenv("SECURE_COOKIES", "").strip().lower()
-    if configured in ("true", "false"):
-        return configured == "true"
-    # A chained proxy sends a list — the client-facing hop comes first.
-    forwarded_proto = request.headers.get("x-forwarded-proto", "").split(",")[0]
-    return request.url.scheme == "https" or forwarded_proto.strip().lower() == "https"
-
-
 def setup_auth_routes(auth_manager: AuthManager) -> APIRouter:
     router = APIRouter(prefix="/api/auth", tags=["auth"])
 
@@ -186,7 +157,7 @@ def setup_auth_routes(auth_manager: AuthManager) -> APIRouter:
             value=token,
             httponly=True,
             samesite="lax",
-            secure=_secure_cookie(request),
+            secure=os.getenv("SECURE_COOKIES", "false").lower() == "true",
             path="/",
         )
         if body.remember:
@@ -718,7 +689,7 @@ def setup_auth_routes(auth_manager: AuthManager) -> APIRouter:
         a scrubbed copy with secret keys blanked. The frontend uses this
         for keybinds + TTS prefs, so it stays callable without admin."""
         user = _get_current_user(request)
-        settings = without_retired_settings(_load_settings())
+        settings = _load_settings()
         if user and auth_manager.is_admin(user):
             return settings
         return scrub_settings(settings)
@@ -738,8 +709,6 @@ def setup_auth_routes(auth_manager: AuthManager) -> APIRouter:
             "agent_max_tool_calls": (0, 1000),  # 0 = unlimited
         }
         for key in DEFAULT_SETTINGS:
-            if key in RETIRED_SETTING_KEYS:
-                continue
             if key not in body:
                 continue
             val = body[key]
@@ -752,7 +721,7 @@ def setup_auth_routes(auth_manager: AuthManager) -> APIRouter:
                 val = max(lo, min(val, hi))
             current[key] = val
         _save_settings(current)
-        return without_retired_settings(current)
+        return current
 
     # ---- Integrations CRUD ----
 

routes/chat_helpers.py

@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ from core.database import Session as DBSession, ModelEndpoint
 from src.llm_core import normalize_model_id
 from src.endpoint_resolver import normalize_base
 from src.context_compactor import maybe_compact, trim_for_context
-from src.model_context import estimate_tokens, get_context_length
+from src.model_context import estimate_tokens
 from src.auth_helpers import effective_user
 from src.prompt_security import untrusted_context_message
 from src.attachment_refs import attachment_ref
@@ -152,38 +152,10 @@ class ChatContext:
     # Uploads attached to this user turn, resolved and owner-checked for the
     # agent's private context. This is not emitted to the browser.
     uploaded_files: list = field(default_factory=list)
-    # Route-neutral prompt before any model-window compaction/trimming. This is
-    # retained only when explicit foreground fallbacks are enabled so each
-    # concrete candidate can apply its own context budget independently.
-    route_messages: list = field(default_factory=list)
 
 
 # ── Helpers ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── #
 
-def _allowed_models_from_privileges(privs: dict) -> Optional[frozenset[str]]:
-    if privs.get("block_all_models"):
-        return frozenset()
-    allowed_raw = privs.get("allowed_models")
-    allowed = allowed_raw if isinstance(allowed_raw, list) else []
-    restricted = bool(privs.get("allowed_models_restricted")) or bool(allowed)
-    return frozenset(model for model in allowed if isinstance(model, str)) if restricted else None
-
-
-def _allowed_models_for_request(request) -> Optional[frozenset[str]]:
-    """Return the caller's model allowlist, or ``None`` when unrestricted."""
-
-    try:
-        user = effective_user(request)
-    except Exception:
-        user = None
-    if not user:
-        return None
-    auth_manager = getattr(getattr(request.app, "state", None), "auth_manager", None)
-    if not auth_manager:
-        return None
-    privs = auth_manager.get_privileges(user) or {}
-    return _allowed_models_from_privileges(privs)
-
 def _enforce_chat_privileges(request, sess) -> None:
     """Apply the per-user privilege gates (allowed_models + max_messages_per_day)
     that both /api/chat and /api/chat_stream must enforce BEFORE any LLM work.
@@ -213,8 +185,10 @@ def _enforce_chat_privileges(request, sess) -> None:
     if privs.get("block_all_models"):
         raise HTTPException(403, f"Your account is not allowed to use model '{sess.model}'.")
 
-    allowed_models = _allowed_models_from_privileges(privs)
+    allowed_raw = privs.get("allowed_models")
-    if allowed_models is not None and sess.model and sess.model not in allowed_models:
+    allowed = allowed_raw if isinstance(allowed_raw, list) else []
+    restricted = bool(privs.get("allowed_models_restricted")) or bool(allowed)
+    if restricted and sess.model and sess.model not in allowed:
         raise HTTPException(403, f"Your account is not allowed to use model '{sess.model}'.")
 
     cap = int(privs.get("max_messages_per_day") or 0)
@@ -313,6 +287,96 @@ async def auto_name_session(session_manager, sess):
         logger.error(f"Auto-name failed for {sess.id}: {e}\n{traceback.format_exc()}")
 
 
+def try_fallback_endpoint(sess, session_id: str) -> dict | None:
+    """Find an alternative working endpoint when the current one fails.
+
+    Returns {"model": ..., "endpoint_url": ..., "endpoint_name": ...} or None.
+    """
+    import requests as _req
+    from src.endpoint_resolver import (
+        build_chat_url,
+        build_headers,
+        build_models_url,
+        normalize_base,
+        resolve_endpoint_runtime,
+    )
+    from src.chatgpt_subscription import is_chatgpt_subscription_base
+
+    current_url = sess.endpoint_url or ""
+    owner = getattr(sess, "owner", None)
+    db = SessionLocal()
+    try:
+        q = db.query(ModelEndpoint).filter(
+            ModelEndpoint.is_enabled == True
+        )
+        if owner:
+            from src.auth_helpers import owner_filter
+            q = owner_filter(q, ModelEndpoint, owner)
+        endpoints = q.all()
+    finally:
+        db.close()
+
+    for ep in endpoints:
+        base = normalize_base(ep.base_url)
+        # Skip current endpoint
+        if current_url and base in current_url:
+            continue
+        try:
+            base, api_key = resolve_endpoint_runtime(ep, owner=owner)
+        except Exception:
+            continue
+        ping_url = build_models_url(base)
+        headers = build_headers(api_key, base)
+        try:
+            if ping_url:
+                r = _req.get(ping_url, headers=headers, timeout=5)
+                r.raise_for_status()
+                data = r.json()
+                models = [m.get("id") for m in (data.get("data") or []) if m.get("id")]
+                if not models:
+                    models = [
+                        m.get("name") or m.get("model")
+                        for m in (data.get("models") or [])
+                        if m.get("name") or m.get("model")
+                    ]
+            else:
+                models = json.loads(ep.cached_models or "[]")
+            if not models:
+                continue
+            # Found a working endpoint — update session
+            new_model = models[0]
+            chat_url = build_chat_url(base)
+            new_headers = build_headers(api_key, base)
+            persisted_headers = {} if is_chatgpt_subscription_base(base) else new_headers
+
+            sess.model = new_model
+            sess.endpoint_url = chat_url
+            sess.headers = new_headers
+
+            # Persist
+            _db = SessionLocal()
+            try:
+                _db.query(DBSession).filter(DBSession.id == session_id).update({
+                    "model": new_model,
+                    "endpoint_url": chat_url,
+                    "headers": persisted_headers,
+                })
+                _db.commit()
+            finally:
+                _db.close()
+
+            logger.info(f"Fallback: switched session {session_id} from {current_url} to {ep.name} ({new_model})")
+            return {
+                "model": new_model,
+                "endpoint_url": chat_url,
+                "endpoint_name": ep.name,
+            }
+        except Exception:
+            continue
+
+    return None
+
+
 def extract_preset(chat_handler, preset_id) -> PresetInfo:
     """Extract preset parameters via chat_handler."""
     temperature, max_tokens, system_prompt, char_name = (
@@ -623,9 +687,6 @@ async def build_chat_context(
     use_enhanced_message: bool = False,
     agent_mode: bool = False,
     allow_tool_preprocessing: bool = True,
-    defer_context_shaping: bool = False,
-    continuation_context_message: str | None = None,
-    persist_user_message: bool = True,
 ) -> ChatContext:
     """Build the full context (preface + messages) for an LLM call.
 
@@ -649,14 +710,14 @@ async def build_chat_context(
     # Add user message to history. Nobody/incognito uses a request-local
     # transcript store instead of session history so stale saved chats cannot
     # bleed into context and the turn is not persisted.
-    if persist_user_message and incognito:
+    if incognito:
         user_meta = {"attachments": preprocessed.attachment_meta} if preprocessed.attachment_meta else None
         _append_incognito_message(session_id, "user", preprocessed.user_content, user_meta)
-    elif persist_user_message:
+    else:
         add_user_message(sess, chat_handler, preprocessed, incognito=False)
 
     # Fire events
-    if persist_user_message and not incognito:
+    if not incognito:
         fire_message_event(request, webhook_manager, session_id, sess, message, compare_mode)
 
     # Resolve owner-scoped prefs/context. Browser requests keep the cookie user;
@@ -668,12 +729,7 @@ async def build_chat_context(
         getattr(chat_handler, "upload_handler", None),
         getattr(sess, "owner", None),
     )
-    context_message = (
+    casual_low_signal = _is_casual_low_signal(message)
-        str(continuation_context_message).strip()
-        if continuation_context_message
-        else message
-    )
-    casual_low_signal = _is_casual_low_signal(context_message)
 
     # Memory enabled?
     mem_enabled = not incognito and not no_memory and uprefs.get("memory_enabled", True)
@@ -710,15 +766,7 @@ async def build_chat_context(
     # Build context preface
     # The stream path uses enhanced_message (with CoT/preprocessing applied),
     # the sync path uses text_for_context.
-    _ctx_msg = (
+    _ctx_msg = preprocessed.enhanced_message if use_enhanced_message else preprocessed.text_for_context
-        context_message
-        if continuation_context_message
-        else (
-            preprocessed.enhanced_message
-            if use_enhanced_message
-            else preprocessed.text_for_context
-        )
-    )
     _preface_kwargs = dict(
         message=_ctx_msg,
         session=sess,
@@ -782,22 +830,13 @@ async def build_chat_context(
         except Exception:
             logger.debug("Failed to add current date/time context", exc_info=True)
 
-    route_messages = list(messages)
+    # Auto-compact
-    # Explicit fallback routing must shape from the same route-neutral prompt
+    messages, context_length, was_compacted = await maybe_compact(
-    # for every candidate. Running selected-model compaction here would mutate
+        sess, sess.endpoint_url, sess.model, messages, sess.headers, owner=user,
-    # session history before we know which route can answer and would make a
+    )
-    # later larger-context candidate unable to recover discarded history.
-    if defer_context_shaping:
-        context_length = get_context_length(sess.endpoint_url, sess.model)
-        was_compacted = False
-    else:
-        messages, context_length, was_compacted = await maybe_compact(
-            sess, sess.endpoint_url, sess.model, messages, sess.headers, owner=user,
-        )
     _before_trim_messages = len(messages)
     _before_trim_tokens = estimate_tokens(messages)
-    if not defer_context_shaping:
+    messages = trim_for_context(messages, context_length)
-        messages = trim_for_context(messages, context_length)
     _after_trim_messages = len(messages)
     _after_trim_tokens = estimate_tokens(messages)
     _context_trimmed = _after_trim_messages < _before_trim_messages or _after_trim_tokens < _before_trim_tokens
@@ -821,7 +860,6 @@ async def build_chat_context(
         context_tokens_after_trim=_after_trim_tokens,
         auto_opened_docs=auto_opened_docs,
         uploaded_files=uploaded_files,
-        route_messages=route_messages,
     )
 
 

routes/cookbook_helpers.py

@@ -1204,41 +1204,6 @@ def _safe_env_prefix(ep: str | None) -> str | None:
     return f'[ -f "{path}" ] && source "{path}" || true'
 
 
-def _local_windows_bash_env_prefix(ep: str | None) -> str | None:
-    """Convert a frontend PowerShell venv prefix for the local Git Bash runner."""
-    if not ep:
-        return ep
-
-    prefix = ep.strip()
-    if not prefix.startswith("&"):
-        return ep
-
-    raw_path = prefix[1:].lstrip()
-    if not raw_path:
-        return ep
-    if raw_path.startswith("'"):
-        if len(raw_path) < 2 or not raw_path.endswith("'"):
-            return ep
-        quoted_path = raw_path[1:-1]
-        if "'" in quoted_path.replace("''", ""):
-            return ep
-        path = quoted_path.replace("''", "'")
-    else:
-        path = raw_path.rstrip()
-        if "'" in path or '"' in path:
-            return ep
-    if any(c in path for c in "\r\n;&|`$<>"):
-        return ep
-    if not path.replace("\\", "/").casefold().endswith("/scripts/activate.ps1"):
-        return ep
-
-    bash_path = _git_bash_path(path)
-    if "\\" in bash_path:
-        return ep
-    bash_path = bash_path[: -len("Activate.ps1")] + "activate"
-    return "source " + shlex.quote(bash_path)
-
-
 def _ssh_ps(host, script_path, port=None):
     """Build SSH command to run a PowerShell script on a Windows remote."""
     pf = f"-p {port} " if port and port != "22" else ""

routes/cookbook_routes.py

@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ from routes.cookbook_helpers import (
     _SESSION_ID_RE, _validate_repo_id, _validate_serve_model_id, _validate_include, _validate_token,
     _validate_local_dir, _validate_gpus, _shell_path,
     _ps_squote, _bash_squote, _validate_serve_cmd, _parse_serve_phase, OLLAMA_MISSING_HINT,
-    _safe_env_prefix, _local_windows_bash_env_prefix, _local_tooling_path_export, _append_serve_preflight_exit_lines,
+    _safe_env_prefix, _local_tooling_path_export, _append_serve_preflight_exit_lines,
     _append_serve_exit_code_lines, _append_llama_cpp_linux_accel_build_lines, _cached_model_scan_script,
     load_stored_hf_token,
     _append_vllm_linux_preflight_lines, _ollama_bind_from_cmd, _pip_install_fallback_chain,
@@ -1336,7 +1336,7 @@ def setup_cookbook_routes() -> APIRouter:
             # Local: run hf download in the background (tmux on POSIX, a detached
             # process + logfile on Windows where tmux doesn't exist).
             if req.env_prefix:
-                lines.append(_safe_env_prefix(_local_windows_bash_env_prefix(req.env_prefix) if local_windows else req.env_prefix))
+                lines.append(_safe_env_prefix(req.env_prefix))
             else:
                 lines.append("deactivate 2>/dev/null; hash -r")
             # Show whether the HF token reached this run (masked) — tells a gated
@@ -2166,7 +2166,7 @@ def setup_cookbook_routes() -> APIRouter:
             if req.gpus:
                 runner_lines.append(f"export CUDA_VISIBLE_DEVICES='{req.gpus}'")
             if req.env_prefix:
-                runner_lines.append(_safe_env_prefix(_local_windows_bash_env_prefix(req.env_prefix) if local_windows else req.env_prefix))
+                runner_lines.append(_safe_env_prefix(req.env_prefix))
             else:
                 runner_lines.append("deactivate 2>/dev/null; hash -r")
             _append_venv_nvidia_library_path_lines(runner_lines, cmd=req.cmd)

routes/email_routes.py

@@ -5004,6 +5004,7 @@ def setup_email_routes():
             from src.endpoint_resolver import (
                 resolve_endpoint,
                 resolve_utility_fallback_candidates,
+                resolve_chat_fallback_candidates,
             )
             from src.llm_core import llm_call_async_with_fallback
 
@@ -5065,6 +5066,8 @@ def setup_email_routes():
                 pass
             for cand in resolve_utility_fallback_candidates(owner=owner) or []:
                 _add(*cand)
+            for cand in resolve_chat_fallback_candidates(owner=owner) or []:
+                _add(*cand)
             if not candidates:
                 return {"success": False, "error": "No LLM endpoint configured"}
 
@@ -5324,11 +5327,13 @@ def setup_email_routes():
             # Build a candidate chain so a stale session-stored API key
             # (the most common cause of "authentication failed" here)
             # doesn't kill AI Reply outright — fall through to the
-            # user's Utility / Default endpoints and active Utility fallback
+            # user's Utility / Default endpoints and the active Utility
-            # chain. Dedupe by url+model so we don't retry the same endpoint.
+            # fallback chain. The retired default-fallback hook stays empty.
+            # Dedupe by url+model so we don't retry the same broken endpoint.
             from src.llm_core import llm_call_async_with_fallback
             from src.endpoint_resolver import (
                 resolve_utility_fallback_candidates,
+                resolve_chat_fallback_candidates,
             )
             _seen = set()
             _candidates = []
@@ -5353,9 +5358,11 @@ def setup_email_routes():
                 _add(_d_url, _d_model, _d_headers)
             except Exception:
                 pass
-            # Active Utility fallbacks last.
+            # Active Utility fallbacks, then the retired default hook.
             for cand in resolve_utility_fallback_candidates(owner=owner) or []:
                 _add(*cand)
+            for cand in resolve_chat_fallback_candidates(owner=owner) or []:
+                _add(*cand)
             _messages = [
                 {"role": "system", "content": system_prompt},
                 {"role": "user", "content": user_msg},

routes/mcp/mcp_routes.py

@@ -475,7 +475,7 @@ def setup_mcp_routes(mcp_manager: McpManager):
                 return RedirectResponse(auth_url)
             else:
                 # Remote device — show paste-back page
-                return HTMLResponse(_oauth_authorize_page(auth_url, server_id, redirect_uri))
+                return HTMLResponse(_oauth_authorize_page(auth_url, server_id, host, redirect_uri))
         finally:
             db.close()
 
@@ -612,13 +612,15 @@ def setup_mcp_routes(mcp_manager: McpManager):
 def _oauth_authorize_page(
     auth_url: str,
     server_id: str,
-    redirect_uri: str,
+    host: str,
+    redirect_uri: str = "http://localhost:7000/api/mcp/oauth/callback",
 ) -> str:
     """Page with Google sign-in link and URL paste-back form for remote access."""
-    # Escape values interpolated into the page: `server_id` comes from the OAuth
+    # Escape values interpolated into the page: `host` comes from the request
-    # state and is not trusted.
+    # Host header and `server_id` from the OAuth state — neither is trusted.
     auth_url = html.escape(auth_url, quote=True)
     server_id = html.escape(server_id, quote=True)
+    host = html.escape(host, quote=True)
     redirect_uri = html.escape(redirect_uri, quote=True)
     return f"""<!DOCTYPE html>
 <html><head>
@@ -662,15 +664,7 @@ def _oauth_authorize_page(
   </div>
   <a class="auth-link" href="{auth_url}" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Sign in with Google</a>
   <div class="divider"></div>
-  <!-- Relative action: the browser resolves it against the origin this page was
+  <form method="POST" action="http://{host}/api/mcp/oauth/exchange/{server_id}">
-       served from, so the form follows the user through any proxy without the
-       app having to know the scheme or the host. An absolute http:// action is
-       blocked as mixed content on exactly the HTTPS deployments that need
-       paste-back, and request.url.scheme cannot be trusted to spot them —
-       uvicorn only honours X-Forwarded-Proto from a peer in
-       --forwarded-allow-ips, which defaults to 127.0.0.1 and excludes a proxy
-       arriving over the Docker bridge. -->
-  <form method="POST" action="/api/mcp/oauth/exchange/{server_id}">
     <p>Paste the URL from your browser after signing in:</p>
     <input type="text" name="callback_url" placeholder="{redirect_uri}?code=..." required>
     <br><button type="submit">Connect</button>

routes/model_routes.py

@@ -46,7 +46,6 @@ _ENDPOINT_SETTING_FIELDS = {
 }
 
 _ENDPOINT_FALLBACK_FIELDS = {
-    "foreground_model_fallbacks": "Foreground Model Fallbacks",
     "utility_model_fallbacks": "Utility Model Fallbacks",
     "vision_model_fallbacks":  "Vision Model Fallbacks",
 }
@@ -181,12 +180,7 @@ def _clear_user_pref_endpoint_refs(all_prefs: dict, ep_id: str) -> int:
     if not isinstance(all_prefs, dict):
         return 0
     users = all_prefs.get("_users")
-    # A mixed store can contain auth-disabled foreground policy at the root
+    pref_sets = users.values() if isinstance(users, dict) else [all_prefs]
-    # alongside named-owner preferences. Both are active namespaces; legacy
-    # `default_model_fallbacks` remains untouched by the field allowlist.
-    pref_sets = [all_prefs]
-    if isinstance(users, dict):
-        pref_sets.extend(users.values())
     cleared_users = 0
     for prefs in pref_sets:
         if isinstance(prefs, dict) and _clear_endpoint_settings_for_endpoint(prefs, ep_id):
@@ -1351,14 +1345,14 @@ def _legacy_visible_api_models(ep) -> List[str]:
 def _picker_models_for_endpoint(ep, base_url: str, kind: str):
     """Return model IDs that should appear in the picker for an endpoint.
 
-    API providers expose remote inventory from /v1/models. Default to that
+    API providers expose remote inventory from /v1/models. Treat that cache as
-    visible inventory until an explicit pinned-model allow-list is saved.
+    inventory, not approval: only manually pinned API models should appear in
-    Local/self-hosted endpoints keep the older hide-list behavior.
+    the picker. Local/self-hosted endpoints keep the older hide-list behavior.
     """
     pinned = _normalize_model_ids(getattr(ep, "pinned_models", None))
     if _picker_requires_pinning(base_url, kind):
         if not _has_explicit_pinned_models(ep):
-            pinned = _legacy_visible_api_models(ep)
+            pinned = _legacy_visible_api_models(ep) if _hidden_model_ids(ep) else []
         return pinned, pinned
     return _visible_models(
         _cached_model_ids(ep),
@@ -2342,7 +2336,9 @@ def setup_model_routes(model_discovery):
                 else:
                     response.headers["X-Model-Refresh-Status"] = "failed"
                     response.headers["X-Model-Refresh-Warning"] = "Model refresh failed or returned no models; kept cached models."
-            _, pinned = _picker_models_for_endpoint(ep, base, kind)
+            pinned = _normalize_model_ids(getattr(ep, "pinned_models", None))
+            if picker_requires_pinning and not _has_explicit_pinned_models(ep):
+                pinned = _legacy_visible_api_models(ep)
             pinned_set = set(pinned)
             return [
                 {

routes/prefs_routes.py

@@ -7,10 +7,6 @@ from src.auth_helpers import get_current_user
 from src.constants import USER_PREFS_FILE
 
 PREFS_FILE = USER_PREFS_FILE
-_FOREGROUND_POLICY_KEYS = (
-    "foreground_fallback_enabled",
-    "foreground_model_fallbacks",
-)
 
 
 def _load():
@@ -30,27 +26,14 @@ def _save(prefs):
 def _load_for_user(user: Optional[str] = None) -> dict:
     """Load preferences for a specific user."""
     all_prefs = _load()
-    users = all_prefs.get("_users")
+    if "_users" in all_prefs:
-    if isinstance(users, dict):
         if user is None:
             # Auth disabled — return first user's prefs for backward compat
-            prefs = dict(next(iter(users.values()), {}))
+            users = all_prefs["_users"]
-            # Foreground fallback consent is never borrowed from a named
+            return dict(next(iter(users.values()), {}))
-            # owner. Auth-disabled operation has a separate flat/root opt-in
+        return dict(all_prefs["_users"].get(user, {}))
-            # that remains inert when authentication is enabled again.
+    # Legacy flat format — return as-is
-            for key in _FOREGROUND_POLICY_KEYS:
+    return dict(all_prefs)
-                prefs.pop(key, None)
-                if key in all_prefs:
-                    prefs[key] = all_prefs[key]
-            return prefs
-        prefs = users.get(user, {})
-        return dict(prefs) if isinstance(prefs, dict) else {}
-    # A legacy flat store belongs only to auth-disabled single-user mode.
-    # Copying it into the first named user's new `_users` record during an
-    # auth transition would silently transfer another user's preferences and,
-    # critically, foreground fallback consent. Named owners therefore start
-    # with an empty record and must write their own preferences explicitly.
-    return dict(all_prefs) if user is None else {}
 
 
 def _save_for_user(user: Optional[str], prefs: dict):
@@ -62,40 +45,17 @@ def _save_for_user(user: Optional[str], prefs: dict):
         # `prefs` flat would overwrite the whole `_users` map and destroy every
         # other user's preferences. Instead write back into the same (first)
         # slot _load_for_user(None) reads from, preserving the others.
-        users = all_prefs.get("_users")
+        if "_users" in all_prefs:
-        if isinstance(users, dict):
+            users = all_prefs["_users"]
             first_key = next(iter(users), None)
             if first_key is not None:
-                existing_named = users.get(first_key)
+                users[first_key] = prefs
-                existing_named = (
-                    dict(existing_named)
-                    if isinstance(existing_named, dict)
-                    else {}
-                )
-                named_foreground = {
-                    key: existing_named[key]
-                    for key in _FOREGROUND_POLICY_KEYS
-                    if key in existing_named
-                }
-                users[first_key] = {
-                    key: value
-                    for key, value in prefs.items()
-                    if key not in _FOREGROUND_POLICY_KEYS
-                }
-                users[first_key].update(named_foreground)
-                for key in _FOREGROUND_POLICY_KEYS:
-                    if key in prefs:
-                        all_prefs[key] = prefs[key]
                 _save(all_prefs)
                 return
         _save(prefs)
         return
-    if not isinstance(all_prefs.get("_users"), dict):
+    if "_users" not in all_prefs:
-        # Preserve the flat single-user object as inert legacy data while
+        all_prefs = {"_users": {}}
-        # creating the first named-owner namespace. In particular, historical
-        # fallback values must not be deleted or copied into the new owner.
-        all_prefs = dict(all_prefs)
-        all_prefs["_users"] = {}
     all_prefs["_users"][user] = prefs
     _save(all_prefs)
 

routes/research/research_routes.py

@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ from pydantic import BaseModel, Field
 from core.middleware import INTERNAL_TOOL_USER
 from src.endpoint_resolver import resolve_endpoint
 from src.auth_helpers import _auth_disabled, get_current_user
-from src.owner_identity import REQUEST_SENTINEL_OWNERS
+from core.auth import RESERVED_USERNAMES
 from src.constants import DEEP_RESEARCH_DIR
 
 _SESSION_ID_RE = re.compile(r"^[a-zA-Z0-9-]{1,128}$")
@@ -496,7 +496,7 @@ def setup_research_routes(research_handler, session_manager=None) -> APIRouter:
         user = require_privilege(request, "can_use_research")
         if user == INTERNAL_TOOL_USER:
             tool_owner = (request.headers.get("X-Odysseus-Owner") or "").strip()
-            if tool_owner and tool_owner not in REQUEST_SENTINEL_OWNERS:
+            if tool_owner and tool_owner not in RESERVED_USERNAMES:
                 auth_mgr = getattr(request.app.state, "auth_manager", None)
                 if auth_mgr is not None and getattr(auth_mgr, "is_configured", False):
                     try:

routes/skills_routes.py

@@ -18,7 +18,6 @@ from pydantic import BaseModel, Field
 
 from services.memory.skills import SkillsManager
 from src.auth_helpers import get_current_user
-from src.prompt_security import untrusted_context_message
 from core.middleware import require_admin
 
 logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
@@ -108,23 +107,6 @@ def _skill_test_task(skill: dict) -> str:
     )
 
 
-def _skill_test_messages(md: str, task: str) -> list[dict]:
-    """Keep user-editable skill text out of the trusted system role."""
-    return [
-        {
-            "role": "system",
-            "content": (
-                "You are TESTING a skill. Follow the supplied reusable procedure "
-                "to complete the user's task for real, using available tools step "
-                "by step. If the skill is wrong, unclear, or references tools that "
-                "do not exist, do your best; the problems will be reviewed afterward."
-            ),
-        },
-        untrusted_context_message("skill under test", md),
-        {"role": "user", "content": task},
-    ]
-
-
 async def _eval_skill_run(skill_md: str, task: str, transcript: str,
                           url: str, model: str, headers: Optional[dict]) -> dict:
     """LLM-as-judge: grade a skill test run from its transcript. Advisory only.
@@ -429,21 +411,7 @@ async def _eval_skill_retrieval_precision(skill_md: str, others: list,
 _skill_test_jobs: dict = {}
 
 
-async def _run_skill_test_job(
+async def _run_skill_test_job(key, name, md, task, url, model, headers, owner, skills_manager=None):
-    key,
-    name,
-    md,
-    task,
-    url,
-    model,
-    headers,
-    owner,
-    skills_manager=None,
-    *,
-    messages=None,
-    transcript=None,
-    exact_approval=None,
-):
     """Background coroutine: run the skill in an agent loop, capture a condensed
     log + transcript, then have the judge grade it. Writes into _skill_test_jobs."""
     import json as _json
@@ -453,7 +421,7 @@ async def _run_skill_test_job(
     if job is None:
         return
     log = job["log"]
-    transcript = transcript if isinstance(transcript, list) else []
+    transcript = []
     say_buf = []
 
     def _flush_say():
@@ -461,12 +429,18 @@ async def _run_skill_test_job(
             log.append({"type": "say", "text": "".join(say_buf)})
             say_buf.clear()
 
-    messages = list(messages) if isinstance(messages, list) else _skill_test_messages(md, task)
+    messages = [
+        {"role": "system", "content":
+            "You are TESTING a skill. Below is a reusable skill (a procedure). Follow it "
+            "to complete the user's task for real, using your available tools, step by "
+            "step. If the skill is wrong, unclear, or references tools that don't exist, "
+            "do your best — the problems will be reviewed afterward.\n\n=== SKILL ===\n" + md},
+        {"role": "user", "content": task},
+    ]
     try:
         async for chunk in stream_agent_loop(
             url, model, messages, headers=headers,
             temperature=0.3, max_tokens=0, max_rounds=8, owner=owner,
-            exact_approval=exact_approval,
         ):
             if not chunk.startswith("data: ") or chunk.strip() == "data: [DONE]":
                 continue
@@ -484,25 +458,8 @@ async def _run_skill_test_job(
             elif d.get("type") == "tool_output":
                 _flush_say()
                 out = str(d.get("output") or "")[:600]
-                tool_log = {"type": "tool_output", "output": out}
+                log.append({"type": "tool_output", "output": out})
-                approval = d.get("ask_user")
-                if isinstance(approval, dict):
-                    tool_log["ask_user"] = approval
-                log.append(tool_log)
                 transcript.append(f"[output] {out}\n")
-                if (
-                    isinstance(approval, dict)
-                    and approval.get("kind") == "tool_approval"
-                    and approval.get("approval_id")
-                ):
-                    # Manual skill tests have their own polling UI instead of a
-                    # chat session. Pause the run and retain only server-side
-                    # continuation state until the same owner approves/denies
-                    # this exact sealed action.
-                    job["status"] = "awaiting_approval"
-                    job["approval"] = approval
-                    job["_transcript"] = transcript
-                    return
             elif d.get("type") == "agent_step":
                 _flush_say()
                 log.append({"type": "agent_step", "round": d.get("round")})
@@ -514,9 +471,6 @@ async def _run_skill_test_job(
         _flush_say()
         log.append({"type": "error", "error": str(e)})
 
-    job.pop("approval", None)
-    job.pop("_transcript", None)
-    job.pop("_run", None)
     log.append({"type": "evaluating"})
     try:
         job["verdict"] = await _eval_skill_run(md, task, "".join(transcript), url, model, headers)
@@ -740,8 +694,12 @@ async def _run_skill_test_once(md: str, task: str, url, model, headers, owner) -
     import json as _json
     from src.agent_loop import stream_agent_loop
     transcript = []
-    approval_required = None
+    messages = [
-    messages = _skill_test_messages(md, task)
+        {"role": "system", "content":
+            "You are TESTING a skill. Follow this skill's procedure to complete the task "
+            "for real, using your tools, step by step.\n\n=== SKILL ===\n" + md},
+        {"role": "user", "content": task},
+    ]
     try:
         # max_tokens explicitly set: passing 0 lets some upstreams (Ollama,
         # OpenAI-compat) generate an empty completion, which manifested as
@@ -761,44 +719,11 @@ async def _run_skill_test_once(md: str, task: str, url, model, headers, owner) -
                 transcript.append(f"\n[tool {d.get('tool')}] {str(d.get('command') or d.get('args') or '')[:300]}\n")
             elif d.get("type") == "tool_output":
                 transcript.append(f"[output] {str(d.get('output') or '')[:600]}\n")
-                approval = d.get("ask_user")
-                if (
-                    isinstance(approval, dict)
-                    and approval.get("kind") == "tool_approval"
-                ):
-                    approval_required = approval
-                    break
             elif d.get("type") == "agent_step":
                 transcript.append(f"\n--- round {d.get('round')} ---\n")
     except Exception as e:
         transcript.append(f"\n[run error] {e}\n")
     text = "".join(transcript)
-    if approval_required is not None:
-        # Unattended audits have no authority to approve and no UI that could
-        # resume this record. Destructively deny it now instead of leaving a
-        # reusable opaque grant pending until TTL/cap eviction.
-        try:
-            from src.tool_approvals import tool_approval_store
-            tool_approval_store.consume(
-                approval_required.get("approval_id"),
-                decision="deny",
-                owner=owner,
-                session_id=None,
-            )
-        except Exception:
-            logger.debug("Could not retire unattended skill approval", exc_info=True)
-        return text, {
-            "verdict": "inconclusive",
-            "confidence": 1.0,
-            "summary": (
-                "This automated audit reached an exact action that requires "
-                "a human approval; no action was executed."
-            ),
-            "issues": [
-                "Run this skill's manual test and review the sealed action."
-            ],
-            "approval_required": True,
-        }
     verdict = await _eval_skill_run(md, task, text, url, model, headers)
     return text, verdict
 
