* fix(security): stop the agent from re-enabling tools an admin disabled
settings.json:disabled_tools is the only global tool-permission boundary
the Settings > Agent Tools panel offers, yet manage_settings exposed an
`enable_tool` action that removed entries from it. Any agent turn could
undo the admin's restriction, and because the agent reads untrusted web
pages, emails and documents, a planted instruction could re-enable bash,
email or any other tool that had been switched off.
The denylist can now only be narrowed from a turn: `disable_tool` and
`list_tools` keep working, `enable_tool` is refused with a message that
points the user to Settings > Agent Tools, and the action is dropped from
the function schema, the prompt rule and the tool index so models are not
steered into calling it. The free-form set/delete/reset actions were
already unable to reach `disabled_tools`; a test now pins that.
Fixes#5523
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UAB5sz5srMKR7rbeDFtdMH
* fix(settings): close internal API tool-policy bypass
Refuse global tool-policy replacement from internal-token requests even when an admin owner is impersonated, and block the same write in app_api. Route explicit image re-enable requests to list_tools with a Settings pointer. Keep disabled_tools outside general settings actions even if a default is added later. Remove the retired action from capability metadata. Validation: 573 focused tests passed; the running app rejected handler, generic API and encoded-path internal HTTP attempts while preserving human administrator controls.
* fix(mcp): block agent writes to per-server MCP tool policy
PATCH /api/mcp/servers/{id}/tools only checked require_admin, which accepts
the internal tool token, and app_api still forwarded it, so an agent turn
could re-enable MCP tools an admin had switched off. Refuse the internal
token on that route (same check as POST /api/tools) and add PATCH
/api/mcp/servers to the app_api blocklist, with regression tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BCbhLNC7mJsunxqfwwshqn
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Afonso Junior <chatgpt@yack.com.br>
Request authority admits whole tool families from the user's request, so a
request to read email also admits send_email, delete_email and bulk_email,
and agent processes inherit the host network. With the gate defaulting to
off, an instruction injected through an email or a fetched page reaches those
tools with no other check; dev refuses them today.
Default the gate on, keep ODYSSEUS_TOOL_APPROVAL_GATE=0 as the opt-out, and
pin the production default with a test that imports the module in a fresh
interpreter. Four routing tests written for the opt-out posture now set it
explicitly.
Snapshot current maintainer-preview application changes and regression fixtures for integration into lab. Excludes local runtime data, evaluation outputs and source backups. Focused Python regression selection: 140 passed; full suite not certified.
Commit e45e0cd removed the workspace feature's entry point (deleted
routes/workspace_routes.py + static/js/workspace.js and dropped the
workspace-param parsing in chat_routes), but left the downstream backend
plumbing dangling: chat_routes passed a hardcoded workspace=None into
stream_agent_loop, which forwarded it to execute_tool_block, so the
workspace value was permanently None and every workspace-gated branch
was unreachable.
Remove the now-dead code (no behavior change, since workspace was always
None):
- src/tool_execution.py: drop _resolve_tool_path_in_workspace and the
workspace params/branches on execute_tool_block, _direct_fallback,
_call_mcp_tool, _do_edit_file, and _resolve_search_root; restore the
bash/python/bg cwd to _AGENT_WORKDIR.
- src/agent_loop.py: drop the workspace param on stream_agent_loop, the
dead 'ACTIVE WORKSPACE' system-prompt block, and the workspace forward.
- routes/chat_routes.py: drop the hardcoded workspace=None arg and var.
- tests: delete test_workspace_confine.py (tested the removed feature) and
the workspace assertion in test_tool_policy.py.
Full suite: 2903 passed, 1 skipped.
