settings.js is 5,721 lines and the registry/navigation/search/sidebar/
lifecycle primitives already live in static/js/settings/. What was left
behind in the coordinator was the layer above them: what happens when a
panel becomes active, where an admin-managed tab is handed to admin.js,
which elements are admin-only, the Appearance window fade, and the
public open/close. That layer reached module-global `modalEl` and
`initialized` directly, so none of it could be exercised without
booting every panel in the file — and every panel I eventually move out
would have to route back through it.
Three modules, no behavior change:
shell.js panel-activation side effects, the admin handoff,
.admin-only visibility, open()/close(). Takes what it
needs from settings.js as injected callbacks, the same
shape bindSettingsNavigation() already uses, so it
holds no panel state.
peek.js the Appearance window fade and its toggle. It is window
chrome rather than Appearance panel data, and it has to
be cleared when the user leaves that panel.
oauthReturn.js the once-per-load return path from the Google OAuth
redirect. It was an IIFE running at module evaluation
in the middle of a 5,700-line file.
settings.js keeps open/close/syncAdminVisibility as exports, so every
caller (app.js, calendar.js, chatStream.js, gallery.js, admin.js,
modelPicker.js, slashCommands.js, chatRenderer.js, emailLibrary.js) is
untouched. 5,721 -> 5,583 lines; the settings/ modules go 887 -> 1,107.
The real-ESM coordinator smoke now links the three new files and asserts
what moved: admin-only elements hidden for a non-admin and shown for an
admin, an admin-managed tab click handed to admin.js without a second
local activation, and the Peek fade applying on Appearance and clearing
when the user navigates away. The OAuth test follows its handler to the
new file and additionally pins the coordinator wiring, since "uses the
module-local open()" is now a property of the seam rather than of one
source slice.
No new module needs a cache-busting query or an sw.js precache entry:
the existing settings/ submodules have neither, they load transitively
from settings.js's versioned URL, and sw.js serves JS network-first.
admin.js stays where it is. It has no shell to extract — open() and
close() already delegate to settingsModule, and its 4,122 lines are all
panel code. That is a panel split, not this one.
* docs(specs): restore bootstrap after dev rewrite
* docs(specs): remove runtime inventory snapshot
* docs(specs): reconcile current dev truth
* docs(specs): document scheduled task actions as an owner-attribution source
Owner Attribution covered cookie, bearer-token and internal-loopback
requests. Scheduled task actions are a fourth source and behave
differently: _execute_action passes owner=task.owner off the stored
ScheduledTask row, so no request and no resolved principal are in
flight, and route-level require_user() never runs.
Webhook triggers are the sharp case. They are unauthenticated by
design with the token as the only credential and execute under the
stored task.owner.
Paths cite routes/task/task_routes.py, the canonical location after
the task subpackage move (#6081); routes/task_routes.py on current dev
is the backward-compat shim.
* docs(specs): add chained tasks to the trigger list, refresh dev stamp
Review feedback from RaresKeY on the previous commit.
"Every trigger path" was too broad: success-chained tasks are another
path into _execute_action. Added them with their own citation, and
noted that chaining additionally requires the target task to share
task.owner and rejects cycles, which is stricter than the trigger-side
checks. Softened the lead-in to "these trigger paths".
Line 56 still pointed at routes/task_routes.py for webhook credential
validation. That path is the backward-compat shim on current dev after
the task subpackage move (#6081); repointed to the canonical
routes/task/task_routes.py.
Stamp moved to dev@2a6b09b. Inspection backing that bump was scoped:
every file path cited in this spec was mechanically checked to resolve
on 2a6b09b, and every file:line in the Owner Attribution additions was
read against it. Behavioral claims elsewhere in the file were not
re-audited.
* docs(specs): correct SECURE_COOKIES description to match current behavior
Third of the stale details RaresKeY enumerated. The cookie section
described SECURE_COOKIES as purely opt-in, which stopped being true.
_secure_cookie() (routes/auth_routes.py:89) treats an explicit true or
false as authoritative and derives the Secure attribute from the
request otherwise, including when the variable is unset and when
docker-compose injects it present-but-empty. Either the connection
scheme or the first X-Forwarded-Proto hop being https is enough.
* docs(specs): refresh current dev truth
---------
Co-authored-by: StressTestor <212606152+StressTestor@users.noreply.github.com>
Léo