Squash Odysseus development history

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pewdiepie-archdaemon
2026-09-11 06:04:19 +00:00
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# Companion bridge
A thin, additive layer so a LAN client (e.g. a phone) can discover what an
Odysseus server offers and pair to it, without duplicating any LLM logic.
| Method | Path | Auth | Purpose |
|---|---|---|---|
| GET | `/api/companion/ping` | session or token | cheap, auth-validated health check |
| GET | `/api/companion/info` | session or token | server identity + capability flags |
| GET | `/api/companion/models` | session or token | the **caller's own** model endpoints |
| GET | `/api/companion/pair` | **admin cookie** | pairing page (a form; never mints) |
| POST | `/api/companion/pair` | **admin cookie** | mint a one-time pairing token (`?format=json` for an in-app screen) |
`/models` scopes to the caller's real owner plus legacy null-owner shared rows
(same rule as `owner_filter`) and never returns API-key material.
## Pairing CSRF posture
Minting happens **only on POST**. The session cookie is `SameSite=Lax`
(`routes/auth_routes.py`), so a browser will not send it on a cross-site POST —
the same protection `POST /api/tokens` relies on. A `GET` would be unsafe (Lax
cookies ride top-level GET navigations), so `GET /pair` only renders a form.
Minting invalidates the auth middleware's token cache, so a freshly minted token
works on the next request without a restart.
The pairing/scoping rules live in small, tested units (`token_owner`,
`owner_can_see`, `mint_pairing_token`, `pairing.*`) — see
`tests/test_companion_readonly.py` and `tests/test_companion_pairing.py`.
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"""Odysseus companion bridge — additive LAN endpoints.
Read endpoints (/api/companion/ping, /info, owner-scoped /models) so a LAN
client can discover what a server offers, plus admin-only pairing
(/api/companion/pair) that mints a one-time chat-scoped token on POST. No new LLM
logic; auth is enforced by the existing AuthMiddleware. See companion/README.md.
"""
from companion.routes import setup_companion_routes
__all__ = ["setup_companion_routes"]
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"""Shared pairing helpers for the companion bridge.
Token minting + LAN discovery + QR rendering, kept here as small, importable
units so the route layer stays thin and the logic is directly testable.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import ipaddress
import json
import os
import re
import secrets
import socket
import uuid
from urllib.parse import urlsplit
import bcrypt
from src.constants import AUTH_FILE
PAIRING_VERSION = 1
COMPANION_SCOPE = "chat"
_COMPANION_IPV4_NETWORKS = tuple(
ipaddress.ip_network(cidr)
for cidr in (
"10.0.0.0/8",
"100.64.0.0/10",
"127.0.0.0/8",
"169.254.0.0/16",
"172.16.0.0/12",
"192.168.0.0/16",
)
)
_DNS_LABEL_RE = re.compile(r"[a-z0-9](?:[a-z0-9-]{0,61}[a-z0-9])?\Z")
def _valid_companion_client_host(host: str) -> bool:
"""Match the host forms supported by the current v1 Expo client."""
if not host or len(host) > 253 or not host.isascii() or "%" in host:
return False
try:
address = ipaddress.ip_address(host)
except ValueError:
labels = host.split(".")
if any(not _DNS_LABEL_RE.fullmatch(label) for label in labels):
return False
if any(label.startswith("xn--") for label in labels):
return False
# WHATWG URL parsers treat a decimal or ``0x`` single-label hostname
# as an IPv4 number even though Python's strict ``ipaddress`` parser
# rejects that spelling. The v1 client interpolates this host back
# into a URL, so accepting e.g. ``134744072`` would make the phone send
# its bearer token to public 8.8.8.8. Keep DNS labels unambiguous.
if len(labels) == 1 and (
labels[0].isdigit()
or re.fullmatch(r"0x[0-9a-f]*", labels[0]) is not None
):
return False
return len(labels) == 1 or (len(labels) >= 2 and labels[-1] == "local")
return isinstance(address, ipaddress.IPv4Address) and any(
address in network for network in _COMPANION_IPV4_NETWORKS
)
def parse_companion_base_url(value: str) -> tuple[str, int]:
"""Validate a v1 companion address and return its legacy (host, port).
