fix untrusted-workspace RCE in dugite git resolution (T-98)
Drop the workspaceRoot parameter from resolveToolchainPaths / Toolchain.resolvePaths entirely. The old code resolved \`<workspaceRoot>/native/dugite/bin/git\` as the git binary before falling back to PATH — a malicious repo could commit an executable at that path and clide would run it on the first auto-fired git.status (which fires automatically on workspace open). Dugite now resolves against trusted locations only: 1. CLIDE_DUGITE_DIR env var (dev override). 2. <exe-parent>/dugite/bin/git (production bundle). 3. <exe-parent>/lib/dugite/bin/git (alternate bundle layout). Test plants `native/dugite/bin/git` in a temp workspace and asserts the resolved git path is NOT inside the workspace. Callers updated (8 sites): main.dart, backend_entry.dart twice, test_app.dart three times (compute now wraps a no-arg call), plus five test fixtures. backend.dart's now-vestigial hintRoot left in the struct for cleanup under T-99. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -1707,3 +1707,5 @@ Why not always? Lock state at fork() time is timing-dependent. ~95% of the time
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- glibc posix_spawn docs: https://www.gnu.org/software/libc/manual/html_node/Process-Creation-Example.html
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', NULL, '2026-05-17 18:05:33', '2026-05-17 18:05:33', '2026-05-17 18:05:33', NULL, '56d9ba7c49068a498a003e900cde416f', 1) ON CONFLICT(hash) DO NOTHING;
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INSERT INTO ticket_history (ticket_id, field, old_value, new_value, changed_by, changed_at, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('T-96', 'status', 'backlog', 'done', NULL, '2026-05-17 18:11:18', '2026-05-17 18:11:18', '2026-05-17 18:11:18', NULL, '3215fc763c4f1dce75ea9e0bb2b9bbb6', 1) ON CONFLICT(hash) DO NOTHING;
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INSERT INTO ticket_history (ticket_id, field, old_value, new_value, changed_by, changed_at, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('T-98', 'status', 'backlog', 'in_progress', NULL, '2026-05-17 18:51:25', '2026-05-17 18:51:25', '2026-05-17 18:51:25', NULL, '0369c8264ec2c67b3bf3f28057404ec0', 1) ON CONFLICT(hash) DO NOTHING;
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INSERT INTO ticket_history (ticket_id, field, old_value, new_value, changed_by, changed_at, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('T-98', 'status', 'in_progress', 'done', NULL, '2026-05-17 18:55:57', '2026-05-17 18:55:57', '2026-05-17 18:55:57', NULL, 'cb0ae539d5665bd9720b327d60a2cbed', 1) ON CONFLICT(hash) DO NOTHING;
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@@ -1597,3 +1597,13 @@ INSERT INTO tickets (id, type, parent_id, title, description, status, priority,
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4. Surface text-zoom (Ctrl +/-/0) in the palette so it''s discoverable.
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Source: consultants.md "UX — Findings — [Minor]" + Strengths section.', 'backlog', 'low', NULL, NULL, NULL, '2026-05-17 18:48:28', '2026-05-17 18:48:28', NULL, 'e749bba718321bcc202cc51c55a59ee4', 1) ON CONFLICT(id) DO UPDATE SET type=excluded.type, parent_id=excluded.parent_id, title=excluded.title, description=excluded.description, status=excluded.status, priority=excluded.priority, assigned_to=excluded.assigned_to, team=excluded.team, decision_ref=excluded.decision_ref, updated_at=excluded.updated_at, deleted_at=excluded.deleted_at, hash=excluded.hash, canonical_version=excluded.canonical_version WHERE excluded.updated_at > tickets.updated_at OR (excluded.updated_at = tickets.updated_at AND excluded.hash > tickets.hash);
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INSERT INTO tickets (id, type, parent_id, title, description, status, priority, assigned_to, team, decision_ref, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, hash, canonical_version) VALUES ('T-98', 'bug', 'T-97', 'fix untrusted-workspace RCE in dugite git resolution', '`toolchain_paths.dart:79` builds `''$workspaceRoot/native/dugite/bin''` and runs `_firstExisting([''$dugite/git''])` — if that file exists in the open workspace it becomes the git binary for all GitClient calls, before falling back to PATH. A malicious repo commits an executable at `native/dugite/bin/git`; clide runs it on the first auto-fired `git.status`. Arbitrary code execution from merely opening a repo.
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**Fix:** resolve `native/dugite` against `Platform.resolvedExecutable`''s directory (or a known install root), never `workspaceRoot`.
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**Acceptance:**
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1. Toolchain resolution does not look at any workspace path.
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2. Test that a planted `native/dugite/bin/git` in the temp-dir workspace is ignored.
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3. Existing dugite-in-install-dir behavior preserved.
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Source: consultants.md "Security — Findings — [Critical]".', 'done', 'critical', NULL, NULL, NULL, '2026-05-17 18:47:13', '2026-05-17 18:55:57', NULL, '40e1ed24c3cce28e2420150f1fac8fbd', 1) ON CONFLICT(id) DO UPDATE SET type=excluded.type, parent_id=excluded.parent_id, title=excluded.title, description=excluded.description, status=excluded.status, priority=excluded.priority, assigned_to=excluded.assigned_to, team=excluded.team, decision_ref=excluded.decision_ref, updated_at=excluded.updated_at, deleted_at=excluded.deleted_at, hash=excluded.hash, canonical_version=excluded.canonical_version WHERE excluded.updated_at > tickets.updated_at OR (excluded.updated_at = tickets.updated_at AND excluded.hash > tickets.hash);
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