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fix(security): stop the agent from re-enabling tools an admin disabled (#6357)
* fix(security): stop the agent from re-enabling tools an admin disabled settings.json:disabled_tools is the only global tool-permission boundary the Settings > Agent Tools panel offers, yet manage_settings exposed an `enable_tool` action that removed entries from it. Any agent turn could undo the admin's restriction, and because the agent reads untrusted web pages, emails and documents, a planted instruction could re-enable bash, email or any other tool that had been switched off. The denylist can now only be narrowed from a turn: `disable_tool` and `list_tools` keep working, `enable_tool` is refused with a message that points the user to Settings > Agent Tools, and the action is dropped from the function schema, the prompt rule and the tool index so models are not steered into calling it. The free-form set/delete/reset actions were already unable to reach `disabled_tools`; a test now pins that. Fixes #5523 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UAB5sz5srMKR7rbeDFtdMH * fix(settings): close internal API tool-policy bypass Refuse global tool-policy replacement from internal-token requests even when an admin owner is impersonated, and block the same write in app_api. Route explicit image re-enable requests to list_tools with a Settings pointer. Keep disabled_tools outside general settings actions even if a default is added later. Remove the retired action from capability metadata. Validation: 573 focused tests passed; the running app rejected handler, generic API and encoded-path internal HTTP attempts while preserving human administrator controls. * fix(mcp): block agent writes to per-server MCP tool policy PATCH /api/mcp/servers/{id}/tools only checked require_admin, which accepts the internal tool token, and app_api still forwarded it, so an agent turn could re-enable MCP tools an admin had switched off. Refuse the internal token on that route (same check as POST /api/tools) and add PATCH /api/mcp/servers to the app_api blocklist, with regression tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BCbhLNC7mJsunxqfwwshqn --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Afonso Junior <chatgpt@yack.com.br>
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co-authored by
Claude Opus 5.5
Afonso Junior
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a646b59110
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@@ -3087,7 +3087,7 @@ def test_qwen_explicit_admin_requests_build_safe_args():
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)
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assert al._parse_qwen_explicit_admin_request("turn image generation back on now") == (
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"manage_settings",
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json.dumps({"action": "enable_tool", "tool": "images"}),
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json.dumps({"action": "list_tools"}),
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)
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assert al._parse_qwen_explicit_admin_request("list API tokens by name and prefix only") == (
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"manage_tokens",
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