The deployed client understands only HTTP plus a LAN-style host and port.
Reject anything outside that exact contract instead of advertising a URL
the client would reject, downgrade, or interpret differently.
"""
if not isinstance(value, str) or not value:
raise ValueError("COMPANION_BASE_URL must be a canonical HTTP LAN origin")
if not value.isascii():
raise ValueError("COMPANION_BASE_URL must contain only ASCII characters")
if any(
ord(char) <= 32 or ord(char) == 127 or char in {"\\", "%"}
for char in value
):
raise ValueError(
"COMPANION_BASE_URL contains a forbidden character"
)
try:
parsed = urlsplit(value)
port = parsed.port
except ValueError as exc:
raise ValueError("COMPANION_BASE_URL must be a valid HTTP LAN origin") from exc
host = parsed.hostname
if parsed.scheme.lower() != "http" or not parsed.netloc or not host:
raise ValueError("COMPANION_BASE_URL must be a canonical HTTP LAN origin")
if parsed.username is not None or parsed.password is not None:
raise ValueError("COMPANION_BASE_URL must not contain credentials")
if parsed.path or parsed.query or parsed.fragment:
raise ValueError("COMPANION_BASE_URL must not contain a path, query, or fragment")
if port is not None and not 1 <= port <= 65535:
raise ValueError("COMPANION_BASE_URL port must be between 1 and 65535")
if not _valid_companion_client_host(host):
raise ValueError("COMPANION_BASE_URL host is not supported by companion v1")
netloc = f"{host}:{port}" if port is not None else host
origin = f"http://{netloc}"
if value != origin:
raise ValueError("COMPANION_BASE_URL must be a canonical HTTP LAN origin")
return host, port or 80
def configured_companion_origin() -> tuple[str, int] | None:
"""Return the validated operator-configured v1 address, if any."""
value = os.environ.get("COMPANION_BASE_URL")
if value is None or value == "":
return None
return parse_companion_base_url(value)
def default_port() -> int:
"""Best guess at the port the server is reachable on. Callers that know the
real request port should pass it explicitly."""
try:
return int(os.environ.get("APP_PORT", "7000"))
except ValueError:
return 7000
def lan_ip_candidates() -> list[str]:
"""Likely LAN IPv4 addresses for this host, best candidate first.
The UDP-connect trick reveals the egress interface the OS would use to reach
the default gateway -- i.e. the address a phone on the same Wi-Fi should
target. No packets are actually sent. Loopback is dropped.
"""
candidates: list[str] = []
def _add(ip):
if ip and ip not in candidates and not ip.startswith("127."):
candidates.append(ip)
s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_DGRAM)
try:
s.connect(("8.8.8.8", 80))
_add(s.getsockname()[0])
except OSError:
pass
finally:
s.close()
try:
for info in socket.getaddrinfo(socket.gethostname(), None, socket.AF_INET):
_add(info[4][0])
except OSError:
pass
return candidates
def find_admin_user() -> str | None:
"""Resolve an admin username from data/auth.json (schema uses is_admin),
falling back to the first user."""
auth_path = AUTH_FILE
try:
with open(auth_path, "r", encoding="utf-8") as f:
data = json.load(f)
except (OSError, json.JSONDecodeError):
return None
if not isinstance(data, dict):
return None
users = data.get("users") or {}
if not isinstance(users, dict):
return None
for uname, udata in users.items():
if isinstance(udata, dict) and udata.get("is_admin") is True:
return uname
return next(iter(users), None)
def mint_token(owner: str, name: str = "companion") -> tuple[str, str]:
"""Create a chat-scoped API token row and return (token_id, raw_token).
