* fix(auth): derive the session cookie Secure flag from the request scheme
SECURE_COOKIES only marked the login cookie Secure when it was explicitly
set to true, so an HTTPS login on an install that never set it handed out a
session cookie the browser is happy to send back in cleartext.
Unset now derives the flag from the request: the connection scheme, which
uvicorn's proxy-headers middleware rewrites for the proxies it trusts, or
X-Forwarded-Proto for a terminator that is not on a trusted address. That
is the same test core/middleware.py already applies before sending HSTS, so
the two stop disagreeing about whether a request arrived over TLS. An
explicit true still forces the flag on and an explicit false turns it off
for an install still answering on both HTTP and HTTPS. Strictly more Secure
flags than before and never fewer.
Empty counts as unset, because docker-compose pinned SECURE_COOKIES=false
for every container; the compose files now pass the variable through
unset, the way FASTEMBED_CACHE_PATH already does.
The helper and its decision order come from #3799, which was closed for
being too large to review and whose six replacement PRs dropped this fix.
Part of #3803.
* docs(setup): flag the leftover SECURE_COOKIES=false on upgrades
The old default was false, so an install set up before scheme derivation
can still carry an explicit SECURE_COOKIES=false in its own .env. That
value stays authoritative, so HTTPS logins keep getting a non-Secure
session cookie even after the tracked compose defaults are updated by a
pull. Say so where people look: the security notes and the variable's
own comment in .env.example.
* docs(setup): align TLS guidance with scheme-derived cookies
---------
Co-authored-by: Alexandre Teixeira <alexandremagteixeira@gmail.com>
* docs(setup): document the HTTP/2 reverse-proxy setup
The "private or proxied deployments" section named Caddy, nginx and Traefik
but gave no runnable config, and never mentioned the main reason to bother:
the frontend is unbundled ES modules, so a page load is a few hundred small
same-origin requests. Over HTTP/1.1 the 6-connection cap serialises those
into dozens of round trips, which is invisible on localhost and dominates
load time over a LAN or VPN.
Adds a five-step setup you can paste: a Caddyfile for each of the three ways
people reach these boxes (public domain, Tailscale, own certificate), how to
run the proxy in the foreground and then as a service, the .env keys that
have to follow the origin, and a curl one-liner to confirm HTTP/2 actually
negotiated.
Also covers what bites when moving an existing install behind TLS:
SECURE_COOKIES applying regardless of the scheme the request arrived on,
OAUTH_REDIRECT_BASE_URL still defaulting to localhost because the MCP
redirect is registered up front rather than derived per request, and HSTS
being host-wide and port-agnostic. Notes that a custom HTTPS port does not
stop Caddy binding port 80 for the redirect, which is the failure I hit
first.
Docs only — no code change is needed to run behind HTTP/2 today.
* docs(setup): clarify HTTP/2 and origin migration
---------
Co-authored-by: Alexandre Teixeira <alexandremagteixeira@gmail.com>
* docs(setup): document supports_tools opt-in for manual Ollama /v1 endpoints
Manually-added Ollama /v1 endpoints default to the conservative
fenced-block tool-calling path, and there's currently no UI control to
opt a specific endpoint into native tool calling (#5192). The
supports_tools PATCH flag already exists and works, it just wasn't
documented anywhere a user could find it without reading source.
Adds a short section next to the existing "Ollama with Docker" notes
explaining when to use it and the exact API call, framed as an
advanced/opt-in setting per the maintainer's stated preference against
a casual UI toggle (#3195/#3438).
* docs(setup): clarify supports_tools false semantics
---------
Co-authored-by: Alexandre Teixeira <111787685+alteixeira20@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Alexandre Teixeira <alexandremagteixeira@gmail.com>
Add Arch-specific package installation and NVIDIA runtime configuration
to the Docker setup guide. Cover passthrough verification, the NVIDIA
Compose overlay, and the distinction between GPU passthrough and
CUDA-backed model serving
Refs #831
Fixes#4926 - the link used docs/backup-restore.md from within docs/setup.md, which resolved to docs/docs/backup-restore.md (404). Changed to same-directory relative path.
ROADMAP "Self-host troubleshooting cookbook" asks to document the weird
30-second fixes that otherwise become 30-minute searches. Adds a "Common
self-host traps" subsection under Troubleshooting covering: the UTF-8 BOM
.env gotcha (app.py loads with utf-8-sig), macOS AirPlay holding port 7000
(the start script uses 7860), the plain-HTTP Tailscale/LAN clipboard
limitation, self-hosted ntfy delivery (NTFY_BIND/NTFY_BASE_URL + the ntfy
Android Instant-delivery toggle), Dovecot cleartext-auth on LAN mail stacks,
and Radicale full-collection-URL sync.