@@ -938,26 +863,6 @@ async def _audit_one_skill(skills_manager, skill, url, model, headers,
     transcript, verdict = await _run_skill_test_once(md, task, url, model, headers, owner)
     v = verdict.get("verdict")
     log(f"{name}: verdict = {v} ({verdict.get('summary', '')[:80]})")
-    if verdict.get("approval_required"):
-        # An unattended audit is not authority for an action influenced by the
-        # skill under test. Preserve the skill's current publication/confidence
-        # state and route the exact action to the manual test UI instead of
-        # letting a safety pause demote, rewrite, or auto-publish the skill.
-        skills_manager.set_audit(
-            name,
-            "inconclusive",
-            by_teacher=False,
-            worker_model=model,
-            owner=owner,
-        )
-        status = skill.get("status") or "draft"
-        log(f"{name}: {status} unchanged — exact action needs manual approval")
-        return {
-            "skill": name,
-            "result": "approval_required",
-            "verdict": verdict,
-            "status": status,
-        }
     if v == "pass":
         # Procedure works. If the reviewer still flagged metadata (tags/category/
         # when_to_use/description), do ONE fixer pass to correct the frontmatter
@@ -1526,19 +1431,6 @@ def setup_skills_routes(skills_manager: SkillsManager) -> APIRouter:
             logger.warning(f"Skill-test model resolve failed: {_e}")
 
         key = (user or "", name)
-        previous_job = _skill_test_jobs.get(key) or {}
-        previous_approval = previous_job.get("approval") or {}
-        if previous_approval.get("approval_id"):
-            try:
-                from src.tool_approvals import tool_approval_store
-                tool_approval_store.consume(
-                    previous_approval["approval_id"],
-                    decision="deny",
-                    owner=user,
-                    session_id=None,
-                )
-            except Exception:
-                logger.debug("Could not retire replaced skill approval", exc_info=True)
         _skill_test_jobs[key] = {
             "status": "running",
             "task": task,
@@ -1547,138 +1439,10 @@ def setup_skills_routes(skills_manager: SkillsManager) -> APIRouter:
             "started": _time.time(),
             "log": [{"type": "skill_test_start", "task": task, "skill": name, "model": model}],
             "verdict": None,
-            "_run": {
-                "md": md,
-                "url": url,
-                "model": model,
-                "headers": headers,
-                "owner": user,
-            },
         }
         _asyncio.create_task(_run_skill_test_job(key, name, md, task, url, model, headers, user, skills_manager))
         return {"ok": True, "status": "running", "skill": name, "model": model}
 
-    @router.post("/{skill_id}/test-approval")
-    async def approve_skill_test_action(request: Request, skill_id: str):
-        """Resume a manual skill test with one exact server-sealed action."""
-        import asyncio as _asyncio
-        from src.tool_approvals import tool_approval_store
-
-        user = _owner(request)
-        skills = skills_manager.load(owner=user)
-        match = next(
-            (s for s in skills if s.get("name") == skill_id or s.get("id") == skill_id),
-            None,
-        )
-        if not match:
-            raise HTTPException(404, "Skill not found")
-        _verify_owner(match, user)
-        name = match.get("name")
-        key = (user or "", name)
-        job = _skill_test_jobs.get(key)
-        if not job or job.get("status") != "awaiting_approval":
-            raise HTTPException(409, "This skill test is not awaiting an approval.")
-
-        body = await request.json()
-        if not isinstance(body, dict):
-            raise HTTPException(400, "Tool approval body must be a JSON object.")
-        approval_id = str(body.get("approval_id") or "")
-        decision = str(body.get("decision") or "").strip().lower()
-        expected = job.get("approval") or {}
-        if approval_id != str(expected.get("approval_id") or ""):
-            raise HTTPException(409, "This approval does not match the pending skill test action.")
-        if decision not in {"approve", "deny"}:
-            raise HTTPException(400, "Invalid tool approval decision.")
-
-        pending = tool_approval_store.peek(approval_id)
-        normalized_owner = str(user or "").strip().casefold()
-        if (
-            pending is None
-            or pending.owner != normalized_owner
-            or pending.session_id != ""
-        ):
-            raise HTTPException(409, "This tool approval is invalid or expired.")
-        exact_approval = tool_approval_store.consume(
-            approval_id,
-            decision=decision,
-            owner=user,
-            session_id=None,
-            # The button here says "Allow once" and there is no chat to carry a
-            # scope into, so the gate must re-arm behind the sealed action.
-            allow_continuation=False,
-        )
-
-        if decision == "approve" and exact_approval is None:
-            raise HTTPException(409, "This tool approval could not be consumed.")
-        job.pop("approval", None)
-        if decision == "deny":
-            job.pop("_transcript", None)
-            job.pop("_run", None)
-            job["log"].append({
-                "type": "approval_denied",
-                "text": "Exact action denied; the skill test stopped without executing it.",
-            })
-            job["verdict"] = {
-                "verdict": "inconclusive",
-                "confidence": 1.0,
-                "summary": "The test stopped because its exact action was denied.",
-                "issues": [],
-            }
-            job["status"] = "done"
-            return {"ok": True, "status": "done", "decision": "deny"}
-
-        run = job.get("_run") or {}
-        transcript = job.pop("_transcript", [])
-        # stream_agent_loop owns its per-round message list internally. Rebuild
-        # continuation context from the original untrusted skill plus the
-        # accumulated transcript so repeated approvals do not lose earlier
-        # approved results, while keeping every transcript byte tainted.
-        messages = _skill_test_messages(
-            run.get("md", ""),
-            job.get("task", ""),
-        )
-        if transcript:
-            messages.append(untrusted_context_message(
-                "skill test transcript",
-                "".join(str(item) for item in transcript),
-            ))
-        messages.extend([
-            {
-                "role": "assistant",
-                "content": str(expected.get("question") or "Allow this exact action once?"),
-            },
-            {
-                "role": "user",
-                "content": (
-                    f"Approved the exact {exact_approval.pending.tool_name} "
-                    "action shown above once."
-                ),
-            },
-        ])
-        job["status"] = "running"
-        job["log"].append({
-            "type": "approval_granted",
-            "text": (
-                f"Approved exact {exact_approval.pending.tool_name} action once; "
-                "resuming test."
-            ),
-        })
-        _asyncio.create_task(_run_skill_test_job(
-            key,
-            name,
-            run.get("md", ""),
-            job.get("task", ""),
-            run.get("url"),
-            run.get("model"),
-            run.get("headers"),
-            run.get("owner"),
-            skills_manager,
-            messages=messages,
-            transcript=transcript,
-            exact_approval=exact_approval,
-        ))
-        return {"ok": True, "status": "running", "decision": "approve"}
-
     @router.get("/{skill_id}/test-status")
     async def test_skill_status(request: Request, skill_id: str):
         """Current background-test state for a skill (status / log / verdict)."""
@@ -1695,7 +1459,6 @@ def setup_skills_routes(skills_manager: SkillsManager) -> APIRouter:
             "model": job.get("model"),
             "log": job.get("log", []),
             "verdict": job.get("verdict"),
-            "approval": job.get("approval"),
         }
 
     @router.post("/audit-all")

routes/task/__init__.py

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-"""Task route domain package (slice 2p, #4082/#4071).
-
-Contains task_routes.py, migrated from the flat routes/ directory.
-Backward-compat shim at routes/task_routes.py re-exports from here.
-"""

scripts/migrate_searxng_settings.py

@@ -1,166 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env python3
-"""Make retained SearXNG settings inherit defaults without replacing them."""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import os
-import stat
-import sys
-import tempfile
-from pathlib import Path
-
-import yaml
-from yaml.nodes import MappingNode
-from yaml.tokens import BlockMappingStartToken, FlowMappingStartToken
-
-
-_UTF8_BOM = b"\xef\xbb\xbf"
-
-
-def _parse_root_mapping(text: str) -> tuple[MappingNode | None, dict]:
-    """Parse settings with the same safe YAML semantics SearXNG uses."""
-    try:
-        loaded = yaml.safe_load(text)
-        node = yaml.compose(text, Loader=yaml.SafeLoader)
-    except yaml.YAMLError:
-        raise ValueError("settings file is not valid single-document YAML") from None
-
-    if loaded is None and node is None:
-        return None, {}
-    if not isinstance(loaded, dict) or not isinstance(node, MappingNode):
-        raise ValueError("settings root is not a mapping")
-    return node, loaded
-
-
-def _flow_mapping_start(text: str) -> int:
-    """Return the root flow mapping's opening-brace character offset."""
-    try:
-        for token in yaml.scan(text, Loader=yaml.SafeLoader):
-            if isinstance(token, FlowMappingStartToken):
-                return token.start_mark.index
-    except yaml.YAMLError:
-        pass
-    raise ValueError("flow-style settings mapping has no opening brace")
-
-
-def _newline_for(contents: bytes) -> bytes:
-    first_lf = contents.find(b"\n")
-    if first_lf > 0 and contents[first_lf - 1 : first_lf + 1] == b"\r\n":
-        return b"\r\n"
-    return b"\n"
-
-
-def _block_mapping_position(text: str, root: MappingNode | None) -> tuple[int, int]:
-    """Return a safe character offset and indent for a root block mapping key."""
-    if root is None:
-        return len(text), 0
-
-    try:
-        for token in yaml.scan(text, Loader=yaml.SafeLoader):
-            if not isinstance(token, BlockMappingStartToken):
-                continue
-            line_start = token.start_mark.index - token.start_mark.column
-            if not text[line_start : token.start_mark.index].strip():
-                return line_start, token.start_mark.column
-            return root.end_mark.index, token.start_mark.column
-    except yaml.YAMLError:
-        pass
-    return root.end_mark.index, root.start_mark.column
-
-
-def _add_block_default_inheritance(
-    contents: bytes, text: str, root: MappingNode | None
-) -> bytes:
-    newline = _newline_for(contents)
-    character_offset, indent_width = _block_mapping_position(text, root)
-    bom_length = len(_UTF8_BOM) if contents.startswith(_UTF8_BOM) else 0
-    offset = bom_length + len(text[:character_offset].encode("utf-8"))
-    separator = b""
-    if offset not in (0, bom_length) and not contents[:offset].endswith((b"\n", b"\r")):
-        separator = newline
-    addition = (
-        separator
-        + b" " * indent_width
-        + b"use_default_settings: true"
-        + newline
-    )
-    return contents[:offset] + addition + contents[offset:]
-
-
-def migrate_settings(path: Path) -> bool:
-    """Add the missing inheritance key atomically; return whether the file changed."""
-    source_stat = path.lstat()
-    if not stat.S_ISREG(source_stat.st_mode):
-        raise ValueError(f"settings path is not a regular file: {path}")
-
-    contents = path.read_bytes()
-    if not contents:
-        return False
-
-    text = contents.decode("utf-8-sig")
-    root, loaded = _parse_root_mapping(text)
-    if "use_default_settings" in loaded:
-        return False
-
-    if root is not None and root.flow_style:
-        start = _flow_mapping_start(text)
-        bom_length = len(_UTF8_BOM) if contents.startswith(_UTF8_BOM) else 0
-        offset = bom_length + len(text[: start + 1].encode("utf-8"))
-        separator = b", " if root.value else b""
-        updated = (
-            contents[:offset]
-            + b"use_default_settings: true"
-            + separator
-            + contents[offset:]
-        )
-    else:
-        updated = _add_block_default_inheritance(contents, text, root)
-    fd, temporary_name = tempfile.mkstemp(
-        prefix=f".{path.name}.odysseus-", dir=path.parent
-    )
-    temporary = Path(temporary_name)
-    try:
-        # chmod before chown: the Compose cap set is `cap_drop: ALL` plus
-        # CHOWN/SETGID/SETUID/DAC_OVERRIDE, with no FOWNER. Once the temporary
-        # file belongs to searxng:searxng — which every retained settings file
-        # does, because searxng's entrypoint chowns /etc/searxng — root can no
-        # longer chmod it and the migration dies with EPERM.
-        os.fchmod(fd, stat.S_IMODE(source_stat.st_mode))
-        os.fchown(fd, source_stat.st_uid, source_stat.st_gid)
-        with os.fdopen(fd, "wb") as handle:
-            fd = -1
-            handle.write(updated)
-            handle.flush()
-            os.fsync(handle.fileno())
-        os.replace(temporary, path)
-        directory_fd = os.open(path.parent, os.O_RDONLY | os.O_DIRECTORY)
-        try:
-            os.fsync(directory_fd)
-        finally:
-            os.close(directory_fd)
-    finally:
-        if fd >= 0:
-            os.close(fd)
-        temporary.unlink(missing_ok=True)
-    return True
-
-
-def main(argv: list[str]) -> int:
-    if len(argv) > 2:
-        print(f"usage: {Path(argv[0]).name} [settings.yml]", file=sys.stderr)
-        return 2
-
-    path = Path(argv[1]) if len(argv) == 2 else Path("/etc/searxng/settings.yml")
-    try:
-        changed = migrate_settings(path)
-    except (OSError, UnicodeError, ValueError) as exc:
-        print(f"SearXNG settings migration failed: {exc}", file=sys.stderr)
-        return 1
-
-    if changed:
-        print("Added use_default_settings inheritance to retained SearXNG settings")
-    return 0
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    raise SystemExit(main(sys.argv))

scripts/mlx_image_server.py

@@ -327,12 +327,7 @@ def list_models():
 
 @app.post("/v1/images/generations")
 def generate(req: ImageRequest):
-    # The served model is the one this process was launched with. `req.model`
+    model = req.model or _args.model
-    # is accepted for OpenAI wire compatibility and ignored, matching
-    # scripts/diffusion_server.py: honouring it would let a caller point the
-    # generator at any local directory or Hugging Face repo, and the HiDream
-    # branch runs a python script from inside that directory.
-    model = _args.model
     width, height = _size(req.size)
     out_images = []
     count = max(1, min(int(req.n or 1), 4))
@@ -398,7 +393,7 @@ async def edit_image(
     size: str = Form("1024x1024"),
     response_format: str = Form("b64_json"),
 ):
-    active_model = _args.model  # pinned; see generate()
+    active_model = model or _args.model
     if _is_lama_inpaint(active_model) or _is_ddcolor(active_model):
         image_raw = await image.read()
         mask_raw = await mask.read() if mask is not None else None

scripts/odysseus-webhook

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 """odysseus-webhook — shell wrapper for scheduled-task webhook tokens.
 
 Tasks in the scheduled-task system can carry a `webhook_token`. Any
-HTTP POST to `/api/tasks/<task-id>/webhook/<token>` fires the task. This CLI lists,
+HTTP POST to `/api/webhook/<token>` fires the task. This CLI lists,
 rotates, and revokes those tokens.
 
     odysseus-webhook list                       # tasks that have a token
@@ -21,7 +21,6 @@ quiet_logs()
 
 import argparse, json, logging, os, secrets, sys
 from pathlib import Path
-from urllib.parse import quote
 
 try:
     from core.database import SessionLocal, ScheduledTask
@@ -54,14 +53,6 @@ def _summary(t: "ScheduledTask", reveal: bool = False) -> dict:
     }
 
 
-def _task_webhook_url(base: str, task_id: str, token: str) -> str:
-    """Build the live task-route URL without leaking ids into path syntax."""
-    root = (base or "http://localhost:7000").rstrip("/")
-    task_part = quote(str(task_id), safe="")
-    token_part = quote(str(token), safe="")
-    return f"{root}/api/tasks/{task_part}/webhook/{token_part}"
-
-
 def cmd_list(args):
     db = SessionLocal()
     try:
@@ -118,7 +109,8 @@ def cmd_url(args):
             fail(f"no task with id {args.id!r}")
         if not t.webhook_token:
             fail(f"task {args.id!r} has no webhook token (rotate one first)")
-        url = _task_webhook_url(args.base, t.id, t.webhook_token)
+        base = (args.base or "http://localhost:7000").rstrip("/")
+        url = f"{base}/api/webhook/{t.webhook_token}"
         emit({
             "task_id": t.id,
             "name": t.name,

services/docs/service.py

@@ -50,46 +50,16 @@ class DocsService:
             List of DocChunk objects
         """
         results = self.rag.search(query, k=top_k)
-        chunks = []
+        return [
-
+            DocChunk(
-        for result in results:
+                text=r.get("text", r.get("content", "")),
-            if not isinstance(result, dict):
+                source=r.get("source", r.get("metadata", {}).get("source", "unknown")),
-                continue
+                score=r.get("score", 0.0),
-
+                metadata=r.get("metadata"),
-            metadata = result.get("metadata")
-            if not isinstance(metadata, dict):
-                metadata = {}
-
-            text = result.get("document")
-            if text is None:
-                text = result.get("text")
-            if text is None:
-                text = result.get("content")
-            if text is None:
-                text = ""
-
-            source = result.get("source")
-            if source is None:
-                source = metadata.get("source")
-            if source is None:
-                source = "unknown"
-
-            score = result.get("similarity")
-            if score is None:
-                score = result.get("score")
-            if score is None:
-                score = 0.0
-
-            chunks.append(
-                DocChunk(
-                    text=text,
-                    source=source,
-                    score=score,
-                    metadata=metadata,
-                )
             )
-
+            for r in results
-        return chunks
+            if isinstance(r, dict)
+        ]
 
     async def index(self, directory: str) -> IndexResult:
         """
@@ -103,8 +73,8 @@ class DocsService:
         """
         result = self.rag.index_personal_documents(directory)
         return IndexResult(
-            indexed=result.get("indexed_count", result.get("indexed", 0)),
+            indexed=result.get("indexed", 0),
-            failed=result.get("failed_count", result.get("failed", 0)),
+            failed=result.get("failed", 0),
             errors=result.get("errors", []),
         )
 

services/memory/skill_importer.py

@@ -1,18 +1,16 @@
 """Import SKILL.md bundles from public GitHub (or skills.sh → GitHub) URLs."""
 from __future__ import annotations
 
-import ipaddress
 import logging
 import os
-import time
+import re
 from dataclasses import dataclass
-from typing import Dict, Iterable, List, Optional, Tuple, cast
+from typing import Dict, List, Optional, Tuple
 from urllib.parse import quote, urljoin, urlparse
 
-import httpcore
 import httpx
 
-from src.url_safety import _default_resolver, check_outbound_url
+from src.url_safety import check_outbound_url
 
 logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
 
@@ -27,7 +25,6 @@ TEXT_NAMES = {"skill.md", "license", "license.md", "readme.md"}
 _GITHUB_HOSTS = frozenset({
     "github.com", "www.github.com", "api.github.com", "raw.githubusercontent.com",
 })
-_SKILLS_SH_HOSTS = frozenset({"skills.sh", "www.skills.sh"})
 
 
 def _github_host(url: str) -> str:
@@ -75,158 +72,18 @@ def _is_text_file(name: str) -> bool:
 _MAX_FETCH_REDIRECTS = 5
 
 
-def _validated_ips(raw_ips: List[str]) -> List[ipaddress._BaseAddress]:
+def _check_fetch_url(url: str) -> None:
-    """Parse and de-duplicate one resolver snapshot in resolver order."""
+    """SSRF guard for skill-import fetches (defense-in-depth).
-    ips: List[ipaddress._BaseAddress] = []
-    seen = set()
-    for raw in raw_ips:
-        if not isinstance(raw, str):
-            continue
-        try:
-            ip = ipaddress.ip_address(raw.split("%", 1)[0])
-        except ValueError:
-            continue
-        if ip in seen:
-            continue
-        seen.add(ip)
-        ips.append(ip)
-    return ips
 
-
+    Skill bundles only ever come from public GitHub, never an internal
-def _resolve_and_check_url(url: str) -> List[ipaddress._BaseAddress]:
+    address, so block private/loopback/link-local targets on every hop —
-    """Return the exact address snapshot approved for one fetch hop."""
+    matching the hardened web-fetch path in
-    resolved_ips: List[str] = []
+    ``services/search/content.py:_get_public_url`` rather than the lenient
-
+    default used for admin-configured model endpoints.
-    def _recording_resolver(host: str) -> List[str]:
+    """
-        answers = list(_default_resolver(host))
+    ok, reason = check_outbound_url(url, block_private=True)
-        resolved_ips[:] = answers
-        return answers
-
-    ok, reason = check_outbound_url(
-        url,
-        block_private=True,
-        resolver=_recording_resolver,
-    )
     if not ok:
-        raise SkillImportError(f"outbound URL blocked: {reason}")
+        raise SkillImportError(reason)
-
-    pinned_ips = _validated_ips(resolved_ips)
-    if not pinned_ips:
-        raise SkillImportError("outbound URL blocked: host did not resolve to a usable address")
-    return pinned_ips
-
-
-# Backward compatibility alias for tests importing _check_fetch_url directly
-_check_fetch_url = _resolve_and_check_url
-
-
-class _PinnedBackend(httpcore.NetworkBackend):
-    """Connect only to addresses from one validated DNS snapshot."""
-
-    def __init__(self, ips: List[ipaddress._BaseAddress]):
-        self._ips = [str(ip) for ip in ips]
-        self._real = httpcore.SyncBackend()
-
-    def connect_tcp(
-        self,
-        host: str,
-        port: int,
-        timeout: float | None = None,
-        local_address: str | None = None,
-        socket_options=None,
-    ):
-        deadline = None if timeout is None else time.monotonic() + timeout
-        last_exc: Optional[Exception] = None
-        for ip in self._ips:
-            remaining = None if deadline is None else max(0.0, deadline - time.monotonic())
-            try:
-                return self._real.connect_tcp(
-                    ip,
-                    port,
-                    remaining,
-                    local_address,
-                    socket_options,
-                )
-            except (httpcore.ConnectError, httpcore.ConnectTimeout) as exc:
-                last_exc = exc
-                if deadline is not None and time.monotonic() >= deadline:
-                    break
-        if last_exc is not None:
-            raise last_exc
-        raise httpcore.ConnectError("no validated address available")
-
-    def connect_unix_socket(self, path, timeout=None, socket_options=None):
-        return self._real.connect_unix_socket(path, timeout, socket_options)
-
-    def sleep(self, seconds: float) -> None:
-        return self._real.sleep(seconds)
-
-
-_HTTPCORE_TO_HTTPX_EXC = {
-    httpcore.ConnectError: httpx.ConnectError,
-    httpcore.ConnectTimeout: httpx.ConnectTimeout,
-    httpcore.LocalProtocolError: httpx.LocalProtocolError,
-    httpcore.NetworkError: httpx.NetworkError,
-    httpcore.PoolTimeout: httpx.PoolTimeout,
-    httpcore.ProtocolError: httpx.ProtocolError,
-    httpcore.ProxyError: httpx.ProxyError,
-    httpcore.ReadError: httpx.ReadError,
-    httpcore.ReadTimeout: httpx.ReadTimeout,
-    httpcore.RemoteProtocolError: httpx.RemoteProtocolError,
-    httpcore.TimeoutException: httpx.TimeoutException,
-    httpcore.UnsupportedProtocol: httpx.UnsupportedProtocol,
-    httpcore.WriteError: httpx.WriteError,
-    httpcore.WriteTimeout: httpx.WriteTimeout,
-}
-
-
-class _PinnedTransport(httpx.BaseTransport):
-    """Pin socket connects while preserving URL authority, Host, and TLS SNI."""
-
-    def __init__(self, ips: List[ipaddress._BaseAddress]):
-        self._pinned_ips = list(ips)
-        self._pool = httpcore.ConnectionPool(
-            ssl_context=httpx.create_ssl_context(),
-            http1=True,
-            http2=False,
-            network_backend=_PinnedBackend(ips),
-        )
-
-    def handle_request(self, request: httpx.Request) -> httpx.Response:
-        core_request = httpcore.Request(
-            method=request.method,
-            url=httpcore.URL(
-                scheme=request.url.raw_scheme,
-                host=request.url.raw_host,
-                port=request.url.port,
-                target=request.url.raw_path,
-            ),
-            headers=request.headers.raw,
-            content=request.stream,
-            extensions=request.extensions,
-        )
-        core_response = None
-        try:
-            core_response = self._pool.handle_request(core_request)
-            content = b"".join(cast(Iterable[bytes], core_response.stream))
-        except Exception as exc:
-            mapped = _HTTPCORE_TO_HTTPX_EXC.get(type(exc))
-            if mapped is not None:
-                raise mapped(str(exc)) from exc
-            raise
-        finally:
-            if core_response is not None:
-                core_response.close()
-
-        return httpx.Response(
-            status_code=core_response.status,
-            headers=core_response.headers,
-            content=content,
-            extensions=core_response.extensions,
-        )
-
-    def close(self) -> None:
-        self._pool.close()
 
 
 def _get_checked(
@@ -243,76 +100,49 @@ def _get_checked(
     hand lets us re-validate every hop, closing that blind-SSRF gap.
     """
     current = url
-    for _ in range(_MAX_FETCH_REDIRECTS + 1):
+    with httpx.Client(follow_redirects=False, timeout=timeout) as client:
-        pinned_ips = _resolve_and_check_url(current)
+        for _ in range(_MAX_FETCH_REDIRECTS + 1):
-        with httpx.Client(
+            _check_fetch_url(current)
-            transport=_PinnedTransport(pinned_ips),
-            follow_redirects=False,
-            timeout=timeout,
-        ) as client:
             r = client.get(current, headers=headers)
-
+            if r.status_code in (301, 302, 303, 307, 308):
-        if r.status_code in (301, 302, 303, 307, 308):
+                location = r.headers.get("location")
-            location = r.headers.get("location")
+                if not location:
-            if not location:
+                    return r
-                return r
+                current = urljoin(str(r.url), location)
-            current = urljoin(str(r.url), location)
+                continue
-            continue
+            return r
-        return r
     raise SkillImportError("too many redirects while fetching skill bundle")
 
 
 def parse_skill_source(url: str) -> ResolvedSource:
     """Normalize skills.sh / GitHub web URLs into owner/repo/ref/path."""
-    url = (url or "").strip()
+    raw = (url or "").strip()
-    if not url:
+    if not raw:
         raise SkillImportError("URL is required")
 
-    # ``urlparse`` only reports an unambiguous scheme when the URL carries the
+    # skills.sh often links to GitHub; try to unwrap ?url= or redirect target later.
-    # ``scheme://`` form. Opaque schemes (``mailto:``, ``javascript:``) and a
+    if "skills.sh" in raw and "github.com" not in raw:
-    # schemeless ``host:port`` both parse a "scheme" that is not one, so they
+        r = _get_checked(raw, timeout=20.0)
-    # fall through to the host check below and are rejected on the host instead.
-    scheme = urlparse(url).scheme.lower()
-    if scheme not in ("http", "https"):
-        if scheme and url.lower().startswith(f"{scheme}://"):
-            raise SkillImportError(f"unsupported URL scheme: {scheme}")
-        # Schemeless "github.com/owner/repo" — accept only a supported host.
-        rough_host = (urlparse("//" + url).hostname or "").lower()
-        if rough_host not in _GITHUB_HOSTS and rough_host not in _SKILLS_SH_HOSTS:
-            raise SkillImportError("Only GitHub or skills.sh URLs are supported")
-        url = "https://" + url
-
-    parsed = urlparse(url)
-    hostname = (parsed.hostname or "").lower()
-    if hostname not in _GITHUB_HOSTS and hostname not in _SKILLS_SH_HOSTS:
-        raise SkillImportError("Only GitHub or skills.sh URLs are supported")
-
-    # A skills.sh link is only usable if it redirects to an exact supported
-    # GitHub host. Scraping the page body for a github.com link cannot work:
-    # skill pages only ever link the repository root, never the skill's
-    # subdirectory, so the scrape resolves every skill in a repo to the same
-    # (wrong) bundle. Fail with an actionable message instead.
-    if hostname in _SKILLS_SH_HOSTS:
-        r = _get_checked(url, timeout=20.0)
         if r.status_code >= 400:
             raise _github_response_error(r)
         final = str(r.url)
-        if _github_host(final) not in _GITHUB_HOSTS:
+        _assert_github_url(final, context="redirect target")
-            raise SkillImportError(
+        # Page may embed a github link; prefer final URL if redirected.
-                "skills.sh did not redirect to GitHub — open the skill's "
+        if "github.com" in final:
-                "repository on GitHub, navigate to the exact skill folder or "
+            raw = final
-                "SKILL.md file, and paste that URL; the repository-root link "
+        else:
-                "alone is not sufficient"
+            m = re.search(r"https?://github\.com/[^\s\"')]+", r.text or "")
-            )
+            if m:
-        url = final
+                raw = m.group(0).rstrip(".,)")
 
-    # Update parsed and hostname to reflect the new GitHub URL
+    parsed = urlparse(raw)
-    parsed = urlparse(url)
+    host = _github_host(raw)
-    hostname = (parsed.hostname or "").lower()
+    if host not in _GITHUB_HOSTS:
+        raise SkillImportError(
+            "Only GitHub URLs are supported (https://github.com/... or raw.githubusercontent.com/...)"
+        )
 
-    _assert_github_url(url)
+    if host == "raw.githubusercontent.com":
-
-    if hostname == "raw.githubusercontent.com":
         # /owner/repo/ref/path/to/file
         bits = [p for p in parsed.path.split("/") if p]
         if len(bits) < 4:

services/search/content.py

@@ -2,18 +2,22 @@
 
 import copy
 import io
+import ipaddress
 import json
 import os
 import re
 import logging
+import socket
+import ssl
 from datetime import datetime, timedelta
-from typing import List
+from typing import Iterable, List, cast
+from urllib.parse import urljoin, urlparse
 
 import httpx
+import httpcore
 from bs4 import BeautifulSoup
 
 from src.constants import WEB_FETCH_SOFT_MAX_BYTES, WEB_FETCH_HARD_MAX_BYTES, WEB_FETCH_USER_AGENT
-from src import outbound_fetch as _outbound_fetch
 
 from .analytics import RateLimitError, error_logger
 from .cache import (
@@ -25,40 +29,336 @@ from .cache import (
 
 logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
 
-def _is_private_address(addr):
+_PRIVATE_NETWORKS = (
-    return _outbound_fetch._is_private_address(addr)
+    ipaddress.ip_network("0.0.0.0/8"),
+    ipaddress.ip_network("10.0.0.0/8"),
+    ipaddress.ip_network("127.0.0.0/8"),
+    ipaddress.ip_network("169.254.0.0/16"),
+    ipaddress.ip_network("172.16.0.0/12"),
+    ipaddress.ip_network("192.168.0.0/16"),
+    ipaddress.ip_network("::1/128"),
+    ipaddress.ip_network("fc00::/7"),
+    ipaddress.ip_network("fe80::/10"),
+)
 
 
-def _resolve_hostname_ips(hostname):
+def _is_private_address(addr: ipaddress._BaseAddress) -> bool:
-    return _outbound_fetch._resolve_hostname_ips(hostname)
+    if isinstance(addr, ipaddress.IPv6Address) and addr.ipv4_mapped is not None:
-
+        addr = addr.ipv4_mapped
-
+    return (
-def _public_http_url(url):
+        addr.is_private
-    return _outbound_fetch._public_http_url(url, resolver=_resolve_hostname_ips)
+        or addr.is_loopback
-
+        or addr.is_link_local
-
+        or addr.is_reserved
-def _resolve_public_ips(url):
+        or addr.is_multicast
-    return _outbound_fetch._resolve_public_ips(url, resolver=_resolve_hostname_ips)
+        or addr.is_unspecified
-
+        or any(addr in net for net in _PRIVATE_NETWORKS)
-
-_PinnedBackend = _outbound_fetch._PinnedBackend
-_PinnedTransport = _outbound_fetch._PinnedTransport
-BodyTooLargeError = _outbound_fetch.BodyTooLargeError
-_CappedFetch = _outbound_fetch._CappedFetch
-
-
-def _get_public_url(url, headers, timeout, max_redirects=5, max_bytes=None):
-    return _outbound_fetch._get_public_url(
-        url,
-        headers=headers,
-        timeout=timeout,
-        max_redirects=max_redirects,
-        max_bytes=max_bytes,
-        resolve_public_ips=_resolve_public_ips,
-        transport_factory=_PinnedTransport,
     )
 