The raw token is returned ONCE -- only its bcrypt hash + an 8-char prefix
are persisted. Mirrors routes/api_token_routes.py so cookie- and
companion-minted tokens are indistinguishable to the auth middleware.
"""
from core.database import get_db_session, ApiToken
raw_token = "ody_" + secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
token_hash = bcrypt.hashpw(raw_token.encode(), bcrypt.gensalt()).decode()
token_id = str(uuid.uuid4())[:8]
with get_db_session() as db:
db.add(ApiToken(
id=token_id,
owner=owner,
name=name,
token_hash=token_hash,
token_prefix=raw_token[:8],
scopes=COMPANION_SCOPE,
is_active=True,
))
return token_id, raw_token
def pairing_payload(host: str, port: int, token: str) -> dict:
"""The exact JSON a client scans / accepts. Keep keys stable."""
return {"v": PAIRING_VERSION, "host": host, "port": port, "token": token}
def pairing_qr_png_data_uri(payload: dict) -> str | None:
"""Render the pairing payload as a QR `data:` URI for an <img>. Returns None
if the optional qrcode dep is unavailable."""
try:
import base64
import io
import qrcode
img = qrcode.make(json.dumps(payload, separators=(",", ":")))
buf = io.BytesIO()
img.save(buf, format="PNG")
return "data:image/png;base64," + base64.b64encode(buf.getvalue()).decode()
except Exception:
return None
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"""Companion bridge — /api/companion/*.
A thin, additive layer so a LAN client (e.g. a phone) can discover what a server
offers and pair to it, without duplicating any LLM logic.
Auth is enforced globally by AuthMiddleware (app.py), so reaching a handler here
means the caller is authenticated by either a cookie session or a Bearer `ody_`
API token. Ping/info accept either credential type, models requires a chat-
scoped API token for bearer callers, and the pairing endpoints are admin-cookie
only.
Pairing CSRF posture: minting happens ONLY on POST. The session cookie is
SameSite=Lax (routes/auth_routes.py), which a browser does not send on a
cross-site POST, so an admin's cookie can't be used by a malicious page to mint
a token -- the same protection the existing POST /api/tokens relies on. Minting
on a GET would be unsafe (Lax cookies ride top-level GET navigations), so GET
/pair only renders a form.
"""
import html
from fastapi import APIRouter, HTTPException, Request
from fastapi.responses import HTMLResponse
from core.middleware import require_admin
from src.auth_helpers import _auth_disabled, get_current_user
from companion import pairing as _pairing
def token_owner(request: Request) -> str | None:
"""The real owner to attribute a request to, for read-scoping.
Cookie sessions resolve to the logged-in username via get_current_user.
Bearer-token callers come through as the sandboxed pseudo-user "api"; their
real owner is stamped on request.state.api_token_owner by the auth
middleware. Returns None when no owner can be resolved.
"""
if getattr(request.state, "api_token", False):
return getattr(request.state, "api_token_owner", None)
return get_current_user(request)
def owner_can_see(row_owner, owner) -> bool:
"""Owner-scope rule for read endpoints.
A caller sees a row when it is their own, or when it is a legacy null-owner
("shared") row. A caller must NEVER see another owner's row. Mirrors the
`owner_filter` rule used elsewhere, expressed as a pure predicate so it can
be tested directly and used as a defensive in-Python check alongside the
SQL filter.
"""
return row_owner is None or row_owner == owner
def require_models_scope(request: Request) -> None:
"""Require the companion chat scope for bearer-token model inventory."""
if not getattr(request.state, "api_token", False):
return
scopes = getattr(request.state, "api_token_scopes", None) or []
if isinstance(scopes, str):
scopes = [scope.strip() for scope in scopes.split(",")]
scope_set = {str(scope).strip() for scope in scopes if str(scope).strip()}
if _pairing.COMPANION_SCOPE not in scope_set:
raise HTTPException(403, "API token requires chat scope")
def mint_pairing_token(owner: str, invalidate=None) -> tuple[str, str]:
"""Mint a pairing token AND invalidate the auth middleware's in-memory token
cache, so the new token is accepted on the very next request without a server
restart. Returns (token_id, raw_token); the raw token is shown once.
