docs: bootstrap specs ground truth (#5794)

* docs(specs): restore bootstrap after dev rewrite

* docs(specs): remove runtime inventory snapshot

* docs(specs): reconcile current dev truth

* docs(specs): document scheduled task actions as an owner-attribution source

Owner Attribution covered cookie, bearer-token and internal-loopback
requests. Scheduled task actions are a fourth source and behave
differently: _execute_action passes owner=task.owner off the stored
ScheduledTask row, so no request and no resolved principal are in
flight, and route-level require_user() never runs.

Webhook triggers are the sharp case. They are unauthenticated by
design with the token as the only credential and execute under the
stored task.owner.

Paths cite routes/task/task_routes.py, the canonical location after
the task subpackage move (#6081); routes/task_routes.py on current dev
is the backward-compat shim.

* docs(specs): add chained tasks to the trigger list, refresh dev stamp

Review feedback from RaresKeY on the previous commit.

"Every trigger path" was too broad: success-chained tasks are another
path into _execute_action. Added them with their own citation, and
noted that chaining additionally requires the target task to share
task.owner and rejects cycles, which is stricter than the trigger-side
checks. Softened the lead-in to "these trigger paths".

Line 56 still pointed at routes/task_routes.py for webhook credential
validation. That path is the backward-compat shim on current dev after
the task subpackage move (#6081); repointed to the canonical
routes/task/task_routes.py.

Stamp moved to dev@2a6b09b. Inspection backing that bump was scoped:
every file path cited in this spec was mechanically checked to resolve
on 2a6b09b, and every file:line in the Owner Attribution additions was
read against it. Behavioral claims elsewhere in the file were not
re-audited.

* docs(specs): correct SECURE_COOKIES description to match current behavior

Third of the stale details RaresKeY enumerated. The cookie section
described SECURE_COOKIES as purely opt-in, which stopped being true.

_secure_cookie() (routes/auth_routes.py:89) treats an explicit true or
false as authoritative and derives the Secure attribute from the
request otherwise, including when the variable is unset and when
docker-compose injects it present-but-empty. Either the connection
scheme or the first X-Forwarded-Proto hop being https is enough.

* docs(specs): refresh current dev truth

---------

Co-authored-by: StressTestor <212606152+StressTestor@users.noreply.github.com>

specs/model-providers/together.md

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+# Together AI Provider Shape
+
+Last updated: dev@e57f60b | 2026-07-20
+
+## Scope
+
+Canonical provider ID `together`; OpenAI-compatible cloud transport; curated
+models and discovery compatibility in `routes/model_routes.py`.
+
+## Shape And Observations
+
+Together has returned both standard `data[]` and bare model-card lists. The
+current generic reader accepts the standard envelope when the caller supplies
+the Together vendor, but it does not accept a bare root list. It keeps
+identity/provider scope and promotes no capability fields. Task, modality,
+parameter, and limit data needs a dedicated Together reader before it becomes
+canonical; model names and the curated picker list are not capability evidence.
+
+Together can serve many upstream families. Direct-provider quirks do not
+automatically apply because Together may normalize requests and responses.
+
+## Fallback And Current Gaps
+
+Both `*.together.xyz` and `*.together.ai` identify the provider. Malformed/null
+lists fail soft. A provider-specific rich capability schema has not been
+confirmed, so general fallback remains intentional. Bare-list catalogs require
+route-specific preprocessing or a future reader update.