 
+def _resolve_hostname_ips(hostname: str) -> list[ipaddress._BaseAddress]:
+    try:
+        infos = socket.getaddrinfo(hostname, None)
+    except Exception:
+        return []
+    out = []
+    for info in infos:
+        try:
+            out.append(ipaddress.ip_address(info[4][0]))
+        except Exception:
+            continue
+    return out
+
+
+def _public_http_url(url: str) -> bool:
+    try:
+        parsed = urlparse(url)
+        if parsed.scheme not in ("http", "https"):
+            return False
+        host = (parsed.hostname or "").strip()
+        if not host:
+            return False
+        lower = host.lower()
+        if lower in ("localhost", "metadata", "metadata.google.internal"):
+            return False
+        if lower.endswith((".local", ".localhost", ".internal", ".lan", ".intranet")):
+            return False
+        try:
+            return not _is_private_address(ipaddress.ip_address(host))
+        except ValueError:
+            pass
+        addrs = _resolve_hostname_ips(host)
+        return bool(addrs) and not any(_is_private_address(a) for a in addrs)
+    except Exception:
+        return False
+
+
+def _resolve_public_ips(url: str) -> list[ipaddress._BaseAddress]:
+    parsed = urlparse(url)
+    if parsed.scheme not in ("http", "https") or not parsed.hostname:
+        raise httpx.RequestError(f"Blocked non-public URL: {url}")
+    host = (parsed.hostname or "").strip().lower()
+    if host in ("localhost", "metadata", "metadata.google.internal"):
+        raise httpx.RequestError(f"Blocked non-public hostname: {host}")
+    try:
+        ip = ipaddress.ip_address(host)
+        if _is_private_address(ip):
+            raise httpx.RequestError(f"Blocked non-public IP literal: {host}")
+        return [ip]
+    except httpx.RequestError:
+        raise
+    except ValueError:
+        pass
+    addrs = _resolve_hostname_ips(host)
+    if not addrs or any(_is_private_address(a) for a in addrs):
+        raise httpx.RequestError(f"Blocked non-public URL: {url}")
+    return addrs
+
+
+class _PinnedBackend(httpcore.NetworkBackend):
+    """Network backend that connects to a pre-resolved IP.
+
+    httpcore derives the TLS SNI and the ``Host`` header from the URL's
+    origin, not from the host argument passed to ``connect_tcp``. So
+    routing the TCP connect to a resolved IP while leaving the URL
+    untouched keeps SNI / vhost behaviour correct and closes the
+    DNS-rebinding TOCTOU between the SSRF check and the connect.
+    """
+
+    def __init__(self, ip: ipaddress._BaseAddress):
+        self._ip = str(ip)
+        self._real = httpcore.SyncBackend()
+
+    def connect_tcp(
+        self,
+        host: str,
+        port: int,
+        timeout: float | None = None,
+        local_address: str | None = None,
+        socket_options=None,
+    ):
+        return self._real.connect_tcp(
+            self._ip, port, timeout, local_address, socket_options
+        )
+
+    def connect_unix_socket(self, path, timeout=None, socket_options=None):
+        return self._real.connect_unix_socket(path, timeout, socket_options)
+
+    def sleep(self, seconds: float) -> None:
+        return self._real.sleep(seconds)
+
+
+# Map httpcore exception classes to their httpx equivalents. Built
+# once at import time from the public exception classes; avoids any
+# import of httpx's private transport machinery. httpcore's
+# ``ConnectionNotAvailable`` is a pool-internal signal (the pool will
+# close and retry on its own) — we never expect to see it surface to
+# a transport caller, so it has no httpx counterpart here.
+_HTTPCORE_TO_HTTPX_EXC = {
+    httpcore.ConnectError: httpx.ConnectError,
+    httpcore.ConnectTimeout: httpx.ConnectTimeout,
+    httpcore.LocalProtocolError: httpx.LocalProtocolError,
+    httpcore.NetworkError: httpx.NetworkError,
+    httpcore.PoolTimeout: httpx.PoolTimeout,
+    httpcore.ProtocolError: httpx.ProtocolError,
+    httpcore.ProxyError: httpx.ProxyError,
+    httpcore.ReadError: httpx.ReadError,
+    httpcore.ReadTimeout: httpx.ReadTimeout,
+    httpcore.RemoteProtocolError: httpx.RemoteProtocolError,
+    httpcore.TimeoutException: httpx.TimeoutException,
+    httpcore.UnsupportedProtocol: httpx.UnsupportedProtocol,
+    httpcore.WriteError: httpx.WriteError,
+    httpcore.WriteTimeout: httpx.WriteTimeout,
+}
+
+
+class _PinnedTransport(httpx.BaseTransport):
+    """Transport that pins every TCP connect to a pre-resolved IP.
+
+    Uses only the public ``httpcore`` and ``httpx`` APIs — no
+    subclassing of ``httpx.HTTPTransport``, no reads of private
+    ``httpcore.ConnectionPool`` attributes, no imports from
+    ``httpx private transport internals``. The URL is passed through unchanged so SNI
+    / vhost work as if httpx had been given the hostname directly;
+    only the TCP destination is pinned, closing the DNS-rebinding
+    TOCTOU between the SSRF check and the connect.
+    """
+
+    def __init__(self, ip: ipaddress._BaseAddress, *, http2: bool = False):
+        self._pool = httpcore.ConnectionPool(
+            ssl_context=ssl.create_default_context(),
+            http1=True,
+            http2=http2,
+            network_backend=_PinnedBackend(ip),
+        )
+
+    def __enter__(self):
+        self._pool.__enter__()
+        return self
+
+    def __exit__(self, exc_type=None, exc_value=None, traceback=None) -> None:
+        self._pool.__exit__(exc_type, exc_value, traceback)
+
+    def handle_request(self, request: httpx.Request) -> httpx.Response:
+        httpcore_req = httpcore.Request(
+            method=request.method,
+            url=httpcore.URL(
+                scheme=request.url.raw_scheme,
+                host=request.url.raw_host,
+                port=request.url.port,
+                target=request.url.raw_path,
+            ),
+            headers=request.headers.raw,
+            content=request.stream,
+            extensions=request.extensions,
+        )
+        try:
+            httpcore_resp = self._pool.handle_request(httpcore_req)
+            # Eager materialisation matches the original
+            # ``response.text`` usage in fetch_webpage_content. The
+            # sync pool's stream is a plain Iterable[bytes] despite
+            # the httpcore type hint unioning the async variant.
+            content = b"".join(cast(Iterable[bytes], httpcore_resp.stream))
+        except Exception as exc:
+            mapped = _HTTPCORE_TO_HTTPX_EXC.get(type(exc))
+            if mapped is not None:
+                raise mapped(str(exc)) from exc
+            raise
+
+        return httpx.Response(
+            status_code=httpcore_resp.status,
+            headers=httpcore_resp.headers,
+            content=content,
+            extensions=httpcore_resp.extensions,
+        )
+
+    def close(self) -> None:
+        self._pool.close()
+
+class BodyTooLargeError(Exception):
+    """The server declared a body larger than the hard fetch ceiling."""
+
+    def __init__(self, url: str, declared_bytes: int):
+        self.url = url
+        self.declared_bytes = declared_bytes
+        super().__init__(
+            f"response body is {declared_bytes:,} bytes, over the "
+            f"{WEB_FETCH_HARD_MAX_BYTES:,}-byte hard cap"
+        )
+
+
+class _CappedFetch:
+    """Result of a size-capped streaming GET.
+
+    Carries just what fetch_webpage_content needs from an httpx.Response,
+    plus the cap bookkeeping: the (possibly truncated) body, whether the
+    cap cut it short, and the size the server declared via Content-Length
+    (wire bytes; None when absent).
+    """
+
+    __slots__ = ("status_code", "headers", "content", "truncated",
+                 "declared_bytes", "encoding", "url")
+
+    def __init__(self, status_code, headers, content, truncated,
+                 declared_bytes, encoding, url):
+        self.status_code = status_code
+        self.headers = headers
+        self.content = content
+        self.truncated = truncated
+        self.declared_bytes = declared_bytes
+        self.encoding = encoding
+        self.url = url
+
+    @property
+    def text(self) -> str:
+        return self.content.decode(self.encoding or "utf-8", errors="replace")
+
+    def raise_for_status(self):
+        if self.status_code >= 400:
+            request = httpx.Request("GET", self.url)
+            raise httpx.HTTPStatusError(
+                f"HTTP {self.status_code} for {self.url}",
+                request=request,
+                response=httpx.Response(self.status_code, request=request),
+            )
+
+
+def _get_public_url(url: str, headers: dict, timeout: int, max_redirects: int = 5,
+                    max_bytes: int = None) -> "_CappedFetch":
+    """Capped streaming GET with SSRF-guarded, DNS-pinned manual redirects.
+
+    Each hop is resolved once, validated as public, and then the actual TCP
+    connection is pinned to that resolved IP. The request URL is left unchanged
+    so Host and TLS SNI keep the original hostname.
+    """
+    cap = min(max_bytes or WEB_FETCH_SOFT_MAX_BYTES, WEB_FETCH_HARD_MAX_BYTES)
+    current = url
+    for _ in range(max_redirects + 1):
+        ips = _resolve_public_ips(current)
+
+        # Force identity transfer-encoding. With gzip/deflate the wire bytes
+        # and Content-Length can be a small fraction of the decoded body, so a
+        # tiny compressed response could pass the hard-cap preflight and then
+        # expand past the ceiling in one decoded chunk before the streamed cap
+        # below can slice it.
+        req_headers = dict(headers or {})
+        req_headers["Accept-Encoding"] = "identity"
+
+        with httpx.Client(
+            headers=req_headers,
+            timeout=timeout,
+            follow_redirects=False,
+            transport=_PinnedTransport(ips[0]),
+        ) as client:
+            with client.stream("GET", current) as response:
+                if response.status_code in (301, 302, 303, 307, 308):
+                    location = response.headers.get("location")
+                    if not location:
+                        return _CappedFetch(response.status_code, response.headers, b"",
+                                            False, None, response.encoding, str(response.url))
+                    current = urljoin(str(response.url), location)
+                    continue
+
+                # A server can ignore the identity request and still return a
+                # compressed body; httpx.iter_bytes would then decode it, and a
+                # tiny gzip can balloon into one decoded chunk far past the cap.
+                # Refuse compressed Content-Encoding so the streamed cap stays
+                # a real memory bound.
+                enc = (response.headers.get("content-encoding") or "").strip().lower()
+                if enc and enc != "identity":
+                    raise httpx.RequestError(
+                        f"Refusing compressed response (Content-Encoding: {enc}) after "
+                        "requesting identity: cannot bound decoded body size",
+                        request=httpx.Request("GET", current),
+                    )
+
+                declared = None
+                raw_len = response.headers.get("content-length")
+                if raw_len and raw_len.isdigit():
+                    declared = int(raw_len)
+
+                if declared is not None and declared > WEB_FETCH_HARD_MAX_BYTES:
+                    raise BodyTooLargeError(current, declared)
+
+                chunks = []
+                read = 0
+                truncated = False
+                for chunk in response.iter_bytes():
+                    read += len(chunk)
+                    if read > cap:
+                        keep = cap - (read - len(chunk))
+                        if keep > 0:
+                            chunks.append(chunk[:keep])
+                        truncated = True
+                        break
+                    chunks.append(chunk)
+
+                return _CappedFetch(response.status_code, response.headers,
+                                    b"".join(chunks), truncated, declared,
+                                    response.encoding, str(response.url))
+
+    raise httpx.RequestError("Too many redirects", request=httpx.Request("GET", current))
+
 # PDF extraction (optional dependency)
 try:
     from pdfminer.high_level import extract_text as pdf_extract_text

src/agent_runs.py

@@ -17,14 +17,13 @@ close / navigation / refresh). It does NOT survive a server restart.
 import asyncio
 import json
 import logging
-import uuid
 from typing import AsyncGenerator, Dict, Optional
 
 logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
 
 
 class _Run:
-    __slots__ = ("buffer", "subscribers", "status", "task", "evict_task", "run_id")
+    __slots__ = ("buffer", "subscribers", "status", "task", "evict_task")
 
     def __init__(self) -> None:
         self.buffer: list = []          # ordered SSE event strings (replay log)
@@ -32,9 +31,6 @@ class _Run:
         self.status: str = "running"    # running | done | error | stopped
         self.task: Optional[asyncio.Task] = None
         self.evict_task: Optional[asyncio.Task] = None
-        # Stable across every subscription/replay of this exact detached run.
-        # The browser uses it to make local cost accounting replay-idempotent.
-        self.run_id: str = uuid.uuid4().hex
 
 
 _RUNS: Dict[str, _Run] = {}
@@ -57,24 +53,13 @@ def _publish(run: _Run, ev: str) -> None:
             pass
 
 
-def _wake_run_subscribers(run: _Run) -> None:
+def _schedule_evict(session_id: str) -> None:
-    """Close subscribers even when the drain task never reached its body."""
-    for q in list(run.subscribers):
-        try:
-            q.put_nowait((None, None))
-        except Exception:
-            pass
-
-
-def _schedule_evict(session_id: str, expected_run: Optional[_Run] = None) -> None:
     """(Re)arm a grace-period eviction for a terminal run with no subscribers.
     Identity-checked so a run that gets replaced/reused is never evicted by a
     stale timer."""
     run = _RUNS.get(session_id)
     if run is None:
         return
-    if expected_run is not None and run is not expected_run:
-        return
     if run.evict_task and not run.evict_task.done():
         run.evict_task.cancel()
 
@@ -100,38 +85,25 @@ def get_status(session_id: str) -> Optional[str]:
     return r.status if r else None
 
 
-def get_run_id(session_id: str) -> Optional[str]:
+async def _drain(session_id: str, agen: AsyncGenerator[str, None],
-    """Return the opaque identity of the current detached run, if present."""
-    r = _RUNS.get(session_id)
-    return r.run_id if r else None
-
-
-def get_active_run(session_id: str) -> Optional[_Run]:
-    """Return the exact active run currently registered for a session."""
-    r = _RUNS.get(session_id)
-    return r if r and r.status == "running" else None
-
-
-async def _drain(session_id: str, run: _Run, agen: AsyncGenerator[str, None],
                  prev_task: Optional[asyncio.Task] = None) -> None:
     """Pull every event from the wrapped generator into the run buffer, fanning
     each out to live subscribers. Runs to completion regardless of subscribers."""
-    subscribers_woken = False
+    run = _RUNS.get(session_id)
-
+    if run is None:
-    def _wake_subscribers() -> None:
+        return
-        nonlocal subscribers_woken
-        if subscribers_woken:
-            return
-        subscribers_woken = True
-        _wake_run_subscribers(run)
-
     # If this run replaced an in-flight one (rapid double-send), wait for that
     # one to fully finish first. Its CancelledError handler calls aclose(), which
     # persists its partial response — letting it complete before we start writing
     # keeps the two runs' session saves sequential instead of interleaved.
-    try:
+    if prev_task is not None and not prev_task.done():
-        if prev_task is not None and not prev_task.done():
+        try:
             await asyncio.wait({prev_task})
+        except asyncio.CancelledError:
+            raise            # our own cancellation — propagate
+        except Exception:
+            pass
+    try:
         async for ev in agen:
             _publish(run, ev)
         if run.status == "running":
@@ -144,16 +116,6 @@ async def _drain(session_id: str, run: _Run, agen: AsyncGenerator[str, None],
             await agen.aclose()
         except Exception:
             pass
-        # A rapid third replacement can cancel this task while it is still
-        # waiting for its predecessor. Close this run's subscribers promptly,
-        # but keep the task alive until the predecessor finishes so the next
-        # run still observes the transitive session-save ordering barrier.
-        _wake_subscribers()
-        if prev_task is not None and not prev_task.done():
-            try:
-                await asyncio.shield(prev_task)
-            except (asyncio.CancelledError, Exception):
-                pass
     except Exception as e:
         logger.error("[agent-run] %s failed: %s", session_id, e, exc_info=True)
         run.status = "error"
@@ -165,11 +127,15 @@ async def _drain(session_id: str, run: _Run, agen: AsyncGenerator[str, None],
         _publish(run, "data: [DONE]\n\n")
     finally:
         # Wake every subscriber with the end sentinel so their SSE closes.
-        _wake_subscribers()
+        for q in list(run.subscribers):
+            try:
+                q.put_nowait((None, None))
+            except Exception:
+                pass
         # Run is terminal — arm the grace timer so it (and its buffer) is
         # eventually freed even if nobody ever reconnects. subscribe() cancels
         # this on connect and re-arms on disconnect.
-        _schedule_evict(session_id, run)
+        _schedule_evict(session_id)
 
 
 def start(session_id: str, agen: AsyncGenerator[str, None]) -> _Run:
@@ -179,37 +145,20 @@ def start(session_id: str, agen: AsyncGenerator[str, None]) -> _Run:
     prev_task: Optional[asyncio.Task] = None
     if prev:
         if prev.task and not prev.task.done():
-            # A task cancelled before its first instruction never enters
-            # _drain(), so its except/finally blocks cannot update status or
-            # wake a response already bound to this exact run. Terminalize it
-            # synchronously before cancelling; _drain's cleanup is idempotent
-            # when the task had already started.
-            if prev.status == "running":
-                prev.status = "stopped"
-                _wake_run_subscribers(prev)
             prev.task.cancel()
             prev_task = prev.task   # new run awaits this before it starts writing
         if prev.evict_task and not prev.evict_task.done():
             prev.evict_task.cancel()
     run = _Run()
     _RUNS[session_id] = run
-    run.task = asyncio.create_task(_drain(session_id, run, agen, prev_task))
+    run.task = asyncio.create_task(_drain(session_id, agen, prev_task))
     return run
 
 
-async def subscribe(
+async def subscribe(session_id: str) -> AsyncGenerator[str, None]:
-    session_id: str,
-    expected_run: Optional[_Run] = None,
-) -> AsyncGenerator[str, None]:
     """Replay the run's buffer from the start, then stream live until it ends.
-    Safe to call repeatedly (reconnect) and from multiple clients at once.
+    Safe to call repeatedly (reconnect) and from multiple clients at once."""
-
+    run = _RUNS.get(session_id)
-    ``expected_run`` binds a lazy StreamingResponse body to the same run whose
-    identity was put in its response headers. Without that binding, a rapid
-    replacement between response construction and body iteration could replay
-    the replacement run under the prior run's identity.
-    """
-    run = expected_run or _RUNS.get(session_id)
     if run is None:
         return
     q: asyncio.Queue = asyncio.Queue()
@@ -252,19 +201,12 @@ async def subscribe(
         # Last subscriber gone on a finished run — (re)arm eviction so the
         # buffer doesn't linger indefinitely.
         if not run.subscribers and run.status != "running":
-            _schedule_evict(session_id, run)
+            _schedule_evict(session_id)
 
 
-def stop(session_id: str, expected_run_id: Optional[str] = None) -> bool:
+def stop(session_id: str) -> bool:
-    """Cancel the matching in-flight run (which saves its partial output).
+    """Cancel an in-flight run (the wrapped generator saves its partial)."""
-
-    A stale browser may issue Stop after another tab has replaced the session's
-    run. Once the caller knows its opaque run identity, fail closed rather than
-    cancelling that newer run.
-    """
     run = _RUNS.get(session_id)
-    if not expected_run_id or run is None or run.run_id != expected_run_id:
-        return False
     if run and run.task and not run.task.done():
         run.task.cancel()
         return True

src/agent_tools/admin_tools.py

@@ -510,12 +510,7 @@ async def do_manage_settings(content: str, owner: Optional[str] = None) -> Dict:
         # set/get/list/delete operate on the REAL app settings (the same store
         # the Settings panel writes), so changing a model / voice / search
         # engine / reminder channel from chat actually takes effect.
-        from src.settings import (
+        from src.settings import load_settings, save_settings, DEFAULT_SETTINGS
-            DEFAULT_SETTINGS,
-            RETIRED_SETTING_KEYS,
-            load_settings,
-            save_settings,
-        )
 
         # Secrets/credentials the agent must NOT write: kept read-only (masked)
         # so API keys never flow through chat. User sets these in the panel.
@@ -567,9 +562,6 @@ async def do_manage_settings(content: str, owner: Optional[str] = None) -> Dict:
                 return k2
             return _ALIASES_SET.get(k2, (k or "").strip())
 
-        def _is_managed_key(key):
-            return key in DEFAULT_SETTINGS and key not in RETIRED_SETTING_KEYS
-
         _ENUMS = {
             "image_quality": ["low", "medium", "high"],
             "reminder_channel": ["browser", "email", "ntfy", "webhook"],
@@ -632,18 +624,14 @@ async def do_manage_settings(content: str, owner: Optional[str] = None) -> Dict:
 
         if action == "list":
             s = load_settings()
-            shown = {
+            shown = {k: _mask(k, v) for k, v in s.items() if k in DEFAULT_SETTINGS and not isinstance(v, dict)}
-                k: _mask(k, v)
-                for k, v in s.items()
-                if _is_managed_key(k) and not isinstance(v, dict)
-            }
             return {"response": f"{len(shown)} settings (use get/set with a key)", "settings": shown, "exit_code": 0}
 
         elif action == "get":
             key = _resolve(args.get("key", ""))
             if not key:
                 return {"error": "key is required", "exit_code": 1}
-            if not _is_managed_key(key):
+            if key not in DEFAULT_SETTINGS:
                 return {"error": f"Unknown setting '{args.get('key')}'. Use action='list' to see them.", "exit_code": 1}
             val = load_settings().get(key, DEFAULT_SETTINGS.get(key))
             return {"response": f"{key} = {_mask(key, val)}", "value": _mask(key, val), "exit_code": 0}
@@ -654,11 +642,11 @@ async def do_manage_settings(content: str, owner: Optional[str] = None) -> Dict:
             if not raw:
                 return {"error": "key is required", "exit_code": 1}
             key = _resolve(raw)
-            if not _is_managed_key(key):
+            if key not in DEFAULT_SETTINGS:
                 return {"error": f"Unknown setting '{raw}'. Use action='list' to see available settings.", "exit_code": 1}
             if _is_secret(key):
                 return {"response": f"'{key}' is a credential/secret. For security I can't set it from chat. Open Settings and set it there.", "exit_code": 0}
-            # Structured settings (dicts/lists like keybinds or vision fallbacks)
+            # Structured settings (dicts/lists like keybinds, default_model_fallbacks)
             # have no safe scalar coercion; _coerce would pass a bare string
             # straight through and clobber the structure. Refuse them here; they're
             # edited in their dedicated panels. (reset/delete still restore the
@@ -687,7 +675,7 @@ async def do_manage_settings(content: str, owner: Optional[str] = None) -> Dict:
 
         elif action == "delete" or action == "reset":
             key = _resolve(args.get("key", ""))
-            if not _is_managed_key(key):
+            if key not in DEFAULT_SETTINGS:
                 return {"error": f"Unknown setting '{args.get('key')}'.", "exit_code": 1}
             if _is_secret(key):
                 return {"response": f"'{key}' is a credential. Reset it in the panel.", "exit_code": 0}

src/agent_tools/document_tools.py

@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ from typing import Any, Dict, List, Optional
 import logging
 import re
 from src.constants import MAX_READ_CHARS
-from src.tool_approvals import document_content_digest
 from src.tool_utils import _parse_tool_args, get_upload_handler
 from src.upload_handler import reserve_upload_references
 
@@ -81,40 +80,6 @@ def _most_recent_owned_document(db, Document, owner: Optional[str], active_only:
     return q.order_by(Document.updated_at.desc()).first()
 
 
-def _approved_document_version_error(doc: Any, ctx: dict) -> Optional[Dict]:
-    """Reject a sealed document action when its target changed meanwhile."""
-    expected_version = ctx.get("expected_document_version")
-    expected_digest = (
-        str(ctx.get("expected_document_digest") or "").strip().lower()
-    )
-    if expected_version is None and not expected_digest:
-        return None
-    try:
-        version_unchanged = (
-            expected_version is None
-            or int(getattr(doc, "version_count", -1)) == int(expected_version)
-        )
-    except (TypeError, ValueError):
-        version_unchanged = False
-    content_unchanged = True
-    if expected_digest:
-        content_unchanged = (
-            doc is not None
-            and document_content_digest(getattr(doc, "current_content", ""))
-            == expected_digest
-        )
-    if version_unchanged and content_unchanged:
-        return None
-    return {
-        "error": (
-            "The target document changed after this action was proposed. "
-            "Review the latest version and request the edit again."
-        ),
-        "exit_code": 1,
-        "document_changed": True,
-    }
-
-
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # Document tools — create/update/edit/suggest living documents
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -489,12 +454,6 @@ class UpdateDocumentTool:
             doc = None
             if target_id:
                 doc = _get_owned_document(db, Document, target_id, owner)
-            if (
-                not doc
-                and target_id
-                and ctx.get("expected_document_version") is not None
-            ):
-                return _approved_document_version_error(None, ctx)
             if not doc:
                 doc = _most_recent_owned_document(db, Document, owner)
                 if doc:
@@ -504,10 +463,6 @@ class UpdateDocumentTool:
             if not doc:
                 return {"error": "No documents exist to update"}
 
-            version_error = _approved_document_version_error(doc, ctx)
-            if version_error:
-                return version_error
-
             is_email_doc = doc.language == "email" or _looks_like_email_document(doc.current_content or "", doc.title or "")
             new_content = _coerce_email_document_content(doc.current_content or "", content) if is_email_doc else content.strip()
             if is_email_doc:
@@ -575,12 +530,6 @@ class EditDocumentTool:
             doc = None
             if target_id:
                 doc = _get_owned_document(db, Document, target_id, owner)
-            if (
-                not doc
-                and target_id
-                and ctx.get("expected_document_version") is not None
-            ):
-                return _approved_document_version_error(None, ctx)
             if not doc:
                 # Fallback: most recently updated document. Avoids "no active doc" errors
                 # after server restart or when the agent loses track of which doc to edit.
@@ -592,10 +541,6 @@ class EditDocumentTool:
             if not doc:
                 return {"error": "No documents exist to edit"}
 
-            version_error = _approved_document_version_error(doc, ctx)
-            if version_error:
-                return version_error
-
             is_email_doc = doc.language == "email" or _looks_like_email_document(doc.current_content or "", doc.title or "")
             blank_find_edits = [e for e in edits if not (e.get("find") or "").strip()]
             if blank_find_edits:
@@ -732,10 +677,6 @@ class SuggestDocumentTool:
             if not doc:
                 return {"error": f"Document {target_id} not found"}
 
-            version_error = _approved_document_version_error(doc, ctx)
-            if version_error:
-                return version_error
-
             # Validate that FIND text exists in document
             valid = []
             for s in suggestions:

src/agent_tools/model_interaction_tools.py

@@ -64,10 +64,7 @@ async def chat_with_model(content: str, session_id: Optional[str] = None, owner:
         return {"model": model, "response": response}
     except Exception as e:
         logger.error(f"chat_with_model failed: {e}")
-        return {
+        return {"error": f"Failed to get response from {model_spec}: {e}"}
-            "error": f"Failed to get response from {model_spec}: {e}",
-            "untrusted_content": True,
-        }
 
 
 async def ask_teacher(content: str, session_id: Optional[str] = None, owner: Optional[str] = None) -> Dict:
@@ -113,10 +110,7 @@ async def ask_teacher(content: str, session_id: Optional[str] = None, owner: Opt
         return {"model": model, "response": response, "teacher": True}
     except Exception as e:
         logger.error(f"ask_teacher failed: {e}")
-        return {
+        return {"error": f"Teacher call failed ({model_spec}): {e}"}
-            "error": f"Teacher call failed ({model_spec}): {e}",
-            "untrusted_content": True,
-        }
 
 
 async def list_models(content: str, session_id: Optional[str] = None, owner: Optional[str] = None) -> Dict:

src/agent_tools/session_tools.py

@@ -240,10 +240,7 @@ async def send_to_session(content: str, session_id: Optional[str] = None, owner:
         }
     except Exception as e:
         logger.error(f"send_to_session failed: {e}")
-        return {
+        return {"error": f"Failed to send to session: {e}"}
-            "error": f"Failed to send to session: {e}",
-            "untrusted_content": True,
-        }
 
 async def manage_session(content: str, session_id: Optional[str] = None, owner: Optional[str] = None) -> Dict:
     """Manage sessions: rename, archive, delete, important, truncate, fork.

src/agent_tools/web_tools.py

@@ -66,7 +66,6 @@ class WebSearchTool:
             return {
                 "error": f"web_search failed: {type(e).__name__}: {str(e) or 'no details'}",
                 "exit_code": 1,
-                "untrusted_content": True,
             }
         if progress_cb:
             await progress_cb({
@@ -137,11 +136,7 @@ class WebFetchTool:
 
         if not text:
             if err:
-                return {
+                return {"error": f"web_fetch: {url}: {err}", "exit_code": 1}
-                    "error": f"web_fetch: {url}: {err}",
-                    "exit_code": 1,
-                    "untrusted_content": True,
-                }
             return {"error": f"web_fetch: {url}: no readable text content (not HTML, or the page needs JS/login)", "exit_code": 1}
 
         # Tell the model when the download budget cut the body short and how

src/ai_interaction.py

@@ -324,10 +324,7 @@ async def do_pipeline(content: str, session_id: Optional[str] = None, owner: Opt
         }
     except Exception as e:
         logger.error(f"pipeline failed at step {len(step_outputs) + 1}: {e}")
-        return {
+        return {"error": f"Pipeline failed at step {len(step_outputs) + 1}: {e}"}
-            "error": f"Pipeline failed at step {len(step_outputs) + 1}: {e}",
-            "untrusted_content": True,
-        }
 
 
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -1092,10 +1089,7 @@ async def do_generate_image(content: str, session_id: Optional[str] = None, owne
                     error_text = err_json.get("error", {}).get("message", error_text) if isinstance(err_json.get("error"), dict) else str(err_json.get("error", error_text))
                 except Exception:
                     pass
-                return {
+                return {"error": f"Image generation failed ({resp.status_code}): {error_text}"}
-                    "error": f"Image generation failed ({resp.status_code}): {error_text}",
-                    "untrusted_content": True,
-                }
 
             data = resp.json()
             images = data.get("data", [])
@@ -1179,10 +1173,7 @@ async def do_generate_image(content: str, session_id: Optional[str] = None, owne
     except httpx.TimeoutException:
         return {"error": "Image generation timed out (300s). The model may be overloaded — try again or use quality=low."}
     except Exception as e:
-        return {
+        return {"error": f"Image generation error: {str(e)}"}
-            "error": f"Image generation error: {str(e)}",
-            "untrusted_content": True,
-        }
 
 
 async def do_edit_image(
@@ -1319,10 +1310,7 @@ async def do_edit_image(
                     error_text = err_json.get("detail") or err_json.get("error") or error_text
                 except Exception:
                     pass
-                return {
+                return {"error": f"Image edit fallback failed ({fallback_resp.status_code}): {error_text}"}
-                    "error": f"Image edit fallback failed ({fallback_resp.status_code}): {error_text}",
-                    "untrusted_content": True,
-                }
             fallback_data = fallback_resp.json()
             image_b64 = fallback_data.get("image")
             if not image_b64:
@@ -1406,10 +1394,7 @@ async def do_edit_image(
                                 "model for attached-image prompts."
                             )
                         }
-                return {
+                return {"error": f"Image edit failed ({resp.status_code}): {error_text}"}
-                    "error": f"Image edit failed ({resp.status_code}): {error_text}",
-                    "untrusted_content": True,
-                }
 
             data = resp.json()
             images = data.get("data", [])
@@ -1449,10 +1434,7 @@ async def do_edit_image(
     except httpx.TimeoutException:
         return {"error": "Image edit timed out. The model may still be loading or overloaded."}
     except Exception as e:
-        return {
+        return {"error": f"Image edit error: {str(e)}"}
-            "error": f"Image edit error: {str(e)}",
-            "untrusted_content": True,
-        }
 
 
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

src/auth_helpers.py

@@ -4,8 +4,6 @@ import os
 from typing import Optional
 from fastapi import Request, HTTPException
 
-from src.owner_identity import auth_disabled, effective_storage_owner
-
 
 def get_current_user(request: Request) -> Optional[str]:
     """Get current username from request state (set by auth middleware)."""
@@ -58,17 +56,7 @@ def _auth_disabled() -> bool:
     """True when the operator has explicitly turned off auth via .env.
     Mirrors the AUTH_ENABLED parse in app.py / core/middleware.py so the
     three call sites agree on what "off" means."""
-    return auth_disabled()
+    return os.getenv("AUTH_ENABLED", "true").lower() == "false"
-
-
-def storage_owner_for_request(request: Request) -> Optional[str]:
-    """Resolve the storage owner for code paths that need an owner bucket.
-
-    This does not replace route authentication. It only gives auth-disabled
-    no-login mode a stable storage identity instead of writing new data as
-    legacy NULL/ownerless state.
-    """
-    return effective_storage_owner(effective_user(request))
 
 
 def require_user(request: Request) -> str:

src/bg_monitor.py

@@ -15,7 +15,6 @@ import json
 import logging
 
 from src import bg_jobs
-from src.prompt_security import untrusted_context_message
 
 logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
 
@@ -26,16 +25,6 @@ POLL_INTERVAL_S = 5
 _FOLLOWUP_MAX_ROUNDS = 12
 
 
-def _background_result_message(rec):
-    inject = (
-        f"[Background job {rec['id']} finished]\n\n"
-        f"{bg_jobs.result_text(rec)}\n\n"
-        "Continue the task using this output. Don't repeat work that's already done. "
-        "If the task is now complete, give the user the final result."
-    )
-    return untrusted_context_message("background job output", inject)
-
-
 async def _drain_agent(sess, messages):
     """Run the agent loop headless against a session. Returns
     (final_prose, tool_events) — tool_events in the same shape the live chat
@@ -73,19 +62,13 @@ async def _drain_agent(sess, messages):
             round_num = d.get("round", round_num)
         elif d.get("type") == "tool_output":
             # Mirror the live chat's tool_event shape (chat_routes / chatRenderer).
-            tool_event = {
+            tool_events.append({
                 "round": round_num,
                 "tool": d.get("tool"),
                 "command": d.get("command"),
                 "output": d.get("output"),
                 "exit_code": d.get("exit_code"),
-            }
+            })
-            if isinstance(d.get("ask_user"), dict):
-                # Preserve exact-approval cards from a tainted background-job
-                # continuation so the user can authorize the sealed action on
-                # the next foreground turn instead of losing it headlessly.
-                tool_event["ask_user"] = d["ask_user"]
-            tool_events.append(tool_event)
     return full, tool_events
 
 
@@ -118,8 +101,14 @@ async def _run_followup(rec: dict) -> bool:
     except Exception:
         pass
 
+    inject = (
+        f"[Background job {rec['id']} finished]\n\n"
+        f"{bg_jobs.result_text(rec)}\n\n"
+        "Continue the task using this output. Don't repeat work that's already done. "
+        "If the task is now complete, give the user the final result."
+    )
     context = sess.get_context_messages()
-    context.append(_background_result_message(rec))
+    context.append({"role": "user", "content": inject})
 
     full, tool_events = await _drain_agent(sess, context)
 

src/builtin_actions.py

@@ -810,27 +810,13 @@ async def action_tidy_research(owner: str, **kwargs) -> Tuple[str, bool]:
 
     Research history lives entirely in data/deep_research/<id>.json and is NOT
     backed by chat-session rows — so a file must never be deleted just because
-    no chat session matches its id. Only prune files that fail to load.
+    no chat session matches its id. Only prune files that fail to load."""
-
-    A broken file has no readable owner stamp, so it cannot be matched against
-    `owner`. Clearing one is privileged: admins and the single-user operator
-    (AUTH_ENABLED=false) may, a regular user may not, and neither may anyone
-    during the pre-setup window before an admin exists.
-    """
     try:
         from pathlib import Path
         import json as _json
-        from src.tool_security import owner_is_admin_or_single_user
         research_dir = Path(DEEP_RESEARCH_DIR)
         if not research_dir.exists():
             raise TaskNoop("no research directory")
-        if not owner_is_admin_or_single_user(owner):
-            # Return before the glob rather than filtering inside the loop: the
-            # loop reports "none broken" off an empty `removed`, which reaches
-            # Activity as a false report to a user whose files it skipped, and a
-            # regular user need not read every owner's file to learn it may
-            # delete none of them.
-            raise TaskNoop("not permitted to remove unattributable research files")
         files = list(research_dir.glob("*.json"))
         removed = []
         for p in files:

src/chat_processor.py

@@ -381,10 +381,7 @@ class ChatProcessor:
                         )
                         if len(rag_content) > 10000:
                             rag_content = rag_content[:10000] + "\n[Truncated]"
-                        preface.append(untrusted_context_message(
+                        preface.append(untrusted_context_message("retrieved documents", rag_content))
-                            "retrieved documents",
-                            rag_content,
-                        ))
             except Exception as e:
                 logger.warning(f"RAG retrieval failed: {e}")
 
@@ -462,38 +459,12 @@ class ChatProcessor:
         skip_url_fetch = len(message) > 2000 or len(non_yt_urls) > 3
         if not skip_url_fetch:
             for url in non_yt_urls:
-                try:
+                result = fetch_webpage_content(url)
-                    result = fetch_webpage_content(url)
-                except Exception:
-                    # The URL and exception can both contain signed-query
-                    # credentials or response-controlled text. Keep the log
-                    # diagnostic stable as well as the model-facing context.
-                    logger.warning("Automatic URL fetch failed while building context")
-                    result = {"success": False, "error": ""}
                 if result.get('success'):
                     content = result.get('content', '')[:10000]
                     preface.append(untrusted_context_message(
                         f"web page: {url}",
                         f"Content from {url}:\n\n{content}",
-                        provenance_origin="external",
-                    ))
-                else:
-                    # A failed automatic URL fetch is context too. Never pass
-                    # exception text or response-controlled diagnostics back to
-                    # the model: reduce the result to a small transport-owned
-                    # status and explicitly state that the page was not read.
-                    error = str(result.get("error") or "")
-                    status = "the page was unavailable"
-                    status_match = re.match(r"^HTTP\s+(\d{3})\b", error)
-                    if status_match:
-                        status = f"the server returned HTTP {status_match.group(1)}"
-                    elif error.startswith("TooLarge:"):
-                        status = "the response exceeded the fetch size limit"
-                    elif error.startswith("Rate limit"):
-                        status = "the request was rate limited"
-                    preface.append(untrusted_context_message(
-                        "web page fetch failure",
-                        f"A linked page was not read: {status}.",
                     ))
 
         # Skills index — progressive disclosure. Only injected when the
@@ -517,9 +488,6 @@ class ChatProcessor:
                     for s in sorted(by_cat[cat], key=lambda x: x["name"]):
                         desc = s.get("description") or ""
                         lines.append(f"    - {s['name']}: {desc}" if desc else f"    - {s['name']}")
-                preface.append(untrusted_context_message(
+                preface.append(untrusted_context_message("available skills index", "\n".join(lines)))
-                    "available skills index",
-                    "\n".join(lines),
-                ))
 
         return preface, rag_sources, web_sources

src/constants.py

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ import os
 
 from src.runtime_paths import get_app_root, get_default_data_dir
 
-APP_VERSION = "1.0.3"
+APP_VERSION = "1.0.2"
 
 # Base paths
 BASE_DIR = os.path.join(get_app_root(), "")

src/context_compactor.py

@@ -282,9 +282,7 @@ def trim_for_context(messages: List[Dict], context_length: int, reserve_tokens:
     if essential_system:
         sys_text = essential_system[0].get("content", "")
         if len(sys_text) > 2000:
-            truncated_system = dict(essential_system[0])
+            essential_system[0] = {"role": "system", "content": sys_text[:2000] + "\n[System prompt truncated for context limits]"}
-            truncated_system["content"] = sys_text[:2000] + "\n[System prompt truncated for context limits]"
-            essential_system[0] = truncated_system
             trimmed = essential_system + convo_msgs
             if estimate_tokens(trimmed) <= budget:
                 return _sanitize_tool_messages(essential_system + protected_msgs + convo_msgs)
@@ -327,9 +325,6 @@ async def maybe_compact(
     messages: List[Dict],
     headers: Optional[Dict] = None,
     owner: Optional[str] = None,
-    *,
-    persist: bool = True,
-    compaction_state: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = None,
 ) -> tuple:
     """Check context usage and compact if above threshold.
 