`invalidate` is the app's request.app.state.invalidate_token_cache callable
(passed in so this stays a pure, testable unit).
"""
token_id, raw_token = _pairing.mint_token(owner)
if callable(invalidate):
invalidate()
return token_id, raw_token
def setup_companion_routes() -> APIRouter:
router = APIRouter(prefix="/api/companion", tags=["companion"])
@router.get("/ping")
def ping(request: Request):
"""Cheap, auth-validated health check. A 200 with ok=true confirms the
host/port and credential are valid; middleware returns 401 otherwise."""
from core.constants import APP_VERSION
return {
"ok": True,
"name": "odysseus",
"version": APP_VERSION,
"auth": "token" if getattr(request.state, "api_token", False) else "session",
}
@router.get("/info")
def info(request: Request):
"""Server identity + coarse capability flags. `owner` is the caller's own
identity (the token's owner for bearer callers)."""
from core.constants import APP_VERSION
return {
"name": "odysseus",
"version": APP_VERSION,
"owner": token_owner(request),
"capabilities": {"chat": True, "streaming": True},
}
@router.get("/models")
def models(request: Request):
"""LLM model endpoints the CALLER can use.
The stock /api/models route scopes to get_current_user, which for a
bearer token is the sandboxed pseudo-user "api" (owns nothing). Here we
scope to the token's real owner instead, plus legacy null-owner shared
rows -- the same rule as owner_filter. Explicit auth-disabled mode keeps
the stock route's single-user all-endpoints view. Read-only; never
returns api_key material.
"""
require_models_scope(request)
import json as _json
from core.database import SessionLocal, ModelEndpoint
from src.endpoint_resolver import build_chat_url
owner = token_owner(request)
single_user_mode = (
owner is None
and not getattr(request.state, "api_token", False)
and _auth_disabled()
)
out = []
db = SessionLocal()
try:
q = db.query(ModelEndpoint).filter(
ModelEndpoint.is_enabled == True, # noqa: E712
(ModelEndpoint.model_type == "llm") | (ModelEndpoint.model_type == None), # noqa: E711
)
if owner:
q = q.filter((ModelEndpoint.owner == owner) | (ModelEndpoint.owner == None)) # noqa: E711
for ep in q.all():
if not single_user_mode and not owner_can_see(ep.owner, owner):
continue
try:
model_ids = _json.loads(ep.cached_models) if ep.cached_models else []
except (ValueError, TypeError):
model_ids = []
try:
hidden = set(_json.loads(ep.hidden_models)) if ep.hidden_models else set()
except (ValueError, TypeError):
hidden = set()
model_ids = [m for m in model_ids if m not in hidden]
try:
chat_url = build_chat_url(ep.base_url)
except Exception:
chat_url = ep.base_url
out.append({
"endpoint_id": ep.id,
"name": ep.name,
"endpoint_url": chat_url,
"models": model_ids,
"supports_tools": ep.supports_tools,
})
finally:
db.close()
return {"endpoints": out}
@router.get("/pair")
def pair_page(request: Request):
"""Admin-only pairing page. Renders a form that POSTs to mint a code.
A GET never mints a credential: SameSite=Lax session cookies ride
top-level GET navigations, so minting on GET would be triggerable by a
link or <img> (CSRF). The actual mint is the POST handler below.
