fix(tls): accept hashed non-CA certificates during trust checks

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RaresKeY
2026-10-21 18:59:02 +00:00
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# CA trust regression fixtures
The public CA certificates embedded in `tests/test_ca_trust.py` exercise the October 2026 eMudhra trust-store check. They contain no private keys. `emsign-g3.pem` and `aaa.pem` are the incident's affected trust anchors; `emsign-g1.pem` is an unaffected emSign anchor that must remain usable. The test creates temporary PEM files from these public constants. The certificate fingerprints are the factual identity of each fixture.
The public certificates embedded in `tests/test_ca_trust.py` exercise the October 2026 eMudhra trust-store check. They contain no private keys. `emsign-g3.pem` and `aaa.pem` are the incident's affected trust anchors; `emsign-g1.pem` is an unaffected emSign anchor that must remain usable. `localhost-leaf.pem` is a synthetic self-signed Ed25519 server certificate with `CA:FALSE`, generated solely to reproduce hashed non-CA certificates found in Ubuntu's OpenSSL directory; its private key was discarded. The test creates temporary PEM files from these public constants. The certificate fingerprints are the factual identity of each fixture.
Sources: the [incident root list](https://emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com/roots.json) and the public Mozilla root certificates distributed in Debian's `ca-certificates` package. Behavioral chain verification should also cover the incident site's separate [twelve published server chains](https://emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com/chains.zip).