fix(security): refresh client trust and adopt corrected upstream SearXNG (#6791)

Select the official immutable SearXNG release with corrected system and certifi stores in all Compose deployments. Retain native offline, actual-entrypoint and Compose/live regression checks while removing the custom trust-repair image and registry publication path. Reuse the canonical CA inventory checker.

Include released Python, certifi, grpcio, uv and Docker CLI trust updates and strict fourteen-chain validation. Keep unreleased CPython verifier and native-helper fixes separate from claims about shipped artifacts.

Part of #6784 and #6790.

Co-authored-by: Léo <leograndcontact@gmail.com>

docs/searxng-trust-image.md

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+# Upstream SearXNG trust validation
+
+SearXNG owns independent system and Python certificate stores. Updating Odysseus's Python environment does not update this sidecar. The base and both standalone GPU Compose files now select the official `docker.io/searxng/searxng:2026.10.24-ef0ec03da` image at immutable multiarch digest `sha256:7c7cbe509429e82755104b2a95f52085a98633c95d53f44e4e905fa3a59f08c8`. Its system and certifi stores remove the affected eMudhra trust. The [upstream certifi update](https://github.com/searxng/searxng/pull/6881) is included in this release.
+
+Deploy the upstream image directly. The validation Dockerfile adds public fixtures and diagnostics only; no repair layer, custom runtime image or project registry publisher is required. `scripts/check_ca_trust.py` owns the known-certificate inventory for both the application and SearXNG checks.
+
+## Validate a pin update
+
+Run from the repository root on a disposable Docker host. The helper uses a fresh configuration volume, omits published ports and does not load the operator's `.env`. It retains the base Compose settings wrapper, healthcheck and capabilities. Outbound network access and working search engines are required for the live checks.
+
+```sh
+image=$(docker compose --env-file /dev/null -f docker-compose.yml config --format json |
+  python3 -c 'import json, sys; print(json.load(sys.stdin)["services"]["searxng"]["image"])')
+
+# Offline build-step checks, including actual entrypoint and loopback health.
+# Pulling the selected base still requires registry access.
+docker build --network=none --target validation \
+  --build-arg "SEARXNG_IMAGE=$image" -f docker/searxng/Dockerfile .
+
+# Exercise the exact unmodified deployment image after an anonymous pull.
+docker pull "$image"
+bash .github/scripts/validate-searxng-image.sh "$image"
+```
+
+The offline checks require all fourteen incident chains to fail certificate verification through the system PEM bundle, hashed CA directory and certifi. The affected positive-control roots must accept those same chains. Each fixture's DER fingerprint is verified first, and a fixed verification timestamp prevents expiry from hiding a broken mitigation. Checks run again after the real upstream root entrypoint regenerates trust.
+
+The live checks use SearXNG's actual curl client factory. Ordinary verified HTTPS must succeed, all fourteen incident hosts must fail with curl certificate error 60, and a JSON search must return results. DNS failures, timeouts and generic handshake failures are inconclusive and fail validation. The checks inspect the already-running service without changing its trust stores.
+
+The `ci / SearXNG trust` workflow runs these offline and Compose/live checks on native amd64 and arm64 runners. It selects the same immutable image as base Compose, pulls without registry credentials, and has read-only repository permissions. It neither publishes a replacement image nor requires package-write credentials. Update all three deployment pins together; the alignment regression guards the standalone GPU files.
+
+## Rollout and scope
+
+Changing a Compose pin does not replace running containers. After updating the checkout, run `docker compose pull searxng` and `docker compose up -d --no-deps searxng`, then inspect health, retained settings and actual Odysseus search integration. Use the appropriate standalone GPU Compose file when that is the deployment being managed.
+
+Operator-mounted trust, custom engines, persisted packages and independently managed clients need separate effective-client checks. An amd64 result does not establish arm64 behavior. The fixture-based check detects known certificate fingerprints; it does not model every native revocation mechanism or arbitrary reissued certificates sharing a compromised key. See [outbound TLS trust](tls-trust.md) for the application, bootstrap, Chromium and other runtime boundaries.
+
+## Public fixture provenance
+
+The public CA inventory comes from the incident's [roots](https://emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com/roots.json) and [intermediates](https://emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com/impacted-intermediates.json). The additional cross-signed issuer and fourteen chain fixtures come from [chains.zip](https://emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com/chains.zip), SHA-256 `7b949956955fc501a30f4d98d2f513d34c0bbbe92e29a968194c96e097ce2345`. Fixtures contain public certificates only. See [the fixture notes](../tests/fixtures/ca-trust/README.md).