"""
require_admin(request)
page = """<!doctype html>
<html><head><meta charset="utf-8"><meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width,initial-scale=1">
<title>Pair a device</title>
<style>
body{font-family:-apple-system,system-ui,sans-serif;max-width:520px;margin:48px auto;padding:0 20px;color:#e8e8e8;background:#16161a}
.card{background:#1f1f25;border:1px solid #2c2c35;border-radius:14px;padding:28px;text-align:center}
button{background:#7c9cff;color:#0e0e12;border:none;border-radius:10px;padding:12px 20px;font-size:15px;font-weight:600;cursor:pointer}
</style></head>
<body><div class="card">
<h2>Pair a device</h2>
<p>Generate a one-time pairing code (a chat-scoped API token) for a LAN client.</p>
<form method="POST" action="/api/companion/pair">
<button type="submit">Generate pairing code</button>
</form>
<p style="color:#8a8a96;font-size:12px;margin-top:18px">Admin only. Each code mints a new token, shown once. Manage or revoke under Settings &rarr; API tokens.</p>
</div></body></html>"""
return HTMLResponse(page)
@router.post("/pair")
def pair_create(request: Request):
"""Mint a pairing code. Admin-cookie only; CSRF-safe because the
SameSite=Lax session cookie is not sent on a cross-site POST (same
protection as POST /api/tokens). Minting invalidates the token cache so
the code works immediately, no restart. `?format=json` returns the
payload for an in-app pairing screen."""
require_admin(request)
try:
configured_origin = _pairing.configured_companion_origin()
except ValueError as exc:
raise HTTPException(500, str(exc)) from None
owner = get_current_user(request)
invalidate = getattr(request.app.state, "invalidate_token_cache", None)
token_id, raw_token = mint_pairing_token(owner, invalidate)
if configured_origin:
host, port = configured_origin
hosts = [host]
else:
hosts = _pairing.lan_ip_candidates()
host = hosts[0] if hosts else "127.0.0.1"
port = request.url.port or _pairing.default_port()
payload = _pairing.pairing_payload(host, port, raw_token)
qr = _pairing.pairing_qr_png_data_uri(payload)
qr_ok = bool(qr and qr.startswith("data:image/png;base64,"))
if (request.query_params.get("format") or "").lower() == "json":
response = {
"host": host,
"port": port,
"token": raw_token,
"token_id": token_id,
"hosts": hosts,
"payload": payload,
"qr": qr if qr_ok else None,
}
return response
import json as _json
payload_json = _json.dumps(payload, separators=(",", ":"))
# Only ever emit a known PNG data-URI into the src; every other value is
# html.escaped.
qr_block = (
f'<img src="{html.escape(qr)}" alt="Pairing QR" width="260" height="260">'
if qr_ok else "<p><em>QR rendering unavailable -- enter the details manually.</em></p>"
)
page = f"""<!doctype html>
<html><head><meta charset="utf-8"><meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width,initial-scale=1">
<title>Pairing code</title>
<style>
body{{font-family:-apple-system,system-ui,sans-serif;max-width:520px;margin:40px auto;padding:0 20px;color:#e8e8e8;background:#16161a}}
.card{{background:#1f1f25;border:1px solid #2c2c35;border-radius:14px;padding:24px;text-align:center}}
code{{background:#0e0e12;padding:2px 6px;border-radius:6px;word-break:break-all}}
.row{{text-align:left;margin:10px 0;font-size:14px;color:#bdbdc7}}
.warn{{color:#e0a85e;font-size:13px;margin-top:18px}}
</style></head>
<body><div class="card">
<h2>Pairing code</h2>
{qr_block}
<div class="row"><strong>Host:</strong> <code>{html.escape(host)}</code></div>
<div class="row"><strong>Port:</strong> <code>{html.escape(str(port))}</code></div>
<div class="row"><strong>Token:</strong> <code>{html.escape(raw_token)}</code></div>
<div class="row"><strong>Payload:</strong> <code>{html.escape(payload_json)}</code></div>
<p class="warn">Shown once. This grants chat access to your Odysseus; revoke it
in Settings &rarr; API tokens (id <code>{html.escape(token_id)}</code>). The
device must be on the same network, and the server must bind to your LAN.</p>
</div></body></html>"""
return HTMLResponse(page)
return router