feat(security): apply audited PR #6738 remediations and test hardening

- Enforce vision probe SSRF safe local host validation, SafeProbeBackend TOCTOU elimination, and session owner authorization - Authorize session titling endpoints against registered owner configuration - Sanitize sensitive metadata logging from agent loop debug logs - Add async non-blocking execution for spec router tools and thinking decisions - Harden email cache invalidation fencing and thread-safe mutation - Add regression test suites for legacy browser authority, spec contracts, spec router request scoping, and task MCP delivery
2026-10-28 00:32:22 +01:00 · 2026-10-27 17:25:25 +00:00
parent 3246ae5d9c
commit 0133de6f0e
43 changed files with 2187 additions and 673 deletions
@@ -149,3 +149,286 @@ def test_keep_recent_image_turns_noop_when_few_images():
    msgs = [_user_with_image("a.png", "[Image attached: a.png]")]
    out = keep_recent_image_turns(msgs, keep=2)
    assert out == msgs
+
+
+def test_keep_recent_image_turns_does_not_mutate_original_history():
+    import copy
+    messages = [_user_with_image('a.png', 'hello'), _user_with_image('b.png', 'later')]
+    original = copy.deepcopy(messages)
+    result = keep_recent_image_turns(messages, keep=1)
+    assert messages == original
+    assert '[Image]' in str(result[0]['content'])
+
+
+def test_old_image_with_string_url_does_not_break_history_compaction():
+    messages = [
+        {'role': 'user', 'content': [{'type': 'image_url', 'image_url': ''}]},
+        _user_with_image('later.png', 'later'),
+    ]
+    result = keep_recent_image_turns(messages, keep=1)
+    assert result[0]['content'] == [{'type': 'text', 'text': '[Image]'}]
+
+
+# --- vision probe security & authorization regressions -----------------------
+
+def test_probe_blocks_link_local_and_cloud_metadata(monkeypatch):
+    ch._vision_probe_cache.clear()
+    calls = []
+    monkeypatch.setattr(ch.httpx, "post", lambda *a, **k: calls.append(a) or None)
+
+    disallowed_urls = [
+        "http://169.254.169.254/v1",
+        "http://169.254.169.253/v1",
+        "http://169.254.1.1/v1",
+        "http://[fe80::1]/v1",
+        "http://100.100.100.200/v1",
+        "http://instance-data/v1",
+        "http://metadata.google.internal/v1",
+    ]
+    for url in disallowed_urls:
+        assert ch.probe_endpoint_supports_vision(url, "some-model") is None
+        assert ch.lmstudio_supports_vision(url, "some-model") is None
+    assert calls == []
+
+
+def test_probe_blocks_public_domains(monkeypatch):
+    ch._vision_probe_cache.clear()
+    calls = []
+    monkeypatch.setattr(ch.httpx, "post", lambda *a, **k: calls.append(a) or None)
+
+    public_urls = [
+        "https://api.openai.com/v1",
+        "https://generativelanguage.googleapis.com/v1",
+        "http://example.com/v1",
+    ]
+    for url in public_urls:
+        assert ch.probe_endpoint_supports_vision(url, "gpt-4o") is None
+        assert ch.lmstudio_supports_vision(url, "gpt-4o") is None
+    assert calls == []
+
+
+def test_model_supports_vision_enforces_owner_authorization(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    from tests.helpers.database import disposable_database
+    from core import database
+
+    post_calls = []
+
+    class _Resp:
+        status_code = 200
+        text = '{"choices":[]}'
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(ch, "is_vision_model", lambda m: False)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(ch.httpx, "post", lambda *a, **k: post_calls.append((a, k)) or _Resp())
+    monkeypatch.setattr(ch, "lmstudio_supports_vision", lambda *a, **k: None)
+
+    with disposable_database(tmp_path) as factory:
+        monkeypatch.setattr("src.database.SessionLocal", factory)
+        with factory() as db:
+            db.add(database.ModelEndpoint(
+                id="alice-local",
+                name="Alice Local",
+                owner="alice",
+                base_url="http://127.0.0.1:18607/v1",
+                api_key="alice-secret",
+                is_enabled=True,
+            ))
+            db.add(database.ModelEndpoint(
+                id="alice-disabled",
+                name="Alice Disabled",
+                owner="alice",
+                base_url="http://127.0.0.1:18608/v1",
+                api_key="alice-secret",
+                is_enabled=False,
+            ))
+            db.commit()
+
+        # 1. Foreign owner cannot probe alice's endpoint