@@ -421,17 +416,7 @@ async def maybe_compact(
     # offset — session.history INCLUDES the system messages, but
     # split_point is indexed against convo_msgs which does NOT. Without
     # this, the slice drops the leading system message(s).
-    if compaction_state is not None:
+    _update_session_history(session, split_point, summary, system_msg_count=len(system_msgs))
-        compaction_state.update({
-            "split_point": split_point,
-            "summary": summary,
-            "system_msg_count": len(system_msgs),
-            "applied": False,
-        })
-    if persist:
-        _update_session_history(session, split_point, summary, system_msg_count=len(system_msgs))
-        if compaction_state is not None:
-            compaction_state["applied"] = True
 
     new_used = estimate_tokens(compacted)
     logger.info(
@@ -442,51 +427,6 @@ async def maybe_compact(
     return compacted, context_length, True
 
 
-def apply_compaction_state(session, compaction_state: Optional[Dict[str, Any]]) -> bool:
-    """Persist a route-specific compaction after that route commits output.
-
-    Candidate prompts may be compacted speculatively while an explicit
-    foreground fallback chain is being tried.  Persisting at construction time
-    would let an unavailable route rewrite history before another route answers,
-    so callers hold this small plan and apply only the winning route's plan.
-    """
-
-    state = compaction_state if isinstance(compaction_state, dict) else None
-    if not state or state.get("applied"):
-        return False
-    summary = state.get("summary")
-    split_point = state.get("split_point")
-    system_msg_count = state.get("system_msg_count", 0)
-    if not isinstance(summary, str) or not isinstance(split_point, int):
-        return False
-    _update_session_history(
-        session,
-        split_point,
-        summary,
-        system_msg_count=system_msg_count if isinstance(system_msg_count, int) else 0,
-    )
-    state["applied"] = True
-    return True
-
-
-def apply_compaction_state_for_session(
-    session_id: Optional[str],
-    compaction_state: Optional[Dict[str, Any]],
-) -> bool:
-    """Resolve an in-memory session and apply a deferred compaction plan."""
-
-    if not session_id:
-        return False
-    try:
-        from core.models import get_session_manager_instance
-
-        manager = get_session_manager_instance()
-        session = manager.get_session(session_id) if manager else None
-    except Exception:
-        session = None
-    return apply_compaction_state(session, compaction_state) if session else False
-
-
 def _update_session_history(session, split_point: int, summary: str,
                             system_msg_count: int = 0):
     """Update the in-memory session history after compaction.

src/endpoint_resolver.py

@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ Consolidates the 4+ copies of normalize_base / resolve_endpoint logic into one p
 """
 
 import json
-import ipaddress
 import logging
 import socket
 import subprocess
@@ -28,43 +27,6 @@ _NON_CHAT_MODEL = (
 )
 
 
-def endpoint_cost_tracked(url: str, endpoint_kind: Optional[str] = None) -> bool:
-    """Return whether token cost should be tracked for a concrete route.
-
-    This is intentionally a non-secret route classification.  It mirrors the
-    frontend's local/subscription exclusions without exposing endpoint URLs to
-    message metadata.
-    """
-
-    try:
-        parsed = urlparse(url or "")
-        host = (parsed.hostname or "").lower().rstrip(".")
-        path = (parsed.path or "").rstrip("/")
-    except Exception:
-        return False
-    if not host:
-        return False
-    if host == "chatgpt.com" and (
-        path == "/backend-api/codex" or path.startswith("/backend-api/codex/")
-    ):
-        return False
-    kind = str(endpoint_kind or "auto").strip().lower()
-    if kind == "local":
-        return False
-    if kind in {"api", "proxy"}:
-        return True
-    if host in {"localhost", "0.0.0.0", "host.docker.internal"} or host.endswith(".local"):
-        return False
-    try:
-        ip = ipaddress.ip_address(host)
-        return ip.is_global
-    except ValueError:
-        pass
-    if "." not in host:
-        return False
-    return True
-
-
 def _first_chat_model(models) -> Optional[str]:
     """First model that isn't an embedding/tts/etc.; falls back to models[0]."""
     for m in (models or []):
@@ -434,14 +396,10 @@ def resolve_endpoint(
         db.close()
 
 
-def _resolve_endpoint_by_id_with_descriptor(
+def resolve_endpoint_by_id(
-    ep_id: str,
+    ep_id: str, model: Optional[str] = None, owner: Optional[str] = None
-    model: Optional[str] = None,
+) -> Optional[Tuple[str, str, Dict]]:
-    owner: Optional[str] = None,
+    """Resolve a specific endpoint id (+ optional model) to (chat_url, model, headers).
-    *,
-    require_exact_model: bool = False,
-) -> Optional[Tuple[Tuple[str, str, Dict], dict]]:
-    """Resolve a concrete endpoint/model plus its non-secret descriptor.
 
     Returns None if the endpoint doesn't exist or is disabled. Used to turn
     a configured fallback entry ({endpoint_id, model}) into a dispatch target.
@@ -468,34 +426,15 @@ def _resolve_endpoint_by_id_with_descriptor(
         chat_url = build_chat_url(base)
         headers = build_headers(api_key, base)
         m = (model or "").strip()
-        enabled_models = _endpoint_enabled_models(ep)
+        # Drop a model the user disabled on the endpoint, then pick the first
-        if require_exact_model:
+        # enabled chat model rather than a hidden one.
-            # Explicit foreground fallback entries are concrete choices. A
+        if m and m in _endpoint_hidden_models(ep):
-            # hidden or known-missing model must disable the entry instead of
+            m = ""
-            # silently substituting another model from the endpoint.
+        if not m:
-            if not m or m in _endpoint_hidden_models(ep):
+            m = _first_chat_model(_endpoint_enabled_models(ep)) or ""
-                return None
-            if enabled_models and m not in enabled_models:
-                return None
-        else:
-            # Legacy Utility/Vision chains retain their model-repair behavior.
-            if m and m in _endpoint_hidden_models(ep):
-                m = ""
-            if not m:
-                m = _first_chat_model(enabled_models) or ""
         if not m:
             return None
-        return (
+        return chat_url, m, headers
-            (chat_url, m, headers),
-            {
-                "endpoint_id": ep.id,
-                "endpoint_label": getattr(ep, "name", None) or ep.id,
-                "endpoint_cost_tracked": endpoint_cost_tracked(
-                    chat_url,
-                    getattr(ep, "endpoint_kind", None),
-                ),
-            },
-        )
     except Exception as e:
         logger.debug(f"Could not resolve endpoint {ep_id}: {e}")
         return None
@@ -503,101 +442,11 @@ def _resolve_endpoint_by_id_with_descriptor(
         db.close()
 
 
-def resolve_endpoint_by_id(
+def resolve_chat_fallback_candidates(owner: Optional[str] = None) -> list:
-    ep_id: str,
+    """Compatibility shim for the retired default-chat fallback chain."""
-    model: Optional[str] = None,
-    owner: Optional[str] = None,
-    *,
-    require_exact_model: bool = False,
-) -> Optional[Tuple[str, str, Dict]]:
-    """Resolve a specific endpoint id (+ optional model) to its runtime route."""
 
-    resolved = _resolve_endpoint_by_id_with_descriptor(
+    del owner
-        ep_id,
+    return []
-        model,
-        owner=owner,
-        require_exact_model=require_exact_model,
-    )
-    return resolved[0] if resolved else None
-
-
-def resolve_route_descriptor(
-    endpoint_url: str,
-    model: str,
-    headers: Optional[Dict] = None,
-    owner: Optional[str] = None,
-) -> dict:
-    """Return the visible endpoint identity for an already-resolved route.
-
-    Headers are compared only inside the process so two endpoints using the
-    same provider URL/model but different credentials remain distinguishable.
-    No credential material is returned or logged.
-    """
-
-    if not endpoint_url or not model:
-        return {
-            "endpoint_id": None,
-            "endpoint_label": "Selected route",
-            "endpoint_cost_tracked": endpoint_cost_tracked(endpoint_url),
-        }
-    db = SessionLocal()
-    try:
-        q = db.query(ModelEndpoint).filter(ModelEndpoint.is_enabled == True)
-        if owner:
-            from src.auth_helpers import owner_filter
-            q = owner_filter(q, ModelEndpoint, owner)
-        expected = (endpoint_url.rstrip("/"), model, headers or {})
-        for ep in q.all():
-            resolved = _resolve_endpoint_by_id_with_descriptor(
-                ep.id,
-                model,
-                owner=owner,
-                require_exact_model=True,
-            )
-            if not resolved:
-                continue
-            candidate, descriptor = resolved
-            actual = (candidate[0].rstrip("/"), candidate[1], candidate[2] or {})
-            if actual == expected:
-                return descriptor
-    except Exception as e:
-        logger.debug("Could not identify selected endpoint route: %s", e)
-    finally:
-        db.close()
-    return {
-        "endpoint_id": None,
-        "endpoint_label": "Selected route",
-        "endpoint_cost_tracked": endpoint_cost_tracked(endpoint_url),
-    }
-
-
-def resolve_route_descriptor_by_id(
-    endpoint_id: str,
-    endpoint_url: str,
-    model: str,
-    headers: Optional[Dict] = None,
-    owner: Optional[str] = None,
-) -> Optional[dict]:
-    """Resolve a selected route's identity without relying on row order.
-
-    The explicit endpoint id is still verified against the resolved runtime
-    route. This prevents stale or mismatched request metadata from being used
-    for attribution while disambiguating endpoints whose routes are otherwise
-    identical.
-    """
-
-    resolved = _resolve_endpoint_by_id_with_descriptor(
-        endpoint_id,
-        model,
-        owner=owner,
-        require_exact_model=True,
-    )
-    if not resolved:
-        return None
-    candidate, descriptor = resolved
-    expected = ((endpoint_url or "").rstrip("/"), model, headers or {})
-    actual = (candidate[0].rstrip("/"), candidate[1], candidate[2] or {})
-    return descriptor if actual == expected else None
 
 
 def resolve_utility_fallback_candidates(owner: Optional[str] = None) -> list:
@@ -611,62 +460,17 @@ def resolve_vision_fallback_candidates(owner: Optional[str] = None) -> list:
 
 
 def _resolve_fallback_candidates(setting_key: str, owner: Optional[str] = None) -> list:
+    out = []
     try:
         from src.settings import get_user_setting, load_settings
         settings = load_settings()
         chain = get_user_setting(setting_key, owner or "", settings.get(setting_key) or []) or []
     except Exception:
-        return []
+        return out
-    return resolve_fallback_entries(chain, owner=owner)
+    for entry in chain:
-
-
-def resolve_fallback_entries(
-    entries,
-    owner: Optional[str] = None,
-    *,
-    require_exact_model: bool = False,
-) -> list:
-    """Resolve ordered endpoint/model entries within the caller's owner scope."""
-
-    out = []
-    for entry in entries or []:
         if not isinstance(entry, dict):
             continue
-        resolved = resolve_endpoint_by_id(
+        resolved = resolve_endpoint_by_id(entry.get("endpoint_id", ""), entry.get("model", ""), owner=owner)
-            entry.get("endpoint_id", ""),
+        if resolved:
-            entry.get("model", ""),
-            owner=owner,
-            require_exact_model=require_exact_model,
-        )
-        if resolved and resolved not in out:
             out.append(resolved)
     return out
-
-
-def resolve_fallback_entries_with_descriptors(
-    entries,
-    owner: Optional[str] = None,
-    *,
-    require_exact_model: bool = False,
-) -> list:
-    """Resolve ordered entries while retaining safe endpoint provenance."""
-
-    out = []
-    seen = []
-    for entry in entries or []:
-        if not isinstance(entry, dict):
-            continue
-        resolved = _resolve_endpoint_by_id_with_descriptor(
-            entry.get("endpoint_id", ""),
-            entry.get("model", ""),
-            owner=owner,
-            require_exact_model=require_exact_model,
-        )
-        if not resolved:
-            continue
-        candidate, descriptor = resolved
-        if any(candidate == prior for prior in seen):
-            continue
-        seen.append(candidate)
-        out.append((candidate, descriptor))
-    return out

src/foreground_model_routing.py

@@ -1,155 +1,22 @@
-"""Explicit foreground Chat and Agent model-routing policy."""
+"""Foreground Chat and Agent model-routing policy.
 
-from dataclasses import dataclass
+The selected session model is strict by default. Historical
-from typing import Any, Collection, Dict, FrozenSet, Optional, Tuple
+``default_model_fallbacks`` values remain stored for compatibility, but this
+policy intentionally does not read or migrate them.
+"""
 
-from src.endpoint_resolver import (
+from typing import Any, Dict, Optional
-    endpoint_cost_tracked,
-    resolve_fallback_entries,
-    resolve_fallback_entries_with_descriptors,
-    resolve_route_descriptor,
-    resolve_route_descriptor_by_id,
-)
-
-_DEFAULT_FALLBACK_ENTRY_RESOLVER = resolve_fallback_entries
-
-
-FOREGROUND_FALLBACK_ENABLED_KEY = "foreground_fallback_enabled"
-FOREGROUND_FALLBACK_LIST_KEY = "foreground_model_fallbacks"
-FOREGROUND_AVAILABILITY_STATUSES: FrozenSet[int] = frozenset({
-    408, 425, 429, 500, 502, 503, 504, 507, 508, 529,
-})
-MAX_FOREGROUND_FALLBACKS = 10
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class ForegroundModelPolicy:
-    """Resolved per-user foreground fallback policy."""
-
-    enabled: bool = False
-    fallback_candidates: Tuple[tuple, ...] = ()
-    fallback_descriptors: Tuple[dict, ...] = ()
-    eligible_statuses: FrozenSet[int] = FOREGROUND_AVAILABILITY_STATUSES
-    fallback_on_empty: bool = False
-
-
-def _load_policy_preferences(owner: Optional[str]) -> dict:
-    """Load only preferences that explicitly belong to ``owner``.
-
-    The generic preferences loader intentionally treats a legacy flat store as
-    the single-user preferences object.  That compatibility must not cross an
-    authentication transition: once a named owner is present, foreground
-    fallback consent exists only in an actual ``_users[owner]`` dictionary.
-    """
-
-    from routes import prefs_routes
-
-    if owner is None:
-        prefs = prefs_routes._load_for_user(None)
-        return dict(prefs) if isinstance(prefs, dict) else {}
-
-    raw = prefs_routes._load()
-    users = raw.get("_users") if isinstance(raw, dict) else None
-    if not isinstance(users, dict):
-        return {}
-    prefs = users.get(owner)
-    return dict(prefs) if isinstance(prefs, dict) else {}
-
-
-def resolve_foreground_model_policy(
-    owner: Optional[str] = None,
-    allowed_models: Optional[Collection[str]] = None,
-) -> ForegroundModelPolicy:
-    """Resolve an explicit owner-scoped policy, failing closed to strict mode.
-
-    The policy is stored in user preferences even when authentication is
-    disabled. Historical ``default_model_fallbacks`` values are deliberately
-    unrelated and are never read or migrated.
-    """
-
-    try:
-        prefs = _load_policy_preferences(owner)
-    except Exception:
-        return ForegroundModelPolicy()
-
-    if prefs.get(FOREGROUND_FALLBACK_ENABLED_KEY) is not True:
-        return ForegroundModelPolicy()
-
-    entries = prefs.get(FOREGROUND_FALLBACK_LIST_KEY)
-    if not isinstance(entries, list) or not entries:
-        return ForegroundModelPolicy()
-    if allowed_models is not None:
-        allowed = frozenset(allowed_models)
-        entries = [
-            entry for entry in entries
-            if (
-                isinstance(entry, dict)
-                and isinstance(entry.get("model"), str)
-                and entry.get("model") in allowed
-            )
-        ]
-        if not entries:
-            return ForegroundModelPolicy()
-    entries = entries[:MAX_FOREGROUND_FALLBACKS]
-
-    if resolve_fallback_entries is not _DEFAULT_FALLBACK_ENTRY_RESOLVER:
-        # Preserve the long-standing resolver seam used by downstream tests and
-        # integrations. Production uses the descriptor-aware resolver below.
-        compatibility_candidates = resolve_fallback_entries(
-            entries,
-            owner=owner,
-            require_exact_model=True,
-        )
-        # Known limitation of this test-only seam: alignment matches on model
-        # alone, so when two entries share a model and the resolver skips the
-        # first, the surviving candidate inherits the skipped entry's
-        # endpoint_id. Production uses the descriptor-aware branch below,
-        # which is unaffected.
-        resolved_routes = []
-        remaining_entries = list(entries)
-        for candidate in compatibility_candidates:
-            matching_index = next(
-                (
-                    index for index, entry in enumerate(remaining_entries)
-                    if isinstance(entry, dict)
-                    and entry.get("model") == candidate[1]
-                ),
-                None,
-            )
-            matching_entry = (
-                remaining_entries.pop(matching_index)
-                if matching_index is not None
-                else {}
-            )
-            descriptor = {
-                "endpoint_id": matching_entry.get("endpoint_id"),
-                "endpoint_label": matching_entry.get("endpoint_id") or "Fallback route",
-                "endpoint_cost_tracked": endpoint_cost_tracked(candidate[0]),
-            }
-            resolved_routes.append((candidate, descriptor))
-    else:
-        resolved_routes = resolve_fallback_entries_with_descriptors(
-            entries,
-            owner=owner,
-            require_exact_model=True,
-        )
-    candidates = [candidate for candidate, _descriptor in resolved_routes]
-    if not candidates:
-        return ForegroundModelPolicy()
-
-    return ForegroundModelPolicy(
-        enabled=True,
-        fallback_candidates=tuple(candidates),
-        fallback_descriptors=tuple(
-            dict(descriptor) for _candidate, descriptor in resolved_routes
-        ),
-    )
 
 
 def resolve_foreground_fallback_candidates(owner: Optional[str] = None) -> list:
-    """Return only candidates explicitly enabled by the current user."""
+    """Return fallback candidates for a foreground Chat or Agent request.
 
-    return list(resolve_foreground_model_policy(owner).fallback_candidates)
+    Foreground routing is strict, so no alternate endpoint/model is eligible.
+    ``owner`` is accepted to keep this policy boundary owner-aware.
+    """
+
+    del owner
+    return []
 
 
 def build_foreground_model_candidates(
@@ -157,50 +24,8 @@ def build_foreground_model_candidates(
     model: str,
     headers: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = None,
     owner: Optional[str] = None,
-    policy: Optional[ForegroundModelPolicy] = None,
 ) -> list:
     """Build the ordered candidate list for a foreground request."""
 
-    policy = policy or resolve_foreground_model_policy(owner)
     primary = (endpoint_url, model, headers or {})
-    candidates = [primary]
+    return [primary] + resolve_foreground_fallback_candidates(owner=owner)
-    for candidate in policy.fallback_candidates:
-        if candidate not in candidates:
-            candidates.append(candidate)
-    return candidates
-
-
-def build_foreground_route_descriptors(
-    endpoint_url: str,
-    model: str,
-    headers: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = None,
-    owner: Optional[str] = None,
-    policy: Optional[ForegroundModelPolicy] = None,
-    selected_endpoint_id: Optional[str] = None,
-) -> list:
-    """Build safe route metadata parallel to foreground candidates."""
-
-    policy = policy or resolve_foreground_model_policy(owner)
-    selected = None
-    if selected_endpoint_id:
-        selected = resolve_route_descriptor_by_id(
-            selected_endpoint_id,
-            endpoint_url,
-            model,
-            headers or {},
-            owner=owner,
-        )
-    if selected is None:
-        selected = resolve_route_descriptor(endpoint_url, model, headers or {}, owner=owner)
-    primary = (endpoint_url, model, headers or {})
-    candidates = [primary]
-    descriptors = [selected]
-    for candidate, descriptor in zip(
-        policy.fallback_candidates,
-        policy.fallback_descriptors,
-    ):
-        if candidate in candidates:
-            continue
-        candidates.append(candidate)
-        descriptors.append(dict(descriptor))
-    return descriptors

src/integrations.py

@@ -719,14 +719,7 @@ async def execute_api_call(
         output = f"HTTP {status}\n{formatted}"
 
         if status >= 400:
-            return {
+            return {"error": output, "exit_code": 1}
-                "error": output,
-                "exit_code": 1,
-                # The error string includes the remote response body.  Preserve
-                # it for diagnostics, but make its provenance explicit so the
-                # agent gate does not treat HTTP failure as content-free.
-                "untrusted_content": True,
-            }
 
         return {"output": output, "exit_code": 0}
 

src/interactive_gate.py

@@ -63,11 +63,8 @@ _PASSIVE_EXACT_PATHS = {
     "/api/activity/heartbeat",
     "/api/client-perf",
     "/api/tasks/notifications",
-    "/api/tasks/runs/recent",
     "/api/research/active",
     "/api/email/urgency-state",
-    # UI idle poll sibling of urgency-state; must not pre-empt background tasks.
-    "/api/email/unread-state",
 }
 
 _PASSIVE_PREFIXES = (
@@ -77,19 +74,6 @@ _PASSIVE_PREFIXES = (
 )
 
 
-async def maybe_stop_background_tasks_for_heartbeat(stop_background) -> bool:
-    """Stop background work for browser activity only when the gate is enabled.
-
-    ``stop_background`` is injected by the application boundary so this policy
-    remains independently testable without importing the full FastAPI app.
-    """
-    if not _enabled():
-        return False
-
-    await stop_background(reason="browser heartbeat")
-    return True
-
-
 def should_track_interactive_request(path: str, method: str = "GET") -> bool:
     if not _enabled():
         return False

src/mcp_manager.py

@@ -530,8 +530,6 @@ class McpManager:
             "stderr": output if is_error else "",
             "exit_code": 1 if is_error else 0,
         }
-        if is_error and output:
-            result_dict["untrusted_content"] = True
         if images:
             result_dict["images"] = images
         return result_dict

src/mcp_oauth.py

@@ -15,32 +15,18 @@ from urllib.parse import urlparse, parse_qs
 
 logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
 
-
-def _resolve_redirect_base() -> str:
-    """Origin the browser is sent back to after authorizing.
-
-    Falls back to the port the app binds natively (APP_PORT, read the same way
-    by app.py and launcher.py) rather than a fixed 7000: the macOS launcher
-    defaults to 7860, and a callback on the wrong port reaches nothing. The
-    hostname stays `localhost` rather than internal_api_base()'s 127.0.0.1 —
-    this URI is registered with the authorization server (via DCR, or by hand
-    for Google clients), so changing the host invalidates registrations that
-    already exist.
-    """
-    return (
-        os.environ.get("OAUTH_REDIRECT_BASE_URL")
-        or os.environ.get("APP_PUBLIC_URL")
-        or f"http://localhost:{os.environ.get('APP_PORT', '7000')}"
-    ).rstrip("/")
-
-
 # OAuth redirect URI registered with every authorization server via DCR. Loopback
 # is allowed for native/desktop clients (RFC 8252); remote users finish via the
-# paste-back flow. Deployments whose externally reachable origin differs from the
+# paste-back flow. Deployments not reachable at http://localhost:7000 (custom
-# port Odysseus binds — reverse proxy, public domain, or Docker, whose host port
+# port, reverse proxy, or public domain) must set OAUTH_REDIRECT_BASE_URL (or
-# map is invisible inside the container — must set OAUTH_REDIRECT_BASE_URL (or
+# APP_PUBLIC_URL) to their externally reachable origin so the redirect lands back
-# APP_PUBLIC_URL), otherwise the redirect never lands back on Odysseus.
+# on Odysseus. APP_PORT is intentionally not used: it is only the Docker host
-_REDIRECT_BASE = _resolve_redirect_base()
+# port-map; the app always listens on 7000 inside the container.
+_REDIRECT_BASE = (
+    os.environ.get("OAUTH_REDIRECT_BASE_URL")
+    or os.environ.get("APP_PUBLIC_URL")
+    or "http://localhost:7000"
+).rstrip("/")
 REDIRECT_URI = f"{_REDIRECT_BASE}/api/mcp/oauth/callback"
 
 # How long the background connect waits for the user to authorize before giving up.

src/model_capability_readers/base.py

@@ -290,22 +290,17 @@ def detect_vendor(base_url: Any = "", endpoint_kind: Any = "") -> str:
         return kind_map[kind]
 
     parsed = urlparse(compact_str(base_url))
-    host = (parsed.hostname or "").lower().rstrip(".")
+    host = (parsed.hostname or "").lower()
     port = parsed.port
-
+    if host.endswith("openrouter.ai"):
-    def host_matches(domain: str) -> bool:
-        domain = domain.lower().rstrip(".")
-        return host == domain or host.endswith(f".{domain}")
-
-    if host_matches("openrouter.ai"):
         return VENDOR_OPENROUTER
-    if host_matches("openai.com"):
+    if host.endswith("openai.com"):
         return VENDOR_OPENAI
-    if host_matches("anthropic.com"):
+    if host.endswith("anthropic.com"):
         return VENDOR_ANTHROPIC
-    if host_matches("googleapis.com"):
+    if host.endswith("googleapis.com"):
         return VENDOR_GOOGLE
-    if host_matches("ollama.com") or port == 11434:
+    if host.endswith("ollama.com") or port == 11434:
         return VENDOR_OLLAMA
     if port == 1234:
         return VENDOR_LMSTUDIO

src/outbound_fetch.py

@@ -1,354 +0,0 @@
-"""SSRF-guarded synchronous HTTP fetching primitives.
-
-This module owns outbound URL classification, one-resolution-per-hop DNS
-pinning, redirects, and response-body budgets.  It deliberately has no search
-or content-extraction dependencies so callers outside search can reuse the
-same transport boundary.
-"""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import ipaddress
-import socket
-import ssl
-from typing import Callable, Iterable, cast
-from urllib.parse import urljoin, urlparse
-
-import httpcore
-import httpx
-
-from src.constants import WEB_FETCH_HARD_MAX_BYTES, WEB_FETCH_SOFT_MAX_BYTES
-
-
-_PRIVATE_NETWORKS = (
-    ipaddress.ip_network("0.0.0.0/8"),
-    ipaddress.ip_network("10.0.0.0/8"),
-    ipaddress.ip_network("127.0.0.0/8"),
-    ipaddress.ip_network("169.254.0.0/16"),
-    ipaddress.ip_network("172.16.0.0/12"),
-    ipaddress.ip_network("192.168.0.0/16"),
-    ipaddress.ip_network("::1/128"),
-    ipaddress.ip_network("fc00::/7"),
-    ipaddress.ip_network("fe80::/10"),
-)
-
-
-def _is_private_address(addr: ipaddress._BaseAddress) -> bool:
-    if isinstance(addr, ipaddress.IPv6Address) and addr.ipv4_mapped is not None:
-        addr = addr.ipv4_mapped
-    return (
-        addr.is_private
-        or addr.is_loopback
-        or addr.is_link_local
-        or addr.is_reserved
-        or addr.is_multicast
-        or addr.is_unspecified
-        or any(addr in net for net in _PRIVATE_NETWORKS)
-    )
-
-
-def _resolve_hostname_ips(hostname: str) -> list[ipaddress._BaseAddress]:
-    try:
-        infos = socket.getaddrinfo(hostname, None)
-    except Exception:
-        return []
-    out = []
-    for info in infos:
-        try:
-            out.append(ipaddress.ip_address(info[4][0]))
-        except Exception:
-            continue
-    return out
-
-
-def _public_http_url(
-    url: str,
-    *,
-    resolver: Callable[[str], list[ipaddress._BaseAddress]] | None = None,
-) -> bool:
-    resolver = resolver or _resolve_hostname_ips
-    try:
-        parsed = urlparse(url)
-        if parsed.scheme not in ("http", "https"):
-            return False
-        host = (parsed.hostname or "").strip()
-        if not host:
-            return False
-        lower = host.lower()
-        if lower in ("localhost", "metadata", "metadata.google.internal"):
-            return False
-        if lower.endswith((".local", ".localhost", ".internal", ".lan", ".intranet")):
-            return False
-        try:
-            return not _is_private_address(ipaddress.ip_address(host))
-        except ValueError:
-            pass
-        addrs = resolver(host)
-        return bool(addrs) and not any(_is_private_address(a) for a in addrs)
-    except Exception:
-        return False
-
-
-def _resolve_public_ips(
-    url: str,
-    *,
-    resolver: Callable[[str], list[ipaddress._BaseAddress]] | None = None,
-) -> list[ipaddress._BaseAddress]:
-    resolver = resolver or _resolve_hostname_ips
-    parsed = urlparse(url)
-    if parsed.scheme not in ("http", "https") or not parsed.hostname:
-        raise httpx.RequestError(f"Blocked non-public URL: {url}")
-    host = (parsed.hostname or "").strip().lower()
-    if host in ("localhost", "metadata", "metadata.google.internal"):
-        raise httpx.RequestError(f"Blocked non-public hostname: {host}")
-    try:
-        ip = ipaddress.ip_address(host)
-        if _is_private_address(ip):
-            raise httpx.RequestError(f"Blocked non-public IP literal: {host}")
-        return [ip]
-    except httpx.RequestError:
-        raise
-    except ValueError:
-        pass
-    addrs = resolver(host)
-    if not addrs or any(_is_private_address(a) for a in addrs):
-        raise httpx.RequestError(f"Blocked non-public URL: {url}")
-    return addrs
-
-
-class _PinnedBackend(httpcore.NetworkBackend):
-    """Network backend that connects to a pre-resolved IP."""
-
-    def __init__(self, ip: ipaddress._BaseAddress):
-        self._ip = str(ip)
-        self._real = httpcore.SyncBackend()
-
-    def connect_tcp(
-        self,
-        host: str,
-        port: int,
-        timeout: float | None = None,
-        local_address: str | None = None,
-        socket_options=None,
-    ):
-        return self._real.connect_tcp(
-            self._ip, port, timeout, local_address, socket_options
-        )
-
-    def connect_unix_socket(self, path, timeout=None, socket_options=None):
-        return self._real.connect_unix_socket(path, timeout, socket_options)
-
-    def sleep(self, seconds: float) -> None:
-        return self._real.sleep(seconds)
-
-
-_HTTPCORE_TO_HTTPX_EXC = {
-    httpcore.ConnectError: httpx.ConnectError,
-    httpcore.ConnectTimeout: httpx.ConnectTimeout,
-    httpcore.LocalProtocolError: httpx.LocalProtocolError,
-    httpcore.NetworkError: httpx.NetworkError,
-    httpcore.PoolTimeout: httpx.PoolTimeout,
-    httpcore.ProtocolError: httpx.ProtocolError,
-    httpcore.ProxyError: httpx.ProxyError,
-    httpcore.ReadError: httpx.ReadError,
-    httpcore.ReadTimeout: httpx.ReadTimeout,
-    httpcore.RemoteProtocolError: httpx.RemoteProtocolError,
-    httpcore.TimeoutException: httpx.TimeoutException,
-    httpcore.UnsupportedProtocol: httpx.UnsupportedProtocol,
-    httpcore.WriteError: httpx.WriteError,
-    httpcore.WriteTimeout: httpx.WriteTimeout,
-}
-
-
-class _PinnedTransport(httpx.BaseTransport):
-    """Transport that pins every TCP connect to a pre-resolved IP."""
-
-    def __init__(self, ip: ipaddress._BaseAddress, *, http2: bool = False):
-        self._pool = httpcore.ConnectionPool(
-            ssl_context=ssl.create_default_context(),
-            http1=True,
-            http2=http2,
-            network_backend=_PinnedBackend(ip),
-        )
-
-    def __enter__(self):
-        self._pool.__enter__()
-        return self
-
-    def __exit__(self, exc_type=None, exc_value=None, traceback=None) -> None:
-        self._pool.__exit__(exc_type, exc_value, traceback)
-
-    def handle_request(self, request: httpx.Request) -> httpx.Response:
-        httpcore_req = httpcore.Request(
-            method=request.method,
-            url=httpcore.URL(
-                scheme=request.url.raw_scheme,
-                host=request.url.raw_host,
-                port=request.url.port,
-                target=request.url.raw_path,
-            ),
-            headers=request.headers.raw,
-            content=request.stream,
-            extensions=request.extensions,
-        )
-        try:
-            httpcore_resp = self._pool.handle_request(httpcore_req)
-            content = b"".join(cast(Iterable[bytes], httpcore_resp.stream))
-        except Exception as exc:
-            mapped = _HTTPCORE_TO_HTTPX_EXC.get(type(exc))
-            if mapped is not None:
-                raise mapped(str(exc)) from exc
-            raise
-
-        return httpx.Response(
-            status_code=httpcore_resp.status,
-            headers=httpcore_resp.headers,
-            content=content,
-            extensions=httpcore_resp.extensions,
-        )
-
-    def close(self) -> None:
-        self._pool.close()
-
-
-class BodyTooLargeError(Exception):
-    """The server declared a body larger than the hard fetch ceiling."""
-
-    def __init__(self, url: str, declared_bytes: int):
-        self.url = url
-        self.declared_bytes = declared_bytes
-        super().__init__(
-            f"response body is {declared_bytes:,} bytes, over the "
-            f"{WEB_FETCH_HARD_MAX_BYTES:,}-byte hard cap"
-        )
-
-
-class _CappedFetch:
-    """Result of a size-capped streaming GET."""
-
-    __slots__ = (
-        "status_code",
-        "headers",
-        "content",
-        "truncated",
-        "declared_bytes",
-        "encoding",
-        "url",
-    )
-
-    def __init__(
-        self,
-        status_code,
-        headers,
-        content,
-        truncated,
-        declared_bytes,
-        encoding,
-        url,
-    ):
-        self.status_code = status_code
-        self.headers = headers
-        self.content = content
-        self.truncated = truncated
-        self.declared_bytes = declared_bytes
-        self.encoding = encoding
-        self.url = url
-
-    @property
-    def text(self) -> str:
-        return self.content.decode(self.encoding or "utf-8", errors="replace")
-
-    def raise_for_status(self):
-        if self.status_code >= 400:
-            request = httpx.Request("GET", self.url)
-            raise httpx.HTTPStatusError(
-                f"HTTP {self.status_code} for {self.url}",
-                request=request,
-                response=httpx.Response(self.status_code, request=request),
-            )
-
-
-def _get_public_url(
-    url: str,
-    headers: dict,
-    timeout: int,
-    max_redirects: int = 5,
-    max_bytes: int | None = None,
-    *,
-    resolve_public_ips: Callable[[str], list[ipaddress._BaseAddress]] | None = None,
-    transport_factory: Callable[[ipaddress._BaseAddress], httpx.BaseTransport] | None = None,
-) -> _CappedFetch:
-    """Capped streaming GET with SSRF-guarded, DNS-pinned redirects."""
-    resolve_public_ips = resolve_public_ips or _resolve_public_ips
-    transport_factory = transport_factory or _PinnedTransport
-    cap = min(max_bytes or WEB_FETCH_SOFT_MAX_BYTES, WEB_FETCH_HARD_MAX_BYTES)
-    current = url
-    for _ in range(max_redirects + 1):
-        ips = resolve_public_ips(current)
-        req_headers = dict(headers or {})
-        req_headers["Accept-Encoding"] = "identity"
-
-        with httpx.Client(
-            headers=req_headers,
-            timeout=timeout,
-            follow_redirects=False,
-            transport=transport_factory(ips[0]),
-        ) as client:
-            with client.stream("GET", current) as response:
-                if response.status_code in (301, 302, 303, 307, 308):
-                    location = response.headers.get("location")
-                    if not location:
-                        return _CappedFetch(
-                            response.status_code,
-                            response.headers,
-                            b"",
-                            False,
-                            None,
-                            response.encoding,
-                            str(response.url),
-                        )
-                    current = urljoin(str(response.url), location)
-                    continue
-
-                enc = (response.headers.get("content-encoding") or "").strip().lower()
-                if enc and enc != "identity":
-                    raise httpx.RequestError(
-                        f"Refusing compressed response (Content-Encoding: {enc}) after "
-                        "requesting identity: cannot bound decoded body size",
-                        request=httpx.Request("GET", current),
-                    )
-
-                declared = None
-                raw_len = response.headers.get("content-length")
-                if raw_len and raw_len.isdigit():
-                    declared = int(raw_len)
-
-                if declared is not None and declared > WEB_FETCH_HARD_MAX_BYTES:
-                    raise BodyTooLargeError(current, declared)
-
-                chunks = []
-                read = 0
-                truncated = False
-                for chunk in response.iter_bytes():
-                    read += len(chunk)
-                    if read > cap:
-                        keep = cap - (read - len(chunk))
-                        if keep > 0:
-                            chunks.append(chunk[:keep])
-                        truncated = True
-                        break
-                    chunks.append(chunk)
-
-                return _CappedFetch(
-                    response.status_code,
-                    response.headers,
-                    b"".join(chunks),
-                    truncated,
-                    declared,
-                    response.encoding,
-                    str(response.url),
-                )
-
-    raise httpx.RequestError(
-        "Too many redirects", request=httpx.Request("GET", current)
-    )

