mirror of
https://github.com/pewdiepie-archdaemon/odysseus.git
synced 2026-10-29 17:22:25 +01:00
feat(editor): harden photo editor security and interactions
This commit is contained in:
@@ -0,0 +1,336 @@
|
||||
#!/usr/bin/env python3
|
||||
"""Sanitize Playwright trace archives to strip sensitive credentials and tokens.
|
||||
|
||||
Structured, format-aware fail-closed security:
|
||||
Replaces naive regex-based replacement with structured JSON / HAR parsing,
|
||||
recursive key/value redaction, URL credential scrubbing, DOM snapshot sanitization,
|
||||
safe source code masking, and strict fail-closed purge on corruption or error.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import json
|
||||
import logging
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import re
|
||||
import sys
|
||||
import urllib.parse
|
||||
import zipfile
|
||||
from typing import Any, Dict, List, Set
|
||||
|
||||
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
|
||||
|
||||
BINARY_IMAGE_EXTENSIONS = ('.png', '.jpg', '.jpeg', '.webp', '.gif', '.ico')
|
||||
|
||||
SENSITIVE_KEY_PATTERN = re.compile(
|
||||
r'(?i)(password|passwd|secret|token|api_key|apikey|access_token|refresh_token|private_key|auth_token|client_secret|session|session_id|sid|csrf|xsrf|jwt|credential|authorization)'
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
SENSITIVE_PARAM_NAMES = frozenset({
|
||||
"token", "session", "auth", "password", "passwd", "key", "secret", "api_key",
|
||||
"apikey", "access_token", "refresh_token", "jwt", "sid", "code", "sig",
|
||||
"signature", "client_secret", "credential"
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
SENSITIVE_HEADER_NAMES = frozenset({
|
||||
"authorization", "proxy-authorization", "cookie", "set-cookie", "x-api-key",
|
||||
"api-key", "x-auth-token", "x-access-token"
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def sanitize_url(url: str) -> str:
|
||||
"""Sanitize query parameters and authority credentials in URLs."""
|
||||
if not isinstance(url, str) or not url.strip():
|
||||
return url
|
||||
try:
|
||||
parts = urllib.parse.urlsplit(url)
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
return url
|
||||
|
||||
netloc = parts.netloc
|
||||
if "@" in netloc:
|
||||
userinfo, host = netloc.split("@", 1)
|
||||
if ":" in userinfo:
|
||||
user, _ = userinfo.split(":", 1)
|
||||
netloc = f"{user}:[REDACTED]@{host}"
|
||||
else:
|
||||
netloc = f"[REDACTED]@{host}"
|
||||
|
||||
query = parts.query
|
||||
if query:
|
||||
q_pairs = urllib.parse.parse_qsl(query, keep_blank_values=True)
|
||||
sanitized_pairs = []
|
||||
for k, v in q_pairs:
|
||||
k_lower = k.lower().replace("-", "_")
|
||||
if k_lower in SENSITIVE_PARAM_NAMES or SENSITIVE_KEY_PATTERN.search(k_lower):
|
||||
sanitized_pairs.append((k, "[REDACTED]"))
|
||||
else:
|
||||
sanitized_pairs.append((k, v))
|
||||
query = urllib.parse.urlencode(sanitized_pairs)
|
||||
|
||||
return urllib.parse.urlunsplit((parts.scheme, netloc, parts.path, query, parts.fragment))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def sanitize_body_text(text: str) -> str:
|
||||
"""Sanitize request bodies formatted as JSON or URL-encoded form data."""
|
||||
if not isinstance(text, str) or not text.strip():
|
||||
return text
|
||||
|
||||
# 1. Try JSON
|
||||
trimmed = text.strip()
|
||||
if (trimmed.startswith("{") and trimmed.endswith("}")) or (trimmed.startswith("[") and trimmed.endswith("]")):
|
||||
try:
|
||||
parsed = json.loads(trimmed)
|
||||
sanitized = sanitize_structured_obj(parsed)
|
||||
return json.dumps(sanitized, ensure_ascii=False)
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
|
||||
# 2. Try URL-encoded form data
|
||||
if "=" in trimmed and not trimmed.startswith("<"):
|
||||
try:
|
||||
pairs = urllib.parse.parse_qsl(trimmed, keep_blank_values=True)
|
||||
if pairs and any(k.lower() in SENSITIVE_PARAM_NAMES or SENSITIVE_KEY_PATTERN.search(k) for k, _ in pairs):
|
||||
out_pairs = []
|
||||
for k, v in pairs:
|
||||
k_lower = k.lower().replace("-", "_")
|
||||
if k_lower in SENSITIVE_PARAM_NAMES or SENSITIVE_KEY_PATTERN.search(k_lower):
|
||||
out_pairs.append((k, "[REDACTED]"))
|
||||
else:
|
||||
out_pairs.append((k, v))
|
||||
return urllib.parse.urlencode(out_pairs)
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
|
||||
return text
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def sanitize_structured_obj(obj: Any) -> Any:
|
||||
"""Recursively sanitize Python objects decoded from JSON or HAR payloads."""
