Rebuild PR C to ship the vendor/photocraft harness as a coherent unit
(vendor implementation + vendor tests) instead of a per-file ahead/behind
mix that produced broken imports and 6+ test failures.
- Flip 36 harness impl/route/test files back to vendor (the per-file
line-set policy misclassified user-rewritten files as 'behind').
- Flip core/models.py + src/tool_approval_scopes.py to vendor: vendor's
harness (authority.py, turn_contract.py, clean_agent_preview.py) depends
on vendor's older approval-scope API; upstream added
CHAT_SESSION_APPROVAL_SIGNATURE_FIELD that vendor's core/models.py lacks.
- Add src/shutdown.py (new vendor infra) required by routes/chat_routes.py.
- Keep src/agent_tools/__init__.py at upstream (editor_tools registration
lives in PR B).
Upstream-only security divergence preserved in C_upstream_delta.patch and
flagged for integration-time reconciliation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(security): keep agent file tools out of the app state directory
The agent's read tools (read_file, grep, glob, ls) resolved model-supplied
paths against a root list whose first entry was the whole data directory.
That directory holds the session store, the auth database, the app
encryption key and the settings file, so prompt-injected content could ask
for any of them. No approval prompt stood in the way: reads are classified
read_workspace and pass the untrusted-context gate untouched, which is
correct for reading a workspace and wrong for reading the app's own state.
The agent gets data/agent_workspace/ instead, and the subprocess cwd and
HOME move with it so bash and read_file agree on where scratch files live.
The deny itself is a property of the path, not of the root it arrived
through, because three routes reach the same bytes and closing only the
first leaves the other two working:
- the default root list
- a workspace bound at or above the data directory, which vet_workspace
accepted and chat_routes auto-binds from a path named in the message
- a tool_path_extra_roots setting covering the data directory
_resolve_search_root also returned the workspace root unchecked when the
path was empty, so a bare ls enumerated the directory whatever the deny
list said. It now resolves that case through the same guards.
A containment rule rather than a filename deny list, so state files added
later are covered without anyone remembering to list them, and so a user's
own settings.json or app.db inside a real workspace is not caught.
Four directories of user content stay readable, because the application
hands their paths to the model and tells it to open them: the chat upload
manifest, downloaded mail attachments, personal docs (which covers the
runbook) and personal uploads.
* fix: enforce state deny during recursive file search
* fix: bound protected filesystem searches
* fix(security): reject inode aliases and workspace redirects
* fix(security): harden partitioned agent searches
* fix(security): report fallback worker exits promptly
* fix(security): clean up search readers and retain relative data roots
---------
Co-authored-by: RaresKeY <158580472+RaresKeY@users.noreply.github.com>
Rework read_file / write_file confinement after review feedback:
- Remove $HOME from default allow roots. Only project data/ and system
temp dirs are allowed out of the box.
- Add a sensitive-subpath deny list (.ssh, .gnupg, shell rc files,
.env, .netrc, SSH key filenames). Checked BEFORE allowlist so it
blocks even when a broader root is configured.
- Add "tool_path_extra_roots" setting for opt-in broader access.
- Sensitive subpaths remain blocked regardless of configured roots.
Tests: 24 cases covering /etc/shadow, ~/.ssh/authorized_keys,
symlink into .ssh, traversal, shell rc files, key filenames,
extra roots, and dispatch-level end-to-end.