docs/tls-trust.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 Odysseus uses both Python package CA bundles and system trust. HTTPX uses certifi by default; the guarded web/PDF fetcher and webhook delivery explicitly use Python's system SSL context. A configured `LLM_CA_BUNDLE` adds certificates to system trust for model calls. Upgrading certifi alone cannot repair every outbound HTTPS path.
 
-For the October 2026 eMudhra incident, use certifi 2026.10.19 or newer, pip 26.2.2 or newer, and uv 0.13.4 or newer wherever uv is used. Pip has its own vendored certifi and also loads system roots. Update the operating system's certificate package separately. See the [Python security announcement](https://discuss.python.org/t/109576) and [incident details](https://emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com/).
+For the October 2026 eMudhra incident, use certifi 2026.10.23 or newer, pip 26.2.2 or newer, and uv 0.13.5 or newer wherever uv is used. Pip has its own vendored certifi and also loads system roots. Update the operating system's certificate package separately. See the [Python security announcement](https://discuss.python.org/t/109576) and [incident details](https://emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com/).
 
 Before other pip installs, bootstrap the selected environment with the integrity-pinned wheels:
 
@@ -27,7 +27,9 @@ Explicit PEM bundles can also be passed as positional arguments. The check rejec
 
 This is an offline inventory check of known certificate fingerprints. It does not modify stores, reject requests at runtime, model native OS revocation, or detect arbitrary reissued certificates sharing the compromised keys. Chromium's policy separately matches public keys. Check mounted or replaced CA files again after deployment, remove affected trust through the owning platform/client configuration, and restart clients that cache SSL contexts. A passing build cannot validate custom files introduced later.
 
-Both Docker build stages refresh system CA certificates and bootstrap pip/certifi before dependency installation. The build fails if known affected CA certificates remain. Node uses the corrected system store through `--use-openssl-ca`. Python gRPC uses that same PEM file through `GRPC_DEFAULT_SSL_ROOTS_FILE_PATH`; updating certifi alone does not replace gRPC's independent wheel bundle. After dependency installation, the image checks gRPC's selected file as well. An explicit gRPC override must be readable and free of known affected CA certificates: gRPC can otherwise fall back to its affected bundled defaults. Upstream gRPC has [merged a bundle update](https://github.com/grpc/grpc/commit/8b32af3bf498c2ba9667410eaa8c836e700e97e6); as checked on 2026-10-21, its [release backport](https://github.com/grpc/grpc/pull/43700) is still open and the latest published grpcio wheel is 1.84.0. Retain the checked override until a released replacement's actual trust behavior has been verified.
+Both Docker build stages use Python 3.14.9, refresh system CA certificates and bootstrap pip/certifi before dependency installation. The build fails if known affected CA certificates remain. Node uses the corrected system store through `--use-openssl-ca`. Python gRPC uses that same PEM file through `GRPC_DEFAULT_SSL_ROOTS_FILE_PATH`; updating certifi alone does not replace gRPC's independent wheel bundle. After dependency installation, the image checks gRPC's selected file as well. An explicit gRPC override must be readable and free of known affected CA certificates. [grpcio 1.84.1](https://github.com/grpc/grpc/releases/tag/v1.84.1) includes the upstream root-bundle correction and is the application minimum. Retain the checked override as a consistent image trust selection; older persisted Python environments and explicit client roots still need independent checks.
+
+The image also bundles Docker CLI [29.9.2](https://github.com/moby/moby/releases/tag/docker-v29.9.2), built with Go 1.26.10's distrust of the compromised intermediate keys. Cookbook uses this client for optional Docker operations. Default Compose does not mount the host Docker socket; local daemon access requires the explicit [host-Docker overlay](../docker/host-docker.yml), whose usual Unix-socket connection does not use TLS. The client update is maintenance of a shipped tool, not evidence that these local calls were exposed. It does not update the host daemon or other containers' clients and trust stores; assess those separately.
 