src/owner_identity.py

@@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
-"""Shared owner identity constants and helpers."""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import os
-from typing import Optional
-
-
-DEFAULT_LOCAL_OWNER = "__odysseus_local__"
-DEFAULT_LOCAL_OWNER_LABEL = "Local"
-INTERNAL_TOOL_USER = "internal-tool"
-
-REQUEST_SENTINEL_OWNERS = frozenset({INTERNAL_TOOL_USER, "api", "demo", "system"})
-RESERVED_AUTH_USERNAMES = REQUEST_SENTINEL_OWNERS | {DEFAULT_LOCAL_OWNER}
-
-
-def auth_disabled() -> bool:
-    """Return True only when auth is explicitly disabled by configuration."""
-    return os.getenv("AUTH_ENABLED", "true").strip().lower() == "false"
-
-
-def normalize_owner(owner: str | None) -> Optional[str]:
-    """Normalize an owner-like value without inventing a fallback identity."""
-    value = str(owner or "").strip()
-    return value or None
-
-
-def owner_key(owner: str | None) -> Optional[str]:
-    normalized = normalize_owner(owner)
-    return normalized.lower() if normalized else None
-
-
-def is_request_sentinel_owner(owner: str | None) -> bool:
-    return owner_key(owner) in REQUEST_SENTINEL_OWNERS
-
-
-def effective_storage_owner(owner: str | None, *, auth_is_disabled: bool | None = None) -> Optional[str]:
-    """Resolve the owner used for storage writes that need a real bucket.
-
-    ``None`` still means no authenticated owner when auth is enabled. In the
-    explicit no-login mode, it resolves to the reserved local owner instead of
-    conflating local-operator writes with legacy NULL/ownerless rows.
-    """
-    normalized = normalize_owner(owner)
-    if normalized:
-        if is_request_sentinel_owner(normalized):
-            return None
-        return normalized
-    disabled = auth_disabled() if auth_is_disabled is None else auth_is_disabled
-    if disabled:
-        return DEFAULT_LOCAL_OWNER
-    return None
-
-
-def is_default_local_owner(owner: str | None) -> bool:
-    return owner_key(owner) == DEFAULT_LOCAL_OWNER

src/prompt_security.py

@@ -61,13 +61,7 @@ def _sanitize_label(label: str) -> str:
     return label
 
 
-def untrusted_context_message(
+def untrusted_context_message(label: str, content: Any) -> Dict[str, Any]:
-    label: str,
-    content: Any,
-    *,
-    provenance_origin: str | None = None,
-    arm_tool_gate: bool = True,
-) -> Dict[str, Any]:
     """Return an LLM message that keeps retrieved/source text out of system role.
 
     The template is structured so that *only* the hardcoded
@@ -79,13 +73,6 @@ def untrusted_context_message(
     safe_label = _sanitize_label(label)
     text = "" if content is None else str(content)
     text = _escape_guard_markers(text)
-    metadata: Dict[str, Any] = {
-        "trusted": False,
-        "source": label,
-        "tool_gate_untrusted": bool(arm_tool_gate),
-    }
-    if provenance_origin:
-        metadata["provenance_origin"] = provenance_origin
     return {
         "role": "user",
         "content": (
@@ -95,5 +82,5 @@ def untrusted_context_message(
             f"{text}\n"
             f"{GUARD_CLOSE}"
         ),
-        "metadata": metadata,
+        "metadata": {"trusted": False, "source": label},
     }

src/request_models.py

@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ class ChatRequest(BaseModel):
     use_research: Optional[bool] = Field(default=False, description="Enable deep research")
     time_filter: Optional[str] = Field(default=None, description="Time filter for search")
     preset_id: Optional[str] = Field(default=None, description="Preset identifier")
-    selected_endpoint_id: Optional[str] = Field(default=None, description="Selected model endpoint ID")
     
     @field_validator('message')
     @classmethod

src/settings.py

@@ -14,13 +14,6 @@ from src.constants import SETTINGS_FILE, FEATURES_FILE
 
 logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
 
-# Keys retained in the raw settings store for compatibility and rollback, but
-# deliberately unavailable through generic settings APIs or agent tools.  They
-# must stay in ``DEFAULT_SETTINGS`` so old files continue to load without data
-# loss; callers that present or mutate settings should use this set as a
-# tombstone boundary.
-RETIRED_SETTING_KEYS = frozenset({"default_model_fallbacks"})
-
 # Tiny TTL cache for settings/features. get_setting() is called on hot paths
 # (every chat, every preprocess); without this it re-parses the JSON each call.
 # Picks up edits within _CACHE_TTL seconds, which is fine for human-edited config.
@@ -204,17 +197,6 @@ DEFAULT_SETTINGS = {
     },
 }
 
-
-def without_retired_settings(settings: dict) -> dict:
-    """Return a shallow copy suitable for generic settings interfaces."""
-    if not isinstance(settings, dict):
-        return {}
-    return {
-        key: value
-        for key, value in settings.items()
-        if key not in RETIRED_SETTING_KEYS
-    }
-
 DEFAULT_FEATURES = {
     "web_search": True,
     "web_fetch": True,
@@ -287,7 +269,7 @@ _PER_USER_KEYS = {
     # Default chat endpoint / model — without per-user resolution every new
     # account inherited whatever the most-recent admin picked, which then
     # got injected into the chat composer on first open.
-    "default_endpoint_id", "default_model",
+    "default_endpoint_id", "default_model", "default_model_fallbacks",
     "utility_endpoint_id", "utility_model", "utility_model_fallbacks",
     "research_endpoint_id", "research_model",
 }

src/task_endpoint.py

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 """Shared resolver for background-task AI endpoints."""
 
 from src.endpoint_resolver import (
+    resolve_chat_fallback_candidates,
     resolve_endpoint,
     resolve_utility_fallback_candidates,
 )
@@ -31,6 +32,7 @@ def resolve_task_candidates(
     2. Utility endpoint/model
     3. Default endpoint/model
     4. Utility fallback chain
+    5. Retired default-fallback compatibility hook (currently empty)
     """
     candidates = []
 
@@ -47,6 +49,9 @@ def resolve_task_candidates(
     _append(*resolve_endpoint("default", owner=owner))
     for url, model, headers in resolve_utility_fallback_candidates(owner=owner):
         _append(url, model, headers)
+    for url, model, headers in resolve_chat_fallback_candidates(owner=owner):
+        _append(url, model, headers)
+
     return candidates
 
 

src/task_scheduler.py

@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@ from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
 from typing import Any, Awaitable, Callable, Dict, Tuple
 
 from core.auth import RESERVED_USERNAMES
-from src.owner_identity import REQUEST_SENTINEL_OWNERS
 from src.task_action_policy import (
     is_admin_only_task_action,
     owner_has_admin_task_privileges,
@@ -1884,7 +1883,6 @@ class TaskScheduler:
             pass
         full_text = ""
         tool_results = []
-        approval_pause = None
 
         # Honor per-task max_steps (defense against runaway agent loops).
         # Falls back to 20 if not set — the historical default.
@@ -1931,44 +1929,9 @@ class TaskScheduler:
                         tool_summary = data.get("stdout") or data.get("output") or data.get("result") or ""
                         if isinstance(tool_summary, str) and tool_summary.strip():
                             tool_results.append(f"[{data.get('tool', '?')}] {tool_summary[:500]}")
-                        approval = data.get("ask_user")
-                        if (
-                            isinstance(approval, dict)
-                            and approval.get("kind") == "tool_approval"
-                        ):
-                            approval_pause = {
-                                "tool": data.get("tool") or "tool",
-                                "approval_id": approval.get("approval_id"),
-                            }
-                            # Scheduled tasks have no interactive surface that
-                            # can safely resume a one-use grant. Retire the
-                            # record immediately instead of leaving it pending
-                            # and report an explicit manual-action boundary.
-                            try:
-                                from src.tool_approvals import tool_approval_store
-                                tool_approval_store.consume(
-                                    approval_pause["approval_id"],
-                                    decision="deny",
-                                    owner=task.owner,
-                                    session_id=session_id,
-                                )
-                            except Exception:
-                                logger.debug(
-                                    "Could not retire scheduled-task approval",
-                                    exc_info=True,
-                                )
-                            break
                 except (json.JSONDecodeError, KeyError):
                     pass
 
-        if approval_pause is not None:
-            return (
-                "Scheduled task paused safely: "
-                f"{approval_pause['tool']} requested an exact action after "
-                "untrusted context. That action was not executed. Run this task "
-                "interactively to inspect and approve the action."
-            )
-
         # Grace summarization — if the model exhausted rounds on tool calls
         # without producing a final text response, do one last LLM call
         # asking it to summarize what it did. Guarantees output.
@@ -2521,7 +2484,7 @@ class TaskScheduler:
         # check-ins seeded, which then double-fire alongside the human user's
         # check-ins. This was the root cause of the duplicate 'Morning check-in'
         # rows we had to manually clean up.
-        if not owner or owner in REQUEST_SENTINEL_OWNERS:
+        if not owner or owner in RESERVED_USERNAMES:
             logger.info(f"ensure_assistant_defaults: skip synthetic owner {owner!r}")
             return
         from core.database import SessionLocal, CrewMember, ScheduledTask

src/teacher_escalation.py

@@ -439,11 +439,56 @@ async def escalate_and_learn(
     failure_reason: str,
     owner: Optional[str] = None,
 ) -> Optional[str]:
-    """Retire legacy background learning when no approval UI is available."""
+    """Call the teacher, evaluate ITS attempt, save a skill on success.
-    logger.info(
+
-        "background teacher learning skipped: generated skills require an "
+    Returns the saved skill name (or None if the teacher couldn't
-        "interactive exact approval"
+    write one). Logs but doesn't raise — escalation is best-effort.
+    """
+    from src.settings import get_setting
+    teacher_spec = (get_setting("teacher_model", "") or "").strip()
+    if not teacher_spec:
+        return None
+
+    prompt = _TEACHER_ESCALATION_PROMPT.format(
+        user_request=user_request or "(no user request captured)",
+        failure_reason=failure_reason or "(failure reason not captured)",
+        untrusted_trace_guard=_UNTRUSTED_TRACE_GUARD,
+        trace=_format_trace(tool_results, agent_reply),
     )
+    response = await _call_teacher(teacher_spec, prompt, owner=owner)
+    if not response:
+        return None
+
+    skill = _extract_skill_json(response)
+    if not skill:
+        # Teacher chose not to write a skill — see prompt contract.
+        logger.info("teacher declined to write a skill for this failure")
+        return None
+
+    # Same regex eval applied to the teacher's response — if the
+    # teacher itself sounded uncertain ("I don't have a tool"), drop
+    # the skill rather than persist a sketchy one.
+    status, reason = evaluate_turn_regex([], response)
+    if status == "failure":
+        logger.info(f"teacher response failed eval, skipping skill save: {reason}")
+        return None
+
+    # Tag the skill with the escalation source for auditability.
+    skill.setdefault("source", "teacher-escalation")
+    skill.setdefault("teacher_model", teacher_spec)
+    # Force action=add regardless of what the teacher wrote.
+    skill["action"] = "add"
+
+    import json
+    from src.tool_implementations import do_manage_skills
+    try:
+        result = await do_manage_skills(json.dumps(skill), owner=owner)
+        if isinstance(result, dict) and not result.get("error"):
+            logger.info(f"teacher wrote skill: {skill.get('name')}")
+            return skill.get("name")
+        logger.warning(f"skill save failed: {result}")
+    except Exception as e:
+        logger.warning(f"skill save raised: {e}")
     return None
 
 
@@ -518,12 +563,6 @@ async def run_teacher_inline(
     student_tool_events: List[Dict[str, Any]],
     student_reply: str,
     owner: Optional[str] = None,
-    session_id: Optional[str] = None,
-    workspace: Optional[str] = None,
-    disabled_tools: Optional[set[str]] = None,
-    tool_policy: Any = None,
-    active_document: Any = None,
-    active_email: Optional[Dict[str, str]] = None,
 ):
     """Async generator. Yields SSE event strings.
 
@@ -622,7 +661,6 @@ async def run_teacher_inline(
     from src.agent_loop import stream_agent_loop
     captured_tool_events: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
     captured_text_parts: List[str] = []
-    captured_metrics: Dict[str, Any] = {}
 
     async for evt_str in stream_agent_loop(
         endpoint_url=teacher_url,
@@ -630,12 +668,6 @@ async def run_teacher_inline(
         messages=teacher_messages,
         headers=teacher_headers,
         owner=owner,
-        session_id=session_id,
-        workspace=workspace,
-        disabled_tools=disabled_tools,
-        tool_policy=tool_policy,
-        active_document=active_document,
-        active_email=active_email,
         _is_teacher_run=True,
     ):
         # Swallow teacher's own [DONE] — outer loop emits the real one
@@ -650,21 +682,13 @@ async def run_teacher_inline(
             if isinstance(payload, dict):
                 payload["teacher"] = True
                 typ = payload.get("type")
-                if typ == "metrics" and isinstance(payload.get("data"), dict):
-                    # The outer chat route persists only the last metrics
-                    # payload. Keep a copy so any approval produced after the
-                    # recursive teacher run's metrics remains reloadable.
-                    captured_metrics = dict(payload["data"])
                 if typ == "tool_output":
-                    captured_tool_event = {
+                    captured_tool_events.append({
                         "tool": payload.get("tool"),
                         "command": payload.get("command"),
                         "output": payload.get("output"),
                         "exit_code": payload.get("exit_code"),
-                    }
+                    })
-                    if isinstance(payload.get("ask_user"), dict):
-                        captured_tool_event["ask_user"] = payload["ask_user"]
-                    captured_tool_events.append(captured_tool_event)
                 if "delta" in payload and isinstance(payload["delta"], str):
                     if payload.get("thinking"):
                         continue
@@ -673,12 +697,6 @@ async def run_teacher_inline(
                 continue
         yield evt_str
 
-    # A takeover that paused for a question or exact action has not completed
-    # yet. Its server-owned approval card is already in the live/persisted tool
-    # events; do not evaluate the partial trace or distill it into a skill.
-    if any(event.get("ask_user") for event in captured_tool_events):
-        return
-
     teacher_text = "".join(captured_text_parts).strip()
     t_status, t_reason = evaluate_turn_regex(captured_tool_events, teacher_text)
     if t_status == "failure":
@@ -722,85 +740,31 @@ async def run_teacher_inline(
     skill.setdefault("source", "teacher-escalation")
     skill.setdefault("teacher_model", teacher_spec)
 
-    if not session_id:
+    import json as _json
+    from src.tool_implementations import do_manage_skills
+    try:
+        result = await do_manage_skills(_json.dumps(skill), owner=owner)
+        if isinstance(result, dict) and not result.get("error"):
+            logger.info(f"teacher succeeded; saved skill: {skill.get('name')}")
+            yield (
+                'data: ' + json.dumps({
+                    "type": "skill_saved",
+                    "name": skill.get("name"),
+                    "category": skill.get("category", "general"),
+                }) + '\n\n'
+            )
+        else:
+            yield (
+                'data: ' + json.dumps({
+                    "type": "skill_save_failed",
+                    "reason": str(result),
+                }) + '\n\n'
+            )
+    except Exception as e:
+        logger.warning(f"skill save raised: {e}")
         yield (
             'data: ' + json.dumps({
                 "type": "skill_save_failed",
-                "reason": (
+                "reason": str(e),
-                    "Teacher-generated skills require an interactive exact "
-                    "approval before they can be saved."
-                ),
             }) + '\n\n'
         )
-        return
-
-    import json as _json
-    import uuid as _uuid
-    from src.tool_approvals import tool_approval_store
-    from src.tool_capabilities import capabilities_for_action
-
-    skill_content = _json.dumps(skill, ensure_ascii=False)
-    pending = tool_approval_store.create(
-        owner=owner,
-        session_id=session_id,
-        origin_run_id=f"teacher-skill-{_uuid.uuid4().hex}",
-        tool_name="manage_skills",
-        content=skill_content,
-        workspace=workspace,
-        external_untrusted_context_seen=True,
-        capabilities=capabilities_for_action("manage_skills", skill_content),
-    )
-    approval = pending.public_payload(
-        reason=(
-            "The teacher generated this reusable skill. Review and approve "
-            "the complete skill definition before it is saved."
-        ),
-    )
-    persisted_metrics = dict(captured_metrics)
-    persisted_tool_events = list(persisted_metrics.get("tool_events") or [])
-    persisted_round_texts = list(persisted_metrics.get("round_texts") or [])
-    prior_rounds = [
-        event.get("round")
-        for event in persisted_tool_events
-        if isinstance(event, dict) and isinstance(event.get("round"), int)
-    ]
-    approval_round = max([len(persisted_round_texts), *prior_rounds, 0]) + 1
-    approval_tool_event = {
-        "round": approval_round,
-        "model": teacher_model,
-        "tool": "manage_skills",
-        "command": str(skill.get("name") or "teacher-generated skill"),
-        "output": "Waiting for an exact user approval.",
-        "exit_code": None,
-        "ask_user": approval,
-    }
-    persisted_tool_events.append(approval_tool_event)
-    persisted_metrics["tool_events"] = persisted_tool_events
-    persisted_metrics.setdefault("model", teacher_model)
-    yield (
-        "data: "
-        + json.dumps({"delta": "Review the teacher-generated skill before saving it."})
-        + "\n\n"
-    )
-    yield (
-        "data: "
-        + json.dumps({
-            "type": "tool_output",
-            **approval_tool_event,
-            "teacher": True,
-        })
-        + "\n\n"
-    )
-    yield (
-        "data: "
-        + json.dumps({"type": "ask_user", "data": approval, "teacher": True})
-        + "\n\n"
-    )
-    # This must be the final metrics event: chat_routes saves only last_metrics
-    # when the outer stream reaches [DONE]. Without it, the live approval card
-    # disappears after a reload even though the server grant remains pending.
-    yield (
-        "data: "
-        + json.dumps({"type": "metrics", "data": persisted_metrics, "teacher": True})
-        + "\n\n"
-    )

src/tool_approval_scopes.py

@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-"""Shared wire values and scope markers for tool approval continuations."""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-from enum import Enum
-
-
-# Keep the existing wire values so the current route and no-build frontend do
-# not need a second protocol migration. ``approve`` no longer means one action;
-# it now selects chat-session scope.
-TASK_APPROVAL_DECISION = "approve_task"
-CHAT_SESSION_APPROVAL_DECISION = "approve"
-DENY_APPROVAL_DECISION = "deny"
-
-# Session.get_context_messages() adds this server-owned marker only when the
-# session history contains a matching, resolved chat-session approval.
-CHAT_SESSION_APPROVAL_CONTEXT_MARKER = "_tool_approval_chat_session_granted"
-
-
-class ToolApprovalScope(str, Enum):
-    # Surfaces without a resumable chat (the skill tester, unattended audits)
-    # keep the original one-use meaning: the sealed action runs and the gate
-    # re-arms immediately for anything after it.
-    SINGLE_ACTION = "single_action"
-    TASK = "task"
-    CHAT_SESSION = "chat_session"
-
-
-def scope_for_decision(decision: object) -> ToolApprovalScope | None:
-    normalized = str(decision or "").strip().lower()
-    if normalized == TASK_APPROVAL_DECISION:
-        return ToolApprovalScope.TASK
-    if normalized == CHAT_SESSION_APPROVAL_DECISION:
-        return ToolApprovalScope.CHAT_SESSION
-    return None

src/tool_approvals.py

@@ -1,513 +0,0 @@
-"""Opaque exact-action approvals with explicit task and chat scopes.
-
-The server still seals and claims the first displayed action exactly once. The
-selected scope then bypasses only the automatic post-external-context approval
-gate for the rest of the resumed task or chat session. Browser-visible fields
-are display copies, never authority.
-"""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import hashlib
-import json
-import os
-import secrets
-import threading
-import time
-from dataclasses import dataclass, field
-from typing import Any
-
-from src.tool_approval_scopes import (
-    CHAT_SESSION_APPROVAL_DECISION,
-    DENY_APPROVAL_DECISION,
-    TASK_APPROVAL_DECISION,
-    ToolApprovalScope,
-    scope_for_decision,
-)
-from src.tool_capabilities import ToolCapabilities, capabilities_for_action
-
-
-DEFAULT_APPROVAL_TTL_SECONDS = 10 * 60
-DEFAULT_MAX_PENDING_APPROVALS = 2048
-
-
-def _normalized_owner(owner: Any) -> str:
-    return str(owner or "").strip().casefold()
-
-
-def _normalized_workspace(workspace: Any) -> str:
-    if not isinstance(workspace, str) or not workspace.strip():
-        return ""
-    return os.path.realpath(os.path.expanduser(workspace))
-
-
-_MAX_APPROVAL_SELECTED_TOOLS = 512
-_MAX_APPROVAL_TOOL_NAME_CHARS = 512
-_MAX_APPROVAL_CONTINUATION_QUERY_CHARS = 4000
-
-
-def _normalized_selected_tools(
-    selected_tools: Any,
-    *,
-    required_tool: Any = None,
-) -> tuple[str, ...]:
-    if isinstance(selected_tools, str):
-        selected_tools = (selected_tools,)
-    try:
-        values = selected_tools or ()
-        names = {
-            name.strip()
-            for name in values
-            if (
-                isinstance(name, str)
-                and name.strip()
-                and len(name.strip()) <= _MAX_APPROVAL_TOOL_NAME_CHARS
-            )
-        }
-        required_name = str(required_tool or "").strip()
-        if required_name and len(required_name) <= _MAX_APPROVAL_TOOL_NAME_CHARS:
-            names.add(required_name)
-        ordered = sorted(names)
-        if len(ordered) <= _MAX_APPROVAL_SELECTED_TOOLS:
-            return tuple(ordered)
-        kept = ordered[:_MAX_APPROVAL_SELECTED_TOOLS]
-        if required_name and required_name in names and required_name not in kept:
-            kept[-1] = required_name
-            kept.sort()
-        return tuple(kept)
-    except TypeError:
-        return ()
-
-
-def _normalized_continuation_query(value: Any) -> str:
-    # The query is server-derived from the interrupted run and already lives in
-    # session history. Keep the pending copy bounded because approvals are held
-    # in memory until consumed or expired.
-    return str(value or "").strip()[:_MAX_APPROVAL_CONTINUATION_QUERY_CHARS]
-
-
-def _canonical_digest(payload: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
-    encoded = json.dumps(
-        payload,
-        sort_keys=True,
-        separators=(",", ":"),
-        ensure_ascii=False,
-    ).encode("utf-8")
-    return hashlib.sha256(encoded).hexdigest()
-
-
-def document_content_digest(content: Any) -> str:
-    """Return the stable server-side fingerprint used to seal a document."""
-    return hashlib.sha256(str(content or "").encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
-
-
-def _binding_payload(
-    *,
-    owner: Any,
-    session_id: Any,
-    origin_run_id: Any,
-    tool_name: Any,
-    content: Any,
-    workspace: Any,
-    document_id: Any,
-    document_version: Any,
-    document_digest: Any,
-    external_untrusted_context_seen: bool,
-    selected_tools: Any,
-    continuation_query: Any,
-    effects: tuple[str, ...],
-    result_integrity: str,
-) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    return {
-        "owner": _normalized_owner(owner),
-        "session_id": str(session_id or ""),
-        "origin_run_id": str(origin_run_id or ""),
-        "tool_name": str(tool_name or ""),
-        "content": str(content or ""),
-        "workspace": _normalized_workspace(workspace),
-        "document_id": str(document_id or ""),
-        "document_version": (
-            int(document_version) if document_version is not None else None
-        ),
-        "document_digest": str(document_digest or "").strip().lower(),
-        "external_untrusted_context_seen": bool(external_untrusted_context_seen),
-        "selected_tools": list(
-            _normalized_selected_tools(selected_tools, required_tool=tool_name)
-        ),
-        "continuation_query": _normalized_continuation_query(continuation_query),
-        "effects": list(effects),
-        "result_integrity": str(result_integrity),
-    }
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class PendingToolApproval:
-    approval_id: str
-    owner: str
-    session_id: str
-    origin_run_id: str
-    tool_name: str
-    content: str
-    workspace: str
-    document_id: str
-    document_version: int | None
-    document_digest: str
-    external_untrusted_context_seen: bool
-    effects: tuple[str, ...]
-    result_integrity: str
-    digest: str
-    created_at: float
-    expires_at: float
-    # Server-only continuation state. Both fields are digest-bound and never
-    # exposed in the browser payload.
-    selected_tools: tuple[str, ...] = ()
-    continuation_query: str = ""
-
-    def public_payload(self, *, reason: str | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        return {
-            "kind": "tool_approval",
-            "approval_id": self.approval_id,
-            # The browser already owns this chat id. Persisting it with the
-            # resolved card lets history-derived session grants remain bound to
-            # this exact chat and prevents inheritance by a forked session.
-            "session_id": self.session_id,
-            "question": "Allow this task to continue?",
-            "description": reason or (
-                "Untrusted context influenced this run, so continuing with "
-                "otherwise-gated actions needs your explicit approval."
-            ),
-            "options": [
-                {
-                    "label": "Allow for this task",
-                    "value": TASK_APPROVAL_DECISION,
-                    "description": (
-                        "Execute the sealed action and allow every otherwise-gated "
-                        "action needed to finish this request. Current tool, account, "
-                        "workspace, and sandbox restrictions still apply."
-                    ),
-                },
-                {
-                    "label": "Allow for this chat session",
-                    "value": CHAT_SESSION_APPROVAL_DECISION,
-                    "description": (
-                        "Execute the sealed action and stop asking at this gate for "
-                        "later requests in this chat. Current tool, account, workspace, "
-                        "and sandbox restrictions still apply."
-                    ),
-                },
-                {
-                    "label": "Deny",
-                    "value": DENY_APPROVAL_DECISION,
-                    "description": "Do not execute the proposed action.",
-                },
-            ],
-            "action": {
-                "tool": self.tool_name,
-                # Show the complete sealed input so approval never hides
-                # trailing lines.  This is not read back as authority.
-                "content": self.content,
-                "digest": self.digest[:16],
-                "effects": list(self.effects),
-                "workspace": self.workspace or None,
-                "document_id": self.document_id or None,
-                "document_version": self.document_version,
-            },
-        }
-
-
-@dataclass
-class ExactToolApproval:
-    """A consumed exact first action plus an explicit continuation scope."""
-
-    pending: PendingToolApproval
-    scope: ToolApprovalScope = ToolApprovalScope.TASK
-    # The seam consumed by agent_loop. Both chat-card allow choices cover the
-    # complete resumed task, because one-action scope there immediately
-    # re-entered the same gate on the next round. Callers with no resumable
-    # chat still get SINGLE_ACTION, which leaves the gate armed behind the
-    # sealed action.
-    allow_remaining_actions: bool = True
-    _claimed: bool = field(default=False, init=False, repr=False)
-    _lock: threading.Lock = field(default_factory=threading.Lock, init=False, repr=False)
-
-    @property
-    def grants_chat_session(self) -> bool:
-        return self.scope is ToolApprovalScope.CHAT_SESSION
-
-    def _matches_unlocked(
-        self,
-        *,
-        owner: Any,
-        session_id: Any,
-        tool_name: Any,
-        content: Any,
-        workspace: Any,
-    ) -> bool:
-        if self._claimed:
-            return False
-        capabilities = capabilities_for_action(tool_name, content)
-        effects = tuple(sorted(effect.value for effect in capabilities.effects))
-        result_integrity = capabilities.result_integrity.value
-        if (
-            effects != self.pending.effects
-            or result_integrity != self.pending.result_integrity
-        ):
-            return False
-        expected = _binding_payload(
-            owner=owner,
-            session_id=session_id,
-            origin_run_id=self.pending.origin_run_id,
-            tool_name=tool_name,
-            content=content,
-            workspace=workspace,
-            document_id=self.pending.document_id,
-            document_version=self.pending.document_version,
-            document_digest=self.pending.document_digest,
-            external_untrusted_context_seen=(
-                self.pending.external_untrusted_context_seen
-            ),
-            selected_tools=self.pending.selected_tools,
-            continuation_query=self.pending.continuation_query,
-            effects=effects,
-            result_integrity=result_integrity,
-        )
-        return _canonical_digest(expected) == self.pending.digest
-
-    def matches(
-        self,
-        *,
-        owner: Any,
-        session_id: Any,
-        tool_name: Any,
-        content: Any,
-        workspace: Any,
-    ) -> bool:
-        with self._lock:
-            return self._matches_unlocked(
-                owner=owner,
-                session_id=session_id,
-                tool_name=tool_name,
-                content=content,
-                workspace=workspace,
-            )
-
-    def claim(
-        self,
-        *,
-        owner: Any,
-        session_id: Any,
-        tool_name: Any,
-        content: Any,
-        workspace: Any,
-    ) -> bool:
-        with self._lock:
-            if not self._matches_unlocked(
-                owner=owner,
-                session_id=session_id,
-                tool_name=tool_name,
-                content=content,
-                workspace=workspace,
-            ):
-                return False
-            self._claimed = True
-            return True
-
-
-class ToolApprovalStore:
-    """Thread-safe pending approval registry with destructive consumption."""
-
-    def __init__(
-        self,
-        *,
-        ttl_seconds: int = DEFAULT_APPROVAL_TTL_SECONDS,
-        max_pending: int = DEFAULT_MAX_PENDING_APPROVALS,
-    ):
-        self._ttl_seconds = max(1, int(ttl_seconds))
-        self._max_pending = max(1, int(max_pending))
-        self._pending: dict[str, PendingToolApproval] = {}
-        self._lock = threading.Lock()
-
-    def _purge_expired_locked(self, now: float) -> None:
-        expired = [
-            approval_id
-            for approval_id, pending in self._pending.items()
-            if pending.expires_at <= now
-        ]
-        for approval_id in expired:
-            self._pending.pop(approval_id, None)
-
-    def create(
-        self,
-        *,
-        owner: Any,
-        session_id: Any,
-        origin_run_id: Any,
-        tool_name: Any,
-        content: Any,
-        workspace: Any,
-        document_id: Any = None,
-        document_version: Any = None,
-        document_digest: Any = None,
-        selected_tools: Any = None,
-        continuation_query: Any = None,
-        external_untrusted_context_seen: bool,
-        capabilities: ToolCapabilities,
-    ) -> PendingToolApproval:
-        now = time.time()
-        effects = tuple(sorted(effect.value for effect in capabilities.effects))
-        result_integrity = capabilities.result_integrity.value
-        payload = _binding_payload(
-            owner=owner,
-            session_id=session_id,
-            origin_run_id=origin_run_id,
-            tool_name=tool_name,
-            content=content,
-            workspace=workspace,
-            document_id=document_id,
-            document_version=document_version,
-            document_digest=document_digest,
-            external_untrusted_context_seen=external_untrusted_context_seen,
-            selected_tools=selected_tools,
-            continuation_query=continuation_query,
-            effects=effects,
-            result_integrity=result_integrity,
-        )
-        pending = PendingToolApproval(
-            approval_id=secrets.token_urlsafe(32),
-            owner=payload["owner"],
-            session_id=payload["session_id"],
-            origin_run_id=payload["origin_run_id"],
-            tool_name=payload["tool_name"],
-            content=payload["content"],
-            workspace=payload["workspace"],
-            document_id=payload["document_id"],
-            document_version=payload["document_version"],
-            document_digest=payload["document_digest"],
-            external_untrusted_context_seen=payload[
-                "external_untrusted_context_seen"
-            ],
-            effects=effects,
-            result_integrity=result_integrity,
-            digest=_canonical_digest(payload),
-            created_at=now,
-            expires_at=now + self._ttl_seconds,
-            selected_tools=tuple(payload["selected_tools"]),
-            continuation_query=payload["continuation_query"],
-        )
-        with self._lock:
-            self._purge_expired_locked(now)
-            # The chat UI exposes one pending card per session, so supersede an
-            # older action there. Headless/manual-test callers use an empty
-            # session id; keep independent origin runs separate so two skill
-            # tests owned by the same user cannot invalidate each other.
-            superseded = [
-                approval_id
-                for approval_id, existing in self._pending.items()
-                if (
-                    existing.owner == pending.owner
-                    and existing.session_id == pending.session_id
-                    and (
-                        bool(pending.session_id)
-                        or existing.origin_run_id == pending.origin_run_id
-                    )
-                )
-            ]
-            for approval_id in superseded:
-                self._pending.pop(approval_id, None)
-            while len(self._pending) >= self._max_pending:
-                oldest_id = min(
-                    self._pending,
-                    key=lambda approval_id: self._pending[approval_id].created_at,
-                )
-                self._pending.pop(oldest_id, None)
-            self._pending[pending.approval_id] = pending
-        return pending
-
-    def consume(
-        self,
-        approval_id: Any,
-        *,
-        decision: Any,
-        owner: Any,
-        session_id: Any,
-        allow_continuation: bool = True,
-    ) -> ExactToolApproval | None:
-        """Consume a pending approval.
-
-        ``allow_continuation`` is the caller's assertion that it owns a
-        resumable conversation the granted scope can apply to. Callers without
-        one (the skill tester, unattended audits) pass ``False`` and get the
-        original one-use grant, so a button labelled "Allow once" cannot widen
-        into a run-long bypass just because the chat card reuses the same wire
-        value.
-        """
-        now = time.time()
-        with self._lock:
-            self._purge_expired_locked(now)
-            approval_key = str(approval_id or "")
-            pending = self._pending.get(approval_key)
-            if pending is None:
-                return None
-            if (
-                pending.owner != _normalized_owner(owner)
-                or pending.session_id != str(session_id or "")
-            ):
-                # Authentication is checked before destructive consumption so
-                # a leaked/guessed opaque id cannot be used to invalidate
-                # another owner's pending action.
-                return None
-            self._pending.pop(approval_key, None)
-        normalized_decision = str(decision or "").strip().lower()
-        scope = scope_for_decision(normalized_decision)
-        if scope is None:
-            return None
-        if not allow_continuation:
-            return ExactToolApproval(
-                pending,
-                scope=ToolApprovalScope.SINGLE_ACTION,
-                allow_remaining_actions=False,
-            )
-        return ExactToolApproval(
-            pending,
-            scope=scope,
-            allow_remaining_actions=True,
-        )
-
-    def peek(self, approval_id: Any) -> PendingToolApproval | None:
-        now = time.time()
-        with self._lock:
-            self._purge_expired_locked(now)
-            return self._pending.get(str(approval_id or ""))
-
-    def retire_for_session(self, *, owner: Any, session_id: Any) -> bool:
-        """Discard pending actions superseded by an ordinary user turn.
-
-        Returns whether any retired action carried external provenance, so the
-        caller can preserve that security state without treating the new user
-        message as an approval continuation.
-        """
-        now = time.time()
-        normalized_owner = _normalized_owner(owner)
-        normalized_session = str(session_id or "")
-        if not normalized_session:
-            return False
-        with self._lock:
-            self._purge_expired_locked(now)
-            retired_ids = [
-                approval_id
-                for approval_id, pending in self._pending.items()
-                if (
-                    pending.owner == normalized_owner
-                    and pending.session_id == normalized_session
-                )
-            ]
-            carried_taint = any(
-                self._pending[approval_id].external_untrusted_context_seen
-                for approval_id in retired_ids
-            )
-            for approval_id in retired_ids:
-                self._pending.pop(approval_id, None)
-        return carried_taint
-
-
-tool_approval_store = ToolApprovalStore()

