* fix(editor): stabilize image workflows and editing controls
* docs(editor): add desktop and mobile visual validation evidence
* fix(editor): synchronize quick edit model events and register imagePreferences in test coordinator
* fix(settings): enforce authoritative global image-gen policy and non-admin preference persistence
- Enforce authoritative administrator global image_gen_enabled disable in get_user_setting, do_generate_image, and image_editing_provider_available, preventing non-admin user preference overrides while preserving user-disabled opt-outs and can_generate_images privilege checks across direct, gallery, and editor paths.
- Filter non-admin preference persistence in saveImagePreferences to user preference keys only (image_model, image_edit_model, image_quality), preventing global policy toggles from leaking into user preferences.
- Return accurate 200 OK Response from saveImagePreferences after fallback persistence succeeds so settings UI displays 'Saved' instead of false 403 error, while retaining visibility of real errors.
- Load per-user preferences via readImagePreferences in initImageSettings so non-admin selections persist and display correctly after page reload.
- Clear per-user model preferences on successful admin save (POST /api/auth/settings) via PUT /api/prefs/{key} with value: null to prevent stale per-user preferences from shadowing updated global settings.
- Support clearing keys in PUT /api/prefs/{key} when value is null.
- Add comprehensive Python regression tests for global-disabled/user-enabled, global-enabled/user-disabled, and authorized generation, plus Node and browser regression tests for non-admin persistence, toggle isolation, reload, and admin clearing.
* fix(settings): invalidate shared appConfig cache near auth settings write
* fix(test): isolate test_tool_policy unit suite from external model endpoint state
* fix(test): isolate web_fetch failure regression from contextual follow-up heuristics
* fix(test): isolate test_tool_policy from cross-test approval gate state
Ensure _patch_loop_basics disables TOOL_APPROVAL_GATE_ENABLED so routing tests in test_tool_policy run in the intended opt-out posture even when prior tests populate DATA_DIR with skills or untrusted context. Remove unnecessary forced_tools and contextual web mock workarounds.
* fix(settings): isolate non-admin image toggle and surface preference cleanup errors
- Restrict image generation availability toggle to admin users in imageModels.js, disabling the switch for non-admins and reverting unauthorized changes with an explicit message.
- Separate non-admin image model preference saves from global toggle updates.
- Track preference cleanup results on admin save in imagePreferences.js, propagating cleanup failures instead of ignoring them.
- Require valid preference keys on 403 fallback so toggle-only attempts reject cleanly.
- Add /api/prefs route mock to test_image_model_settings_sync_both_directions_and_survive_reopening.
- Add regression coverage for admin cleanup failures and non-admin toggle rejection.
* fix(settings): reconcile admin toggle on partial cleanup failure and report errors
- In imagePreferences.js, distinguish pre-persistence failures from post-save cleanup failures using err.globalSaved and err.phase.
- In imagePreferences.js, notify listeners of global policy updates on partial success before propagating cleanup failure.
- In imageModels.js, retain the persisted target state on admin toggle when global persistence succeeds but cleanup fails.
- In imageModels.js, reconcile admin toggle with authoritative server state via readImagePreferences() after ambiguous or partial failures.
- In imageModels.js, report partial success accurately without suppressing preference cleanup error messages.
- Add regression coverage in test_settings_save_response_ok_js.py for cleanup HTTP 500, cleanup network rejection, successful cleanup, and failed global POST.
---------
Co-authored-by: pewdiepie-archdaemon <pewdiepie-archdaemon@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Alexandre Teixeira <general@alexandreteixeira.dev>
Gallery search built a single `%{search}%` LIKE, so multi-word queries only matched the exact adjacent phrase ("red car" missed "a car that is red") and literal % / _ acted as SQL wildcards. Split on whitespace and require each token to match (prompt OR tags OR ai_tags), escaping LIKE wildcards per token; same escaping for the tag filter. Promote _escape_like to public escape_like_pattern() shared helper.
Part of #2123.
Tests: tests/test_gallery_search_multiword.py (5 tests); 4 fail pre-fix, 5 pass post-fix. Neighbors (session_search, gallery null-user, shims): 25 passed.
- routes/gallery/gallery_routes.py: use stable diagnostic log message without
interpolating raw exception, resolver details, tokens, or destination strings.
- tests/e2e/teardown.js: remove environment-variable path overrides from production
code, strictly confine test options and temp directories, and prevent arbitrary
directory cleanup.
- Add regression tests covering non-leakage of synthetic tokens/queries/exceptions
into logs and responses, and path confinement during teardown.
- Reconcile conflict resolution in routes/editor_agent_routes.py and src/editor_agent_model.py
- Enforce strict server-authorized endpoint resolution and reject client URL overrides
- Enforce bearer-token privilege separation: delegated API tokens are capped at non-admin scope per src/tool_security.py and cannot inspect private base URLs or probe metadata
- Preserve chat-scope authorization, missing-session 401 rejection, and owner-scoped browser bridge/SSE queues
- Preserve administrator-disabled-tool denylist enforcement introduced by PR #6357
- Fix mobile toolbar flyout hit-testing and stacking context trapping on viewports <= 700px via scoped elevation and mask suppression
- Stabilize project recovery test fixture by awaiting document draft quiescence prior to baseline capture
"Is this path inside that root" is asked in twenty places in this tree and
answered twenty times by a locally written realpath/commonpath pair. Nine test
files exist because nine call sites each needed their own proof. Each one is
defensible alone; together they are the defect, because the boundary has no
single definition and a site that gets a detail wrong is wrong by itself.