+        ch._vision_probe_cache.clear()
+        assert ch.model_supports_vision("text-only-9b", "http://127.0.0.1:18607/v1", owner="bob") is False
+        assert len(post_calls) == 0
+
+        # 2. Disabled endpoint is never probed
+        ch._vision_probe_cache.clear()
+        assert ch.model_supports_vision("text-only-9b", "http://127.0.0.1:18608/v1", owner="alice") is False
+        assert len(post_calls) == 0
+
+        # 3. Unregistered endpoint is never probed when owner is provided
+        ch._vision_probe_cache.clear()
+        assert ch.model_supports_vision("text-only-9b", "http://127.0.0.1:18609/v1", owner="alice") is False
+        assert len(post_calls) == 0
+
+        # 4. Registered, enabled endpoint owned by alice IS probed with registered runtime credentials
+        ch._vision_probe_cache.clear()
+        assert ch.model_supports_vision("text-only-9b", "http://127.0.0.1:18607/v1", owner="alice") is True
+        assert len(post_calls) == 1
+        args, kwargs = post_calls[0]
+        assert "http://127.0.0.1:18607/v1/chat/completions" in args[0]
+        assert kwargs.get("headers", {}).get("Authorization") == "Bearer alice-secret"
+
+
+def test_is_ip_safe_local_ipv6_and_mapped_addresses():
+    import ipaddress
+    # IPv4 loopback & IPv6 loopback must be allowed
+    assert ch._is_ip_safe_local(ipaddress.ip_address("127.0.0.1")) is True
+    assert ch._is_ip_safe_local(ipaddress.ip_address("::1")) is True
+
+    # Cloud metadata destinations must be blocked
+    assert ch._is_ip_safe_local(ipaddress.ip_address("169.254.169.254")) is False
+    assert ch._is_ip_safe_local(ipaddress.ip_address("169.254.169.253")) is False
+    assert ch._is_ip_safe_local(ipaddress.ip_address("100.100.100.200")) is False
+    assert ch._is_ip_safe_local(ipaddress.ip_address("fe80::1")) is False
+    assert ch._is_ip_safe_local(ipaddress.ip_address("169.254.1.1")) is False
+
+    # IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses must be unwrapped and judged as IPv4
+    assert ch._is_ip_safe_local(ipaddress.ip_address("::ffff:169.254.169.254")) is False
+    assert ch._is_ip_safe_local(ipaddress.ip_address("::ffff:100.100.100.200")) is False
+    assert ch._is_ip_safe_local(ipaddress.ip_address("::ffff:127.0.0.1")) is True
+    assert ch._is_ip_safe_local(ipaddress.ip_address("::ffff:192.168.1.1")) is True
+
+    # NAT64 translated addresses must be unwrapped
+    assert ch._is_ip_safe_local(ipaddress.ip_address("64:ff9b::169.254.169.254")) is False
+    assert ch._is_ip_safe_local(ipaddress.ip_address("64:ff9b::127.0.0.1")) is True
+
+    # Unspecified, multicast, and non-loopback reserved addresses must be blocked
+    assert ch._is_ip_safe_local(ipaddress.ip_address("::")) is False
+    assert ch._is_ip_safe_local(ipaddress.ip_address("0.0.0.0")) is False
+    assert ch._is_ip_safe_local(ipaddress.ip_address("ff02::1")) is False
+
+
+def test_is_safe_local_host_handles_ipv6_and_dual_stack(monkeypatch):
+    import socket
+    # Direct literals
+    assert ch._is_safe_local_host("::1") is True
+    assert ch._is_safe_local_host("[::1]") is True
+    assert ch._is_safe_local_host("127.0.0.1") is True
+
+    # Dual-stack localhost where getaddrinfo returns both IPv6 ::1 and IPv4 127.0.0.1
+    def fake_dual_stack_getaddrinfo(host, port):
+        return [
+            (socket.AF_INET6, 1, 6, "", ("::1", 0, 0, 0)),
+            (socket.AF_INET, 1, 6, "", ("127.0.0.1", 0)),
+        ]
+    monkeypatch.setattr(socket, "getaddrinfo", fake_dual_stack_getaddrinfo)
+    assert ch._is_safe_local_host("localhost") is True
+
+    # Mixed DNS resolution (one valid loopback, one metadata destination) must be rejected
+    def fake_mixed_getaddrinfo(host, port):
+        return [
+            (socket.AF_INET, 1, 6, "", ("127.0.0.1", 0)),
+            (socket.AF_INET, 1, 6, "", ("169.254.169.254", 0)),
+        ]
+    monkeypatch.setattr(socket, "getaddrinfo", fake_mixed_getaddrinfo)
+    assert ch._is_safe_local_host("rig.local") is False
+
+
+def test_bracketed_ipv6_url_handling(monkeypatch):
+    calls = []
+
+    class _Resp:
+        status_code = 200
+        text = '{"models":[{"key":"model1","architecture":{},"capabilities":{"vision":true}}]}'
+        is_success = True
+        def json(self):
+            import json
+            return json.loads(self.text)
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(ch, "_safe_probe_get", lambda url, **k: calls.append(url) or _Resp())