src/tool_capabilities.py

@@ -1,686 +0,0 @@
-"""Deterministic capability metadata for agent tools.
-
-Model output requests an action; it never supplies the authority for that
-action.  This module classifies the effects of each built-in tool and applies
-run-local integrity gates before dispatch.
-"""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import json
-import uuid
-from dataclasses import dataclass, field
-from enum import Enum
-from types import MappingProxyType
-from typing import Any, Iterable, Mapping
-
-from src.tool_approval_scopes import CHAT_SESSION_APPROVAL_CONTEXT_MARKER
-from src.tool_security import BUILTIN_EMAIL_TOOLS
-
-
-class ToolEffect(str, Enum):
-    READ_PUBLIC = "read_public"
-    READ_WORKSPACE = "read_workspace"
-    READ_PRIVATE = "read_private"
-    WRITE_WORKSPACE = "write_workspace"
-    WRITE_PRIVATE = "write_private"
-    EXECUTE_CODE = "execute_code"
-    BROKERED_NETWORK_READ = "brokered_network_read"
-    NETWORK_EGRESS = "network_egress"
-    EXTERNAL_SIDE_EFFECT = "external_side_effect"
-    UI_SIDE_EFFECT = "ui_side_effect"
-    ADMIN_CHANGE = "admin_change"
-    DESTRUCTIVE = "destructive"
-    USER_INTERACTION = "user_interaction"
-
-
-class ResultIntegrity(str, Enum):
-    SYSTEM = "system"
-    WORKSPACE_UNTRUSTED = "workspace_untrusted"
-    EXTERNAL_UNTRUSTED = "external_untrusted"
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class ToolCapabilities:
-    effects: frozenset[ToolEffect]
-    result_integrity: ResultIntegrity = ResultIntegrity.SYSTEM
-    known: bool = True
-
-
-def _capabilities(
-    *effects: ToolEffect,
-    result_integrity: ResultIntegrity = ResultIntegrity.SYSTEM,
-) -> ToolCapabilities:
-    return ToolCapabilities(frozenset(effects), result_integrity)
-
-
-_REGISTRY: dict[str, ToolCapabilities] = {}
-
-
-def _register(
-    names: Iterable[str],
-    *effects: ToolEffect,
-    result_integrity: ResultIntegrity = ResultIntegrity.SYSTEM,
-) -> None:
-    capabilities = _capabilities(*effects, result_integrity=result_integrity)
-    for name in names:
-        if name in _REGISTRY:
-            raise RuntimeError(f"Duplicate tool capability classification: {name}")
-        _REGISTRY[name] = capabilities
-
-
-_register(
-    {"ask_user", "update_plan"},
-    ToolEffect.USER_INTERACTION,
-)
-_register(
-    {
-        "list_cached_models",
-        "list_cookbook_servers",
-        "list_downloads",
-        "list_models",
-        "list_serve_presets",
-        "list_served_models",
-    },
-    ToolEffect.READ_PRIVATE,
-    # These readers return provider-controlled model identifiers or durable
-    # user/admin-authored Cookbook and process state.  Local brokering does not
-    # make the returned text server-authored.
-    result_integrity=ResultIntegrity.EXTERNAL_UNTRUSTED,
-)
-_register(
-    {"search_hf_models"},
-    ToolEffect.BROKERED_NETWORK_READ,
-    result_integrity=ResultIntegrity.EXTERNAL_UNTRUSTED,
-)
-_register(
-    {"get_workspace", "glob", "grep", "ls", "read_file"},
-    ToolEffect.READ_WORKSPACE,
-    result_integrity=ResultIntegrity.WORKSPACE_UNTRUSTED,
-)
-_register(
-    {"web_search"},
-    ToolEffect.BROKERED_NETWORK_READ,
-    result_integrity=ResultIntegrity.EXTERNAL_UNTRUSTED,
-)
-_register(
-    {"web_fetch"},
-    ToolEffect.BROKERED_NETWORK_READ,
-    ToolEffect.NETWORK_EGRESS,
-    result_integrity=ResultIntegrity.EXTERNAL_UNTRUSTED,
-)
-_register(
-    {
-        "list_email_accounts",
-        "list_emails",
-        "read_email",
-        "resolve_contact",
-        "scan_email_unsubscribes",
-        "search_chats",
-        "search_emails",
-        "list_sessions",
-        "tail_serve_output",
-        "vault_get",
-        "vault_search",
-    },
-    ToolEffect.READ_PRIVATE,
-    result_integrity=ResultIntegrity.EXTERNAL_UNTRUSTED,
-)
-_register(
-    {"bash", "manage_bg_jobs", "python"},
-    ToolEffect.EXECUTE_CODE,
-    result_integrity=ResultIntegrity.WORKSPACE_UNTRUSTED,
-)
-_register(
-    {"apply_patch", "edit_file", "write_file"},
-    ToolEffect.WRITE_WORKSPACE,
-    # Successful writes include unified diffs that can echo arbitrary existing
-    # workspace content back into the next model round.
-    result_integrity=ResultIntegrity.WORKSPACE_UNTRUSTED,
-)
-_register(
-    {
-        "create_document",
-        "manage_calendar",
-        "manage_contact",
-        "manage_documents",
-        "manage_memory",
-        "manage_notes",
-        "manage_research",
-        "manage_session",
-        "manage_skills",
-        "manage_tasks",
-        "suggest_document",
-        "todowrite",
-    },
-    ToolEffect.WRITE_PRIVATE,
-)
-_register(
-    {
-        "ai_draft_email_reply",
-        "create_session",
-        "draft_email",
-        "draft_email_reply",
-    },
-    ToolEffect.WRITE_PRIVATE,
-    # These tools resolve user-configured endpoints/accounts or read stored
-    # email content before returning model-visible status text.
-    result_integrity=ResultIntegrity.EXTERNAL_UNTRUSTED,
-)
-_register(
-    {"edit_document", "update_document"},
-    ToolEffect.WRITE_PRIVATE,
-    # These tools can echo stored document content that was not present in
-    # their arguments.  edit_document returns the complete edited document;
-    # update_document also preserves stored email headers/thread history.
-    result_integrity=ResultIntegrity.EXTERNAL_UNTRUSTED,
-)
-_register(
-    {"pipeline"},
-    ToolEffect.NETWORK_EGRESS,
-    result_integrity=ResultIntegrity.EXTERNAL_UNTRUSTED,
-)
-_register(
-    {"send_to_session"},
-    ToolEffect.NETWORK_EGRESS,
-    ToolEffect.WRITE_PRIVATE,
-    result_integrity=ResultIntegrity.EXTERNAL_UNTRUSTED,
-)
-_register(
-    {"chat_with_model", "ask_teacher"},
-    ToolEffect.NETWORK_EGRESS,
-    result_integrity=ResultIntegrity.EXTERNAL_UNTRUSTED,
-)
-_register(
-    {"download_attachment"},
-    ToolEffect.READ_PRIVATE,
-    ToolEffect.WRITE_WORKSPACE,
-    result_integrity=ResultIntegrity.EXTERNAL_UNTRUSTED,
-)
-_register(
-    {"edit_image", "generate_image", "trigger_research"},
-    ToolEffect.NETWORK_EGRESS,
-    ToolEffect.WRITE_PRIVATE,
-    result_integrity=ResultIntegrity.EXTERNAL_UNTRUSTED,
-)
-_register(
-    {
-        "archive_email",
-        "bulk_email",
-        "mark_email_read",
-        "reply_to_email",
-        "send_email",
-        "unsubscribe_email",
-    },
-    ToolEffect.EXTERNAL_SIDE_EFFECT,
-    # Email action results can include stored headers/account labels or remote
-    # SMTP/IMAP responses, even when the action itself succeeded.
-    result_integrity=ResultIntegrity.EXTERNAL_UNTRUSTED,
-)
-_register(
-    {"delete_email"},
-    ToolEffect.EXTERNAL_SIDE_EFFECT,
-    ToolEffect.DESTRUCTIVE,
-    result_integrity=ResultIntegrity.EXTERNAL_UNTRUSTED,
-)
-_register(
-    {"ui_control"},
-    ToolEffect.UI_SIDE_EFFECT,
-    # Model switches and custom-theme validation read mutable user settings.
-    result_integrity=ResultIntegrity.EXTERNAL_UNTRUSTED,
-)
-_register(
-    {
-        "adopt_served_model",
-        "cancel_download",
-        "download_model",
-        "serve_model",
-        "serve_preset",
-        "stop_served_model",
-        "vault_unlock",
-    },
-    ToolEffect.ADMIN_CHANGE,
-    # Cookbook/process operations can return stored presets, provider data,
-    # remote shell output, and command errors.
-    result_integrity=ResultIntegrity.EXTERNAL_UNTRUSTED,
-)
-_register(
-    {
-        "api_call",
-        "app_api",
-        "manage_endpoints",
-        "manage_mcp",
-        "manage_settings",
-        "manage_tokens",
-        "manage_webhooks",
-    },
-    ToolEffect.ADMIN_CHANGE,
-    # api_call/app_api return remote or stored application data, and the
-    # admin managers can echo user-controlled configuration.  Conservatively
-    # retain the action effect while treating every successful result as data.
-    result_integrity=ResultIntegrity.EXTERNAL_UNTRUSTED,
-)
-
-
-TOOL_CAPABILITIES: Mapping[str, ToolCapabilities] = MappingProxyType(dict(_REGISTRY))
-KNOWN_CAPABILITY_TOOLS = frozenset(TOOL_CAPABILITIES)
-
-_UNKNOWN_CAPABILITIES = _capabilities(
-    ToolEffect.READ_PRIVATE,
-    ToolEffect.WRITE_WORKSPACE,
-    ToolEffect.WRITE_PRIVATE,
-    ToolEffect.EXECUTE_CODE,
-    ToolEffect.NETWORK_EGRESS,
-    ToolEffect.EXTERNAL_SIDE_EFFECT,
-    ToolEffect.ADMIN_CHANGE,
-    ToolEffect.DESTRUCTIVE,
-    result_integrity=ResultIntegrity.EXTERNAL_UNTRUSTED,
-)
-_UNKNOWN_CAPABILITIES = ToolCapabilities(
-    _UNKNOWN_CAPABILITIES.effects,
-    _UNKNOWN_CAPABILITIES.result_integrity,
-    known=False,
-)
-_BROWSER_MCP_READ_CAPABILITIES = _capabilities(
-    ToolEffect.BROKERED_NETWORK_READ,
-    result_integrity=ResultIntegrity.EXTERNAL_UNTRUSTED,
-)
-_BROWSER_MCP_READ_TOOLS = frozenset(
-    {
-        "mcp__builtin_browser__browser_console_messages",
-        "mcp__builtin_browser__browser_network_requests",
-        "mcp__builtin_browser__browser_snapshot",
-        "mcp__builtin_browser__browser_take_screenshot",
-    }
-)
-
-
-def capabilities_for_tool(tool_name: Any) -> ToolCapabilities:
-    """Return deterministic capabilities; malformed and unknown tools fail high."""
-    if not isinstance(tool_name, str) or not tool_name:
-        return _UNKNOWN_CAPABILITIES
-    capabilities = TOOL_CAPABILITIES.get(tool_name)
-    if capabilities is not None:
-        return capabilities
-    if tool_name.startswith("mcp__email__"):
-        bare_name = tool_name[len("mcp__email__"):]
-        capabilities = TOOL_CAPABILITIES.get(bare_name)
-        if bare_name in BUILTIN_EMAIL_TOOLS and capabilities is not None:
-            return capabilities
-    if tool_name in _BROWSER_MCP_READ_TOOLS:
-        return _BROWSER_MCP_READ_CAPABILITIES
-    return _UNKNOWN_CAPABILITIES
-
-
-_PRIVATE_ACTION_READS: Mapping[str, frozenset[str]] = MappingProxyType(
-    {
-        "manage_calendar": frozenset({"list_calendars", "list_events"}),
-        "manage_contact": frozenset({"list"}),
-        "manage_documents": frozenset({"list", "read", "view", "open", "get"}),
-        "manage_memory": frozenset({"list", "search"}),
-        "manage_notes": frozenset({"list", "search", "find", "view"}),
-        "manage_research": frozenset({"list", "read", "open", "view", "get"}),
-        "manage_session": frozenset({"list", "switch", "open", "select", "view"}),
-        "manage_skills": frozenset({"list", "index", "view", "view_ref", "search"}),
-        "manage_tasks": frozenset({"list"}),
-    }
-)
-
-_PRIVATE_ACTION_WRITES: Mapping[str, frozenset[str]] = MappingProxyType(
-    {
-        "manage_calendar": frozenset(
-            {"create_event", "update_event", "delete_event"}
-        ),
-        "manage_contact": frozenset({"add", "update", "edit", "delete"}),
-        "manage_documents": frozenset({"delete", "tidy"}),
-        "manage_memory": frozenset({"add", "edit", "delete"}),
-        "manage_notes": frozenset({"add", "update", "delete", "toggle_item"}),
-        "manage_research": frozenset({"delete"}),
-        "manage_session": frozenset(
-            {
-                "rename",
-                "archive",
-                "unarchive",
-                "delete",
-                "important",
-                "unimportant",
-                "truncate",
-                "fork",
-            }
-        ),
-        "manage_skills": frozenset({"add", "edit", "patch", "publish", "delete"}),
-        "manage_tasks": frozenset({"create", "edit", "delete", "pause", "resume", "run"}),
-    }
-)
-
-_ACTION_DESTRUCTIVE: Mapping[str, frozenset[str]] = MappingProxyType(
-    {
-        "manage_calendar": frozenset({"delete_event"}),
-        "manage_contact": frozenset({"delete"}),
-        "manage_documents": frozenset({"delete", "tidy"}),
-        "manage_endpoints": frozenset({"delete"}),
-        "manage_bg_jobs": frozenset({"kill", "stop", "cancel", "terminate"}),
-        "manage_memory": frozenset({"delete"}),
-        "manage_mcp": frozenset({"delete"}),
-        "manage_notes": frozenset({"delete"}),
-        "manage_research": frozenset({"delete"}),
-        "manage_session": frozenset({"delete", "truncate"}),
-        "manage_settings": frozenset({"delete", "reset"}),
-        "manage_skills": frozenset({"delete"}),
-        "manage_tasks": frozenset({"delete"}),
-        "manage_tokens": frozenset({"delete"}),
-        "manage_webhooks": frozenset({"delete"}),
-    }
-)
-
-_ACTION_DEFAULTS: Mapping[str, str] = MappingProxyType(
-    {
-        "manage_calendar": "list_events",
-        "manage_documents": "list",
-        "manage_research": "list",
-        "manage_tasks": "list",
-    }
-)
-
-_ACTION_ALIASES: Mapping[str, Mapping[str, str]] = MappingProxyType(
-    {
-        "manage_calendar": MappingProxyType(
-            {
-                "create": "create_event",
-                "update": "update_event",
-                "delete": "delete_event",
-                "list": "list_events",
-            }
-        ),
-        "manage_notes": MappingProxyType(
-            {
-                "create": "add",
-                "new": "add",
-                "save": "add",
-                "remind": "add",
-                "reminder": "add",
-                "remove": "delete",
-                "remove_item": "toggle_item",
-            }
-        ),
-    }
-)
-
-_LINE_ACTION_TOOLS = frozenset({"manage_memory", "manage_session"})
-
-
-def _action_from_content(tool_name: str, content: Any) -> str | None:
-    """Extract the action discriminator using the same accepted input shapes."""
-    if isinstance(content, Mapping):
-        payload: Any = dict(content)
-    elif isinstance(content, str):
-        raw = content.strip()
-        if tool_name in _LINE_ACTION_TOOLS and raw and not raw.startswith("{"):
-            return raw.splitlines()[0].strip().replace("-", "_").casefold() or None
-        try:
-            payload = json.loads(raw) if raw else {}
-        except (TypeError, ValueError):
-            return None
-    else:
-        payload = {}
-
-    if not isinstance(payload, dict):
-        return None
-    if (
-        len(payload) == 1
-        and isinstance(payload.get("body"), dict)
-        and "action" in payload["body"]
-    ):
-        payload = payload["body"]
-
-    action = payload.get("action")
-    if (
-        not action
-        and tool_name == "manage_calendar"
-        and isinstance(payload.get("events"), list)
-    ):
-        action = "create_event"
-    if not action and tool_name == "manage_tasks" and any(
-        payload.get(key) is not None
-        for key in ("task", "description", "schedule", "time", "day_of_week")
-    ):
-        action = "create"
-    if not isinstance(action, str) or not action.strip():
-        action = _ACTION_DEFAULTS.get(tool_name)
-    if not action:
-        return None
-    normalized = action.strip().replace("-", "_").casefold()
-    return _ACTION_ALIASES.get(tool_name, {}).get(normalized, normalized)
-
-
-def capabilities_for_action(tool_name: Any, content: Any) -> ToolCapabilities:
-    """Classify a sealed multiplexed action; ambiguous actions fail high."""
-    base = capabilities_for_tool(tool_name)
-    if not isinstance(tool_name, str):
-        return base
-
-    action = _action_from_content(tool_name, content)
-    destructive = action in _ACTION_DESTRUCTIVE.get(tool_name, ())
-    if tool_name not in _PRIVATE_ACTION_READS:
-        if not destructive:
-            return base
-        return ToolCapabilities(
-            frozenset(set(base.effects) | {ToolEffect.DESTRUCTIVE}),
-            base.result_integrity,
-            known=base.known,
-        )
-    if action in _PRIVATE_ACTION_READS[tool_name]:
-        return _capabilities(
-            ToolEffect.READ_PRIVATE,
-            result_integrity=ResultIntegrity.EXTERNAL_UNTRUSTED,
-        )
-    if action in _PRIVATE_ACTION_WRITES[tool_name]:
-        effects = set(base.effects)
-        if destructive:
-            effects.add(ToolEffect.DESTRUCTIVE)
-        return ToolCapabilities(
-            frozenset(effects),
-            ResultIntegrity.EXTERNAL_UNTRUSTED,
-            known=base.known,
-        )
-
-    return _capabilities(
-        ToolEffect.READ_PRIVATE,
-        ToolEffect.WRITE_PRIVATE,
-        result_integrity=ResultIntegrity.EXTERNAL_UNTRUSTED,
-    )
-
-
-def tool_result_is_successful(result: Any) -> bool:
-    """Return whether a result actually introduced successful tool output."""
-    return bool(
-        isinstance(result, dict)
-        and not result.get("blocked")
-        and not result.get("approval_required")
-        and not result.get("error")
-        and result.get("exit_code") in (None, 0)
-        and result.get("success") is not False
-    )
-
-
-def tool_result_should_arm_gate(
-    tool_name: Any,
-    result: Any,
-    content: Any = None,
-) -> bool:
-    """Return whether a result introduced non-system content to the model.
-
-    A blocked/approval placeholder and a genuinely content-free failure do not
-    change authority. Once a non-system tool returns text or structured data
-    that will be folded into model context, however, failure status cannot make
-    that payload trusted: MCP ``isError`` text, provider exception messages,
-    and HTTP error bodies are all attacker-controlled input surfaces.
-    """
-    if not isinstance(result, dict):
-        return False
-    if result.get("blocked") or result.get("approval_required"):
-        return False
-    # A producer that knows a particular response body came from a remote or
-    # stored source overrides a coarse static SYSTEM default.
-    if result.get("untrusted_content") is True:
-        return True
-    capabilities = capabilities_for_action(tool_name, content)
-    if capabilities.result_integrity is ResultIntegrity.SYSTEM:
-        return False
-    if tool_result_is_successful(result):
-        return True
-    # ``format_tool_result`` serializes every additional structured field, so
-    # a fixed allowlist here would inevitably miss model-visible payloads such
-    # as ``details``, ``events``, or provider-specific response keys. Exclude
-    # only status/policy controls that carry no producer content; any other
-    # non-empty field crosses the same integrity boundary even on failure.
-    non_content_keys = frozenset(
-        {
-            "approval_required",
-            "blocked",
-            "exit_code",
-            "policy",
-            "success",
-            "untrusted_content",
-        }
-    )
-    return any(
-        key not in non_content_keys and value not in (None, "", [], {}, ())
-        for key, value in result.items()
-    )
-
-
-POST_EXTERNAL_BLOCKED_EFFECTS = frozenset(
-    {
-        ToolEffect.READ_PRIVATE,
-        ToolEffect.WRITE_WORKSPACE,
-        ToolEffect.WRITE_PRIVATE,
-        ToolEffect.EXECUTE_CODE,
-        ToolEffect.NETWORK_EGRESS,
-        ToolEffect.EXTERNAL_SIDE_EFFECT,
-        ToolEffect.UI_SIDE_EFFECT,
-        ToolEffect.ADMIN_CHANGE,
-        ToolEffect.DESTRUCTIVE,
-    }
-)
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class ToolGateDecision:
-    allowed: bool
-    reason: str | None = None
-
-
-_EXTERNAL_MESSAGE_SOURCES = frozenset(
-    {
-        "injected research context",
-        "prefetched search context",
-        "research context",
-        "web search results",
-        "youtube transcript",
-    }
-)
-_EXTERNAL_MESSAGE_SOURCE_PREFIXES = ("web page:",)
-
-
-def messages_contain_external_untrusted_context(messages: Iterable[dict]) -> bool:
-    """Detect explicitly labelled external context already present in a run."""
-    for message in messages or ():
-        if not isinstance(message, dict):
-            continue
-        metadata = message.get("metadata")
-        if not isinstance(metadata, dict) or metadata.get("trusted") is not False:
-            continue
-        gate_marker = metadata.get("tool_gate_untrusted")
-        if gate_marker is True:
-            return True
-        if gate_marker is False:
-            # Explicit current-format opt-outs are authoritative.  The source
-            # label heuristics below exist only for older saved wrappers that
-            # predate the marker.
-            continue
-        if metadata.get("provenance_origin") == "external":
-            return True
-        source = metadata.get("source")
-        if not isinstance(source, str):
-            continue
-        normalized_source = source.strip().casefold()
-        if normalized_source in _EXTERNAL_MESSAGE_SOURCES:
-            return True
-        if normalized_source.startswith(_EXTERNAL_MESSAGE_SOURCE_PREFIXES):
-            return True
-    return False
-
-
-@dataclass
-class ToolRunSecurityContext:
-    """Server-owned integrity state for one agent run."""
-
-    external_untrusted_context_seen: bool = False
-    external_sources: list[str] = field(default_factory=list)
-    run_id: str = field(default_factory=lambda: uuid.uuid4().hex)
-    # Task-scope approval sets this for the resumed in-memory run. Chat-scope
-    # approval is projected from the server-owned session history marker below.
-    # The bypass affects only this automatic gate; current tool policy, ownership,
-    # workspace confinement, and execution/sandbox restrictions still apply.
-    approval_gate_bypassed: bool = False
-
-    def observe_messages(self, messages: Iterable[dict]) -> None:
-        """Apply server-owned chat scope and promote untrusted prompt context."""
-        message_list = list(messages or ())
-        if any(
-            isinstance(message, dict)
-            and isinstance(message.get("metadata"), dict)
-            and message["metadata"].get(
-                CHAT_SESSION_APPROVAL_CONTEXT_MARKER
-            ) is True
-            for message in message_list
-        ):
-            self.approval_gate_bypassed = True
-        if messages_contain_external_untrusted_context(message_list):
-            self.external_untrusted_context_seen = True
-
-    def decision_for(self, tool_name: Any, content: Any = None) -> ToolGateDecision:
-        if self.approval_gate_bypassed:
-            return ToolGateDecision(True)
-        if not self.external_untrusted_context_seen:
-            return ToolGateDecision(True)
-        capabilities = capabilities_for_action(tool_name, content)
-        blocked_effects = capabilities.effects & POST_EXTERNAL_BLOCKED_EFFECTS
-        if capabilities.known and not blocked_effects:
-            return ToolGateDecision(True)
-        effects = ", ".join(sorted(effect.value for effect in blocked_effects))
-        if not capabilities.known:
-            effects = "unknown/high-impact"
-        return ToolGateDecision(
-            False,
-            (
-                "External untrusted context has already influenced this run. "
-                f"Tool '{tool_name}' requires a separate user-authorized action "
-                f"because it can cause {effects}."
-            ),
-        )
-
-    def observe_tool_result(
-        self,
-        tool_name: Any,
-        result: Any,
-        content: Any = None,
-    ) -> None:
-        if not tool_result_should_arm_gate(tool_name, result, content):
-            return
-        self.external_untrusted_context_seen = True
-        if isinstance(tool_name, str) and tool_name not in self.external_sources:
-            self.external_sources.append(tool_name)
-
-
-def blocked_tool_result(tool_name: Any, reason: str) -> tuple[str, dict]:
-    return (
-        f"{tool_name}: BLOCKED",
-        {
-            "error": reason,
-            "exit_code": 1,
-            "blocked": True,
-            "policy": "external_untrusted_context",
-        },
-    )

src/tool_execution.py

@@ -27,24 +27,10 @@ from src.tool_security import (
     is_public_blocked_tool,
     owner_is_admin_or_single_user,
 )
-from src.tool_capabilities import ToolRunSecurityContext, blocked_tool_result
-from src.tool_approvals import ExactToolApproval
 from src.tool_policy import ToolPolicy
 from src.constants import MAX_OUTPUT_CHARS, MAX_READ_CHARS, MAX_DIFF_LINES, DATA_DIR
 from src.tool_utils import _truncate, get_mcp_manager
 
-
-class _MissingToolSecurityContext:
-    pass
-
-
-class _NoToolSecurityContext:
-    """Explicit sentinel for non-agent callers that have no run provenance."""
-
-
-_MISSING_TOOL_SECURITY_CONTEXT = _MissingToolSecurityContext()
-NO_TOOL_SECURITY_CONTEXT = _NoToolSecurityContext()
-
 # Persistent working directory for agent subprocesses.
 # Resolves to <repo_root>/data, which is the bind-mounted volume in Docker
 # (/app/data) and the local data directory for manual installs.
@@ -568,19 +554,10 @@ async def _document_tool_dispatch(
     content: str,
     session_id: Optional[str] = None,
     owner: Optional[str] = None,
-    document_id: Optional[str] = None,
-    document_version: Optional[int] = None,
-    document_digest: Optional[str] = None,
 ) -> Optional[Dict]:
     """Route a document tool through TOOL_HANDLERS with the right ctx shape."""
     from src.agent_tools import TOOL_HANDLERS
-    ctx = {
+    ctx = {"session_id": session_id, "owner": owner}
-        "session_id": session_id,
-        "owner": owner,
-        "doc_id": document_id,
-        "expected_document_version": document_version,
-        "expected_document_digest": document_digest,
-    }
     if tool in TOOL_HANDLERS:
         return await TOOL_HANDLERS[tool](content, ctx)
     return None
@@ -598,12 +575,6 @@ async def execute_tool_block(
     progress_cb: Optional[Callable[[Dict], Awaitable[None]]] = None,
     workspace: Optional[str] = None,
     tool_policy: Optional[Any] = None,
-    security_context: (
-        ToolRunSecurityContext
-        | _NoToolSecurityContext
-        | _MissingToolSecurityContext
-    ) = _MISSING_TOOL_SECURITY_CONTEXT,
-    exact_approval: Optional[ExactToolApproval] = None,
 ) -> Tuple[str, Dict]:
     """Execute a single tool block. Returns (description, result_dict).
 
@@ -611,104 +582,6 @@ async def execute_tool_block(
     cwd confine to it) for the duration of this call, then delegate. Reset on the
     way out so the binding never leaks to the next tool call.
     """
-    if security_context is _MISSING_TOOL_SECURITY_CONTEXT:
-        raise TypeError(
-            "execute_tool_block requires security_context; pass a "
-            "ToolRunSecurityContext or NO_TOOL_SECURITY_CONTEXT explicitly"
-        )
-    if (
-        not isinstance(security_context, ToolRunSecurityContext)
-        and security_context is not NO_TOOL_SECURITY_CONTEXT
-    ):
-        raise TypeError(
-            "security_context must be a ToolRunSecurityContext or "
-            "NO_TOOL_SECURITY_CONTEXT"
-        )
-
-    approval_claimed = False
-    if exact_approval is not None:
-        if (
-            not isinstance(security_context, ToolRunSecurityContext)
-            or not security_context.external_untrusted_context_seen
-            or not exact_approval.pending.external_untrusted_context_seen
-        ):
-            return (
-                f"{getattr(block, 'tool_type', None)}: BLOCKED",
-                {
-                    "error": "Exact-action approval requires an armed run security context.",
-                    "exit_code": 1,
-                    "blocked": True,
-                    "policy": "exact_tool_approval",
-                },
-            )
-        if (
-            exact_approval.pending.tool_name
-            in {"edit_document", "suggest_document", "update_document"}
-            and (
-                not exact_approval.pending.document_id
-                or exact_approval.pending.document_version is None
-                or not exact_approval.pending.document_digest
-            )
-        ):
-            return (
-                f"{getattr(block, 'tool_type', None)}: BLOCKED",
-                {
-                    "error": (
-                        "The approved document action has no sealed target and "
-                        "cannot be executed."
-                    ),
-                    "exit_code": 1,
-                    "blocked": True,
-                    "policy": "exact_tool_approval",
-                },
-            )
-        sealed_workspace = exact_approval.pending.workspace
-        if sealed_workspace and vet_workspace(sealed_workspace) != sealed_workspace:
-            return (
-                f"{getattr(block, 'tool_type', None)}: BLOCKED",
-                {
-                    "error": (
-                        "The approved workspace is no longer a valid safe "
-                        "directory. Review the action again."
-                    ),
-                    "exit_code": 1,
-                    "blocked": True,
-                    "policy": "exact_tool_approval",
-                },
-            )
-        approval_claimed = exact_approval.claim(
-            owner=owner,
-            session_id=session_id,
-            tool_name=getattr(block, "tool_type", None),
-            content=getattr(block, "content", None),
-            workspace=workspace,
-        )
-        if not approval_claimed:
-            return (
-                f"{getattr(block, 'tool_type', None)}: BLOCKED",
-                {
-                    "error": "The exact-action approval did not match this tool request.",
-                    "exit_code": 1,
-                    "blocked": True,
-                    "policy": "exact_tool_approval",
-                },
-            )
-
-    if isinstance(security_context, ToolRunSecurityContext) and not approval_claimed:
-        decision = security_context.decision_for(
-            getattr(block, "tool_type", None),
-            getattr(block, "content", None),
-        )
-        if not decision.allowed:
-            logger.warning(
-                "External-context policy blocked tool=%r",
-                getattr(block, "tool_type", None),
-            )
-            return blocked_tool_result(
-                getattr(block, "tool_type", None),
-                decision.reason or "Tool blocked by external-context policy.",
-            )
-
     token = _active_workspace.set(workspace or None)
     try:
         output = await _execute_tool_block_impl(
@@ -718,28 +591,7 @@ async def execute_tool_block(
             owner=owner,
             progress_cb=progress_cb,
             tool_policy=tool_policy,
-            approved_document_id=(
-                exact_approval.pending.document_id
-                if approval_claimed
-                else None
-            ),
-            approved_document_version=(
-                exact_approval.pending.document_version
-                if approval_claimed
-                else None
-            ),
-            approved_document_digest=(
-                exact_approval.pending.document_digest
-                if approval_claimed
-                else None
-            ),
         )
-        if isinstance(security_context, ToolRunSecurityContext):
-            security_context.observe_tool_result(
-                getattr(block, "tool_type", None),
-                output[1],
-                getattr(block, "content", None),
-            )
         return output
     finally:
         _active_workspace.reset(token)
@@ -752,9 +604,6 @@ async def _execute_tool_block_impl(
     owner: Optional[str] = None,
     progress_cb: Optional[Callable[[Dict], Awaitable[None]]] = None,
     tool_policy: Optional[Any] = None,
-    approved_document_id: Optional[str] = None,
-    approved_document_version: Optional[int] = None,
-    approved_document_digest: Optional[str] = None,
 ) -> Tuple[str, Dict]:
     """Execute a single tool block. Returns (description, result_dict).
 