 Chromium uses a separate trust store. The Docker image installs a managed `CADistrustedCertificates` policy for the eight compromised intermediate public keys, covering their cross-signs without depending on background revocation updates. It adds no trusted certificate and does not disable certificate verification. The policy and public-certificate provenance are documented in [the browser policy note](../docker/chromium-ca-policy.md). Native browser installations and independently managed profiles require their own platform policy or vendor update; this image policy does not configure host browsers.
 
@@ -62,4 +64,12 @@ For containers started non-root or without the SETUID/SETGID capabilities needed
 
 SearXNG is a separate HTTPS client and image; updating the Odysseus image does not patch it. Inspect its effective CA path and update or rebuild that image independently. Also inspect persisted `/app/.local` packages, remote Cookbook environments, and externally configured MCP runtimes. Image replacement does not necessarily replace those environments.
 
-For behavioral validation, all twelve [published test chains](https://emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com/chains.zip), including the AAA cross-signs, must fail certificate verification through the effective stores. Confirm that an ordinary known-good HTTPS request still succeeds. In Chromium, confirm the managed policy is loaded at `chrome://policy` and test the incident endpoints through the actual browser path with certificate verification enabled. The PEM checker cannot inspect Chromium's policy or its active verifier. Package versions and a successful image build alone do not prove that a running deployment selects the corrected store.
+For behavioral validation, all fourteen [published test chains](https://emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com/chains.zip), including the AAA cross-signs and two chains without Certificate Transparency entries, must fail certificate verification through the effective stores. Confirm that an ordinary known-good HTTPS request still succeeds. In Chromium, confirm the managed policy is loaded at `chrome://policy` and test the incident endpoints through the actual browser path with certificate verification enabled. The PEM checker cannot inspect Chromium's policy or its active verifier. Package versions and a successful image build alone do not prove that a running deployment selects the corrected store.
+
+## Follow-up releases
+
+The maintained bootstrap selects certifi 2026.10.23 with its verified wheel hash; pip remains 26.2.2. The certifi update removes the C1/C3 roots in addition to the earlier incident changes. CI uses uv 0.13.5, which adds verifier-level rejection of the compromised intermediate keys and updated managed CPython builds. Existing virtual environments do not update automatically. See the [certifi change](https://github.com/certifi/python-certifi/commit/b60466c9f2882d9cf088943c650b0faac06c080c), [uv release](https://github.com/astral-sh/uv/releases/tag/0.13.5), and [Python security releases](https://blog.python.org/2026/10/python-3151-3149-31317/). The pinned bootstrap still replaces the selected versions exactly; preserving newer installed versions and private-mirror support remain separate maintenance.
+
+SearXNG remains an independent trust owner. Use the [upstream-image validation and rollout instructions](searxng-trust-image.md); updating these application packages does not repair an existing sidecar. Host daemons, native browser policy, optional compiled clients and independently managed integrations require their own effective-client checks.
+
+CPython's [intermediate-key verifier block](https://github.com/python/cpython/pull/160042) and its [3.14 backport](https://github.com/python/cpython/pull/160569) merged on October 24. They are distinct from Python 3.14.9's bundled-pip update. No released 3.14 interpreter containing that verifier change was identified when this image pin was selected; retain the corrected effective trust stores and track the subsequent security release. hf-xet's [trust fix](https://github.com/huggingface/xet-core/pull/1038) is also merged but not included in the latest published 1.7.0 release at that check. Agent-browser 0.39.2 and primp 2.0.1 are not established incident fixes for their independent native trust paths. A version bump alone does not establish that the active client uses corrected trust.