|
||||
if isinstance(obj, dict):
|
||||
new_dict: Dict[str, Any] = {}
|
||||
|
||||
# Check for header entry with inverted or standard keys: {"name": ..., "value": ...}
|
||||
name_val = obj.get("name")
|
||||
val_val = obj.get("value")
|
||||
if isinstance(name_val, str) and isinstance(val_val, str):
|
||||
name_lower = name_val.lower().strip()
|
||||
if name_lower in SENSITIVE_HEADER_NAMES or SENSITIVE_KEY_PATTERN.search(name_lower):
|
||||
for k, v in obj.items():
|
||||
if k == "value":
|
||||
new_dict[k] = "[REDACTED]"
|
||||
else:
|
||||
new_dict[k] = sanitize_structured_obj(v)
|
||||
return new_dict
|
||||
|
||||
# Process standard dictionary keys
|
||||
for k, v in obj.items():
|
||||
k_lower = str(k).lower().replace("-", "_")
|
||||
|
||||
# Action parameters in Playwright traces (e.g. page.fill, page.type)
|
||||
if k == "params" and isinstance(v, dict):
|
||||
sanitized_params = sanitize_structured_obj(v)
|
||||
# If this action involves fill, type, or sensitive inputs, redact value/text
|
||||
if "value" in sanitized_params:
|
||||
sanitized_params["value"] = "[REDACTED]"
|
||||
if "text" in sanitized_params:
|
||||
sanitized_params["text"] = "[REDACTED]"
|
||||
new_dict[k] = sanitized_params
|
||||
continue
|
||||
|
||||
# DOM snapshot nodes
|
||||
if k == "attributes" and isinstance(v, (dict, list)):
|
||||
if isinstance(v, dict):
|
||||
attr_dict = dict(v)
|
||||
type_val = str(attr_dict.get("type") or "").lower()
|
||||
if type_val == "password" or "password" in str(attr_dict.get("name") or "").lower():
|
||||
if "value" in attr_dict:
|
||||
attr_dict["value"] = "[REDACTED]"
|
||||
new_dict[k] = attr_dict
|
||||
continue
|
||||
elif isinstance(v, list):
|
||||
# List of attribute strings or pairs
|
||||
new_list = []
|
||||
is_pw = any("password" in str(x).lower() for x in v)
|
||||
for x in v:
|
||||
if is_pw and isinstance(x, str) and not x.startswith("type="):
|
||||
new_list.append("[REDACTED]")
|
||||
else:
|
||||
new_list.append(sanitize_structured_obj(x))
|
||||
new_dict[k] = new_list
|
||||
continue
|
||||
|
||||
# Request postData / text
|
||||
if k in ("postData", "postDataText") and isinstance(v, str):
|
||||
new_dict[k] = sanitize_body_text(v)
|
||||
continue
|
||||
|
||||
# URL fields
|
||||
if k == "url" and isinstance(v, str):
|
||||
new_dict[k] = sanitize_url(v)
|
||||
continue
|
||||
|
||||
# Cookie arrays
|
||||
if k == "cookies" and isinstance(v, list):
|
||||
sanitized_cookies = []
|
||||
for c in v:
|
||||
if isinstance(c, dict):
|
||||
c_copy = dict(c)
|
||||
if "value" in c_copy:
|
||||
c_copy["value"] = "[REDACTED]"
|
||||
sanitized_cookies.append(c_copy)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
sanitized_cookies.append(sanitize_structured_obj(c))
|
||||
new_dict[k] = sanitized_cookies
|
||||
continue
|
||||
|
||||
# Direct sensitive key matches
|
||||
if SENSITIVE_KEY_PATTERN.search(k_lower) and isinstance(v, str):
|
||||
new_dict[k] = "[REDACTED]"
|
||||
continue
|
||||
|
||||
new_dict[k] = sanitize_structured_obj(v)
|
||||
|
||||
return new_dict
|
||||
|
||||
elif isinstance(obj, list):
|
||||
return [sanitize_structured_obj(item) for item in obj]
|
||||
|
||||
elif isinstance(obj, str):
|
||||
# Check for inline credentials/tokens
|
||||
if obj.startswith("Bearer ") or obj.startswith("bearer "):
|
||||
return "Bearer [REDACTED]"
|
||||
if obj.startswith("Basic ") or obj.startswith("basic "):
|
||||
return "Basic [REDACTED]"
|
||||
return obj
|
||||
|
||||
return obj
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def sanitize_jsonl_content(data: bytes) -> bytes:
|
||||
"""Sanitize newline-delimited JSON Lines (.trace, .network, .stacks)."""
