The three worst-covered files were genuinely untested, not edge cases:
os.dart 27%→~85% (inject the process runner so openURL/reveal don't spawn a
real browser), clide_code_block 39%→~90% (expose the byte→char span mapper
as a top-level fn + render tests), deeplink 29%→~75% (the confirm-opens and
not-activated paths). Buys buffer above the 95% floor so a feature batch
doesn't immediately trip the gate. 95.01% → 95.22%.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A clide:// link is an untrusted external vector (any webpage can fire one), so it
no longer translates to a command in parseArgv. It routes the raw URL to a new
builtin.deeplink handler that is doubly defensive: a default-deny allowlist
(kDeepLinkSafeActions — only the read-only 'open' verb; run/git/write/passthrough
rejected) AND a mandatory 'an external link wants to: … allow?' confirmation
before anything runs. Records the security boundary as D-90.
The earlier silent editor.open passthrough is replaced; open still works, now
behind the prompt. Tests cover the allowlist (the boundary) + the gating.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
jpmschweitzerandClaude Opus 4.8