+    ch._lmstudio_models_cache.clear()
+    models = ch._probe_lmstudio_models("http://[::1]:18607/v1")
+    assert models is not None
+    assert calls == ["http://[::1]:18607/api/v1/models"]
+
+
+def test_connection_time_address_enforcement_blocks_unsafe_destinations():
+    backend = ch.SafeProbeBackend()
+    import httpcore
+    import pytest
+    with pytest.raises(httpcore.ConnectError, match="not an authorized safe local destination"):
+        backend.connect_tcp("169.254.169.254", 80, timeout=0.1)
+
+    with pytest.raises(httpcore.ConnectError, match="not an authorized safe local destination"):
+        backend.connect_tcp("100.100.100.200", 80, timeout=0.1)
+
+
+def test_vision_probe_never_follows_redirects(monkeypatch):
+    class _RedirectResp:
+        status_code = 302
+        headers = {"Location": "http://169.254.169.254/secret"}
+        is_success = False
+        text = ""
+
+    # Verify _probe_lmstudio_models does not follow redirects
+    monkeypatch.setattr(ch, "_safe_probe_get", lambda url, **k: _RedirectResp())
+    ch._lmstudio_models_cache.clear()
+    assert ch._probe_lmstudio_models("http://127.0.0.1:18607/v1") is None
+
+    # Verify probe_endpoint_supports_vision does not follow redirects
+    monkeypatch.setattr(ch, "_safe_probe_post", lambda url, **k: _RedirectResp())
+    ch._vision_probe_cache.clear()
+    assert ch.probe_endpoint_supports_vision("http://127.0.0.1:18607/v1", "text-only-9b") is None
+
+
+def test_model_supports_vision_auth_policy_matrix(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    from tests.helpers.database import disposable_database
+    from core import database
+
+    post_calls = []
+
+    class _Resp:
+        status_code = 200
+        text = '{"choices":[]}'
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(ch, "is_vision_model", lambda m: False)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(ch, "lmstudio_supports_vision", lambda *a, **k: None)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(ch, "_safe_probe_post", lambda *a, **k: post_calls.append((a, k)) or _Resp())
+
+    with disposable_database(tmp_path) as factory:
+        monkeypatch.setattr("src.database.SessionLocal", factory)
+        with factory() as db:
+            db.add(database.ModelEndpoint(
+                id="alice-local",
+                name="Alice Local",
+                owner="alice",
+                base_url="http://127.0.0.1:18607/v1",
+                api_key="alice-key",
+                is_enabled=True,
+            ))
+            db.add(database.ModelEndpoint(
+                id="unowned-local",
+                name="Unowned Local",
+                owner=None,
+                base_url="http://127.0.0.1:18610/v1",
+                api_key="unowned-key",
+                is_enabled=True,
+            ))
+            db.commit()
+
+        # Case 1: Auth disabled, explicitly configured local endpoint -> probes with runtime credentials
+        monkeypatch.setenv("AUTH_ENABLED", "false")
+        ch._vision_probe_cache.clear()
+        post_calls.clear()
+        assert ch.model_supports_vision("text-only-9b", "http://127.0.0.1:18610/v1", owner=None) is True
+        assert len(post_calls) == 1
+        assert post_calls[0][1].get("headers", {}).get("Authorization") == "Bearer unowned-key"
+
+        # Case 2: Auth disabled, unregistered caller-supplied endpoint -> allowed if safe local, probed without credentials
+        monkeypatch.setenv("AUTH_ENABLED", "false")
+        ch._vision_probe_cache.clear()
+        post_calls.clear()
+        assert ch.model_supports_vision("text-only-9b", "http://127.0.0.1:18611/v1", owner=None) is True
+        assert len(post_calls) == 1
+        assert post_calls[0][1].get("headers") is None
+
+        # Case 3: Auth enabled, missing owner ("" or None from unowned session) -> rejected immediately
+        monkeypatch.setenv("AUTH_ENABLED", "true")
+        ch._vision_probe_cache.clear()
+        post_calls.clear()
+        assert ch.model_supports_vision("text-only-9b", "http://127.0.0.1:18607/v1", owner="") is False
+        assert len(post_calls) == 0
+
+        # Case 4: Auth enabled, foreign-owned endpoint -> rejected immediately
+        monkeypatch.setenv("AUTH_ENABLED", "true")
+        ch._vision_probe_cache.clear()
+        post_calls.clear()
+        assert ch.model_supports_vision("text-only-9b", "http://127.0.0.1:18607/v1", owner="bob") is False
+        assert len(post_calls) == 0