@@ -916,15 +765,7 @@ async def _execute_tool_block_impl(
     elif tool in ("create_document", "update_document", "edit_document",
                   "suggest_document", "manage_documents"):
         desc = f"{tool}: {content.split(chr(10))[0][:80]}"
-        result = await _document_tool_dispatch(
+        result = await _document_tool_dispatch(tool, content, session_id, owner) \
-            tool,
-            content,
-            session_id,
-            owner,
-            document_id=approved_document_id,
-            document_version=approved_document_version,
-            document_digest=approved_document_digest,
-        ) \
             or {"error": f"{tool}: execution failed", "exit_code": 1}
         if tool in ("edit_document", "suggest_document") and "title" in (result or {}):
             desc = f"{tool}: {result.get('title', '')}"

src/tools/cookbook.py

@@ -954,11 +954,7 @@ async def _cookbook_kill_session(session_id: str, *, remote_host: str = "",
             resp = await client.post(f"{_INTERNAL_BASE}/api/shell/exec",
                                      json={"command": cmd}, headers=headers)
         if resp.status_code >= 400:
-            return {
+            return {"error": f"shell/exec returned HTTP {resp.status_code}: {resp.text[:200]}", "exit_code": 1}
-                "error": f"shell/exec returned HTTP {resp.status_code}: {resp.text[:200]}",
-                "exit_code": 1,
-                "untrusted_content": True,
-            }
         try:
             data = resp.json()
         except Exception:
@@ -1087,11 +1083,7 @@ async def do_tail_serve_output(content: str, owner: Optional[str] = None) -> Dic
             resp = await client.post(f"{_INTERNAL_BASE}/api/shell/exec",
                                      json={"command": cmd}, headers=headers)
         if resp.status_code >= 400:
-            return {
+            return {"error": f"shell/exec returned HTTP {resp.status_code}: {resp.text[:200]}", "exit_code": 1}
-                "error": f"shell/exec returned HTTP {resp.status_code}: {resp.text[:200]}",
-                "exit_code": 1,
-                "untrusted_content": True,
-            }
         data = resp.json() if resp.content else {}
         output_text = (data.get("stdout") or "").strip()
         stderr_text = (data.get("stderr") or "").strip()

src/tools/research.py

@@ -123,11 +123,7 @@ async def do_trigger_research(content: str, owner: Optional[str] = None) -> Dict
             resp = await client.post(f"{_INTERNAL_BASE}/api/research/start",
                                      json=payload, headers=_internal_headers(owner))
         if resp.status_code >= 400:
-            return {
+            return {"error": f"research/start returned HTTP {resp.status_code}: {resp.text[:200]}", "exit_code": 1}
-                "error": f"research/start returned HTTP {resp.status_code}: {resp.text[:200]}",
-                "exit_code": 1,
-                "untrusted_content": True,
-            }
         data = resp.json()
         sid = data.get("session_id", "?")
         return {

src/tools/system.py

@@ -725,7 +725,6 @@ async def do_app_api(content: str, owner: Optional[str] = None) -> Dict:
                 "status_code": resp.status_code,
                 "body": preview,
                 "exit_code": 1,
-                "untrusted_content": True,
             }
         return {
             "output": f"{method} {path} -> {resp.status_code}\n{preview}",

src/user_time.py

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ from __future__ import annotations
 
 import re
 from contextvars import ContextVar
-from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone, tzinfo
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
 from typing import Dict, Optional
 
 
@@ -65,31 +65,19 @@ def format_utc_offset(offset_min: Optional[int]) -> str:
     return f"{sign}{hours:02d}:{minutes:02d}"
 
 
-def _zoneinfo_from_name():
+def user_timezone() -> timezone:
-    """Return ZoneInfo for the request's IANA name, or None if missing/invalid."""
+    """Return the best known user timezone as a fixed-offset tzinfo."""
-    name = get_user_tz_name()
-    if not name:
-        return None
-    try:
-        from zoneinfo import ZoneInfo
-        return ZoneInfo(name)
-    except Exception:
-        return None
-
-
-def user_timezone() -> tzinfo:
-    """Return the best known user timezone.
-
-    A valid IANA name wins over x-tz-offset. The offset is a fixed number and
-    can disagree with the name (wrong sign, stale client); the name carries DST.
-    """
-    zone = _zoneinfo_from_name()
-    if zone is not None:
-        return zone
     offset = get_user_tz_offset()
-    if offset is not None:
+    if offset is None:
-        return timezone(timedelta(minutes=offset))
+        name = get_user_tz_name()
-    return datetime.now().astimezone().tzinfo or timezone.utc
+        if name:
+            try:
+                from zoneinfo import ZoneInfo
+                return ZoneInfo(name)
+            except Exception:
+                pass
+        return datetime.now().astimezone().tzinfo or timezone.utc
+    return timezone(timedelta(minutes=offset))
 
 
 def now_user_local(now_utc: Optional[datetime] = None) -> datetime:
@@ -112,13 +100,14 @@ def _clock_label(dt: datetime) -> str:
 
 def timezone_label(dt: Optional[datetime] = None) -> str:
     """Return a concise display label such as Australia/Brisbane, UTC+10:00."""
-    if dt is None:
+    offset = get_user_tz_offset()
-        dt = now_user_local()
+    if offset is None:
-    offset = int((dt.utcoffset() or timedelta()).total_seconds() // 60)
+        if dt is None:
+            dt = datetime.now().astimezone()
+        offset = int((dt.utcoffset() or timedelta()).total_seconds() // 60)
     offset_label = f"UTC{format_utc_offset(offset)}"
-    if _zoneinfo_from_name() is not None:
+    name = get_user_tz_name()
-        return f"{get_user_tz_name()}, {offset_label}"
+    return f"{name}, {offset_label}" if name else offset_label
-    return offset_label
 
 
 def current_datetime_prompt(now_utc: Optional[datetime] = None) -> str:

start-macos.sh

@@ -34,10 +34,6 @@ fi
 # values (APP_PORT / APP_BIND), then built-in defaults.
 PORT="${ODYSSEUS_PORT:-${APP_PORT:-7860}}"   # 7860, not 7000 — macOS AirPlay Receiver holds 7000.
 HOST="${ODYSSEUS_HOST:-${APP_BIND:-127.0.0.1}}" # Set APP_BIND=0.0.0.0 in .env for LAN/Tailscale access.
-# The port only reaches uvicorn as a flag, so export it too: everything that
-# builds a URL for this instance — internal_api_base(), the companion pairing
-# code, the MCP OAuth callback — reads APP_PORT and would otherwise assume 7000.
-export APP_PORT="$PORT"
 PROBE_HOST="$HOST"
 if [ "$PROBE_HOST" = "0.0.0.0" ] || [ "$PROBE_HOST" = "::" ]; then
     PROBE_HOST="127.0.0.1"

static/app.js

@@ -10,9 +10,9 @@ import modelsModule from './js/models.js?v=20260715startupcalm2';
 import ragModule from './js/rag.js';
 import presetsModule from './js/presets.js';
 import searchModule from './js/search.js';
-import chatModule from './js/chat.js?v=20260819approvalcontrol1';
+import chatModule from './js/chat.js?v=20260801fix1';
-import compareModule from './js/compare/index.js?v=20260819approvalcontrol1';
+import compareModule from './js/compare/index.js?v=20260723compareicon2';
-import documentModule from './js/document.js?v=20260815approvalsave1';
+import documentModule from './js/document.js?v=20260722emailfastindex1';
 import searchChatModule from './js/search-chat.js';
 import { makeWindowDraggable } from './js/windowDrag.js';
 import {
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ import {
   settleSessionHydration
 } from './js/startupShell.js';
 import markdownModule from './js/markdown.js';
-import chatRenderer from './js/chatRenderer.js?v=20260819approvalcontrol1';
+import chatRenderer from './js/chatRenderer.js?v=20260722emailfastindex1';
 import sessionModule from './js/sessions.js';
 import memoryModule from './js/memory.js?v=20260722memoryloading1';
 import voiceRecorderModule from './js/voiceRecorder.js';
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ import tasksModule from './js/tasks.js?v=20260723tasksbulkfeedback1';
 import calendarModule from './js/calendar.js';
 import notesModule from './js/notes.js';
 import adminModule from './js/admin.js?v=20260716openrouter3';
-import settingsModule from './js/settings.js?v=20260815approvalsave1';
+import settingsModule from './js/settings.js?v=20260722emailfastindex1';
 // Eagerly bind unified minimize/restore behavior across all tool modals.
 import './js/modalManager.js?v=20260723compareicon2';
 // Desktop window tiling — drag a modal near an edge/corner to snap.
@@ -50,7 +50,6 @@ import * as researchPanelModule from './js/research/panel.js?v=20260630researcht
 import ttsModule from './js/tts-ai.js';
 import spinnerModule from './js/spinner.js';
 import { initKeyboardShortcuts } from './js/keyboard-shortcuts.js';
-import { getSettings } from './js/appConfig.js';
 import { initSidebarLayout, syncRailSide } from './js/sidebar-layout.js?v=20260715startupclean';
 import { initSectionCollapse, initSectionDrag } from './js/section-management.js';
 
@@ -1519,11 +1518,13 @@ function initializeEventListeners() {
     })
     .catch(() => {});
 
-  // Hide Gallery when image generation is disabled in settings.
+  // Hide Gallery when image generation is disabled in settings
-  // getSettings() consumes the login prefetch itself, so every other module
+  const _prefetchedSettings = sessionStorage.getItem('ody-prefetch-settings');
-  // that asks for settings this load gets the same snapshot without a request.
+  sessionStorage.removeItem('ody-prefetch-settings');
-  window._initSettingsReady = getSettings()
+  window._initSettingsReady = (_prefetchedSettings
-    .then(settings => {
+    ? Promise.resolve(JSON.parse(_prefetchedSettings))
+    : fetch(`${API_BASE}/api/auth/settings`, { credentials: 'same-origin' }).then(r => r.json())
+  ).then(settings => {
       // NOTE: image_gen_enabled only governs *generating* images in chat — the
       // tool is blocked server-side (chat_routes / agent_loop). The Gallery
       // holds uploads and past images too, so it stays visible regardless;
@@ -3704,7 +3705,7 @@ function startOdysseusApp() {
   modelsModule.init(API_BASE);
   ragModule.init(API_BASE);
   presetsModule.init(API_BASE);
-  searchModule.init();
+  searchModule.init(API_BASE);
   chatModule.init(API_BASE);
   chatModule.initListeners();
   groupModule.init(API_BASE);