|
||||
lines = data.split(b"\n")
|
||||
out_lines = []
|
||||
for line in lines:
|
||||
if not line.strip():
|
||||
out_lines.append(line)
|
||||
continue
|
||||
try:
|
||||
parsed = json.loads(line.decode("utf-8"))
|
||||
except (json.JSONDecodeError, UnicodeDecodeError):
|
||||
# Not valid JSON, keep as-is
|
||||
out_lines.append(line)
|
||||
continue
|
||||
sanitized = sanitize_structured_obj(parsed)
|
||||
out_lines.append(json.dumps(sanitized, ensure_ascii=False).encode("utf-8"))
|
||||
return b"\n".join(out_lines)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def sanitize_trace_archive(zp: str) -> bool:
|
||||
"""Sanitize a single zip archive in a strict fail-closed manner.
|
||||
|
||||
If the archive is malformed, partial, unreadable, or encounters an exception
|
||||
during processing, the archive is permanently deleted so that raw traces
|
||||
cannot leak.
|
||||
Returns True if successfully sanitized, False if deleted due to error.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if not os.path.exists(zp):
|
||||
return False
|
||||
|
||||
temp_zp = zp + ".tmp"
|
||||
try:
|
||||
if os.path.getsize(zp) == 0:
|
||||
raise zipfile.BadZipFile("Empty archive")
|
||||
|
||||
with zipfile.ZipFile(zp, "r") as zin:
|
||||
infolist = zin.infolist()
|
||||
if not infolist:
|
||||
raise zipfile.BadZipFile("Archive has no entries")
|
||||
|
||||
corrupt_file = zin.testzip()
|
||||
if corrupt_file is not None:
|
||||
raise zipfile.BadZipFile(f"Corrupt entry detected: {corrupt_file}")
|
||||
|
||||
with zipfile.ZipFile(temp_zp, "w", compression=zipfile.ZIP_DEFLATED) as zout:
|
||||
for item in infolist:
|
||||
filename_lower = item.filename.lower()
|
||||
|
||||
# 1. Binary image screenshots/diagnostics: preserve as-is
|
||||
if filename_lower.endswith(BINARY_IMAGE_EXTENSIONS):
|
||||
content = zin.read(item.filename)
|
||||
zout.writestr(item, content)
|
||||
continue
|
||||
|
||||
# 2. Embedded test source code (e.g. resources/src@... or .js/.ts):
|
||||
# Mask safely without syntax corruption!
|
||||
if "src@" in filename_lower or filename_lower.endswith((".js", ".ts", ".mjs", ".py")):
|
||||
safe_placeholder = b"// [SOURCE CODE REDACTED FOR TRACE CONFIDENTIALITY]\n"
|
||||
zout.writestr(item, safe_placeholder)
|
||||
continue
|
||||
|
||||
# 3. JSON Lines and structured JSON/HAR traces
|
||||
content = zin.read(item.filename)
|
||||
if filename_lower.endswith((".trace", ".network", ".stacks")):
|
||||
sanitized_content = sanitize_jsonl_content(content)
|
||||
zout.writestr(item, sanitized_content)
|
||||
elif filename_lower.endswith((".json", ".har")):
|
||||
try:
|
||||
parsed = json.loads(content.decode("utf-8"))
|
||||
sanitized = sanitize_structured_obj(parsed)
|
||||
zout.writestr(item, json.dumps(sanitized, ensure_ascii=False).encode("utf-8"))
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
# If invalid JSON, treat as text line-by-line
|
||||
zout.writestr(item, sanitize_jsonl_content(content))
|
||||
else:
|
||||
# Unknown binary or text member: exclude to fail closed
|
||||
continue
|
||||
|
||||
# Atomic replace
|
||||
os.replace(temp_zp, zp)
|
||||
return True
|
||||
|
||||
except Exception as exc:
|
||||
logger.warning("Sanitizing trace %s failed (%s); removing fail-closed", zp, exc)
|
||||
for path_to_remove in (temp_zp, zp):
|
||||
if os.path.exists(path_to_remove):
|
||||
try:
|
||||
os.remove(path_to_remove)
|
||||
except OSError as remove_err:
|
||||
logger.error("Failed to delete unredacted trace %s: %s", path_to_remove, remove_err)
|
||||
return False
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def sanitize_directory(results_dir: str) -> int:
|
||||
"""Walk results_dir and sanitize every .zip archive fail-closed.
|
||||
|
||||
Returns the number of archives processed. Exits with 1 if any archive fails.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if not os.path.exists(results_dir):
|
||||
return 0
|
||||
|
||||
count = 0
|
||||
all_ok = True
|
||||
for root, _, files in os.walk(results_dir):
|
||||
for f in files:
|
||||
if f.endswith(".zip"):
|
||||
zp = os.path.join(root, f)
|
||||
ok = sanitize_trace_archive(zp)
|
||||
if not ok:
|
||||
all_ok = False
|
||||
count += 1
|
||||
|
||||
if not all_ok:
|
||||
sys.exit(1)
|
||||
return count
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def main() -> None:
|
||||
if len(sys.argv) < 2:
|
||||
print(f"Usage: {sys.argv[0]} <results_directory>")
|
||||
sys.exit(1)
|
||||
|
||||
target_dir = sys.argv[1]
|
||||
sanitize_directory(target_dir)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
if __name__ == "__main__":
|
||||
main()
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user