src/path_confinement.py is that definition, and it settles the details the
copies disagreed on. Both sides get canonicalized: comparing a realpath-ed
candidate against a root that was only abspath-ed is the macOS /tmp ->
/private/tmp mismatch that has already produced a false failure here, and
canonicalizing one side is worse than canonicalizing neither. commonpath rather
than startswith, because /a/bc begins with /a/b and is not inside it. A relative
candidate joins the root rather than os.getcwd(), which is whatever directory
the server happens to be running in. NUL and newline are refused with a reason
instead of caught by a bare `except Exception` and reported as an ordinary
escape. Eighteen call sites go through it now. It deliberately does not decide
whether a path is sensitive -- that deny list answers "allowed" rather than
"inside", and it stays with src/tool_execution, which owns it. The one
commonpath left in the tree, in src/workspace_paths.py, stays: that function
translates a host path into a container path, so canonicalizing either side
would change the relative path it computes and break the mapping. It is not a
confinement check.
Two of those sites were weaker than the rest and are fixed rather than moved.
The email attachment check used abspath, which folds `..` but does not resolve
symlinks, so a symlink written into the extraction directory passed it and was
then read through. The skill-reference guard compared a realpath-ed target
against a raw dirname, so on a host where the skills tree is reached through a
symlink the two sides never matched and the guard could not fire.
The execution boundary had two separate holes.
The workspace namespace bound /home and /mnt read-write. On the one platform
where that namespace engages at all, a command inside it reaches outside the
workspace and writes to the user's home directory -- measured by running this
argv on a Linux host with working bubblewrap, not inferred from the source.
Binding the user's whole home directory into a workspace-confinement namespace
gives back most of what the namespace was for. Both are read-only now. The
workspace is also bound writable at its real host path, not only at /workspace:
BashTool's own /tmp redirect rewrites `/tmp/` to `<agent_cwd()>/.tmp/` before
the namespace is built, so the command bwrap receives already names the real
path, and those writes previously landed only because the workspace happened to
sit under the writable /home.
`namespaced or _replace_workspace_alias(...)` chose between a mount namespace
and a regex with nothing in the result saying which one ran. The fallback
rewrites the literal token /workspace in the command string, so a command that
never mentions /workspace is untouched by it and runs on the host unrestricted
-- which is every agent shell command on macOS. Both tools now ask
containment.probe() instead of each deciding for itself, and every bash and
python result carries a containment block naming the mechanism and stating
whether the filesystem dimension actually held. Under enforcing mode the
command is not run and the result says so.
That block reports the filesystem dimension only, and says so in a
reported_dimensions field. The probe knows this host could also give a process
group and a real wall clock, but these two tools still assemble their own
create_subprocess_* call and pass neither, so listing those dimensions would be
exactly the false claim src/containment.py calls worse than an honest absence.
probe() is new on src/containment.py: the same mechanism table and the same
arithmetic as acquire(), stopping before the side effects. acquire() is the
wrong shape for a decision -- it writes a durable grant record, and a record
whose pid is never filled in and whose release() never runs is an entry a
restart reaper keeps finding.
CONTAINMENT_MODE stays report_only. Flipping it refuses every agent shell
command on macOS and on any Linux host without bubblewrap, which is a product
decision rather than a code one.
Smaller things in the same area: the /tmp redirect's makedirs was unguarded, so
a read-only workspace turned a command that merely mentioned `/tmp/` into an
OSError traceback instead of a tool error; it degrades now. WORKSPACE_MOUNT
moved to src/constants.py so the namespace and the path resolvers read one
definition of the contract rather than two. The ".tmp" dirname got a constant,
since it appeared in both tool paths.
One generated artifact moved with it: website/configuration-reference.md pins
the source line where each ODYSSEUS_* variable is read, and three of those
shifted. Regenerated with scripts/generate_env_reference.py; the diff is line
numbers only.
Three existing tests changed. test_workspace_artifact_tool_floor asserted that
an unsafe interpreter prefix produces no `--ro-bind <prefix> <prefix>`, which
now fires on /home because /home is legitimately a read-only base mount.
Asserting the absence of a literal flag string cannot distinguish "the prefix
was rejected" from "the argv mounted that root itself", so it compares the argv
against the no-prefix baseline instead: an unsafe prefix must add nothing.
The Windows bash test asserted dict equality on the
whole result, which makes adding a field to every bash result impossible without
touching a test about tmux; it asserts the shape now. The personal-dir symlink
test grepped the resolver's source for the literal "os.path.realpath", which is
gone because the resolution moved into the shared boundary -- it keeps the
negative assertion that the closure must not grow its own abspath check again,
and the behavioural half now runs against the boundary, where it covers every
call site instead of one closure.
Not verified: the bubblewrap argv is asserted, not executed. There is no bwrap
on macOS, and in Docker it needs --privileged to work at all -- default and
seccomp=unconfined both fail with "Creating new namespace failed", and
--cap-add=SYS_ADMIN fails at pivot_root. The Python tool's
needs_virtual_namespace gate means ordinary Python code gets no namespace even
on a Linux host that could provide one; that is reported now but deliberately
not changed, because it alters the Linux Python path on every call and cannot be
checked from here.
Snapshot current maintainer-preview application changes and regression fixtures for integration into lab. Excludes local runtime data, evaluation outputs and source backups. Focused Python regression selection: 140 passed; full suite not certified.
Replace substring OpenAI endpoint detection with exact parsed-host matching.
Route gallery image endpoint construction through a constant path allowlist.
Remove client-visible exception and upstream response body leaks from gallery image flows while preserving diagnostics in server logs.
Add focused regression tests for OpenAI host matching, checked endpoint joining, harmonize SSRF hardening, and sanitized client errors.