static/index.html

@@ -231,11 +231,23 @@
       }
     }
   </style>
-  <!-- KaTeX and Mermaid are vendored in /static/lib and pulled in by
+  <!-- KaTeX CSS is loaded with media="print" so it doesn't block render,
-       static/js/markdown.js the first time a page actually renders math or a
+       then flipped to "all" via JS after load. Mermaid init runs once the
-       ```mermaid fence. They used to load here from cdn.jsdelivr.net on every
+       library finishes loading. Both hooks are wired via addEventListener
-       page load, which cost ~985 KB on the wire, broke offline installs, and
+       below (inline onload= attrs are blocked by CSP script-src-attr). -->
-       announced every session to a third party. -->
+  <link id="katex-css" rel="stylesheet" href="https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/katex@0.16.22/dist/katex.min.css" media="print">
+  <script async src="https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/katex@0.16.22/dist/katex.min.js"></script>
+  <script id="mermaid-script" async src="https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/mermaid@11/dist/mermaid.min.js"></script>
+  <script nonce="{{CSP_NONCE}}">
+    (function(){
+      var k = document.getElementById('katex-css');
+      if (k) k.addEventListener('load', function(){ k.media = 'all'; }, { once: true });
+      var m = document.getElementById('mermaid-script');
+      if (m) m.addEventListener('load', function(){
+        if (window.odysseusInitMermaid) window.odysseusInitMermaid();
+      }, { once: true });
+    })();
+  </script>
   <!-- Preload the two faces first paint actually uses: Fira Code 400 and 600,
        the app font and the weight the sidebar and header text render at. They
        are declared in style.css, so without a hint they are only discovered
@@ -246,8 +258,8 @@
   <link rel="preload" as="font" type="font/woff2" crossorigin href="/static/fonts/FiraCode-Regular.woff2">
   <link rel="preload" as="font" type="font/woff2" crossorigin href="/static/fonts/FiraCode-SemiBold.woff2">
   <link rel="stylesheet" href="/static/style.css?v=20260808startupshell1">
-  <link rel="modulepreload" href="/static/app.js?v=20260815toolapproval4">
+  <link rel="modulepreload" href="/static/app.js?v=20260808startupshell1">
-  <link rel="modulepreload" href="/static/js/chat.js?v=20260815toolapproval4">
+  <link rel="modulepreload" href="/static/js/chat.js?v=20260801fix1">
   <link rel="modulepreload" href="/static/js/ui.js">
   <link rel="modulepreload" href="/static/js/sessions.js">
   <link rel="modulepreload" href="/static/js/markdown.js">
@@ -1409,55 +1421,6 @@
       </div>
       <div class="settings-layout">
         <div class="settings-sidebar">
-          <button
-            type="button"
-            class="settings-sidebar-toggle"
-            id="settings-sidebar-toggle"
-            aria-label="Collapse settings navigation"
-            title="Collapse settings navigation"
-          >
-            <svg class="settings-sidebar-toggle-collapse" width="12" height="12" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2.3" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" aria-hidden="true">
-              <polyline points="15 18 9 12 15 6"></polyline>
-            </svg>
-            <svg class="settings-sidebar-toggle-expand" width="12" height="12" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2.3" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" aria-hidden="true">
-              <polyline points="9 18 15 12 9 6"></polyline>
-            </svg>
-          </button>
-
-          <div
-            class="settings-sidebar-resize-handle"
-            id="settings-sidebar-resize-handle"
-            role="separator"
-            aria-orientation="vertical"
-            aria-label="Resize settings navigation"
-            aria-valuemin="150"
-            aria-valuemax="340"
-            aria-valuenow="220"
-            tabindex="0"
-          ></div>
-
-          <div class="settings-sidebar-content">
-          <div class="settings-nav-search-wrap">
-            <svg class="settings-nav-search-icon" width="13" height="13" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" aria-hidden="true">
-              <circle cx="11" cy="11" r="7"></circle>
-              <path d="M20 20l-4-4"></path>
-            </svg>
-            <input
-              type="search"
-              id="settings-nav-search"
-              class="settings-nav-search"
-              placeholder="Find settings…"
-              autocomplete="off"
-              aria-label="Find settings"
-              aria-controls="settings-nav-search-results"
-            />
-            <div
-              id="settings-nav-search-results"
-              class="settings-nav-search-results hidden"
-              role="listbox"
-              aria-label="Settings search results"
-            ></div>
-          </div>
           <!-- Section 1: AI plumbing (Add Models → AI Defaults → Search) -->
           <button class="settings-nav-item active" data-settings-tab="services">
             <svg width="15" height="15" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2.6" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round"><path d="M12 5v14"/><path d="M5 12h14"/></svg>
@@ -1518,10 +1481,9 @@
             <span>Users</span>
           </button>
           <button class="settings-nav-item admin-only" data-settings-tab="system">
-            <svg width="15" height="15" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round"><circle cx="12" cy="12" r="3"/><path d="M19.4 15a1.65 1.65 0 0 0 .33 1.82l.06.06a2 2 0 0 1-2.83 2.83l-.06-.06a1.65 1.65 0 0 0-1.82-.33 1.65 1.65 0 0 0-1 1.51V21a2 2 0 0 1-4 0v-.09A1.65 1.65 0 0 0 9 19.4a1.65 1.65 0 0 0-1.82.33l-.06.06a2 2 0 0 1-2.83-2.83l.06-.06A1.65 1.65 0 0 0 4.68 15a1.65 1.65 0 0 0-1.51-1H3a2 2 0 0 1 0-4h.09A1.65 1.65 0 0 0 4.6 9a1.65 1.65 0 0 0-.33-1.82l-.06-.06a2 2 0 0 1 2.83-2.83l.06.06A1.65 1.65 0 0 0 9 4.68a1.65 1.65 0 0 0 1-1.51V3a2 2 0 0 1 4 0v-.09a1.65 1.65 0 0 0 1 1.51 1.65 1.65 0 0 0 1.82-.33l.06-.06a2 2 0 0 1 2.83 2.83l-.06.06A1.65 1.65 0 0 0 19.4 9a1.65 1.65 0 0 0 1.51 1H21a2 2 0 0 1 0 4h-.09A1.65 1.65 0 0 0 19.4 15z"/></svg>
+            <svg width="15" height="15" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round"><circle cx="12" cy="12" r="3"/><path d="M19.4 15a1.65 1.65 0 0 0 .33 1.82l.06.06a2 2 0 0 1-2.83 2.83l-.06-.06a1.65 1.65 0 0 0-1.82-.33 1.65 1.65 0 0 0-1 1.51V21a2 2 0 0 1-4 0v-.09A1.65 1.65 0 0 0 9 19.4a1.65 1.65 0 0 0-1.82.33l-.06.06a2 2 0 0 1-2.83-2.83l.06-.06A1.65 1.65 0 0 0 4.68 15a1.65 1.65 0 0 0-1.51-1H3a2 2 0 0 1 0-4h.09A1.65 1.65 0 0 0 4.6 9a1.65 1.65 0 0 0-.33-1.82l-.06-.06a2 2 0 0 1 2.83-2.83l.06.06A1.65 1.65 0 0 0 9 4.68a1.65 1.65 0 0 0 1-1.51V3a2 2 0 0 1 4 0v.09a1.65 1.65 0 0 0 1 1.51 1.65 1.65 0 0 0 1.82-.33l.06-.06a2 2 0 0 1 2.83 2.83l-.06.06A1.65 1.65 0 0 0 19.4 9a1.65 1.65 0 0 0 1.51 1H21a2 2 0 0 1 0 4h-.09a1.65 1.65 0 0 0-1.51 1z"/></svg>
             <span>System</span>
           </button>
-          </div>
         </div>
         <div class="settings-panels">
 
@@ -1542,6 +1504,13 @@
                 <span class="adm-model-logo" id="set-defaultModelSelect-logo" style="display:inline-flex;align-items:center;justify-content:center;width:18px;height:18px;flex-shrink:0;opacity:0.9;color:var(--fg);"></span>
                 <select id="set-defaultModelSelect" class="settings-select"></select>
               </div>
+              <div class="settings-row" style="align-items:flex-start;" hidden>
+                <label class="settings-label" style="margin-top:6px;">Fallbacks</label>
+                <div style="flex:1;display:flex;flex-direction:column;gap:6px;">
+                  <div id="set-defaultFallbacks" class="settings-fallbacks"></div>
+                  <button type="button" class="settings-fallback-add" id="set-defaultAddFallback" title="Add a model to try if the one above fails">+ Add fallback</button>
+                </div>
+              </div>
               <div id="set-defaultChatMsg" style="font-size:11px;color:color-mix(in srgb, var(--fg) 45%, transparent);"></div>
             </div>
           </div>
@@ -2570,20 +2539,20 @@
 <script type="module" src="/static/js/search.js"></script>
 <script type="module" src="/static/js/spinner.js"></script>
 <script type="module" src="/static/js/tts-ai.js"></script>
-<script type="module" src="/static/js/document.js?v=20260815approvalsave1"></script>
+<script type="module" src="/static/js/document.js?v=20260722emailfastindex1"></script>
 <script type="module" src="/static/js/gallery.js?v=20260708match1"></script>
-<script type="module" src="/static/js/chatRenderer.js?v=20260819approvalcontrol1"></script>
+<script type="module" src="/static/js/chatRenderer.js?v=20260722emailfastindex1"></script>
 <script type="module" src="/static/js/codeRunner.js"></script>
-<script type="module" src="/static/js/chatStream.js?v=20260819approvalcontrol1"></script>
+<script type="module" src="/static/js/chatStream.js?v=20260722emailfastindex1"></script>
-  <script type="module" src="/static/js/chat.js?v=20260819approvalcontrol1"></script>
+  <script type="module" src="/static/js/chat.js?v=20260801fix1"></script>
 <script type="module" src="/static/js/cookbook.js"></script>
 <script src="/static/js/cookbookSchedule.js"></script>
 <script type="module" src="/static/js/search-chat.js"></script>
 <script type="module" src="/static/js/theme.js"></script>
 <script type="module" src="/static/js/censor.js"></script>
-<script type="module" src="/static/js/settings.js?v=20260815approvalsave1"></script>
+<script type="module" src="/static/js/settings.js?v=20260723compareicon1"></script>
 <script type="module" src="/static/js/assistant.js"></script>
-<script type="module" src="/static/app.js?v=20260815toolapproval4"></script>  <!-- app.js must be LAST -->
+<script type="module" src="/static/app.js?v=20260808startupshell1"></script>  <!-- app.js must be LAST -->
   <script type="module" src="/static/js/init.js?v=20260715freshroot3"></script>
 <script type="module" src="/static/js/a11y.js"></script>
 <script nonce="{{CSP_NONCE}}">if('serviceWorker' in navigator){navigator.serviceWorker.register('/static/sw.js').catch(()=>{});}</script>

static/js/admin.js

@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ import settingsModule from './settings.js';
 import { providerLogo, providerLogoFromUrl } from './providers.js';
 import { sortModelObjects } from './modelSort.js';
 import { PROVIDER_DEVICE_FLOWS, formatDeviceFlowError, runProviderDeviceFlow } from './providerDeviceFlow.js';
-import { getSettings, getTools, invalidateSettings, invalidateTools } from './appConfig.js';
 
 let initialized = false;
 let modalEl = null;
@@ -346,7 +345,8 @@ function initSignupToggle() {
 
 function initShareDefaultsToggle() {
   const toggle = el('adm-shareDefaultsToggle');
-  getSettings()
+  fetch('/api/auth/settings', { credentials: 'same-origin' })
+    .then(r => r.json())
     .then(d => { toggle.checked = !!d.share_defaults_with_users; })
     .catch(e => console.warn('Settings fetch failed:', e));
   toggle.addEventListener('change', async () => {
@@ -361,9 +361,6 @@ function initShareDefaultsToggle() {
       toggle.checked = !!data.share_defaults_with_users;
     } catch (e) {
       toggle.checked = !toggle.checked;
-    } finally {
-      // Drop the shared snapshot: it still says what this toggle used to be.
-      invalidateSettings();
     }
   });
 }
@@ -1896,16 +1893,8 @@ async function loadBuiltinTools() {
   const list = el('adm-builtin-tools-list');
   if (!list) return;
   try {
-    // This panel is an editor, and its save posts the whole disabled list
+    const res = await fetch('/api/tools', { credentials: 'same-origin' });
-    // rebuilt from the checkboxes below. So it has to render authoritative
+    const data = await res.json();
-    // state: a snapshot that went stale out of band (the manage_settings tool,
-    // another tab) would be re-posted wholesale on the next unrelated toggle
-    // and would silently undo the newer state. refreshAll() calls this on every
-    // panel open, so drop the shared entry and refill it. The startup read that
-    // chatRenderer.js shares is unaffected; this panel just never edits a cache,
-    // which is the same rule the settings panel follows by reading directly.
-    invalidateTools();
-    const data = await getTools();
     const tools = data.tools || [];
     if (!tools.length) { list.innerHTML = '<div class="admin-empty">No tools found</div>'; return; }
 
@@ -1979,50 +1968,17 @@ async function loadBuiltinTools() {
       });
     });
 
-    // Merge only the user's intended changes onto authoritative server state.
+    // Helper: save disabled tools + update counters
-    // /api/tools replaces the full disabled list, so rebuilding it from this
+    async function _saveToolState() {
-    // panel's DOM can undo a change made by another tab or manage_settings
+      const allChecks = list.querySelectorAll('input[data-tool-id]');
-    // after the panel was opened.
+      const disabled = [];
-    async function _saveToolState(changes) {
+      allChecks.forEach(c => { if (!c.checked) disabled.push(c.dataset.toolId); });
-      invalidateTools();
+      await fetch('/api/tools', {
-      const latest = await getTools();
+        method: 'POST',
-      const state = new Map(
+        headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
-        (latest.tools || []).map(t => [t.id, !!t.enabled])
+        body: JSON.stringify({ disabled }),
-      );
+        credentials: 'same-origin',
-
+      });
-      for (const change of changes) {
-        if (state.has(change.id)) {
-          state.set(change.id, !!change.enabled);
-        }
-      }
-
-      const disabled = Array.from(state.entries())
-        .filter(([, enabled]) => !enabled)
-        .map(([id]) => id);
-
-      try {
-        const res = await fetch('/api/tools', {
-          method: 'POST',
-          headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
-          body: JSON.stringify({ disabled }),
-          credentials: 'same-origin',
-        });
-        if (!res.ok) throw new Error(`Failed to update tools (${res.status})`);
-
-        // Bring the still-open editor forward to the same merged snapshot so an
-        // out-of-band change is visible instead of leaving stale checkboxes.
-        list.querySelectorAll('input[data-tool-id]').forEach(c => {
-          if (state.has(c.dataset.toolId)) {
-            c.checked = state.get(c.dataset.toolId);
-          }
-        });
-        list.querySelectorAll('.admin-tool-category').forEach(_updateCatCounter);
-      } finally {
-        // This route persists disabled_tools into the settings store
-        // (routes/model_routes.py), so both snapshots are now stale.
-        invalidateTools();
-        invalidateSettings();
-      }
     }
     function _updateCatCounter(catEl) {
       if (!catEl) return;
@@ -2037,9 +1993,7 @@ async function loadBuiltinTools() {
     // Wire individual tool toggles
     list.querySelectorAll('input[data-tool-id]').forEach(chk => {
       chk.addEventListener('change', async () => {
-        await _saveToolState([
+        await _saveToolState();
-          { id: chk.dataset.toolId, enabled: chk.checked },
-        ]);
         _updateCatCounter(chk.closest('.admin-tool-category'));
       });
     });
@@ -2050,10 +2004,8 @@ async function loadBuiltinTools() {
         const catEl = chk.closest('.admin-tool-category');
         if (!catEl) return;
         const checked = chk.checked;
-        const changes = Array.from(catEl.querySelectorAll('input[data-tool-id]'))
-          .map(c => ({ id: c.dataset.toolId, enabled: checked }));
         catEl.querySelectorAll('input[data-tool-id]').forEach(c => { c.checked = checked; });
-        await _saveToolState(changes);
+        await _saveToolState();
         _updateCatCounter(catEl);
       });
     });

static/js/appConfig.js

@@ -1,86 +0,0 @@
-// static/js/appConfig.js
-//
-// One shared, invalidatable cache for the two config endpoints that every
-// module wants at startup.
-//
-// Before this, /api/auth/settings was fetched independently by six modules and
-// /api/tools by three, none of them aware of the others — 4 and 3 requests on a
-// single cold load. Worse than the requests: each caller could observe a
-// different snapshot of the same object, and chatRenderer.js is imported under
-// three different ?v= query strings, so it is three separate module instances
-// each issuing its own /api/tools fetch. Caching here fixes both, because the
-// cache lives in one module every instance imports by the same specifier.
-//
-// URLs are bare paths on purpose. The callers that used `${API_BASE}/api/...`
-// resolved to the identical URL — API_BASE is `window.location.origin`
-// (app.js) — so nothing about the request changes for them.
-//
-// WRITERS MUST INVALIDATE. Anything that POSTs /api/auth/settings calls
-// invalidateSettings(); anything that POSTs /api/tools calls invalidateTools()
-// *and* invalidateSettings(), because that route persists `disabled_tools`
-// into the same settings store (routes/model_routes.py). Miss one and the UI
-// serves a stale settings object for the rest of the session, which is worse
-// than the duplicate fetches this replaces.
-//
-// The resolved object is shared by reference, so treat it as read-only: copy
-// before mutating (`{ ...await getSettings() }`).
-
-// Written by login.html immediately before it redirects to '/', so the first
-// load after a login can skip the request entirely. Consumed once per page
-// load, by whichever module asks for settings first.
-const PREFETCH_KEY = 'ody-prefetch-settings';
-
-const _URLS = { settings: '/api/auth/settings', tools: '/api/tools' };
-const _cache = { settings: null, tools: null };
-
-function _readPrefetchedSettings() {
-  try {
-    const raw = sessionStorage.getItem(PREFETCH_KEY);
-    if (!raw) return null;
-    sessionStorage.removeItem(PREFETCH_KEY);
-    return JSON.parse(raw);
-  } catch (_) {
-    return null;
-  }
-}
-
-// A rejected promise must not stay in the slot. Plain `??=` memoisation would
-// keep it, so one transient blip during boot would leave keybinds, TTS and the
-// search provider on their defaults for the whole session with no retry. Clear
-// the slot on failure — unless a later invalidate/refetch already replaced it —
-// and rethrow, so every caller's existing .catch() still runs exactly as before.
-function _get(key) {
-  if (_cache[key]) return _cache[key];
-  const pending = fetch(_URLS[key], { credentials: 'same-origin' })
-    .then(r => r.json())
-    .catch(err => {
-      if (_cache[key] === pending) _cache[key] = null;
-      throw err;
-    });
-  _cache[key] = pending;
-  return pending;
-}
-
-/** GET /api/auth/settings, once per page load (or once per invalidation). */
-export function getSettings() {
-  if (!_cache.settings) {
-    const prefetched = _readPrefetchedSettings();
-    if (prefetched) _cache.settings = Promise.resolve(prefetched);
-  }
-  return _get('settings');
-}
-
-/** GET /api/tools, once per page load (or once per invalidation). */
-export function getTools() {
-  return _get('tools');
-}
-
-/** Call after any write that can change settings. */
-export function invalidateSettings() {
-  _cache.settings = null;
-}
-
-/** Call after any write that can change the tool enable/disable state. */
-export function invalidateTools() {
-  _cache.tools = null;
-}

static/js/chatModelProvenance.js

@@ -1,104 +0,0 @@
-/** Select and update the response holder for a route-provenance event. */
-export function applyModelRouteEventState(event, holder, roundHolder, defaultModel = '') {
-  const target = event && event.round && roundHolder ? roundHolder : holder;
-  if (!target) return null;
-
-  target._requestedModel = (
-    event.requested_model
-    || event.selected_model
-    || target._requestedModel
-    || defaultModel
-  );
-  target._actualModel = (
-    event.model
-    || event.answered_by
-    || target._actualModel
-    || target._requestedModel
-  );
-  const hasEndpointRoute = Boolean(
-    event.requested_endpoint_id
-    || event.selected_endpoint_id
-    || event.endpoint_id
-    || event.answered_by_endpoint_id
-    || event.requested_endpoint_label
-    || event.selected_endpoint_label
-    || event.endpoint_label
-    || event.answered_by_endpoint_label
-    || target._requestedEndpointLabel
-  );
-  if (hasEndpointRoute) {
-    target._requestedEndpointId = (
-      event.requested_endpoint_id
-      || event.selected_endpoint_id
-      || target._requestedEndpointId
-      || null
-    );
-    target._requestedEndpointLabel = (
-      event.requested_endpoint_label
-      || event.selected_endpoint_label
-      || target._requestedEndpointLabel
-      || 'Selected route'
-    );
-    target._actualEndpointId = (
-      event.endpoint_id
-      || event.answered_by_endpoint_id
-      || target._actualEndpointId
-      || target._requestedEndpointId
-      || null
-    );
-    target._actualEndpointLabel = (
-      event.endpoint_label
-      || event.answered_by_endpoint_label
-      || target._actualEndpointLabel
-      || target._requestedEndpointLabel
-    );
-  }
-  return target;
-}
-
-/** Copy the active route into the bubble created for the next Agent round. */
-export function inheritModelRouteState(holder, roundHolder, target, defaultModel = '') {
-  if (!target) return null;
-  const source = roundHolder || holder;
-  target._requestedModel = source?._requestedModel || defaultModel;
-  target._actualModel = source?._actualModel || target._requestedModel;
-  if (source?._requestedEndpointLabel || source?._actualEndpointLabel) {
-    target._requestedEndpointId = source?._requestedEndpointId || null;
-    target._requestedEndpointLabel = source?._requestedEndpointLabel || 'Selected route';
-    target._actualEndpointId = source?._actualEndpointId || target._requestedEndpointId;
-    target._actualEndpointLabel = source?._actualEndpointLabel || target._requestedEndpointLabel;
-  }
-  return target;
-}
-
-/** Apply final/metrics provenance to the active round, not the first bubble. */
-export function applyModelMetricsState(metrics, holder, roundHolder, defaultModel = '') {
-  const target = roundHolder || holder;
-  if (!target || !metrics) return target || null;
-  const roundModels = Array.isArray(metrics.round_models) ? metrics.round_models : [];
-  const roundModel = roundHolder && roundModels.length
-    ? roundModels[roundModels.length - 1]
-    : null;
-  target._requestedModel = metrics.requested_model || target._requestedModel || defaultModel;
-  target._actualModel = roundModel || metrics.model || target._actualModel || target._requestedModel;
-  const roundEndpointIds = Array.isArray(metrics.round_endpoint_ids) ? metrics.round_endpoint_ids : [];
-  const roundEndpointLabels = Array.isArray(metrics.round_endpoint_labels) ? metrics.round_endpoint_labels : [];
-  if (
-    metrics.requested_endpoint_label
-    || metrics.endpoint_label
-    || roundEndpointLabels.length
-    || target._requestedEndpointLabel
-  ) {
-    target._requestedEndpointId = metrics.requested_endpoint_id || target._requestedEndpointId || null;
-    target._requestedEndpointLabel = metrics.requested_endpoint_label || target._requestedEndpointLabel || 'Selected route';
-    const hasRoundEndpointId = Boolean(roundHolder && roundEndpointIds.length);
-    const hasRoundEndpointLabel = Boolean(roundHolder && roundEndpointLabels.length);
-    target._actualEndpointId = hasRoundEndpointId
-      ? roundEndpointIds[roundEndpointIds.length - 1]
-      : (metrics.endpoint_id || target._actualEndpointId || target._requestedEndpointId);
-    target._actualEndpointLabel = hasRoundEndpointLabel
-      ? roundEndpointLabels[roundEndpointLabels.length - 1]
-      : (metrics.endpoint_label || target._actualEndpointLabel || target._requestedEndpointLabel);
-  }
-  return target;
-}

static/js/chatRenderer.js

@@ -9,9 +9,7 @@ import { providerLogo, providerLabel } from './providers.js';
 import settingsModule from './settings.js';
 import spinnerModule from './spinner.js';
 import { bindMenuDismiss } from './escMenuStack.js';
-import { loadPanel } from './panels.js';
 import { matchModelKey } from './model/matchKey.js';
-import { getTools } from './appConfig.js';
 
 const SEARCH_ICON = '<svg viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2"><circle cx="11" cy="11" r="8"/><path d="M21 21l-4.35-4.35"/></svg>';
 const REPORT_ICON = '<svg width="14" height="14" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round"><path d="M14 2H6a2 2 0 0 0-2 2v16a2 2 0 0 0 2 2h12a2 2 0 0 0 2-2V8z"/><polyline points="14 2 14 8 20 8"/><line x1="16" y1="13" x2="8" y2="13"/><line x1="16" y1="17" x2="8" y2="17"/><line x1="10" y1="9" x2="8" y2="9"/></svg>';
@@ -447,12 +445,8 @@ function stripExecutedFence(match, tag, inline, body) {
 
 async function loadExecFenceRegex() {
   try {
-    // Shared with admin.js, and — more to the point — with the other copies of
+    const res = await fetch('/api/tools', { credentials: 'same-origin' });
-    // this module: chatRenderer.js is imported under three different ?v= query
+    const data = await res.json();
-    // strings, so it is instantiated three times per load and used to issue
-    // three identical /api/tools requests. appConfig.js is imported by one
-    // specifier from all of them, so they now share a single fetch.
-    const data = await getTools();
     const tags = (data.tools || [])
       .map((t) => t.id)
       .filter((id) => id && !EXEC_FENCE_NON_TOOL.has(id));
@@ -621,36 +615,10 @@ export function sameModelName(left, right) {
     || shortModel(a).toLowerCase() === shortModel(b).toLowerCase();
 }
 
-function shortEndpointLabel(label) {
+export function modelRouteLabel(requestedModel, actualModel) {
-  const value = modelValue(label);
-  if (!value) return '';
-  return value.length > 18 ? value.slice(0, 17) + '…' : value;
-}
-
-export function modelRouteLabel(
-  requestedModel,
-  actualModel,
-  requestedEndpointLabel = '',
-  actualEndpointLabel = '',
-  requestedEndpointId = '',
-  actualEndpointId = '',
-) {
   const requested = modelValue(requestedModel);
   const actual = modelValue(actualModel) || requested;
-  const requestedRoute = modelValue(requestedEndpointId || requestedEndpointLabel);
+  if (!requested || sameModelName(requested, actual)) return shortModel(actual || requested);
-  const actualRoute = modelValue(actualEndpointId || actualEndpointLabel);
-  const routeChanged = Boolean(
-    actualRoute
-    && requestedRoute
-    && actualRoute !== requestedRoute
-  );
-  if (!requested || sameModelName(requested, actual)) {
-    const model = shortModel(actual || requested);
-    if (!routeChanged) return model;
-    const from = shortEndpointLabel(requestedEndpointLabel || 'Selected route');
-    const to = shortEndpointLabel(actualEndpointLabel || actualEndpointId);
-    return model + ' (' + from + ' -> ' + to + ')';
-  }
   return shortModel(requested) + ' -> ' + shortModel(actual);
 }
 
@@ -661,24 +629,10 @@ export function replyModelPair(modelName, metadata) {
   if (actualFromMeta || requestedFromMeta) {
     const actual = actualFromMeta || requestedFromMeta || modelValue(modelName);
     const requested = requestedFromMeta || actual;
-    return {
+    return { requestedModel: requested, actualModel: actual };
-      requestedModel: requested,
-      actualModel: actual,
-      requestedEndpointId: meta.requested_endpoint_id || null,
-      requestedEndpointLabel: meta.requested_endpoint_label || 'Selected route',
-      actualEndpointId: meta.endpoint_id || null,
-      actualEndpointLabel: meta.endpoint_label || meta.requested_endpoint_label || 'Selected route',
-    };
   }
   const fallback = modelValue(modelName);
-  return {
+  return { requestedModel: fallback, actualModel: fallback };
-    requestedModel: fallback,
-    actualModel: fallback,
-    requestedEndpointId: null,
-    requestedEndpointLabel: 'Selected route',
-    actualEndpointId: null,
-    actualEndpointLabel: 'Selected route',
-  };
 }
 
 /**
@@ -870,50 +824,12 @@ export function isCostTrackedEndpoint(url) {
 }
 
 /** Cost for the current turn, returning null for non-billable endpoints. */
-function _billableCost(model, inputTokens, outputTokens, endpointCostTracked, selectedEndpointUrl) {
+function _billableCost(model, inputTokens, outputTokens) {
-  // Foreground fallback can answer on a different endpoint than the session's
+  const url = _currentEndpointUrl();
-  // selected route. Prefer the backend's non-secret actual-route
+  if (!isCostTrackedEndpoint(url)) return null;
-  // classification; retain the selected-endpoint check for older history.
-  if (endpointCostTracked === false) return null;
-  const selectedUrl = selectedEndpointUrl === undefined
-    ? _currentEndpointUrl()
-    : selectedEndpointUrl;
-  if (endpointCostTracked !== true && !isCostTrackedEndpoint(selectedUrl)) {
-    return null;
-  }
   return getModelCost(model, inputTokens, outputTokens);
 }
 
-/** Sum cost using the route/model that produced each Agent round. */
-function _metricsBillableCost(metrics, model, inputTokens, outputTokens, selectedEndpointUrl) {
-  const buckets = Array.isArray(metrics.usage_buckets) ? metrics.usage_buckets : [];
-  if (!buckets.length) {
-    return _billableCost(
-      model,
-      inputTokens,
-      outputTokens,
-      metrics.endpoint_cost_tracked,
-      selectedEndpointUrl,
-    );
-  }
-  let total = 0;
-  let hasPricedUsage = false;
-  for (const bucket of buckets) {
-    if (!bucket || typeof bucket !== 'object') continue;
-    const bucketCost = _billableCost(
-      bucket.model || model,
-      Number(bucket.input_tokens) || 0,
-      Number(bucket.output_tokens) || 0,
-      bucket.endpoint_cost_tracked,
-      selectedEndpointUrl,
-    );
-    if (bucketCost === null) continue;
-    total += bucketCost;
-    hasPricedUsage = true;
-  }
-  return hasPricedUsage ? total : null;
-}
-
 export function getImageCost(model, quality, size) {
   if (!model) return null;
   const m = model.toLowerCase();
@@ -928,9 +844,6 @@ export function getImageCost(model, quality, size) {
 
 /* ── Session cost helpers ─────────────────────────────────────────── */
 const _COST_KEY = 'ody-session-cost';
-const _COST_RUNS_KEY = 'ody-session-cost-runs';
-const _MAX_COST_RUNS_PER_SESSION = 256;
-const _COST_LEDGER_LOCK = 'odysseus-session-cost-ledger';
 
 /** Return the accumulated cost for the current (or given) session. */
 export function getSessionCost(sessionId) {
@@ -938,14 +851,7 @@ export function getSessionCost(sessionId) {
   if (!sid) return 0;
   try {
     const costs = JSON.parse(localStorage.getItem(_COST_KEY) || '{}');
-    const runCosts = JSON.parse(localStorage.getItem(_COST_RUNS_KEY) || '{}');
+    return costs[sid] || 0;
-    const recordedRuns = runCosts[sid] && typeof runCosts[sid] === 'object'
-      ? Object.values(runCosts[sid])
-      : [];
-    return (costs[sid] || 0) + recordedRuns.reduce(
-      (total, value) => total + (Number(value) || 0),
-      0,
-    );
   } catch (_e) { return 0; }
 }
 
@@ -957,9 +863,6 @@ export function resetSessionCost(sessionId) {
     const costs = JSON.parse(localStorage.getItem(_COST_KEY) || '{}');
     delete costs[sid];
     localStorage.setItem(_COST_KEY, JSON.stringify(costs));
-    const runCosts = JSON.parse(localStorage.getItem(_COST_RUNS_KEY) || '{}');
-    delete runCosts[sid];
-    localStorage.setItem(_COST_RUNS_KEY, JSON.stringify(runCosts));
   } catch (_e) { /* ignore */ }
   updateSessionCostUI();
 }
@@ -968,8 +871,21 @@ export function resetSessionCost(sessionId) {
 export function updateSessionCostUI() {
   const el = document.getElementById('session-cost-display');
   if (!el) return;
-  // The ledger records billable work already performed in this session. A
+  // Non-billable endpoint? Hide the badge and clear stale cost that a previous
-  // selected local endpoint does not erase cost from a paid fallback route.
+  // cloud-rate calculation may have left in localStorage for this session.
+  const _url = _currentEndpointUrl();
+  if (!isCostTrackedEndpoint(_url)) {
+    const sid = window.sessionModule && window.sessionModule.getCurrentSessionId();
+    if (sid && getSessionCost(sid) > 0) {
+      try {
+        const costs = JSON.parse(localStorage.getItem(_COST_KEY) || '{}');
+        delete costs[sid];
+        localStorage.setItem(_COST_KEY, JSON.stringify(costs));
+      } catch (_e) { /* ignore */ }
+    }
+    el.style.display = 'none';
+    return;
+  }
   const cost = getSessionCost();
   if (cost > 0) {
     el.textContent = '$' + (cost < 0.01 ? cost.toFixed(4) : cost < 1 ? cost.toFixed(3) : cost.toFixed(2));
@@ -979,94 +895,6 @@ export function updateSessionCostUI() {
   }
 }
 
-/** Record one metrics payload in a session ledger at most once. */
-export function recordSessionMetricsCost(metrics, sessionId, selectedEndpointUrl) {
-  if (!metrics || typeof metrics !== 'object') return null;
-  const cost = _metricsBillableCost(
-    metrics,
-    metrics.model || 'Unknown',
-    metrics.input_tokens || 0,
-    metrics.output_tokens || 0,
-    selectedEndpointUrl,
-  );
-  if (metrics._fromHistory) return cost;
-  const sid = sessionId || (
-    window.sessionModule && window.sessionModule.getCurrentSessionId()
-  );
-  if (!sid || cost === null) return cost;
-  const runId = typeof metrics._costRecordId === 'string'
-    ? metrics._costRecordId.trim()
-    : '';
-  if ((metrics._costRecorded || metrics._costRecordPending) && !runId) return cost;
-  // Recorded is only set once the write actually runs; pending covers the
-  // window while the write waits on the cross-tab lock, so a replay in that
-  // window cannot double-add and a tab closed mid-queue never claims recorded.
-  metrics._costRecordPending = true;
-  const writeCost = () => {
-    if (runId) {
-      try {
-        const runCosts = JSON.parse(localStorage.getItem(_COST_RUNS_KEY) || '{}');
-        const sessionRuns = runCosts[sid] && typeof runCosts[sid] === 'object'
-          ? runCosts[sid]
-          : {};
-        // Assigning by detached-run identity is replay-idempotent even when a
-        // refresh produces a fresh metrics object. The Web Lock around this
-        // read/modify/write also keeps distinct runs from two tabs from
-        // overwriting one another's stale snapshot.
-        sessionRuns[runId] = cost;
-        const entries = Object.entries(sessionRuns);
-        if (entries.length > _MAX_COST_RUNS_PER_SESSION) {
-          const overflow = entries.slice(0, entries.length - _MAX_COST_RUNS_PER_SESSION);
-          const costs = JSON.parse(localStorage.getItem(_COST_KEY) || '{}');
-          costs[sid] = (costs[sid] || 0) + overflow.reduce(
-            (total, entry) => total + (Number(entry[1]) || 0),
-            0,
-          );
-          overflow.forEach(([oldRunId]) => delete sessionRuns[oldRunId]);
-          localStorage.setItem(_COST_KEY, JSON.stringify(costs));
-        }
-        runCosts[sid] = sessionRuns;
-        localStorage.setItem(_COST_RUNS_KEY, JSON.stringify(runCosts));
-      } catch (_e) { /* ignore */ }
-    } else {
-      try {
-        const costs = JSON.parse(localStorage.getItem(_COST_KEY) || '{}');
-        costs[sid] = (costs[sid] || 0) + cost;
-        localStorage.setItem(_COST_KEY, JSON.stringify(costs));
-      } catch (_e) { /* ignore */ }
-    }
-    metrics._costRecorded = true;
-    metrics._costRecordPending = false;
-    const currentSid = window.sessionModule && window.sessionModule.getCurrentSessionId();
-    if (currentSid === sid) updateSessionCostUI();
-  };
-
-  let writeStarted = false;
-  const guardedWrite = () => {
-    writeStarted = true;
-    writeCost();
-  };
-  try {
-    if (
-      typeof navigator !== 'undefined'
-      && navigator.locks
-      && typeof navigator.locks.request === 'function'
-    ) {
-      const pendingWrite = navigator.locks.request(_COST_LEDGER_LOCK, guardedWrite);
-      if (pendingWrite && typeof pendingWrite.catch === 'function') {
-        pendingWrite.catch(() => {
-          if (!writeStarted) guardedWrite();
-        });
-      }
-    } else {
-      guardedWrite();
-    }
-  } catch (_e) {
-    if (!writeStarted) guardedWrite();
-  }
-  return cost;
-}
-
 /** Create a timestamp span for role labels.
  * Pass an ISO string / Date / epoch-ms to render the message's own time
  * (used when replaying history). Falls back to "now" when no value is given. */
@@ -1373,7 +1201,7 @@ document.addEventListener('click', function(e) {
       } catch {}
     });
   } else if (kind === 'document') {
-    import('./document.js?v=20260815approvalsave1').then(mod => {
+    import('./document.js?v=20260722emailfastindex1').then(mod => {
       const open = mod.loadDocument
         || mod.openDocument
         || (mod.default && (mod.default.loadDocument || mod.default.openDocument));
@@ -1395,7 +1223,7 @@ document.addEventListener('click', function(e) {
       if (open) open(id);
     }).catch(() => {});
   } else if (kind === 'email') {
-    import('./emailLibrary.js?v=20260815approvalsave1').then(mod => {
+    import('./emailLibrary.js?v=20260722emailfastindex1').then(mod => {
       const open = mod.openEmailLibrary || (mod.default && mod.default.openEmailLibrary);
       if (open) open({ uid: id });
     }).catch(() => {});
@@ -1554,7 +1382,7 @@ export function buildImageBubble(imageUrl, prompt, model, size, quality, imageId
     try {
       const [galleryMod, editorMod] = await Promise.all([
         import('./gallery.js'),
-        loadPanel('editor'),
+        import('./galleryEditor.js'),
       ]);
       // Ensure the Gallery modal is open so the editor has a container
       // to render into; switch its tabs to the Edit tab.
@@ -2046,19 +1874,23 @@ export function displayMetrics(messageElement, metrics) {
   const isReal = metrics.usage_source === 'real';
   const ctxPct = metrics.context_percent;
   const model = metrics.model || 'Unknown';
-  const cost = _metricsBillableCost(
+  const cost = _billableCost(model, inputTokens, outputTokens);
-    metrics,
-    model,
-    inputTokens,
-    outputTokens,
-  );
 
   // Nothing useful to show — bail out (only if ALL metrics are missing)
   if (!responseTime && !inputTokens && !outputTokens && tps == null && !ctxPct) return;
 
-  // Rendering can occur when metrics arrive and again after [DONE]. The
+  // Accumulate session cost (only on fresh metrics, not history reload)
-  // ledger mutation is idempotent for that shared payload.
+  if (!metrics._fromHistory) {
-  recordSessionMetricsCost(metrics);
+    const _sid = window.sessionModule && window.sessionModule.getCurrentSessionId();
+    if (_sid && cost !== null) {
+      try {
+        const _costs = JSON.parse(localStorage.getItem(_COST_KEY) || '{}');
+        _costs[_sid] = (_costs[_sid] || 0) + cost;
+        localStorage.setItem(_COST_KEY, JSON.stringify(_costs));
+      } catch (_e) { /* ignore */ }
+      updateSessionCostUI();
+    }
+  }
 
   // Keep token counts in the Message Stats popup; the footer should stay slim.
   const costStr0 = cost !== null ? `$${cost < 0.01 ? cost.toFixed(4) : cost.toFixed(3)}` : null;
@@ -2327,42 +2159,6 @@ export function removeAskUserCards(root) {
   scope.querySelectorAll('.ask-user-card').forEach((node) => node.remove());
 }
 
-// While a choice card is visible, let plain 1–3 activate the corresponding
-// rendered option. Reuse the option's click path so the question keeps its
-// existing submission semantics. Tool approval cards are excluded: that card
-// exists to make consent deliberate after untrusted context influenced the
-// run, and its first option is the widest grant, so a stray digit must not
-// answer it.
-function _handleAskUserShortcut(event) {
-  if (
-    event.defaultPrevented
-    || event.repeat
-    || event.isComposing
-    || event.ctrlKey
-    || event.altKey
-    || event.metaKey
-    || event.shiftKey
-  ) return;
-  if (!/^[1-3]$/.test(event.key)) return;
-
-  const target = event.target;
-  if (target?.closest?.('input, textarea, select, [contenteditable="true"]')) return;
-
-  const focusedCard = document.activeElement?.closest?.('.ask-user-card') || null;
-  const mainCard = document.querySelector('#chat-history .ask-user-card');
-  const compareCards = document.querySelectorAll('.compare-pane .ask-user-card');
-  const card = focusedCard || mainCard || (compareCards.length === 1 ? compareCards[0] : null);
-  if (!card) return;
-  if (card.dataset.askUserKind === 'tool_approval') return;
-  const option = card.querySelectorAll('.ask-user-option')[Number(event.key) - 1];
-  if (!option || option.disabled) return;
-
-  event.preventDefault();
-  option.click();
-}
-
-document.addEventListener('keydown', _handleAskUserShortcut);
-
 /**
  * Render an ask_user payload as a durable choice card.
  *
@@ -2372,15 +2168,11 @@ document.addEventListener('keydown', _handleAskUserShortcut);
  */
 export function renderAskUserCard(payload, options) {
   const aq = payload || {};
-  if (aq.resolved) return null;
   const opts = Array.isArray(aq.options) ? aq.options : [];
-  const renderOptions = options || {};
+  const chatBox = document.getElementById('chat-history');
-  const chatBox = renderOptions.root || document.getElementById('chat-history');
-  const onSubmit = typeof renderOptions.onSubmit === 'function'
-    ? renderOptions.onSubmit
-    : null;
   if (!chatBox || !aq.question || opts.length < 2) return null;
 
+  const renderOptions = options || {};
   removeAskUserCards(chatBox);
 
   const card = document.createElement('div');
@@ -2388,8 +2180,6 @@ export function renderAskUserCard(payload, options) {
   card.setAttribute('role', 'group');
   card.tabIndex = -1;
   const multi = !!aq.multi;
-  const isToolApproval = aq.kind === 'tool_approval' && !!aq.approval_id;
-  card.dataset.askUserKind = isToolApproval ? 'tool_approval' : 'question';
   const emojiText = (value) => svgifyEmoji(uiModule.esc(String(value)));
 
   const head = document.createElement('div');
@@ -2398,6 +2188,7 @@ export function renderAskUserCard(payload, options) {
   closeBtn.type = 'button';
   closeBtn.className = 'modal-close ask-user-close';
   closeBtn.setAttribute('aria-label', 'Dismiss question');
+  closeBtn.textContent = '×';
   closeBtn.addEventListener('click', () => {
     card.remove();
     const input = uiModule.el('message');
@@ -2413,44 +2204,12 @@ export function renderAskUserCard(payload, options) {
   card.appendChild(question);
   card.setAttribute('aria-labelledby', question.id);
 
-  if (isToolApproval && aq.action) {
-    const action = document.createElement('div');
-    action.className = 'ask-user-option-desc';
-    const effects = Array.isArray(aq.action.effects)
-      ? aq.action.effects.join(', ')
-      : '';
-    action.textContent = [
-      aq.action.tool || 'tool',
-      aq.action.content || '',
-      effects ? `Effects: ${effects}` : '',
-      aq.action.workspace ? `Workspace: ${aq.action.workspace}` : '',
-      aq.action.document_id ? `Document: ${aq.action.document_id}` : '',
-      aq.action.document_version != null
-        ? `Document version: ${aq.action.document_version}`
-        : '',
-      aq.action.digest ? `Approval fingerprint: ${aq.action.digest}` : '',
-    ].filter(Boolean).join('\n');
-    action.style.whiteSpace = 'pre-wrap';
-    card.appendChild(action);
-  }
-
   const list = document.createElement('div');
   list.className = 'ask-user-options';
   card.appendChild(list);
 
   const send = (text) => {
     if (!text) return;
-    if (onSubmit) {
-      const accepted = onSubmit({
-        kind: 'answer',
-        text,
-        label: text,
-        payload: aq,
-        card,
-      });
-      if (accepted !== false) card.remove();
-      return;
-    }
     card.remove();
     const input = uiModule.el('message');
     if (input) input.value = text;
@@ -2482,32 +2241,7 @@ export function renderAskUserCard(payload, options) {
     }
     if (!multi) {
       row.type = 'button';
-      row.addEventListener('click', () => {
+      row.addEventListener('click', () => send(label));
-        if (isToolApproval) {
-          const detail = {
-            approval_id: aq.approval_id,
-            decision: String((opt && opt.value) || '').toLowerCase(),
-            label,
-            document_id: aq.action && aq.action.document_id
-              ? String(aq.action.document_id)
-              : '',
-          };
-          if (onSubmit) {
-            const accepted = onSubmit({
-              kind: 'tool_approval',
-              ...detail,
-              payload: aq,
-              card,
-            });
-            if (accepted !== false) card.remove();
-          } else {
-            card.remove();
-            document.dispatchEvent(new CustomEvent('odysseus:tool-approval', { detail }));
-          }
-        } else {
-          send(label);
-        }
-      });
     }
     list.appendChild(row);
   });
@@ -2543,7 +2277,7 @@ export function renderAskUserCard(payload, options) {
   });
   other.appendChild(otherInput);
   other.appendChild(otherSend);
-  if (!isToolApproval) card.appendChild(other);
+  card.appendChild(other);
 
   chatBox.appendChild(card);
   if (renderOptions.scroll !== false) {
@@ -2573,19 +2307,9 @@ export function addMessage(role, content, modelName, metadata) {
     const textRaw = Array.isArray(content) ? markdownModule.renderContent(content) : content;
 
     // --- Agent multi-bubble reconstruction from saved metadata ---
-    if (
+    if (role === 'assistant' && metadata && metadata.tool_events && metadata.tool_events.length > 0) {
-      role === 'assistant'
-      && metadata
-      && (
-        (Array.isArray(metadata.tool_events) && metadata.tool_events.length > 0)
-        || (Array.isArray(metadata.round_texts) && metadata.round_texts.length > 1)
-      )
-    ) {
       const roundTexts = metadata.round_texts || [];
-      const roundModels = metadata.round_models || [];
+      const toolEvents = metadata.tool_events;
-      const roundEndpointIds = metadata.round_endpoint_ids || [];
-      const roundEndpointLabels = metadata.round_endpoint_labels || [];
-      const toolEvents = metadata.tool_events || [];
       let pendingAskUser = null;
       let lastWrap = null;
       let firstMsgAi = null;
@@ -2593,20 +2317,16 @@ export function addMessage(role, content, modelName, metadata) {
 
       const toolsByRound = {};
       for (const ev of toolEvents) {
-        const r = ev.round ?? 1;
+        const r = ev.round || 1;
         if (!toolsByRound[r]) toolsByRound[r] = [];
         toolsByRound[r].push(ev);
       }
 
-      const toolRounds = Object.keys(toolsByRound).map(Number);
+      const maxRound = Math.max(...Object.keys(toolsByRound).map(Number), roundTexts.length);
-      const maxRound = Math.max(toolRounds.length ? Math.max(...toolRounds) : 0, roundTexts.length);
 
-      const firstRound = (toolsByRound[0] || []).length ? 0 : 1;
+      for (let r = 0; r < maxRound; r++) {
-      for (let roundNum = firstRound; roundNum <= maxRound; roundNum++) {
+        const roundNum = r + 1;
-        const r = roundNum - 1;
+        const txt = resolveDocumentPlaceholderLinks((roundTexts[r] || '').trim(), metadata);
-        const txt = r >= 0
-          ? resolveDocumentPlaceholderLinks((roundTexts[r] || '').trim(), metadata)
-          : '';
 
         if (txt) {
           const wrap = document.createElement('div');
@@ -2614,31 +2334,10 @@ export function addMessage(role, content, modelName, metadata) {
           const roleEl = document.createElement('div');
           roleEl.className = 'role';
           const pair = replyModelPair(modelName, metadata);
-          const contModel = roundModels[r] || pair.actualModel || pair.requestedModel;
+          const contModel = pair.actualModel || pair.requestedModel;
-          const contEndpointId = r < roundEndpointIds.length
+          roleEl.textContent = modelRouteLabel(pair.requestedModel, contModel);
-            ? roundEndpointIds[r]
+          if (pair.requestedModel && contModel && !sameModelName(pair.requestedModel, contModel)) {
-            : pair.actualEndpointId;
+            roleEl.title = pair.requestedModel + ' -> ' + contModel;
-          const contEndpointLabel = r < roundEndpointLabels.length
-            ? roundEndpointLabels[r]
-            : pair.actualEndpointLabel;
-          roleEl.textContent = modelRouteLabel(
-            pair.requestedModel,
-            contModel,
-            pair.requestedEndpointLabel,
-            contEndpointLabel,
-            pair.requestedEndpointId,
-            contEndpointId,
-          );
-          if (
-            pair.requestedModel
-            && contModel
-            && (
-              !sameModelName(pair.requestedModel, contModel)
-              || (pair.requestedEndpointId && contEndpointId && pair.requestedEndpointId !== contEndpointId)
-            )
-          ) {
-            roleEl.title = pair.requestedModel + ' -> ' + contModel
-              + ' (' + pair.requestedEndpointLabel + ' -> ' + contEndpointLabel + ')';
           }
           applyModelColor(roleEl, contModel);
           if (r === 0) roleEl.appendChild(roleTimestamp(metadata?.timestamp));
@@ -2688,7 +2387,7 @@ export function addMessage(role, content, modelName, metadata) {
             box.appendChild(threadWrap);
           }
           for (const ev of roundTools) {
-            if (ev.ask_user && !ev.ask_user.resolved) pendingAskUser = ev.ask_user;
+            if (ev.ask_user) pendingAskUser = ev.ask_user;
             const ok = (ev.exit_code === 0 || ev.exit_code == null);
             let outHtml = '';
             if (ev.output && ev.output.trim()) {
@@ -2793,14 +2492,7 @@ export function addMessage(role, content, modelName, metadata) {
     const isCompacted = metadata?.compacted;
     const replyModels = replyModelPair(modelName, metadata);
     const resolvedModel = replyModels.actualModel || replyModels.requestedModel;
-    var _roleText = role === 'user' ? 'You' : (isSlash || isCompacted) ? 'Odysseus' : modelRouteLabel(
+    var _roleText = role === 'user' ? 'You' : (isSlash || isCompacted) ? 'Odysseus' : modelRouteLabel(replyModels.requestedModel, resolvedModel);
-      replyModels.requestedModel,
-      resolvedModel,
-      replyModels.requestedEndpointLabel,
-      replyModels.actualEndpointLabel,
-      replyModels.requestedEndpointId,
-      replyModels.actualEndpointId,
-    );
     if (role === 'assistant' && (metadata?.research || metadata?.research_clarification)) {
       _roleText += ' (Research)';
     }
@@ -2811,14 +2503,8 @@ export function addMessage(role, content, modelName, metadata) {
     }
     r.textContent = _roleText;
     if (role !== 'user') {
-      const endpointChanged = Boolean(
+      if (!isSlash && !isCompacted && replyModels.requestedModel && resolvedModel && !sameModelName(replyModels.requestedModel, resolvedModel)) {
-        replyModels.requestedEndpointId
+        r.title = replyModels.requestedModel + ' -> ' + resolvedModel;
-        && replyModels.actualEndpointId
-        && replyModels.requestedEndpointId !== replyModels.actualEndpointId
-      );
-      if (!isSlash && !isCompacted && replyModels.requestedModel && resolvedModel && (!sameModelName(replyModels.requestedModel, resolvedModel) || endpointChanged)) {
-        r.title = replyModels.requestedModel + ' -> ' + resolvedModel
-          + ' (' + replyModels.requestedEndpointLabel + ' -> ' + replyModels.actualEndpointLabel + ')';
       }
       if (!isSlash && !isCompacted) applyModelColor(r, resolvedModel);
       r.appendChild(roleTimestamp(metadata?.timestamp));
@@ -3102,7 +2788,6 @@ const chatRenderer = {
   getSessionCost,
   resetSessionCost,
   updateSessionCostUI,
-  recordSessionMetricsCost,
   roleTimestamp,
   stripToolBlocks,
   copyMessageText,

static/js/chatStream.js

@@ -7,36 +7,7 @@ import Storage from './storage.js';
 import themeModule from './theme.js';
 import markdownModule from './markdown.js';
 import sessionModule from './sessions.js';
-import documentModule from './document.js?v=20260815approvalsave1';
+import documentModule from './document.js?v=20260722emailfastindex1';
-
-// Tool approvals are control-plane submits for the current chat. chat.js
-// deliberately leaves the composer untouched, then programmatically clicks the
-// shared send button after it records the sealed approval id/decision. That
-// button is polymorphic: with an empty composer it can mean New chat or Record
-// voice instead of Send. Intercept only the programmatic approval click and
-// route it through the form submit path, which already reaches chat.js directly.
-document.addEventListener('odysseus:tool-approval', () => {
-  const sendButton = document.querySelector('.send-btn');
-  const chatForm = document.getElementById('chat-form');
-  if (!sendButton || !chatForm) return;
-
-  const interceptApprovalClick = (event) => {
-    // A real user click must retain the normal send/new-chat/STT behavior.
-    if (event.isTrusted) return;
-    sendButton.removeEventListener('click', interceptApprovalClick, true);
-    event.preventDefault();
-    event.stopImmediatePropagation();
-    if (chatForm.requestSubmit) chatForm.requestSubmit();
-    else chatForm.dispatchEvent(new Event('submit', { bubbles: true, cancelable: true }));
-  };
-
-  sendButton.addEventListener('click', interceptApprovalClick, true);
-  // Fail-safe cleanup if the approval continuation never reaches its deferred
-  // synthetic click (for example because the surrounding view is torn down).
-  setTimeout(() => {
-    sendButton.removeEventListener('click', interceptApprovalClick, true);
-  }, 60000);
-}, true);
 
 /**
  * Handle a ui_control SSE event — AI-driven UI manipulation.
@@ -185,7 +156,7 @@ export function handleUIControl(uiData) {
           if (fn) fn();
         }).catch(function(){});
       } else if (panel === 'email') {
-        import('./emailLibrary.js?v=20260815approvalsave1').then(function(mod) {
+        import('./emailLibrary.js?v=20260722emailfastindex1').then(function(mod) {
           var fn = mod.openEmailLibrary || (mod.default && mod.default.openEmailLibrary);
           if (fn) fn();
         }).catch(function(){});
@@ -234,7 +205,7 @@ export function handleUIControl(uiData) {
       } catch (e) {
         console.warn('open_email_reply existing draft update failed:', e);
       }
-      import('./emailInbox.js?v=20260815approvalsave1').then(function(mod) {
+      import('./emailInbox.js?v=20260722emailfastindex1').then(function(mod) {
         var fn = mod.openReplyDraft || (mod.default && mod.default.openReplyDraft);
         if (fn) fn(uiData.uid, uiData.folder || 'INBOX', uiData.mode || 'reply', uiData.body || '');
       }).catch(function(e) {

static/js/chatStreamErrors.js

@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
-/** Build a terminal stream error while preserving provider-supplied text. */
-export function createTerminalStreamError(payload = {}) {
-  const rawError = payload.error;
-  const message = (
-    payload.text
-    || (typeof rawError === 'string' ? rawError : rawError?.message)
-    || `Error ${payload.status || 'unknown'}`
-  );
-  const error = new Error(message);
-  error.name = 'TerminalStreamError';
-  error.terminalStreamError = true;
-  error.status = payload.status;
-  return error;
-}
-
-/** Only connection-class stream failures are safe to resubmit automatically. */
-export function isRecoverableStreamError(error) {
-  if (!error || error.terminalStreamError || error.name === 'TerminalStreamError') return false;
-  if (error.name === 'TypeError') return true;
-  const message = (error.message || '').toLowerCase();
-  if (/\btool\b|unsupported|json|parse|\b4\d\d\b|\b5\d\d\b/.test(message)) return false;
-  return /network|fetch|connection|reset|closed|aborted|stream|tim(?:e|ed)\s?out|econn|eof/.test(message);
-}

static/js/compare/index.js

@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ import { EVAL_PROMPTS, WAVE_FRAMES,
 import { fetchModels, _persistSelections, _modelDisplayNames, getExcludedModels, setExcludedModels } from './models.js';
 import { showModelSelector, disableToolToggles, restoreToolToggles, _syncToolbarIndicator } from './selector.js?v=20260723compareicon2';
 import { _checkUnprobed, _clearProbeWaves } from './probe.js';
-import { streamToPane, _renderSearchResults, _runSynthForPane, _formatMs, registerStreamActions } from './stream.js?v=20260819approvalcontrol1';
+import { streamToPane, _renderSearchResults, _runSynthForPane, _formatMs, registerStreamActions } from './stream.js';
 import {
   stopAll, stopPane, rerollPane, shufflePanePositions, resetCompare,
   _addPane, _removePane, toggleExpandPane, togglePanePreview, copyPaneResponse,
@@ -1006,16 +1006,11 @@ async function _executeCompare(message) {
     console.error('Compare error:', err);
     if (uiModule) uiModule.showError('Compare failed: ' + err.message);
   } finally {
-    // A pane may have started its own ask_user/approval continuation while the
+    state._streaming = false;
-    // original all-pane Promise was settling. Keep Compare busy until every
+    _setSendBtn('send');
-    // pane-owned controller is gone instead of exposing a second broadcast send.
+    // Re-enable header buttons
-    const compareStillStreaming = state._abortControllers.some(Boolean);
+    document.querySelectorAll('#compare-shuffle-btn, #compare-check-btn, #compare-add-btn').forEach(b => {
-    state._streaming = compareStillStreaming;
+      b.disabled = false; b.style.opacity = '0.7'; b.style.pointerEvents = '';
-    _setSendBtn(compareStillStreaming ? 'stop' : 'send');
-    document.querySelectorAll('#compare-shuffle-btn, #compare-check-btn, #compare-add-btn').forEach((button) => {
-      button.disabled = compareStillStreaming;
-      button.style.opacity = compareStillStreaming ? '0.25' : '0.7';
-      button.style.pointerEvents = compareStillStreaming ? 'none' : '';
     });
   }
 }
@@ -1519,7 +1514,7 @@ async function showShufflePoolEditor() {
 // ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
 registerCompareActions({ stopAll, resetCompare });
-registerStreamActions({ rerollPane, autoPreviewHtml: _autoPreviewHtml, setSendBtn: _setSendBtn });
+registerStreamActions({ rerollPane, autoPreviewHtml: _autoPreviewHtml });
 registerPaneActions({ setSendBtn: _setSendBtn, deactivate, streamToPane, renderSearchResults: _renderSearchResults, fetchModels });
 
 // ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────