Files
clide/test/files/path_safety_test.dart
T
jpmschweitzerandClaude Opus 4.7 06b08b7388 reject symlinks pointing outside the workspace (T-102)
resolveUnderRoot already blocked path-layer traversal but explicitly
did NOT follow symlinks — a repo symlink config -> /etc/shadow
passed the containment check because the link path was under root.
clide would then read the target.

Add resolveUnderRootFollowingSymlinks: resolves any symlinks at the
target and re-verifies containment against the resolved real root.
The split keeps pure path math testable without filesystem access.
files.read and files.ls now route through it.

Tests cover: plain non-symlink passthrough, non-existent target
(returns path-layer result so caller surfaces not-found cleanly),
single-hop and chained symlinks whose targets escape the workspace,
and tolerance of symlinks in the root path itself (macOS /tmp).

Also adds the T-101 CHANGELOG entry that the docs commit missed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-17 21:01:56 +02:00

128 lines
4.9 KiB
Dart

import 'dart:io';
import 'package:clide/src/files/path_safety.dart';
import 'package:test/test.dart';
void main() {
late Directory root;
setUp(() {
root = Directory.systemTemp.createTempSync('clide_path_safety_');
});
tearDown(() {
if (root.existsSync()) root.deleteSync(recursive: true);
});
group('resolveUnderRoot', () {
test('plain relative path resolves under root', () {
final out = resolveUnderRoot(root, 'file.txt');
expect(out, '${root.absolute.path}/file.txt');
});
test('nested relative path resolves under root', () {
final out = resolveUnderRoot(root, 'src/main.dart');
expect(out, '${root.absolute.path}/src/main.dart');
});
test('empty relative path resolves to root itself', () {
final out = resolveUnderRoot(root, '');
expect(out, root.absolute.path);
});
test('rejects ../etc/passwd traversal', () {
expect(() => resolveUnderRoot(root, '../../../etc/passwd'), throwsA(isA<PathOutsideRoot>()));
});
test('rejects traversal that lands at filesystem root', () {
expect(() => resolveUnderRoot(root, '../'), throwsA(isA<PathOutsideRoot>()));
});
test('rejects sibling-directory traversal', () {
expect(() => resolveUnderRoot(root, '../sibling/file'), throwsA(isA<PathOutsideRoot>()));
});
test('allows internal `..` that stays under root', () {
final out = resolveUnderRoot(root, 'a/b/../c');
expect(out, '${root.absolute.path}/a/c');
});
test('rejects path that prefix-matches root but is outside', () {
// Sibling dir whose name starts with the root's last segment.
// resolveUnderRoot must not be fooled by string-prefix matching.
final twin = Directory('${root.parent.path}/${root.uri.pathSegments.where((s) => s.isNotEmpty).last}_twin');
try {
twin.createSync();
expect(() => resolveUnderRoot(root, '../${twin.uri.pathSegments.where((s) => s.isNotEmpty).last}/file'), throwsA(isA<PathOutsideRoot>()));
} finally {
if (twin.existsSync()) twin.deleteSync(recursive: true);
}
});
test('PathOutsideRoot.toString embeds requested + resolved + root', () {
final e = PathOutsideRoot('r', '/abs', '/root');
expect(e.toString(), allOf(contains('r'), contains('/abs'), contains('/root')));
});
});
group('resolveUnderRootFollowingSymlinks (T-102)', () {
test('plain non-symlink file passes through with the resolved real path', () {
final f = File('${root.path}/plain.txt')..writeAsStringSync('hello');
final out = resolveUnderRootFollowingSymlinks(root, 'plain.txt');
// Real-path may differ from root.path on hosts where systemTemp
// is itself a symlink (macOS /tmp -> /private/tmp). Compare via
// resolveSymbolicLinksSync on both sides.
expect(out, f.resolveSymbolicLinksSync());
});
test('non-existent target returns the path-layer result (caller surfaces not-found)', () {
final out = resolveUnderRootFollowingSymlinks(root, 'never-existed.txt');
expect(out, endsWith('/never-existed.txt'));
});
test('rejects a symlink under the workspace whose target lives outside', () async {
// Create an outside file the symlink will point at.
final outside = await Directory.systemTemp.createTemp('clide_t102_outside_');
addTearDown(() async {
if (await outside.exists()) await outside.delete(recursive: true);
});
final secret = File('${outside.path}/secret.txt')..writeAsStringSync('payload');
// Plant a symlink inside the workspace that targets the outside file.
final link = Link('${root.path}/leak')..createSync(secret.path);
expect(link.existsSync(), isTrue);
expect(
() => resolveUnderRootFollowingSymlinks(root, 'leak'),
throwsA(isA<PathOutsideRoot>()),
);
});
test('tolerates symlinks in the workspace root path itself', () {
// Where systemTemp is itself a symlink (macOS), the realPath of a
// file under root won't startWith root.absolute.path — but
// resolveUnderRootFollowingSymlinks resolves the root too, so
// the containment check still passes.
File('${root.path}/under-root.txt').writeAsStringSync('ok');
// No throw is the assertion.
resolveUnderRootFollowingSymlinks(root, 'under-root.txt');
});
test('rejects a symlink-to-symlink chain whose final target is outside', () async {
final outside = await Directory.systemTemp.createTemp('clide_t102_chain_');
addTearDown(() async {
if (await outside.exists()) await outside.delete(recursive: true);
});
final secret = File('${outside.path}/secret.txt')..writeAsStringSync('payload');
// a -> b (under root) -> /outside/secret.txt
Link('${root.path}/b').createSync(secret.path);
Link('${root.path}/a').createSync('${root.path}/b');
expect(
() => resolveUnderRootFollowingSymlinks(root, 'a'),
throwsA(isA<PathOutsideRoot>()),
);
});
});
}