mirror of
https://github.com/pewdiepie-archdaemon/odysseus.git
synced 2026-09-21 23:52:19 +02:00
Merge commit from fork
* fix(security): keep agent file tools out of the app state directory
The agent's read tools (read_file, grep, glob, ls) resolved model-supplied
paths against a root list whose first entry was the whole data directory.
That directory holds the session store, the auth database, the app
encryption key and the settings file, so prompt-injected content could ask
for any of them. No approval prompt stood in the way: reads are classified
read_workspace and pass the untrusted-context gate untouched, which is
correct for reading a workspace and wrong for reading the app's own state.
The agent gets data/agent_workspace/ instead, and the subprocess cwd and
HOME move with it so bash and read_file agree on where scratch files live.
The deny itself is a property of the path, not of the root it arrived
through, because three routes reach the same bytes and closing only the
first leaves the other two working:
- the default root list
- a workspace bound at or above the data directory, which vet_workspace
accepted and chat_routes auto-binds from a path named in the message
- a tool_path_extra_roots setting covering the data directory
_resolve_search_root also returned the workspace root unchecked when the
path was empty, so a bare ls enumerated the directory whatever the deny
list said. It now resolves that case through the same guards.
A containment rule rather than a filename deny list, so state files added
later are covered without anyone remembering to list them, and so a user's
own settings.json or app.db inside a real workspace is not caught.
Four directories of user content stay readable, because the application
hands their paths to the model and tells it to open them: the chat upload
manifest, downloaded mail attachments, personal docs (which covers the
runbook) and personal uploads.
* fix: enforce state deny during recursive file search
* fix: bound protected filesystem searches
* fix(security): reject inode aliases and workspace redirects
* fix(security): harden partitioned agent searches
* fix(security): report fallback worker exits promptly
* fix(security): clean up search readers and retain relative data roots
---------
Co-authored-by: RaresKeY <158580472+RaresKeY@users.noreply.github.com>
This commit is contained in:
+31
-2
@@ -2,10 +2,11 @@
|
||||
"""Initialize all application components and dependencies."""
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import logging
|
||||
import stat
|
||||
from typing import Dict, Any
|
||||
|
||||
from src.constants import (
|
||||
DATA_DIR, PERSONAL_DIR, RUNBOOK_DIR, UPLOAD_DIR,
|
||||
DATA_DIR, PERSONAL_DIR, RUNBOOK_DIR, UPLOAD_DIR, AGENT_WORKSPACE_DIR,
|
||||
SESSIONS_FILE, DEFAULT_HOST, OPENAI_API_KEY
|
||||
)
|
||||
from src.memory import MemoryManager
|
||||
@@ -30,7 +31,35 @@ def create_directories():
|
||||
"""Create necessary directories if they don't exist."""
|
||||
for directory in (DATA_DIR, PERSONAL_DIR, RUNBOOK_DIR, UPLOAD_DIR):
|
||||
os.makedirs(directory, exist_ok=True)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# The model-controlled workspace must be a real child of DATA_DIR. Never
|
||||
# follow a pre-existing symlink here: it would silently move the default
|
||||
# native-file root outside the application volume before any resolver runs.
|
||||
data_root = os.path.realpath(os.path.abspath(os.path.expanduser(DATA_DIR)))
|
||||
workspace = os.path.abspath(os.path.expanduser(AGENT_WORKSPACE_DIR))
|
||||
expected_workspace = os.path.join(data_root, "agent_workspace")
|
||||
# Validate the real parent so a supported DATA_DIR bind/symlink works, but
|
||||
# require the fixed internal carve-out name and reject a link at the model-
|
||||
# controlled workspace entry itself.
|
||||
if (
|
||||
os.path.basename(workspace) != "agent_workspace"
|
||||
or os.path.realpath(os.path.dirname(workspace)) != data_root
|
||||
):
|
||||
raise RuntimeError("agent workspace must be the canonical child of DATA_DIR")
|
||||
if os.path.lexists(workspace):
|
||||
mode = os.lstat(workspace).st_mode
|
||||
if stat.S_ISLNK(mode) or not stat.S_ISDIR(mode):
|
||||
raise RuntimeError("agent workspace must be a real directory")
|
||||
else:
|
||||
os.mkdir(workspace, 0o700)
|
||||
resolved_workspace = os.path.realpath(workspace)
|
||||
if resolved_workspace != expected_workspace:
|
||||
raise RuntimeError("agent workspace must be the canonical child of DATA_DIR")
|
||||
try:
|
||||
os.chmod(workspace, 0o700)
|
||||
except OSError:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
|
||||
def initialize_managers(base_dir: str, rag_manager=None) -> Dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""
|
||||
Initialize all manager and handler instances.
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user