Docs only; grounded in existing repo behavior (.env.example NTFY_* block,
app.py utf-8-sig loader, start-macos.sh port choice).
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The native Windows launcher binds to 127.0.0.1 via its own -BindHost
parameter and does not read APP_BIND/ODYSSEUS_HOST from .env, so editing
.env alone leaves the server on loopback. Document the -BindHost flag in
the Native Windows setup section, with the existing keep-auth-on /
don't-expose-publicly caveats.
Fixes#4552
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test: align README presentation guards with the #4306 refresh
The 'Refresh README presentation' change (#4306) swapped the ASCII banner
for a centered wordmark image and moved the native quickstart into
docs/setup.md, which left four base tests failing on dev and froze the
merge gate:
- test_security_regressions::test_readme_native_quickstart_uses_loopback
now also accepts the loopback guidance from docs/setup.md, where the
quickstart moved (no behaviour change; the guidance is intact there).
- test_readme_ascii_fenced guards the new wordmark title instead of the
removed ASCII banner, and keeps a defensive check that any reintroduced
box-drawing banner stays inside a code fence (the original #1390 mode).
- The five unreferenced demo gifs under docs/ (chat, compare, document,
notes, research) are removed so test_docs_no_orphan_images passes; they
were de-referenced by the refresh. Recoverable from history if a docs
page wants to embed them again.
* chore: refresh PR checks
---------
Co-authored-by: Alexandre Teixeira <alexandremagteixeira@gmail.com>
The scripts/odysseus-backup snapshot/restore CLI was undocumented in
README.md and docs/. Add docs/backup-restore.md covering the snapshot,
list, verify, and restore subcommands, default include/skip behavior
(deep_research and mail-attachments skipped unless flagged), the
destructive-restore warning and its data.before-restore-* stash, a cron
example, and Docker-vs-native data/ paths (including the ChromaDB named
volume caveat). Link it from the README Data section.
Addresses the "Backup/restore guide and helper flow for data/" item in
ROADMAP.md. Docs only; no change to the tool.
Fixes#2583
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* ci: add security scanning suite and governance
Consolidates the security CI work into one reviewable change. Adds, as
separate workflow files under .github/workflows/:
- secret-scan.yml gitleaks (pinned + checksum-verified), full history
- workflow-security.yml actionlint + zizmor, audits the workflows themselves
- dependency-review.yml PR dependency gate + advisory pip-audit
- container-scan.yml hadolint (blocking) + Trivy image scan (advisory)
- codeql.yml CodeQL for Python and JS, main + weekly
Plus .github/dependabot.yml (pip/npm/actions/docker), .github/CODEOWNERS,
and docs/security-ci.md explaining each check and the one-time settings.
All additive: no existing files are modified. Actions are pinned to commit
SHAs, tokens default-deny (permissions: {}), advisory scans never block,
and SARIF upload is gated to push so fork PRs do not fail on a read-only
token. Composes with the correctness CI in #1015.
* ci(security): isolate Trivy from the Dockerfile lint gate
Address review on #1314 (points 2 and 3).
container-scan.yml now runs only hadolint (the blocking Dockerfile lint)
and keeps the broad pull_request + push:[main] trigger so the required
check always reports and never hangs a PR.
The advisory image scan moves to container-trivy.yml, split by event:
- pull_request / workflow_dispatch: build and scan under contents:read
only, no SARIF upload. The image build runs PR-supplied Dockerfile
instructions, so this path holds no write scope.
- push to main: build, scan, and upload SARIF with security-events:write.
Only this trusted path is granted write.
This stops PR jobs from requesting security-events:write they never use,
and a paths-ignore (matching docker-publish.yml) skips the image rebuild
on docs-only changes.
docs/security-ci.md: correct the trigger description to "every pull
request and every push to main", matching the workflows and the existing
ci.yml convention.
Verified locally: zizmor --offline --min-severity=low and actionlint are
clean on the changed and new workflow files.
---------
Co-authored-by: Alexandre Teixeira <111787685+alteixeira20@users.noreply.github.com>
PRs #738 and #644 committed their before/after review screenshots into the
repo (docs/a11y/focus-*.png, docs/a11y/login-*.png, docs/gallery-314-*.png).
Nothing references these files, so they only showed up as "random images" in
the doc folder (issue #1335). The README hero image and the feature preview
clips are referenced and are left untouched.
Add tests/test_docs_no_orphan_images.py to guard against recurrence: it fails
if any image under docs/ is referenced by no tracked text file.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
pewdiepie-archdaemon