* fix(security): stop API tokens reaching privileged agent tools
A bearer API token resolves to the human who minted it, and minting is admin-only, so every owner-keyed privilege check in the agent path answers "admin". A token issued for a narrow integration therefore reached bash and python with the authority of the account that created it.
Three independent routes to that sink, each closed here.
The token could answer its own tool-approval prompt. An approval records that a person authorized one dangerous action, and a token cannot make that statement, so /api/chat_stream now refuses an approval resume from a bearer caller.
The chat-session grant was reconstructable from caller-supplied message metadata. Two routes persist a metadata blob on the caller's behalf, so the shape of a resolved approval card could be written straight into a transcript and was then read back as authority. The server now signs the grant when it resolves an approval and verifies that signature when reading it back, binding it to the chat and the approval it was issued for. Both routes also drop server-owned keys from an inbound blob.
A run driven by a token inherited its owner's tool set. Such a run is now capped at the non-admin policy regardless of who minted the credential, which holds even where no approval is raised at all.
The human path is unchanged: a browser session still receives the prompt, still approves, and a granted chat-session scope still carries to later turns in that chat.
Scope enforcement across the wider route surface is a separate gap and is not addressed here.
* fix scoped chat delegation boundaries
* fix(auth): reject malformed chat approval signatures
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Co-authored-by: RaresKeY <158580472+RaresKeY@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(api): attribute bearer-token actions to the token owner on owner-scoped routes
Owner-scoped chat, session, and upload routes called
get_current_user(), which resolves a bearer ody_ API token to the
sandboxed "api" pseudo-user. A paired API-token client (companion, CLI,
IDE extension) therefore saw and created a separate "api"-owned silo
instead of the owner's data.
effective_user() already exists for exactly this: it attributes a token's
actions to request.state.api_token_owner, is identical to
get_current_user() for cookie sessions, and falls back safely when a
token has no owner. session_routes.py was already migrated; this
completes the migration for the remaining owner-scoped routes:
- chat_helpers.py: chat-privilege enforcement, message attribution, prefs/context
- chat_routes.py: orphaned-endpoint owner, session-auth owner, message search
- upload_routes.py: upload owner attribution + access checks
The /api/models swap is intentionally omitted: #4292 already migrated it
to effective_user (plus the chat-scope gate and ownerless-token 403), so
this PR keeps dev's version of routes/model_routes.py unchanged.
chat_routes.py keeps importing get_current_user for the workspace owner
gate; session_routes.py drops the now-unused import.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test: target effective_user in auth monkeypatches and owner-scope assertion
The owner-scoped routes now call effective_user() instead of
get_current_user(), so the tests that stubbed get_current_user (or
asserted on it) follow suit:
- test_chat_helpers.py, test_review_regressions.py,
test_kv_cache_invalidation_2927.py: monkeypatch effective_user
- test_session_endpoint_owner_scope.py: assert the owner-scope guard uses
effective_user(request)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
